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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyses the fabled public exchange of letters that occurred between 
political theorist Hannah Arendt and historian of Jewish religion Gershom Scholem in 
1964 following the historic trial of Adolf Eichmann and Arendt's subsequent 
publication of her report of the event, Eichmann in Jerusalem. The thesis covers the 
historical issues that form the contextual background to the exchange. It involves the 
introduction of the two participants as defining Jewish intellectuals of the past 
century, the course of the trial itself and the political and ideological problems it 
entailed as well as the turbulent history of the reception of Arendt's book. It is down 
to these four factors that guaranteed the eminence of the exchange of letters analysed 
in the thesis. Oft-quoted as the exchange is, there has been no proper analysis of it to 
this date. To accomplish this task, the thesis adopts the theoretical-methodological 
framework of discourse analysis in general, and the version of rhetorically oriented 
discursive psychology, proposed mainly in the publications of Potter and Wetherell 
(1987) and Billig (1996}, in particular. This approach allows the thesis to provide a 
fine-grained analysis of the various ways of textual construction. Firstly, the ways 
examined concern the significance, worth and value of the debate itself, as formulated 
by both of the participants. Secondly, they involve the construction of the attempt to 
establish definite versions of the content of the book. Thirdly, they cover the textual 
acts of accounting for that content, or the practice of misinterpretation of that content, 
respectively. What all these three aspects have in common is the positioning of the 
problems touched upon in a moral and political context, and ultimately approaching 
them in terms of the identities of the participants. In this sense, versions of the events 
and ways of accounting for it will not only aim at producing accurate descriptions of 
events but in the forms of an implied morality or politics an implied "action-plan" for 
the future as well. The construction of Arendt and Scholem is, hence, analysed in 
terms of its argumentative organisation in order to undermine the other's counter-
version and to establish its own as the definite one. While, structurally, there are many 
similarities in the two letters, what distinguishes them is that they conceive of their 
objects (i.e. the text), subject positions, and political or moral values according to 
which they should be assessed in quite diametrically opposite ways. This thesis not 
only registers the various rhetorical ways the participants fashion their versions as 
definite ones, but also accounts for the differences in their contents. 
Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Gershom Scholem, Eichmann Trial, Jewish identity, 
discourse analysis, discursive psychology, rhetoric 
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1. Introduction 
The main part of this thesis is the analysis of a text. An often quoted yet, by and 
large, substantially neglected text: the public exchange of letters between the American-
German-Jewish (in alphabetical order) political theorist Hannah Arendt and the Israeli-
Jewish (of German origin) historian of Jewish religion, Gershom Scholem in 1964.1 The 
exchange took place in the aftermath of the historic trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem 
and followed the much-debated publication of Arendt's coverage of the event, Eichmann 
in Jerusalem. 
In analysing the text, there will be three aspects- of both Scholem's and Arendt's 
letter- I mostly concentrate on. The first concerns the very importance and significance 
of the exchange, as the participants construe it. Why did this happen? Why is it 
important? What might be the long-term significance of conducting this exchange? 
Second, what is its object? What is the status of Arendt's text, as Scholem displays his 
understanding in his letter; and what that of Scholem's intetpretation, as Arendt counters 
it? What, then, is in the book and, correspondingly, in the intetpretation of the book? 
These questions involve, naturally, on one level a construction of the event in question, 
and a persuasive one at that. In line with discourse analysis it is understood that these 
versions constantly orientate towards other challenging alternative versions on the same 
topic and establish themselves as superior representations to those other (potential or 
concrete) possibilities. Yet, another level or layer of the problem will be confronted in the 
thesis: the assumptions, which undetpin those constructed versions. The question, then, is 
1 The exchange originally took place in private (Scholem's letter is dated as of 23 June, 1963 while 
Arendt's 2() July, 1963. See Scholem, 1991: 95-105), though already with the explicit aim of publication. 
Subsequently, the exchange was first published in Mitteilungsblatt, no. 33 (16 August, 1963) and reprinted 
then in Neue Zurcher Zeitung (20 October, 1963) and in Encounter (January, 1964). My analysis is based 
on the (English) Encounter-version (see the Appendix), while consulting the German original, where 
deemed to be required. (For further information of the history of publication, see fu. 40). 
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not merely what that version presented is and how it is presented as a persuasive version, 
but what are the unsaid but basic and necessary assumptions that are manifested within 
and through them. 
There is, however, a third concern to address, having analysed the first two. Who, 
namely, is the person that produced the book Eichmann in Jentsalem and who is the one 
r that produced this interpretation of it? What are the moral and political qualities that 
underpin Arendt's or Scholem's textual practices and those basic assumptions recovered? 
This issue, which both of the letters show an inclination to address, brings into the thesis 
a move from the text and even from the "depth" of the text and its basic assumptions to 
the person that produced it as well as her/his place in the world. 
Hence, what the exchange in my analysis will ultimately revolve around and what 
the utterances examined in this thesis will be taken to point to are the questions of 
identity, politics, and morality. Likewise, my ultimate concern will be to investigate the 
political and moral conditions that make the utterances in the exchange accountable and 
meaningful, and to understand it as both direct and indirect answers to the current Jewish 
condition. 
Analysing these aspects of a text, one can take several routes and I do not believe 
that any one of them is intrinsically superior. My way of analysing is dependent on the 
purpose I had in mind while working with the exchange, namely, of tracing back the 
rhetorical presuppositions of the utterances and to uncover thereby the conditions that 
account for their existence. There is nothing unique in this enterprise: reading will always 
inevitably involve the question of what a text really means. In my understanding, "really" 
is a metaphor of the reader's activity- patience, awareness and, let us face it, love. As the 
last of this three-part list is to be a central issue of the thesis, it is perhaps necessary to 
quote here an explication of that concept: 
"So it is with the word of the Torah, which reveals herself only to those 
who love her. [ ... ] he understands that to those words [of the Torah] 
indeed nothing may be added and nothing taken away. And then for the 
first time he understands the true meaning of the words of the Torah, as 
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they stand there, those words to which not a syllable or a letter may be 
added and from which none may be taken away. And therefore men 
should take care to pursue the Torah (that is, study it with great 
precision f, in order to become her lovers as has been related" (Zohar, II, 
99a-b, quoted in Scholem, 1965: 55-56). 
"That is, study it with great precision", as the learned commentator elucidates this 
tale of love and interpretation. Love here is not blind and is not at all in the eye of the 
beholder. It is, furthermore, not the result of some kind of sudden outburst. Love, on the 
contrary, countenances on every single detail and realises how and why they should 
exactly be that way. Revelation is not a state of being but a state of eternal procedure. 
To be sure, such an attitude is an old-fashioned one. Is it, however, politically 
conservative as well? I do not think that it should necessarily be so. Love here is the 
precise opposite of being uncritical. Nothing is taken-for-granted; nothing is taken-for-
natural. It is the basis of any given status quo that. may be investigated and such an 
investigation may both precipitate the evaluation of that status quo as well as provide one 
with the means to get rid of it. Love and subversion are therefore taken here to be 
potential bedfellows, if unlikely ones. What they should convey together by the end of 
this thesis is, on the one hand, how those categories usually voiced with regard to this 
exchange (or elsewhere) are more productively understood if considered actually 
occasioned and constructed in the exchange; and what the basic assumptions of these 
constructions and categories are, on the other. The whole of Jewish history might not 
merely surround this exchange. It might not simply bear its mark on it. Rather, it might 
be found in these very letters to be analysed, as being constructed and occasioned. 
In Chapter 2, I will start with the description of the historical background 
information that contextualises the exchange. The chapter will begin with Hannah 
Arendt, her life and scholarly achievement - from, as it were, a Jewish perspective. As 
the narration of a story, however short, involves by definition selecting certain aspects 
and neglecting others, there is no shame in acknowledging this perspective. Taking into 
2 This is Ge:rshom Scholem's insertion. 
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account that this dissertation concentrates on the construction of Jewish identity and 
one's relation as a Jew to one's past as well as one's community, this choice might even 
look self-evident. Approaching Arendt, the person, the political theorist, the essayist, and 
the philosopher, primarily as a Jewish person has recently become characteristic of the 
ever-growing literature on her (c£ Barnouw, 1990; Bemstein, 1996; Parvikko, 1996; 
Ring, 1997) and I will draw upon these monographs. I follow up the sketch of Arendt's 
life with a similar piece on Scholem. In his case, certainly, the problem is not to justify a 
narration "from a Jewish perspective". Hardly any other would seem reasonable and, as 
far as I know, virtually no work written on him ignored the Jewish aspects of his life or 
work. The special perspective here, rather, is the parallel existence of the meticulous, 
objectivist scholar and the Zionist "ideologue" of Jewish history and identity. Or even, 
complicating things even further, the historian of mysticism and the mystic himself. 
Having introduced the two participants, I will turn to the event itself that 
prompted the exchange to take place. This will involve the description of the trial of 
Adolf Eichmann along with its unique significance and Arendt' s book Eichmann in 
Jernsalem along with the huge public outcry that followed its publication. As in the cases 
of the biographical sketches, I will not have the time to dwell on either of these issues for 
too long. What will have to suffice - much in the way as I render Arendt and Scholem -
is that I try to indicate certain problems and angles from which the meaning and 
importance of these events might be gauged. 
In Chapter 3, I will present my methodological and theoretical considerations. 
The chapter will begin with a very brief review of the history of the reception of the 
exchange, where I will try to indicate the huge disparity existing between the eminence 
the exchange has been accorded with, the amount of work having referred to it on one 
hand, and the dearth of any kind of substantive analysis devoted to it on the other. I will 
first briefly introduce discourse analysis and then three typical subcategories of it: 
bottom-up conversation analysis, top-down critical discourse analysis, and discursive 
psychology. The theoretical-methodological approach I will endorse thereafter ("middle-
of-the-road" discursive psychology) is no automatic remedy for the identified 
shortcomings of the reception of the exchange (there is no methodological remedy for 
misquotations and intellectual carelessness). Nevertheless, it will be introduced as an 
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approach that pays enormous attention to textual details (something commentators on the 
exchange never really did) yet does not shy away from a potentially big picture emerging 
from them (something certain strands of empirical approaches to discourse do). 
In Chapter 4, I will begin the analysis of the exchange. The first (two) of four 
analytical chapters will be entirely on Gershom Scholem's letter. What I will investigate 
in this chapter is how he establishes a definite version of the content of Arendt's book, 
what this content is constructed to be and what kinds of assumptions are constructed to 
underpin that content. As I will try to show, Scholem is at pains to establish Arendt's 
"historical judgment" as a pervasively and strikingly anti-Semitic one and deriving from 
an equally immoral act of judgment. That act is presented as parasitic upon (indeed, 
quasi-synonymous with) Arendt's rejecting the moral authority of the "dead" - an 
idiosyncratic concept covering those who "were there" - in evaluating and morally 
judging those very conditions and acts taking place during the Holocaust. The upshot 
being, hence, that Arendt's content of judgment ultimately could not but be immoral: the 
moment of judgment equals the moment of immorality. 
However, if Arendt's book is reconstructed to be an effectively anti-Semitic text 
and one that derives as such from the very act of producing it in disregarding the sole 
moral authority of the "dead", the normative question arises: how could she do it? 
Scholem's practice of accounting for this state of affairs will be the topic of Chapter 5. 
The answer is a move, as it were, beyond the text and beyond even the basic assumptions 
recovered in the act of producing it. That is, it involves the personality of the author as 
Scholem invokes two moralities in this chapter. One that accounts for his morally just 
approach and another that explains Arendt's failure. My analysis will attempt to uncover 
the morality Scholem constructs and his efforts to position Arendt with regard to it. What 
stands for this morality in Scholem's letter is the notion of Ahabath Israel, or in his 
translation, "the love of the Jewish people". I will analyse how this concept and the 
morality it represents are constructed in the text, how they are assimilated to a different 
language and culture, while their uniqueness is constantly shown to be retained. The 
morality (that would honour the moral authority of the "dead") Ahabath Israel expresses 
will be understood as a broadly (as well as vaguely) Jewish one, that requires one (once 
perceived as a Jew) to act in a broadly-vaguely Jewish way but shunning from any kind 
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of definition of what it might exactly be. Furthennore, as will be argued, Scholem's 
construction does not simply involve a morality. There is the existence of many billions 
of morally just people that naturally do not and should not care a bit about Ahabath 
Israel. Hence, the rejection of this morality in the rejection of Ahabath Israel will be 
analysed not merely as a moral choice but one that ultimately indicates the quasi-
pathology of Jewish self-hatred. That is, as a natural subject of that morality (i.e. a Jew) 
rejects it, this state of affairs indicates that he or she is a Jewish anti-Semite. This displays 
the striking conclusion and implication of Scholem's letter: Eichmann in Jerusalem is an 
anti-Semitic book, originating from a self-hating author, the account (either as a cause or 
as a consequence) for this being Arendt's rejection of Ahabath Israel. 
In Chapter 6, I will start analysing Hannah Arendt's answer, her textual moves 
mirroring those of Scholem. I will scrutinise her response to Scholem's highly damaging 
construction of her own book. This, first, will result in Arendt constructing a substantially 
different version of his book's content. Second, however, Arendt's reconstruction of her 
book will involve an orientation towards Scholem's letter as well, as a profoundly and 
astonishingly failed interpretation. Hence, the issue will implicitly be shifted from 
Arendt's significant and striking moral failure to that of the intellectual insignificance of 
the debate and, then, to the significance of this very insignificance. Arendt will not only 
defend herself against accusations but will redirect those accusations to Scholem. 
Likewise, his construction of the content of Arendt's book will not only turn to be 
incorrect in a factual sense, but immoral. Claiming though to talk in the name of "the 
Jews", Scholem's interpretation will turn out to be serving in fact only the interests of the 
"Jewish functionaries" at the expense of the masses, the "simple Jews". 
Again, paralleling the analysis of Scholem's text, in Chapter 7 I will look at how 
Arendt moves beyond the text, beyond its morally dubious assumptions, and what she 
"explores" there (and makes us "see"). What is the morality or ideology that 
accomplishes such a striking "misunderstanding" and such a scheming innuendo? What 
is the source from where these untenable insinuations are leaking? The subject position 
that is to account for Scholem's machinations will be that of the right-wing, religious 
Zionist who (ab )uses religious concepts and symbols in the public-political realm and 
who invokes the idea of collective unity in order to stifle dissent. An effectively 
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totalitarian ideology will therefore be reconstructed by Arendt, her answer amounting not 
to the opposition "cold brain" and rationality to Scholem's invoked "love of the Jewish 
people", but exposing the destructive hypocrisy covered up in and by his rhetoric. 
Reflexively, albeit Arendt does not explicitly depict herself as the patriot, the saviour of 
the "real" interests of the Jewish people, she does imply that it is her position as the 
dissenter without which no kind of patriotism and no kind of democratic institution is 
possible. 
In Chapter 8, I will present my conclusion. This will involve still more questions, 
rather than answers, however. Namely, one must be puzzled by these two, diametrically 
opposed constructions, which are completely excluding each other. Which of them are we 
to believe? Is Arendt a Jewish anti-Semite and Scholem the representative of a legitimate 
and just Jewish morality, honouring the moral authority of our "dead"? Or is it that this 
"honouring" is nothing but the masking of certain vexed interests of groups within the 
Jews? And that the solemn morality that Scholem mobilises in the defence of the moral 
authority of the "dead" is, in fact, a right-wing, religious Zionist cover-up for choking 
dissenting voices, as Arendt turns out to be the real example, the real patriot? My 
conclusion will point out how we may attempt to answer these questions and that this 
attempt must start from insisting on both of our participants being reasonable and morally 
just people. This does not mean that we cannot choose between their versions. It only 
means that such a decision must not involve the construction of the other as pathological 
or thoroughly immoral; even if the outcome of our decision should be that s!he, indeed, 
IS. 
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2. Historical Background: Two Unique Intellectuals on a 
Unique Historical Scene 
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present the historical context that forms the 
background to the public exchange of letters between Hannah Arendt and Gershom 
Scholem. The first section will introduce the two protagonists and the second the 
historical scene from the capture and trial of Adolf Eichmann to Arendt's book Eichmann 
in Jerusalem and its tumultuous public reception. 
Most certainly, there can be no pretension here to attempt to provide definite 
images of these issues: not only from a theoretical point of view, which would deny any 
story's capability of "mapping" the reality it purports to represent (see White, 1978, 
1987), as the restrictions that this chapter must face seem to be more of a practical kind. 
Namely, four huge topics (i.e. Arendt; Scholem; the trial of Adolf Eichmann; Eichmann 
in Jerusalem and its reception) with far too many layers should be cramped into one mere 
chapter. This should be done, moreover, without the prospect of expounding them in 
depth later on in the dissertation. While the analysis of the exchange might resonate on 
certain points raised here, it is intended to be of independent worth and not primarily to 
elucidate most of the issues touched upon in this historical introduction. What, then, are 
we to do with such complex and far-reaching topics? 
The choice I made is to acknowledge this complexity instead of trying to get 
round of it. While I cannot properly cover these four topics in one chapter, I will indicate 
aspects of them that can be perceived to have relevance to the exchange itself. Again, it is 
all but impossible to dwell on these aspects exhaustively. Yet, my aim will be to 
emphasise certain points, certain issues of interest within these vast topics. 
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Thus, the central perspective through which political theorist Hannah Arendt is to 
be introduced will be her identity as a Jew, her identification with the Jewish people and 
the ways her works reflect these "nodal points". These issues touch on her experience as 
a Jewish refugee before and during World War II. 
In historian Gershom Scholem's case, the central point that governs my 
introduction is his identity as a scholar and that of a Zionist. This problem is apparently 
more enigmatic than Arendt's life and work, as Scholem's scholarly output far outweighs 
that of the essayist or the public intellectual. Furthermore, as far as Scholem was 
concerned, there was always a careful and distinct line drawn between the two. 
Nevertheless, many scholars (pro or contra) pondered the permeability of this boundary. 
In this part of the chapter, I will attempt to follow their lead and consider Scholem - the 
historian and the public intellectual - not as two isolated persons but two aspects of the 
same phenomenon; hence interpreting, and shedding mutual light on each other. 
The second section will cover the historical event of Adolf Eichmann's capture in 
Argentina and trial in Jerusalem, with their significance to Israeli and American (Jewish) 
collective memory regarding Jewish identity and the Holocaust. In line with this, I will 
briefly sketch out some legal problems involved in the trial, problems whose importance 
appear to move far beyond the boundary of the legal and intrude into the realm of the 
political and ideological. It is some of these aspects and problems that were taken up in 
Arendt's controversial book Eichmann in Jernsalem, the book that helped to imprint the 
trial into the public mind more than anything else. The last part of this chapter will 
elaborate on the infamous reception of the book and present various accounts of this. 
Again, I acknowledge that I shall not be able to come closer to explain the furore in 
depth. However, I will finish this chapter by arguing that for such an explanation to take 
place, one must treat the participants of the debate as reasonable human beings and their 
utterances as having some reasonable sense and concerns instead of being mere lies, 
simple misunderstandings, or instances of immorality. It is this approach that I shall be 
taking during my analysis of the exchange as well. 
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2.2. The People 
2.2.1. Hannah Arendt, political theorist 
"I so explicitly stress my membership in the group of Jews expelled 
from Germany [ ... ] because I wish to anticipate certain 
misunderstandings which can arise only too easily when one speaks of 
humanity. In this connection I cannot gloss over the fact that for many 
years I considered the only adequate reply to the question, who are you? 
to be: A Jew. That answer alone took into account the reality of 
persecution. As for the statement with which Nathan the Wise (in effect, 
though not in actual wording) countered the command: 'Step closer, 
Jew' - the statement: I am a man - I would have considered as nothing 
but a grotesque and dangerous evasion of reality" (Arendt, 1968, 17-18). 
With these words, akin to which she uttered many times during her life (cf. 
Arendt, 1979: 334; Arendt, 1994b: 12; 2007: 164), German-Jewish political theorist 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) appeared to be unequivocal in her stance towards humanity 
and the Jewish community. She clearly seemed to question the possibility of the sort of 
guarantee that the ideas of Enlightenment could offer for human and citizen rights. She 
clearly seemed thereby to discard the (traditionally) noble notion of the enlightenment 
liberalism and assimilation: To the Jews "as individuals [ ... ] everything" but "as a nation 
- nothing", as Comte de Clermont-Tonnere at the French National Assembly in 1789 
uttered representing the Gentile side. 3 "Over and above everything else, I am a human 
being; it is only second to that [ ... ] that I am a Gem1an and then a Jew" (Geiger, 1962: 
71 ), as expressed by the great Jewish spokesperson for the enlightenment, liberalism and 
emancipation, Abraham Geiger. 4 
3 Quoted in Hazony (2000: 88). 
4 Cf. the French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut's comments on similar sentiments voiced by Moses 
Mende!sohn (Finkielkraut, 1994: 57-80, esp. 59-60). 
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In contrast to these, the utterance of Arendt quoted above is informed by her 
dichotomy of the conscious pariah and the parvenu, and the never realised program of 
what "the emancipation of the Jews[ ... ] should have been- an admission of Jews as Jews 
to the ranks of humanity, rather than a permit to ape the gentiles [ ... ]" (Arendt, 1978a: 68 
- emphasis in the original). 
Yet, as it appears, these very words have always sounded rather troubling from 
someone who appeared to fit rather comfortably Isaac Deutscher's non-Jewish Jew (cf. 
Deutscher, 1968). One, who spoke neither Hebrew nor Yiddish, whose knowledge of the 
Jewish tradition was scarce, who did not usually attend the synagogue, and whose 
relationship with Israel was described as "anti-Zionist"5, allegedly bordering even on the 
phenomenon of "self-hatred".6 Little wonder, then, that those quoted words appeared to 
be inconsistent with Arendt, both the person and the thinker. Thus, Judith Shklar fumed 
in a not quite favourable 1983 article: "By East European and even American standards 
Arendt was, of course, completely assimilated, a view she always found 
incomprehensible. That was because she clung to the bizarre notion that being Jewish 
was an act of personal defiance and not a matter of actively maintaining a cultural and 
religious tradition with its own rights and patterns of speech" (Shklar, 1983: 65). 
Yet, it is also of significance that in a still considerably heated reception, which 
appears to be quite polarising at times with apologetics and attacks rather than analysis 
and commentary, Shklar's remarks are also echoed (in substance, not in style) in writings 
otherwise sympathetic towards their object of study. Thus, Richard Bernstein in his 
altogether much more synoptic monograph poses the essentially similar rhetorical 
question: 
"The crucial question- and Arendt's blind spot- is the relation between 
Judaism and Jewishness. What does it mean to be a Jew if one insists on 
a sharp distinction between Judaism and Jewishness? For all Arendt's 
5 Biographical details regarding Arendt's life are all taken from Elisabeth Young-Bruehl's monograph, 
unless otherwise indicated (see Young-Bruehl, 2004). 
6 See Halpem (1948), Scholem (2002: 330-333). Cf. Young-Bruehl (2004: 223, 230). The notion of 
Arendt's self-hatred is implied, amongst others, by Diner (1997) and Wolin (1996: 21-22,2001: Ch. 3; 
etc.). 
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insistence on affirming herself as a Jew, and her conviction that one can 
truly resist and rebel as a Jew, the question that must be asked is: What 
precisely is being affirmed in asserting one's identity as Jewish?" 
(Bemstein, 1996: 184, 186; cf. Lang, 1994: 44) 
One wonders whether anyone in history has managed to answer these questions 
posed by Bemstein. But the harmony of these two otherwise radically divergent critics' 
points nevertheless to something important in Arendt's programmatic utterance. The 
problem is, on the one hand, what one answers to someone whose question is not hostile 
and threatening to one's existence. That is, the chance and form of this avowedly political 
attitude in constructive, creative as opposed to simply defensive contexts7, and the 
question,· on the other hand, of culture's, history's and tradition's place in Arendt's 
conception of the political and the social, the pariah and the parvenu. 
Yet, even if there really is a "blind spot", a paradox, or something 
incomprehensive in Arendt's stance in these matters, one can assert with certainty that the 
flesh-and-blood Hannah Arendt surely lived by this paradox. 
Born in Hannover in 1906 into an assimilated, secular middle-class Jewish family 
(Arendt's grandparents were reform Jews but her parents, Paul and Martha, are better 
characterised as committed to the then illegal Socialist party than by their Jewish 
affiliation}, she spent her childhood in Kiinigsberg - an East-Prussian town whose most 
illustrious child and philosopher was, symbolically, Immanuel Kant - and Berlin. Her 
higher education with a major in philosophy and minors in Greek and theology took place 
at the universities of Marburg, Freiburg, and finally Heidelberg. She studied, amongst 
others, with Martin Heidegger (with whom she had a love affair}, Edmund Husserl, and 
Rudolph Bultmann and completed her dissertation under the tutelage of Karl Jaspers 
(with whom she formed a lifelong friendship) on the concept oflove in the writings of St. 
7 Cf. "When my parochialism is threatened, then I am wholly, radically parochial: a Serb, a Pole, a Jew (a 
black, a woman, a homosexual), and nothing else. But this is an artificial situation in the modem world 
(and perhaps in the past too)" (Walzer, 1994: 82). 
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Augustine. It was, thus, the typical way of the traditional German Bildung, with hardly 
any conspicuous Jewish traces in it. 
Yet, in 1926, Arendt attended a lecture given by Kurt Blwnenfeld, former 
secretary general of the World Zionist Organization and at the time the most influential 
spokesperson of Zionism in Germany. Although both Arendt8 and her biographer9 appear 
to be at pains to downplay the significance of the occasion with hindsight, it must be 
pointed out that she continued to retain an ever-intensifying eye on Zionist issues 
afterwards. From then on, she maintained a good relationship with not only Blumenfeld 
but also other notable Zionists such as Robert Weltsch (editor of the German-Zionist 
organ Jiidische Rundschau), Siegfried Moses (leader of the German Zionist 
Organization), and Salman Schocken (publisher of Shocken books) amongst others. 
Furthermore, she made up her mind already by 1930 to concentrate on the project of 
writing a book on Rahel Varnhagen (the German-Jewish epitome of the age of the 
Enlightenment) of which the bulk had been finished by the time she left Berlin in 1933. 
As can be attested by their correspondence (which lasted till 1963 when Blumenfeld 
passed away), Arendt found Blwnenfeld's notion of ''post-assimilatory Zionism" (which 
acknowledged and even made virtue of the yawning gap between traditional Judaism and 
the current status, knowledge and aspiration of much of contemporary German Jewry) 
attractive. It is not by chance, then, that Blwnenfeld's two, rightly famous adages were 
bequeathed to posterity, incidentally, by Arendt herself: "I'm a Zionist by the grace of 
Goethe" and "Zionism is Germany's gift to the Jews" (Arendt and Jaspers, 1992: 198; cf. 
El on, 2002: 291 ). 
It is certainly all but impossible to decide whether Arendt's historical, political 
and "Jewish" awakening occurred steadily or, as she much later recalled, it was the 
burning of the Reichstag that "turned her political" (Arendt, 1994b: 4-5; cf. Power, 2004: 
34). What is for sure, however, is that from 1933 the exemplary end-product of the 
traditional German Bildung worked exclusively with various Jewish organisations, 
8 
"I was not a Zionist. Nor did the Zionists try to convert me" (Arendt, 1994b: 5). 
9 
"Arendt found herself in the audience [ ... ] not from any interest in Zionism. [ ... ] The lecture did not 
convert Hannah Arendt to Zionism, but it did convert her to Kurt Blumenfeld" (Young-Bruehl, 2004: 71). 
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addressed Jewish topics and published in Jewish periodicals and weeklies for almost the 
next twenty years. 
In 1933, with the Nazis already in government, she was approached by 
Blumenfeld to collect anti-Semitic material for the Zionist Organisation for presentation 
on an international conference. Arendt was not a member of the organisation but it was 
exactly her status of being an outsider that made her suitable for this kind of work. The 
risk was personal and did not threaten the organisation as such. "I said, 'Of course.' I was 
very happy. First of all, it seemed a very intelligent idea to me, and second, it gave me the 
feeling that something could be done after all", as she later described her prompt 
acceptance of the task (Arendt, 1994b: 5). Her activity, however, was rather short-lived 
as she was duly arrested and spent the subsequent eight days in custody. Being free again 
(thanks to a "charming fellow" [Ibid: 6] just promoted from the criminal police to the 
political section, hence being ill-versed in the party line), she left Berlin and escaped with 
her mother but without papers to Paris. 
"[ ... ]belonging to Judaism had become my own problem, and my own problem 
was political. Purely political! I wanted to go into practical work, exclusively and only 
Jewish work. With this in mind I then looked for work in France" (Ibid: 12).10 Indeed, 
she did work for various Zionist organizations until she left France in 1940. First, she was 
a secretary of Agriculture at Artisanat and then, from 1935 to 1938 director of the Paris 
branch of Youth Aliyah. Both organisations prepared adolescent or even younger would-
be immigrants for life in Palestine. Having seen the removal of the Youth Aliyah 
headquarters to London, she continued work from late 1938 with the Jewish Agency, 
where she assisted various sorts of Jewish refugees in Paris. Besides this "practical" 
work, she finished her book on Rahe1 V arnhagen and maintained her interest in Zionist 
affairs, earning a certain Gershom Scholem's approving remark: "an excellent 
[ausgezeichnete] Zionist" (Scholem, 1994: 285).u The outbreak of the war, however, 
10 I think the use of"political" in this utterance is rather different from the way Arendt usually uses it in her 
political writings. In her conception, ideally, ''practical" and "political" hardly ever go together, for the 
former as a "specifically human achievement lies altogether outside the category of means and ends.[ ... ] 
there is nothing higher to attain than this actuality itself' (Arend~ 1998: 207; cf. Arend~ 1990, 1993b; 
Canovan, 1992, 1994; Habermas, 1994). 
11 Rahel Varnhagen- The Life of a Jewess was finally published in 1957 by the Leo Baeck Institute. Ye~ 
the book "was neither marketed well, nor distributed widely in the United States", causing dissatisfaction to 
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turned her status into an "enemy alien", which meant that she was deported to the Ours 
concentration camp and was thus forced to emigrate again in 1940-41, now for the last 
time, to the United States. 
This, however, did not mean that Arendt's Zionist and Jewish involvements 
terminated. She earned her first full-time salary in America as research director of the 
Commission on European Jewish Cultural Reconstruction (of the Conference on Jewish 
Relations); an organisation that was established to recover any kind of books of Jewish 
interest surviving the war years. Then, in 1948 she became executive director of the 
Jewish Cultural Reconstruction (retaining this position until 1952), and in 1950 senior 
editor of Shocken Books. It was in the United States, however, that besides practical 
work Arendt also got involved in different sorts of Jewish and Zionist political issues, 
giving form to this involvement in a series of publications. From October 1941 to April 
1945, she regularly contributed to the German language Jewish weekly, Aujbau (see 
Arendt, 2007: 134-240) and also wrote occasional pieces for various other Jewish 
journals (i.e. Menorah Journal, Jewish Frontier, Commentary, Jewish Social Studies; cf. 
Arendt, 2007: 241-461). 
It was one of her essays - To Save the Jewish Homeland: There Is Still Time 
(1948)- in Commentary that caught the attention of Judah Leon Magnes. Magnes was 
the erstwhile Chancellor (1925-1935) and then the President (1935-1948) of the Hebrew 
University, as well as the leader of the Palestine group Ichud (Unity). The group included 
notables such as Martin Buber, Emst Simon and Hans Kohn amongst its members 
(Hazony, 2000: 157-265; Young-Bruehl, 2004: 225-227). Magnes approached Arendt to 
join the group and though she never became a formal member and refused to take up the 
proposed post of a chairperson for a political committee representing Ichud, Magnes and 
Arendt nevertheless worked closely for approximately six months in 1948, up to the 
death of the former. To be sure, Ichud was by no means a mainstream organisation as, in 
the age of extremity and polarisation, it based its platform on Jewish-Arab dialogue and 
Arend4 which ultimately amounted to her wanting to turn to another publisher. The book, thus, was 
reissued by Harcouf4 Brace, Jovanovich with some changes (Weissberg, 1997: 42-44). The "First 
Complete Edition" was published by the John Hopkins UP in 1997 (Arend4 1997). 
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the idea of the "Jewish Homeland" in the form of a binational state.12 (Later, following 
actual partition, in that of a federation.) Nevertheless, at a crucial point the organisation 
had its moment, when the chance occurred to submit its proposals to the UN mediator in 
Palestine, Count Folke Bemadotte, in 1948. Frantic work ensued in which Arendt took 
her share. However, his two suggestions having been rejected by both the Palestinians 
and the Israelis, Bemadotte was soon killed by Jewish extremists - members of the 
notorious Stern Gang - in Palestine, and Judah Magnes passed away in October. That 
effectively meant the end of Arendt's actual political involvement with Zionist affairs. 13 
However transitory these years turned out to be in terms of Arendt's active and 
practical involvement, they were not just productive and stormy, but proved later to be 
also highly formative with regard to her development as a political thinker. Evidently, 
these years did not transform the theoretical mind into a political activist hand. Rather, 
they not only resulted in the theoretical crystallisation of both Arendt's conception of 
emancipation and J ewishness or assimilation and Zionism, but also bore a lasting mark 
on her later political thought. 
As noted, her first book-length work in this regard dated back to her last years in 
Germany and the ones in Paris. It was a monograph on the German-Jewish salonneur 
Rahel V arnhagen (born Levin). Her life, Berlin salon, and its visitors epitomised the 
emancipation of the Jews in Germany. The book constituted a straightforward critique of 
the enlightenmentalist notion of emancipation, including what Arendt took to be its 
corollary social process, assimilation (cf. Arendt, 1997: esp. 85-121). Rahel Varnhagen 
was depicted throughout the book as constantly trying to shrug off her Jewishness in 
every possible way: using her (alas, non-existent) beauty, her social status as a salonneur, 
and her marriage -just to realise in the now famous words on her deathbed: "The thing 
which all my life seemed to me the greatest shame, which was the misery and misfortune 
12 To such an extent was Ichud outside the mainstream (in a time when that mainstream proved to be almost 
all-embracing) that the recent right or even extreme-right wing account by Israeli author Yoram Hazony 
(2000) even treats it effectively as an "anti-Zionist" organisation. 
13 For various accounts on Bernadotte's activity see Morris (2001: 235-258) and Pappe (!992: 136-163). 
For Arendt's appreciation ofMagnes and Bernadotte see Arendt (2007a) and (2007b), respectively. 
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of my life- having been born a Jewess- this I should on no account now wish to have 
missed" (Arendt, 1997: 85).14 
What is already manifest in Rahel's two ways of coping is the distinction Arendt 
later constantly drew between the parvenu and the pariah, between, that is, the social 
climbers "using [their] elbows" and the "social outcasts" who "reflect the political status 
of their entire people" (Arendt, 1978a: 90, 68). Not until the 1990s was it customary to 
cast an analytical eye on this distinction (cf. Barnouw, 1990), or to consider it a guide in 
understanding her works in general (Bemstein, 1996; Ring, 1997) and Eichmann in 
Jerusalem in particular (Parvikko, 1996, 1998, 2003). Yet, one thing is important to bear 
in mind and that is the way Arendt fmished her progranunatic essay The Jew as Pariah. 
Categorically denying the present relevance of the distinction between parvenu and 
pariah she stated in 1944 poignantly: "Today[ ... ] the pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are 
in the same boat [ ... ] Both are branded with the same mark; both alike are outcasts". The 
isolation of the pariah, then, is just as senseless and hopeless as "social climbing". The 
only possible answer is, concluded Arendt, political:"[ ... ] only within the framework of a 
people can a man live as a man among men, without exhausting himself. And only when 
a people lives and functions in consort with other peoples can it contribute to the 
establishment upon earth of a community conditioned and commonly controlled 
humanity'' (Arendt, 1978a: 90). This, in 1944, inevitably meant the political position of 
ZionismY 
Arendt's early years in the United States witness these two themes: assimilation 
and the articulation of the position of the "conscious" (i.e. political) pariah with regard to 
Jewish history as well as reflections on current Jewish politics. In other words, they 
witness the analysis of the theoretical foundations of Zionism and the actual criticism of 
its current practices. 
In her shorter pieces (published mainly in Aujbau ), more of inunediate relevance, 
Arendt is passionately and explicitly committed to constantly arguing for the 
14 Cf. El on (1999), however, for a different version as to those words on the deathbed. 
15 Cf. as late as in her The Origins of Totalitarianism, where Arendt describes Zionism as "the only political 
answer Jews have ever found to antisemitism and the only ideology in which they have ever taken seriously 
a hostility that would place them in the center of world events"' (Arend4 1991: 120). 
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establishment of a Jewish army as the beginning of Jewish politics and (what she 
perceived as) against revisionist tendencies within mainstream Zionism. Though she 
never actually identifies herself explicitly with Zionism, there are frequent references to a 
subject position signalled as "we Jews" or ''we Jewish patriots" (cf. Arendt, 2007: 169, 
171, etc ). By contrast, her longer and more reflective pieces on assimilation and Zionism 
betray hardly anything about the personal position of the author, their intellectual density, 
intensity, and engagement notwithstanding. 
What is, however, common in her pieces is the constant emphasis put on the 
desirability of the political orientation. This entails that the solution of the so-called 
Jewish question (which consists both of the response to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism 
and the establishment of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine) means discarding both 
individualist notions inherited from the Enlightenment and organic-collectivist ones from 
German Romanticism. The first thread is more pronounced in Arendt' s writings on 
pariahs and parvenus, where she argues against social assimilation (see Arendt, 1978: 55-
121). The latter, however, is equally clear in her essays addressing directly the problem 
of Zionism (see Arendt, 1978: 125-222). 
In Arendt's words, the "lasting greatness" of Theodor Herzl can be found 
precisely "in his very desire to do something about the Jewish question, his desire to act 
and solve the problem in political terms" (Arendt, 1978d: 166). This clearly marks what 
Arendt finds positive in Herzl's (and Zionism's) approach as opposed to the individualist 
social assimilation of the pariahs. Though she would only present her notions about the 
nation-state and its relationship to minorities and human rights in a fully-fledged form in 
her The Origins of Totalitarianism, the insights upon which the opus magnum will be 
built are already there. Thus, her remark that "The terrible and bloody annihilation of 
individual Jews was preceded by the bloodless destruction of the Jewish people" (Arendt, 
1978b: 109) makes clear what her avowal of the acknowledgment of the people-hood of 
the Jews stands for. Namely, it is not an ethical or a cultural (let alone a psychological) 
idea. What needs to be sorted out is, first and foremost, a political problem, and the 
capacity of the "conscious pariah" lies in his/her being able to act politically by 
identifying with, rather than evading from, his/her people, as well as assuming common 
responsibility with them. 
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At this point, however, Arendt and the mainstream of the Zionist movement 
parted company. As noted, what she perceived was an exclusive and ever increasing 
reliance on the organic and biological conception of Zionist nationalism - an inheritance 
of German romanticism (Arendt, 1978c: 156, 1978d: 172), rather than on a civic one of 
French nature16 -, the flight from political responsibility to the myth of eternal anti-
Semitism (Arendt, 1978c: 141, 147), as well as an excessive use (and abuse) of historical 
and even theological argumentation contradicting the very idea of pursuing common 
interests with the surrounding Arab people (Arendt, 1978f: 199, 222). What Arendt 
perceived at the time were signs of a hidden revisionist takeover, the domination of the 
attitude of a secular "hastening the end" and the self-isolation into one's own circular 
logic (Arendt, 1978f: 200-201)- all of these carrying either an imminently tragic or a 
devastating and deforming long-run effect (Arendt, 1978e: 187). 17 
What is clear even in these writings is that by political Arendt did not understand 
something resembling Aktualpolitik. Rather, she conceived of a relatively pure, 
uncontaminated realm; uncontaminated, that is, by social, economical but apparently 
even by cultural or historical factors. Such a conception chimes well with Arendt's 
conviction- implied though not explicitly theorised in these overtly "Jewish" writings -
about the decline of the nation-state. That is, about the superfluous notion of national 
sovereignty when it came to both protecting minorities (which it inherently appeared 
incapable of) and guaranteeing independence in the state's own affairs (which the 
inevitable imperial spheres of interests made impossible). Hence, Arendt advocated (way 
out of tune with the growing consensus of the contemporary Zionist mainstream) on a 
macro level of the political form of federation, and on the micro one "local self-
government and mixed Jewish-Arab councils, on a small scale and as numerous as 
possible" (Arendt, 1978e: 192). 
Whether these ideas were extremely under-informed and hopefully naive (cf. 
Laqueur, 2001) or remarkably prescient (cf. Zimmermann, 2001) is quite besides the 
16 See Finkielkraut (1995: esp. Ch 1). Cf. Condor (2001), de Cillia et al. (1999). 
17 For a useful critique of these aspects of her approach see Avishai, 2002: 157-159. 
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point here18, my concerns being with the outlay of the conceptual framework of these 
thoughts and the significant marks these considerations of the 1940s bore on later 
writings of Hannah Arendt. This is, most obvious with regard to the "final product" of the 
era, the publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism (which, incidentally, coincided with 
Arendt's obtaining American citizenship) in 1951. Many themes featuring in the earlier, 
manifestly "Jewish" articles constituted the hidden backbone of this book. For example, 
her radically political conception of anti-Semitism, the critique of the abstract notion of 
human rights and the subsequent idea of the "right to have rights" (cf. Birmingham, 
2006), that is, the political formation that may successfully claim the allegedly 
"universal" human rights to its members. As has been recently argued, it was in part the 
Palestine experience that formed Arendt's thinking on the decline of the nation-state (i.e. 
a political formation equalling nation with the state) and the inevitability of a civic polity, 
the only possible de facto guarantee of human rights (cf. Bernstein, 1996: 71-100; Beiner, 
2000). 
The book consists of three major parts: Anti-Semitism, hnperialism, and 
Totalitarianism. It is not a book by a historian, as Arendt associated a certain kind of 
determinism with that discipline. Instead, her idea was to write a book on certain 
concepts that later came to be crystallised in the form of the totalitarian state of the 
twentieth century: Nazi Germany and Communist Soviet Union (cf. Arendt, 1994d: 403). 
The first part of the book delivers a political analysis of the nature of anti-Semitism, as it 
developed from an originally religious idea to an modern racist one at the end of the 
nineteenth century in line with the changing social and political position of the newly 
emancipated Jewish community. Arendt then moves on to analyse imperialism as it 
contravened the novum of that century, the political formation of the nation-states. What 
constitutes imperialism is that it denies those very (actual or desired) borders nationalists 
consider sacrosanct and hence attempts at permanent expansion. It is from there that 
Arendt turns her attention to the totalitarian regimes and scrutinises their internal 
functioning, concluding that it is the elimination of the public sphere, that of action that 
characterises and even constitutes these states, inasmuch as they render their citizens 
18 On Arendt's Zionism in general see Bamouw (1990: 72-134), Bemstein (2001), Eddon (2003), 
Zimmermann (200 I). 
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"superfluous". Hence, she invokes the example of the concentration camps as totalitarian 
micro-worlds, or, the paradigm of the totalitarian state itself. 
From the Origins on, explicit Jewish orientation disappeared even more from 
Arendt's writings. Nevertheless, as already noted above, various scholars have recently 
pointed out that the years between 1933 and 1951 were more than but a closed shell, 
something to be passed just to be able to return to the alma mater of philosophy. For one 
thing, Arendt never quite returned to philosophy (until, that is, her very last and 
posthumously published work, the Life of the Mind) and she explicitly refrained from 
branding herself a philosopher, preferring the term political scientist (cf. Arendt, 1994b: 
1). Certainly, this was not a simple reflection on or elongation of her "awakening" from 
1933. As she put it many times, the focus on the political, the active life and public 
discourse is a reversal of traditional philosophical priority that considered vita 
contemplativa of value over vita activa (Arendt, 1993a, 1998). Yet, the firm distinction in 
her characterisation of the active life - underpinning conceptually her major work 
theorising the political, Human Condition (1958), her treatise On Revolution (1963) on 
the differences between the American and the French revolutions and her provocative 
essay Reflections on the Little Rock (I 959) against legally enforced racial integration (!) 
in a Southern elementary school - between the social and the political already makes its 
first appearance, as we have just seen, in Arendt's early Jewish writings. This is certainly 
not to argue that all of these later volumes would be "Jewish" works. It is only to point 
out that just as Arendt's personal experiences and reflections on statelessness, human 
rights, and the nation-state lead to certain central ideas in the Origins, so did her early 
thoughts concerning the political and the social canalise conceptually many of her 
subsequent works. 
Up to the very last minute of her life, one should add. It was only in her last and 
posthumous work (the Life of the Mind) that she returned to the traditional topic of 
philosophy, to the analysis of the vita contemplativa, of willing and thinking. Instead of 
the action between women and men, that is, to the analysis of"action" within the person. 
Yet again, the theme of the activity of thinking occurred first in Arendt's Rahel 
Vamhagen and made its appearance in one of the examples for pariah-hood, Franz 
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Kafka. There was, however, a major turn in Arendt's thinking about "thinking". While in 
her early accounts "thinking" represented the option in time of political isolation, while it 
was the "weapon" of the "outcast"19 - i.e. however respectable or even heroic, the 
ultimate sign of political impotency -, by the end of her life Arendt began to consider 
"thinking" in an altogether different light. 
"Could the activity of thinking as such, the habit of examining whatever happens 
to come to pass or to attract attention, regardless of results and specific content, could this 
activity be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil-doing or even actually 
'condition' them against it?", as she explicitly poses the problem to be considered in the 
posthumous book (Arendt, 1978h: 5). How did this change occur? What was it that made 
Arendt change her approach, from the active to the contemplative realm? Arendt is 
straightforward about this, dating her encounter with what she calls "not stupidity but 
thoughtlessness" to 1961: the Jerusalem trial of Adolf Eichmann (Arendt, 1978h: 4-
emphasis in the original). 
By the 1960s, Hannah Arendt was a respected (if somewhat controversial) figure 
of the New York intellectual life. The Origins of Totalitarianism won immediate acclaim 
and propelled the author not only to fame outside Jewish circles but also to various grants 
(such as the Guggenheim Fellowship in 1952), lecture commissions (such as [as the first 
woman to give] Gauss seminars at Princeton University in 1953 and the Walgren 
Foundation lectures at the University of Chicago in 1956), visiting professorship (visiting 
professor at Berkeley in 1955), and full-time professorship at Princeton in 1959. 
In 1961 alone, for instance, she had been due to stay for two months at 
Northwestern University, to hold a Plato seminar at Columbia, a lecture at Vassar 
College and was awarded with a one-year grant by the Rockefeller Foundation. None of 
this was to take place, however, as she learned about the capture of Adolf Eichmann in 
Argentina on 24 May, 1960. Arendt immediately proposed herself to the editor of the The 
New Yorker, William Shawn, to report on the trial. Having in mind originally one single 
article, Arendt nevertheless summoned Kurt Blumenfeld to review and translate the 
19 Cf. Arendt (1997: 89-91, 1978a: 83). See, however, Arendt (1968: 8-11) as early as in 1957, accepting 
the Lessing Prize. 
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Israeli press, and Karl Jaspers to inform her on the European reactions. No wonder, 
instead of one article a series of them - subsequently in the form of a book - arrived, to 
the unimaginable furore of many in Jewish circles all over the world.20 
The breach that the book caused, however, was not confined to the public realm. 
Old friendships and acquaintances were terminated, such as with Siegfried Moses and 
Robert Weltsch. Hans Jonas, the philosopher-friend way back from university years 
refused to speak to Arendt for an entire year and changed his mind only on the urgings of 
his wife. Even then, he vowed never again to touch the Eichmann issue with Arendt. Kurt 
Blumenfeld (Arendt's political "mentor" from the 1930s and later close friend) 
considered the termination of their relationship while lying almost literally on his 
deathbed. Whether this would or would not have happened, we do not know. Arendt 
visited him once more in Jerusalem, but there is no convincing sign that they could have 
restored their friendship. 
It was, however, her complete break with Gershom Scholem that is the most well 
known and documented among these post-Eichmann fall-outs. This was due to a number . 
of reasons: its public nature (published in Neue Zurcher Zeitung and in the Encounter), 
its totality (they never spoke again), and, as will be the prime point of interest for this 
thesis, because it reflected much, much more than a mere personal altercation. It was not 
a banal incident as it appeared to reveal the conflict of complete worldviews. 
In the following subsection, I will turn my attention to the formation and genesis 
of that other conflicting worldview, that of Gershom Scholem. 
2.2.2. Gershom Scholem, historian of Judaic ideas 
"All of us have students, some of us have even created schools, but only Gershom 
Scholem has created a whole academic discipline" - spoke Martin Buber to virtually 
20 The five essays appeared as Hannah Arendt: A Reporter at Large: Eichmann in Jerusalem. In: The New 
Yorker: 16, 23 February; 2, 9, 16 March, 1963. 
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everyone's consent (quoted by Biale [1979: 206] and Hertzberg [1985: 11]). "Nonsense 
is nonsense. But the history of nonsense is scholarship" - added another adage to the 
breviariurn Professor of Talmud, Saul Liberrnan as he introduced a lecture of Scholem at 
the Jewish Theology Seminar in New York (see Ozick, 2002). Indeed, there is no 
divergence in opinion with regard to Scholem's basic achievement on the scholarly field. 
It was not more and not less than creating the entire academic discipline of Jewish 
mysticism, an area of Jewish thought that had hitherto received a double sort of neglect, 
if not contempt. One evolved from mainstream orthodoxy and ultra-orthodoxy, which 
defined Jewish religion according to their own interest strictly in terms of Halacha. The 
other emanated from reform/liberal Judaism or from the rationalistic precursor of modem 
Jewish scholarship, Wissenschaft des Judentums, whose idea of Judaism as an essentially 
spiritual and rational religion would have surely been compromised, had they accepted 
mystical phenomena throughout the ages in their own right as a legitimate area of Jewish 
religious endeavours (see Biale, 1979: 13-33; Brenner, 1999; Roemer, 1997; Scholem, 
1997: 21-22, 75-79). 
Gershom Scholem, thus, created a discipline. Yet he arguably did even more. It 
was not in isolation that he pursued his research. His overall outlook influenced heavily, 
perhaps more than anyone else's, the entire inchoate realm of Jewish studies, contributing 
"more than any other scholar to its clarification and to the establishment of Jewish studies 
as a true discipline within the humanities" (Dan, 1987: 26). Such an outlook was based 
on disinterested and objective scholarship, as opposed to apologetics that characterised 
both his scientific precursors (the Wissenschaft des Judentums) and, much to his chagrin, 
his contemporaries. "All of these ills have now assumed a national dress" (Scholem 1997: 
70), as he resigned in a powerful 1944 article against the apologetic approach of the 
Wissenschaft (see Scholem, 1997: 51-71). Yet, Scholem's principled conviction was that 
it is nevertheless the framework of Zionism that allows a Jew to discard his/her 
apologetic tendencies, realising that there is no one around to be endeared. Such an 
attitude, to be sure, was the outcome of a radical choice: "Precisely because he had early 
chosen to be only a Jew, without hyphen or adjective, not a Western Jew or a German 
Jew or an American Jew, Scholem felt himself free to speak to Western culture 
unapologetically and very directly" (Hertzberg, 1985: 7). How did this choice come 
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about? Moreover, are there but academic consequences of it? Was Gershom Scholem, 
''the most influential Judaic scholar[ ... ] of the century" (Aschheim, 2004: 903), simply a 
scholar? In other words, for all his and his students' rejection of the mere idea, did he not 
help to create more than the modem science of Judaism? Did he not form, rather, that 
very Judaism itself and that very Zionism under whose aegis the allegedly objective 
pursuit of Jewish scholarship became possible? 
The "bacillus" (Scholem, 1983: 114) of the Kabbalah took hold in a rather 
unlikely place. By his own description, the Berlin family he was born into in 1897 was a 
typical liberal middle-class family, where "assimilation to things German, as people put it 
at the time, had progressed quite far" (!bid: 9).21 This progress, however, was not a one-
way street. For one thing, lighting up a cigarette was common on Saturdays. For another, 
the still-existing Friday-night candle was used to do this. For one thing, Christmas was 
held instead of Chanukah. For another, one of young Gerhard's (as was his name then) 
gifts was a picture of his hero, Theodor Herzl. For one thing, yearly fatherly preachers of 
the "mission of the Jews" were in place. For another, this mission did not involve such 
particularistic projects, which young Gerhard was typically found of, i.e. Jewish tradition 
and Zionism (see !bid: Ch. I, 2). 
Nevertheless, it was perhaps precisely due to these paradoxes that the family was 
so representative of German Jewry, almost haggadically expressing this with the 
subsequent life-story of the four children of the house. The oldest, Reinhold became a 
fierce German nationalist and remained one even after Adolf Hitler's twelve cataclysmic 
years. Erich, the second oldest opted for the middle-of-the road, wishy-washy liberal 
Democratic Club. Werner turned to the communists, became as a deputy the youngest 
member of the Reichstag, left the party in 1926 and perished in Buchenwald in 1940 
(!bid: 30,42-43, 145-146). 
In this context, clearly, Scholem's embracing of Zionism and, even more 
importantly, of Jewish mysticism questioned in effect the very assumption upon which 
21 On the German-Jewish coexistence, see Elon (2002). For a treatise on the Weimar-period see Brenner 
(1996). 
25 
liberal Gennan-Jewish existence was based. Indeed, turning "to this wild, strange subject, 
Scholem was making a claim to Jewish, as opposed to Gennan, culture" (Maccoby, 1983: 
38). No wonder, Scholem's father was more than furious with this "claim" and following 
a fierce argument around the dinner table- where Gerhard defended the anti-war stance 
he took up right at the beginning of World War I -, he was expelled from home in 1917 
(Scholem, 1983: 83-84). 
Not that it appears to be a shock of any sort for him, who -having completed his 
dissertation on the earliest existing Kabbalistic manuscript, the book Bahir, at the 
University of Munich - changed his first name from Gerhard to Gershom and left the 
country in 1923 for Palestine (Aschheim, 2004: 917). Originally, he had in mind a 
position as a teacher of mathematics (a subject he studied before turning to mysticism), 
but soon an opportunity arose through the philosopher Hugo Bergmann to become the 
librarian of the Hebrew section of the Jewish National Library in Jerusalem. That 
appointment did not last very long. In 1925 the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (whose 
conception had taken almost a decade) was eventually founded and Scholem took up a 
lecturing position he then retained to the very end of his life (Scholem, 1983: eh. 10). 
At the Hebrew University, Scholem could begin in earnest his work on Jewish 
mysticism. Initially, it involved not only scholarly analysis of texts but also the collecting 
and systematising of those very scriptures. The first major international airing of his 
research (aside of many significant Hebrew scholarly articles in-between) was a series of 
lectures given in New York in 1940. It was the content of these lectures that fonned his 
subsequent book- ever to be considered the path-breaking work in Jewish mysticism-, 
Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism. 
"[ ... ] it was the first time this literature [i.e. of mysticism] was not treated as an 
insignificant, late collection of incomprehensible texts with no bearing on the 
development of Jewish culture", as Scholem's student Joseph Dan summed up Scholem's 
New York achievement (Dan, 1987: 21). Thus, the book, consisting of an overview of 
Jewish mysticism from early merkabah mysticism to 18th century Hasidism, defined the 
area and study of Jewish mysticism, outlined its boundaries and, in fact, "virtually 
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invented" it as a discipline (Aschheim, 2004: 905).22 (Interestingly enough Scholem 
prevented the book to be translated to Hebrew, for years. Claiming, allegedly, that 
"anyone who could read the sources had no need of a book like this" [Dan, 1999].) 
As such, the book pushed its author to academic fame outside Palestine as well. 
From then on, Scholem was frequently invited to hold lectures, both in the United States 
and- for all his programmatic and outspoken denial of the (practical) impossibility of the 
German-Jewish dialogue (Scholem, 1976: 61-64, 65-70, 71-92)- in Germany, where he 
was awarded the highest possible German award, the Pour le Merite (see Elon, 2003: 79). 
From a professional point of view, however, Scholem's most productive and extended 
international cooperation covered the annual conferences of the Jungian Eranos group, in 
Ascona, Switzerland (see Dan, 1991; Wasserstrom, 1999). Ironically, Scholem never 
ceased to emphasise his reservations towards psychoanalysis in general and the Jungian 
conception of collective unconscious in particular. The latter's methodology of seeking 
collective human symbols was in downright opposition to Scholem's own orientation of 
interpreting the ideas of Jewish mysticism mostly from within the tradition, rather than 
from without through analogies or exterior impacts (cf. Dan, 1991; Scholem, 1976: 28-
31).23 Nevertheless, the appealing context of German language, the equally appealing 
absence from post-war Germany proper, as well as the presence of such luminaries as 
Mircea Eliade and Henry Corbin proved to be ideal for Scholem. 
He attended the conferences from 1949 on and his contributions are available now 
in two English volumes (Scholem, 1965, 1991). Together with Major Trends and his two-
volume monograph of Sabbatai Tzvi, these essays undoubtedly mark one of the peak 
points of Scholem's scholarly achievement. What is common in them is that they all 
represent an exercise or case study in the history of ideas, Scholem tracing back and forth 
the meaning of a concept through a variety of contexts in Jewish tradition. What the 
difference is between the two volumes is that while in the first one (where Scholem, so to 
say, initiated the Eranos circle into his research and Jewish mysticism in general) most of 
the essays "attempted to present some problems concerning Jewish mysticism within the 
" The emphasis is very much on the "practically" here, as Scholem was in principled opposition to any pre-
defmed essence of Judaism or Jewish mysticism (see Scholem, 1973: xi., 1974: 275, 1997: 93; cf. Dan, 
1999) 
"On some ideological implications ofScholem's methodology see Raz-Krakotzkin (2006). 
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framework of the study of religions in general"2\ the second volume turned exclusively 
to the "elucidation of the most central and important topics in the Kabbalah, not only as 
viewed from without, by scholars and historians, but as viewed from within, by the 
Kabbalists themselves"25 (Dan, 1991: 5-6). 
The respect that Scholem achieved outside as well as inside Israel - where he was 
elected the third president of the Israeli Academy of Sciences in 1968 (Scholem, 1983: 
90) - did not mean that his research was uncontroversial. Indeed, the very choice of 
Jewish mysticism (to which he almost exclusively devoted his entire career) appeared to 
be more than a mere and pure academic choice. It suggested a devotion to irrational and 
even destructive forces. This state of affairs was further exacerbated by the fact that 
Scholem sometimes appeared to serve as the intellectual representative of Israeli Jewry, 
especially in Germany and in the United States, where post-assimilatory Jewish 
intelligentsia found its way back to tradition often via his work (cf. Howe, 1983: 57). 
Thus, a wide-ranging research that aimed to show "how Jewish mysticism changed from 
an esoteric by-path on the fringes of the Jewish community to an active communal force 
capable of influencing the course of Jewish history'' (Maccoby, 1983: 39) was bound to 
be contested from many fields. 
Again, for orthodox Jewry Scholem's work always appeared to be a suspicious 
move away from religious Jaw, Halacha (even though Scholem later claimed that what 
attracted him from the beginning was how mystical ideas helped the Halacha to survive 
the ages [cf. Biale, 1979: 121 Scholem, 1976: 19; but see Scholem, 1983: 56, 1997: 94, 
116]).Yet, the striking claim that the haskalah (the Jewish enlightenment) and the 
ensuing emergence of secular Jewry (and reform Judaism which amongst others 
attempted to neutralise the national aspect of Judaism) was a dialectical result of the 
antinomian tendencies of the movement of the (false and apostate) "Mystical Messiah", 
Sabbatai Tzvi from the seventeenth century and of the notion that "the violation of the 
Torah is now its true fulfilment" was perhaps even harder to digest for secular Jews 
(Scholem, 1971: 1 10). For them, it was one thing that a scholar challenged religious 
sensitivities. But to present his and his "supporters"' supposedly secular background as 
24 E.g. religious authority, myth, ritual. 
25 E.g. "the mystical shape of the Godhead", "the transmigration of the souls", "the shechinah". 
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derivative from the history of Jewish mysticism - that was something completely 
extraordinary and contentious.26 
Nevertheless, it was precisely Scholem's next major project and undoubtedly the 
pinnacle of his career to narrate the history of the movement ofSabbatai Tzvi. Again, that 
a major and respected Israeli scholar of worldwide reputation would devote his prime 
energies and indeed almost one thousand pages to (traditionally) one of the most 
shameful episodes of Jewish history was difficult to comprehend. But all of this was even 
more aggravated by summaries such as the following: 
"Sabbatai's followers and believers were good Jews. They believed in 
the holy books. Hence their first reaction, one might almost say reflex, 
was to search Scripture and tradition for intimations, hints, and 
indications of the extraordinary and bewildering events. Moreover, lo 
and behold the Bible, rabbinic Haggadah, and kabbalistic literature 
turned out to abound in allusions to Sabbatai Sevi in general and to the 
mystery of his apostasy in particular. The Sabbatians were second to 
none in the art of interpreting, hair-splitting, and twisting texts, for 
which the Jews forever have had such an uncontested reputation" 
(Scholem, 1975: 802).27 
As the apostate Messiah, a former object of shame and ridicule, turned out to be 
an authentic Jewish phenomenon in the hands of the scholar, it was perhaps inevitable 
that that scholar's hands came quickly under scrutiny. Was he not advocating this 
antinomianism and the breaking the Halacha? Did he not want to overtake Judaism by 
26 See Scholem (1946: 287-324, 1975) for more on this thesis and Taubes (1981) debating it. 
27 Scholem was programmatic in this rather polemical stance, expressed already in the preface of the book: 
"I do not hold to the opinion of those (and there are indeed many of them) who view the events of Jewish 
history from a fixed dogmatic standpoint and who know exactly whether some phenomenon or another is 
'Jewish' or not. Nor am I a follower of that school which proceeds on the assumption that there is a well-
defined and unvarying 'essence' of Judaism, especially not where the evaluation of historical events is 
concerned" (Scholem, 1975: xi.). For later examples of his attitude on this see Scholem (1997: 93-99, 114-
117); cf. Roemer(l997: 29). 
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mystical forces? Did he not imply a connection between mystical and nationalistic ideas? 
Was he, thus, not a hidden proponent of messianic Zionism?28 
Much of these allegations were certainly vulgar, though no less down-to-Earth 
than it must have been for the lifelong politically leftist and anti-revisionist Scholem to 
experience that some of his students celebrated the (re-)settlement of the occupied 
territories with references to their teacher's work (see Elon, 2003: 79), or to witness the 
messianic Zionistic "extremisation" of the heritage of the revered Rabbi Abraham Isaac 
Kool29 by his highly influential son Zvi Yehuda Kook (see Ravitzky, 1996: 79-144). 
Nevertheless, his stance has always been defended as that of a scholar and his method as 
that of objectivity. Whatever the outcome, it is the events, facts, and scriptures that must 
be "blamed", not the historian. The persona of the scholar and that of the public 
intellectual were firmly distinguished, furthermore, by pointing out that Scholem 's 
strictly scholarly output by far outweighed that of the public intellectual (Dan, 1987: Ch. 
I; 1999). 
Still, there have always been attempts from friendly sources as well either to 
account for the scholar and his work in terms of the public intellectual, or even to tie that 
scholar ever more closely to its sources, which, in the name of objectivity, he was 
supposed to distance himself from. Thus, though he did not cease to draw attention to 
what he called the ''price ofmessianism" (Scholem, 1971: 35-36; cf. Taubes, 1981), and 
clearly did not side with the antinomians (cf. Maccoby, 1983: 41), he many times 
professed to be a "religious anarchist" (see Scholem, 1974: 278, 1983: 52-53, 1997: 84-
86; cf. Biale, 1979: 80, 111). In fact, as his monographer David Biale states,"[ ... ] it is 
hard to avoid the impression that Scholem has tried to find a precursor to his own 
anarchistic theology in Sabbatian antinomianism" (Biale, 1979: 174). Likewise, though 
what he exercised was clearly not mysticism but historiography, he appeared to have 
28 These are mainly the reconstructed charges of the Orthodox and the secular establishment (for an account 
of Scholem's most well-known debate with Baruch Kurzweil, see Myers [1986]). For a far more measured 
secular critique see Raz-Krakotzkin (2001, 2006). Religious Zionists, however, seem to be appalled by his 
negative portrnyal of the messianic movement, as well as his thesis concerning the later "neutralization" of 
the Messianic concepts by Hasidism. See Hazony (2000: 290). On neutralization see Scholem (1946: 325-
350; 1971: 176-202). 
29 Scholem regarded Kook the "example par excellence of a great Jewish mystic" and a person "in whose 
original personality there were once again incorporated in our own generation the holy lights of Jewish 
mysticism" (Scholem, 1997: 11, 154- emphasis in the original). 
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deduced such a secular activity precisely from the traditional activity of "commentary'' 
that, in his rendering, primarily characterised the "tradition of Jewish speculative 
thought" that remained "alien to systematization" throughout the ages (Scholem, 1946: 
205). And again, while he firmly maintained his identity of the scholar and the stance of 
methodological objectivity, one cannot but wonder whether his many times showcased 
"anti-essentialist" view of Judaism and Jewish identity was merely an outcome of 
disinterested, objective historical research or- for good or ill - an ideological statement 
as such (cf. Myers, 1986).30 
For all the disclaimers from the position of the disinterested, objective scholar, 
then, the moment Scholem uttered that for him "secularism is part of the dialectic of the 
development within Judaism" (Scholem, 1974: 290 - emphasis in the original), he 
effectively justified in principle those endeavours that wanted to find values and 
guidelines in his scholarly writings, instead of simply events and their disinterested 
description. And by the same token, when he repeatedly referred to the "dialectics 
concealed in the historical consciousness of the Zionists, a consciousness which I shared 
with all my heart and all my soul: the dialectics of continuity and revolt" (Scholem, 1983: 
166; cf. Ibid: 54; 1974: 275), it certainly threw into doubt the earlier avowed conception 
of Zionism as a meta-historical framework for (and of) unapologetic (i.e. non-
ideological) scholarly objectivity. 
What, then, was Scholem's view of Zionism? Though the early date of his aliyah 
lent the character of the clairvoyant to him (cf. Aschheim, 2001; Steiner, 1998: 10), he 
had always been unequivocal in asserting that 
"[ ... ] the reason I embraced Zionism was not the establishment of a 
Jewish state (which I defended in discussions) as the main goal of the 
movement seemed urgent and utterly convincing to me. For me as for 
many others, this aspect of the movement played only a secondary role 
or none at all, until Hitler's destruction of the Jews. Those aspects of 
30 For relating Scholem's work to philosophy see Alter (1987, 1991), Biale (1985) and Habermas (1985). 
For relating it to literature see Bloom (1975, 1987); cf. Ozick (1987). 
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Zionism that dealt with politics and international law were not of prime 
importance to many of those who joined the movement. Of great 
influence, however, were tendencies that promoted the rediscovery by 
the Jews of their own selves and their history as well as a possible 
spiritual, cultural, and, above all, social rebirth. [ ... ] One's attitude 
toward religious tradition also played a part here, and had a clear 
dialectical function. From the outset the struggle between striving for 
continuation and revivification of the traditional form of Judaism and a 
conscious rebellion against this very tradition, though within the Jewish 
people and not through alienation from it and abandonment of it, created 
an ineluctable dialectics that was central to Zionism" (Scholem, 1983: 
54).31 
Such an approach was a clear reflection and continuation of the thought of Asher 
Ginsberg (better known by his Hebrew penname Ahad Ha'Am [one of the people]), who 
dubbed his own approach as "spiritual Zionism". Ahad Ha' Am placed the cultural and 
spiritual regeneration of the Jewish people at the heart of his program and juxtaposed it to 
that ofTheodor Herzl's "political Zionism", whose prime objective was the establishment 
of the Jewish State (Ahad Ha'Am, 1946; Zipperstein, 1993).32 "Spiritual Zionism", 
nevertheless, was a political approach of course and Scholem himself immersed in the 
politics of the Yishuv after his arrival. He was a member of the radical pacifist group of 
Brith Shalom (Covenant of Peace), which advocated an essentially anti-imperialist 
stance: the establishment of the binational state and of a substantive Jewish-Arab 
dialogue (Eddon, 2003; Laqueur, 2003: 251-255). The group, founded in 1925, never 
attracted more than a handful of intellectuals (though by dint of their profession these 
opinions were rather well known) and effectively ceased to exist by 1933, due to the 
various disturbances between Arabs and Jews. 
31 Cf. "We did not come to Zionism in search of politics" (Scholern, 1976: 2; cf. Scholern,1983: 151). 
32 On Scholem's nationalism see Rotenstreich (1994). 
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Was Scholem, then, the archetypical naive peacenik as some scholars continue to 
see the entire Brith Shalom circle to this very day (see Hazony, 2000; Laqueur, 2001)? 
Hardly so, even if Scholem's participation in the group appears to have earned him the 
everlasting scorn of the political (far) right (cf. Hazony, 2000: 290). It is of significance, 
however, that one of the leaders of Brith Shalom was the same Judah Leon Magnes that 
we encountered in the previous subsection. His new initiative of August 1942, the Ichud 
(as far as I can tell) functioned on the same platform as Brith Shalom. Yet, this time, 
without Scholem's participation and even without his apparent sympathy. 
Around as well as in the midst of the Holocaust such a shift might be all too 
understandable. However, as Israeli historian Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin claims, the 
Holocaust did not only change Scholem's view with regard to questions such as the 
Jewish state versus the Jewish homeland: 
"[ ... ] it was not only that he abandoned his political activity. At the same 
time, he turned his academic focus of research from early and medieval 
Jewish mysticism [ ... ] to questions of messianism, especially to 
Sabbatianism. [ ... ] Within his research and in individual essays, Scholem 
also formulated his vision of Zionism as national-theological redemption. 
He located Zionism within the myth of redemption, defined as political and 
national. Nationalism here was not distinguished from religion, but 
modernized interpretation of the theological realm" (Raz-Krakotzkin, 2001: 
174-175). 
For once, the divergence between the "earlier" and the "later" Scholem might not 
merely be in the eye of the beholder. Such a divergence, moreover, might not simply be a 
temporal question either (i.e. before and during/after the catastrophe). 
As noted, there are many occasions in the oeuvre where Scholem points out the 
"price of messianism" as well as his pride in Zionism being not a messianic movement 
(Scholem 1974: 269, 1976: 26, 44, 1979: 116; cf. Dan, 1994: 73). He repeatedly called 
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for distinguishing ''between messianism and secular movements" and pronounced his 
opposition "to mixing up religious and political concepts" (quotes himself from 1929 in 
Scholem, 1976: 44). 33 At face value, thus, there is nothing equivocal here in this position. 
Yet, it is in the selfsame work that Scholem states that he does not "believe in a world of 
total secularism in which the religious factor will not manifest itself with redoubled 
strength" (!bid: 44) and spells later out his 
"[ ... ] unshakeable belief in a specific moral centre, which bestows 
meaning in world history on the Jewish people, transcends the sphere of 
pure secularization. I would not even deny that in it a remnant of 
theocratic hope also accompanies the re-entry into world history of the 
Jewish people that at the same time signifies the truly Utopian return to 
its own history"34 (Scholem, 1976: 294-95- emphasis: mine). 
Moreover, just to make sure that his comments are of prescriptive (rather than 
merely descriptive nature), he himself accepts elsewhere his Zionism characterised as a 
"religious-mystical quest for a regeneration of Judaism" (Scholem, 2003: 217). 
Certainly, one does not expect an unequivocal stance from a position that prides 
itself in being the "dialectic of continuity and revolt" (cf. Scholem, I 974). Still, what one 
can state with certainty is that such a conception does definitely not coincide with a 
Western liberal conception of secularism. A difference and distinction, to be sure, that 
Scholem would not have found damaging or problematic at all. 35 Doing so, however, one 
33 The quote continues: I categorically deny that Zionism is a messianic movement and that it is entitled to 
use religious terminology to advance its political aims. [ ... ]Action on the political plane of secular history 
is something different from action on the spiritual-religious plane". 
34 The extract continues: "[ ... ]!am convinced that behind its profane and secular fa9ade, Zionism involves 
potential religious contents, and that this potentiality is much stronger than the actual content finding its 
expression in the 'religious Zionism; of political parties" (Scholem, 1976: 295). 
35 Cf. "Secularism is no more than a narrow transition from one religious dogma to another" (Scholem, 
1997: 164); "I have always considered the transition through secularism necessary, unavoidable. But I 
don't think that Zionism's secular vision is the ultimate vision, the last word. [ ... ]I have always considered 
secular Zionism a legitimate way but rejected the foolish declaration about the Jews becoming 'a nation 
like all the nations'. If this should materialize, it will be the end of the Jewish people.[ ... ] I cannot free 
myself from the dialectical lesson of history, according to which secularism is part of the process of our 
34 
might not have the necessary safeguard either when realising with distaste the amount of 
political power given to the rabbis by the Israeli Prime Minister, and its consequences in 
their pervasive, unavoidable and effervescent presence in many political questions (cf. 
Scholem, 1997: 93-99).36 
Without acknowledging, then, that there was something like a straightforward 
explicit messianic ideology in Gershom Scholem's writings, one may indeed argue with 
Raz-Krakotzkin that 
"[ ... ] even though he often warned against the dangers and 'the price' of 
messianism, he had a constitutive role in the shaping of the perception of 
messianic imagination m Jewish tradition as 'national', and 
consequently the view of Zionism as the fulfilment of Jewish 
expectations throughout the ages. [ ... ] His intentions were certainly 
different, but his assumptions did not offer a different approach, and 
they even motivated right-wing national-religious tendencies" (Raz-
Krakotzkin, 2001: 175). 
Thus, Scholem's life (as well as his "after-life") was replete with debates and 
controversies. There was one amongst them, however, on which Scholem even at the age 
of 82 had to say that he "found [ ... ] impossible to express [ ... ] the bitterness of my 
feelings and thoughts in this matter". That "matter'' was the Eichmann-controversy and 
entry into history; entry into history means assimilating to it. Since I do not believe in 'like all the nations', 
I do not see ultimate secularism as a possibility for us and it will not come to pass. I do not believe that we 
are going to liquidate ourselves. There is no reason for the Jews to exist like the Setbs. The Serbs have a 
reason to exist without theology, without an ahistorical dimension. [ ... ] I don't believe in a world of total 
secularism in which the religious factor will not manifest itself with redoubled strength" (Scholem, 1976: 
33-34); "I don't consider myself a secularist. My secularism fails right at the core, owing to the fact that I 
am a religious person, because I am sure of my belief in God. My secularism is not secular" (Scholem, 
1976: 46); "I consider a complete secularization oflsrael to be out of question so long as the faith in God is 
still a fundamental phenomenon of anything human[ ... ] I consider a dialogue with such secularization 
about its validity, legitimacy, and limitations as fruitful and decisive" (Scholem, 1976: 297). 
36 As the quote continues, "[Ben-Gurion] should never have agreed in the first place to place a bill before 
the Knesset forcing rabbinical law on those Jews who do not want it, creating, in a democratic state like 
Israel, a condition which does not allow civil marriage or which does not acknowledge that marriages of 
Jews may be performed by non-Orthodox rabbis" (Scholem, 1997: 98). On Scholem's later gloom 
regarding the intrusion of religion and messianism into politics, see Elon (2003: 79). 
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the person with whom Scholem was "caused to break all and every connection [ ... ] up to 
the day of her death" was Hannah Arendt (Scholem, 2002: 487).37 
The relationship between Scholem and Arendt predated their correspondence on 
the Eichmann trial by more than thirty years. By Scholem's account, they first met in 
1932 in Berlin, through their common friend Waiter Benjamin (Scholem, 2003: 241).38 
Immediate correspondence ensued and during the war they formed a relatively close 
relationship (see Skinner's comment on Scholem's letters in Scholem, 2002: 215).39 
It was never an easy friendship, however, and the differing worldviews of the two 
protagonists regularly surfaced, as can be assessed from their earlier letters (see 
especially a fierce debate on Arendt [1978c]: Scholem, 2002: 330-334) as well as certain 
comments Arendt made about Scholem elsewhere (Arendt and Blumenfeld, 1995: 135, 
138, 176; Arendt and Jaspers, 1994: 133, 523). Nevertheless, the abrupt end that was to 
follow might still be regarded as wholly unexpected. 
This abrupt end was even published, as already requested in Scholem's original 
letter. Arendt gave her consent to the publication but was taken then by complete 
surprise, when Scholem's initiative embraced far wider circles than she originally 
imagined. Thus, the exchange was not only published in the Tel-Aviv based 
Mitteilungsblatt, but also in such prominent media as the Neue Ziircher Zeitung and the 
Encounter. 40 That this irreversible and "fatal" fall-out of two Jewish intellectuals of 
German origin- one of them in Israel the other in the United States - reached the eyes of 
an effectively worldwide audience surely contributed to the fame of the exchange. 
37 Letter to American sociologist, Daniel Bell. 
38 In this thesis I do not go any deeper into the relationship of either Scholem or Arendt with Benjamin. For 
an intellectual analysis see Eddon (2006). 
39 It is noteworthy, at the same time, that neither Arendt's biographer, nor the monographs available on 
Scholem (which, to be sure, are not concentrating on personal details) pay much attention to the 
relationship. As if hindsight had overwritten their earlier relationship (see Biale, 1979; Dan, 1987; Young· 
Bruehl, 2004). 
40 See her letter to Jaspers: "[ ... ] who [i.e. Scholem] went out to shout this whole sordid story from the 
rooftops in Neue Zilrcher Zeitung and Encounter Which accomplished nothing else, it seems to me, than to 
infect those segments of the population that had not yet been stricken by the epidemic of lies. And 
everybody goes along. I can't do anything about it Scholem was determined to publish, and I assumed he 
would in the Tei-Aviv Mitteilungsblatt, which seemed harmless to me. And he did that first, but then used 
all his connections to broadcast the letters to the world" (Arendt and Jaspers, 1994: 523). 
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(Especially that during the entire controversy on Arendt's book, it was one of the very 
few occasions that she directly answered one of her critics.41) 
It is certainly my aim in this thesis to move beyond mere "fame", and analyse the 
meaning and internal significance of this exchange. The next step in the second half of 
this chapter is, however, to review the chain of events that preceded the correspondence: 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann, Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and the stormy reception it 
brought about. 
2.3. The Scene 
2.3.1. The trial of Adolf Eichmann 
It was never going to be a simple trial. At 4 pm on 23 May, 1960 Prime Minister 
oflsrael, David Ben-Gurion announced to the Knesset: 
"[ ... ]a short time ago one of the greatest of Nazi criminals was found by 
the Israeli Security Services. Adolf Eichmann, who was responsible, 
together with the Nazi leaders, for what they called the 'Final Solution 
of the Jewish problem' - that is, the extermination of six million Jews of 
Europe. Adolf Eichmann is under arrest in Israel, and will shortly be 
brought to trial in Israel under the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators 
(Punishment) Law of 1950" (quoted in Cesarani, 2004: 236; for slightly 
different translations see Segev, 2000: 326; Yablonka, 2004: 32). 
Accounts vary regarding the immediate aftermath of this dramatic and ceremonial 
announcement. One can read about ''the Knesset [being] shocked. No one moved" 
(Y ablonka, 2004: 32), as well about an extended "breathless silence" followed by 
41 For the other two occasions see Arendt (1963, 1978g). 
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"individual shouts of swprise" (Aharoni and Diet!, 1996: 167), or a "tangible silence" 
followed by "a roar of applause" (Pearlman, 1963: 60-61; cf. Hare!, 1975). Eichmann's 
only serious biographer to date, David Cesarani aptly relates to these sorts of 
divergences: "As with so much of what would follow, it was hard to reach an agreement 
about anything surrounding AdolfEichmann" (Cesarani, 2004: 236). 
Ben-Gurion's announcement (along with the extraordinary capture of the man) 
ensured that the case gained worldwide publicity and foreshadowed a trial that would 
later unanimously be held a "turning point" in the history of Israel as well as the 
reception of the Holocaust. There was, however, one thing missing at the basement of an 
unrivalled consensus of significance. It was just not clear who exactly this man, Adolf 
Eichmann was. 
Surely not suggesting a position "responsible, together with the Nazi leaders" (see 
Ben-Gurion above) it was the "meagre" rank of an Obersturrnbannfiihrer (lieutenant 
colonel) that Adolf Eichmann reached in the SS hierarchy. This does not represent a overt 
sign of incredible power, the position of- as Attorney General Gideon Hausner would 
later claim - being the "central pillar of the whole wicked system" (quoted in Cesarani, 
2004: 300), or a criminal "more extreme than the evil man Hitler himself' (quoted in 
ibid: 304). As a result of his rank, perhaps, Eichmann was not even considered a major 
figure of the Nazi hierarchy for years. Little was known about him and, as many pointed 
out, he was neither convicted at Nuremberg in absentia (an option available for the 
judges as evidenced in the judgment on Martin Bohrmann), nor did his name occur 
frequently enough to raise his profile. Certainly not often enough to initially prompt the 
renowned Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal to track him down (Ibid: 1-2). 
At the same time, though by no means someone to be mentioned "together with 
the Nazi leaders", Eichmann was not a mere and easily replaceable "cog" either. Born in 
Linz to a German family in 1906, he joined the Nazi party and the SS in 1932. During the 
years leading up to the war he acquainted himself deeper and deeper with the Jewish 
question, and established himself as a unique expert amongst the many units and 
departments devoted to this task in the various organisations of the Third Reich. In this 
capacity, he was the main instrument of the successful forced emigration of the Jewish 
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community of Vienna. It was an "achievement", which cemented his reputation and 
ensured his central position during the war: first at the forced evacuation of Jews and 
Poles and second at the logistical organisation of the genocide of the Jewish (and Gypsy) 
people. Eichmann did not make decisions concerning the overall Nazi policy in these 
areas but had certainly to make many "minor" decisions of otherwise enormous 
significance. To put it bluntly, he was in charge of getting the trains full and rolling 
smoothly. In achieving this, negotiations, deals, and occasional threats were needed with 
various sorts of people, i.e. from diplomats to leaders of the Jewish councils, from Nazi 
officials to Wehrmacht officers. 
Following his last efforts in Hungary, where, exceptionally, he worked on the 
spot, Eichmann went hiding. He escaped from the camp in Ober-Dachstetten in January 
1946 and lived as a woodman for years in the small German town Eversen. It was not 
until 1950 that he reached safety, however, when, assisted by a Franciscan friar in Italy, 
he made his way under the name Ricardo Klement via the infamous "rat line" (see 
Cesarani, 2004: 205-207) to Tucuman, Argentina. It was here that he started his never 
quite successful integration into the Nazi refugee-committee, working in several low-
profile jobs, all of them lacking by far in the importance and prominence he was used to 
during his earlier activities. In 1952, he was joined by his wife Vera (whom he 
subsequently remarried) and his children Klaus, Hors!, and Dieter - all of them, 
uncannily, carrying the name "Eichmann" (Cesarani, 2004: 215; cf. Arendt, 1994a: 236-
237). 
Ironically, Eichmann's "passage into oblivion" (Cesarani, 2004: 2) was well 
assisted by the Israelis as well who, contrary to later claims, did not bother much to 
retrieve him. Those who made sure the former Obersturmbannfiihrer never got lost 
completely from sight were individuals, such as the renowned Nazi-hunter Simon 
Wiesenthal, the somewhat eccentric Tuvia Friedman (see Pearlman, 1963: 18-27; 
Wiesenthal, 1989) and last but not least the Attorney General of the German State of 
Hesse, Fritz Bauer, whose insistence must ultimately be credited for Eichmann's capture 
in Argentina. Bauer first approached the director of the Mossad, Isser Hare! in 1957, after 
he learned by chance about Eichmann's whereabouts. Hare!, however, contrary to his 
later claims seemed neither to know who Eichmann exactly was, nor to care about him at 
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all and, inevitably, the information was thereby followed up by a "sloppily executed and 
lazy mission" (Cesarani, 2004: 224; for Harel's version, see Hare!, 1975). It concluded 
that no Ado if Eichmann could live in such a decrepit place that was found in Argentina. 
Yet Bauer's insistence did not peter out and two years later he re-approached the 
Israelis with the information, this time contacting fellow-Attorney General Chaim Cohen. 
It was his insistence and this "second coming" that kicked off the chain of events that 
lead up to Eichmann being captured in Buenos Aires by the secret agents of the Mossad 
on 11 May, 1960 (Aharoni and Diet!, 1996: 77-87; Cesarani, 2004: 222-226). 
Thus, though it would have surely appeared counter-intuitive at the time of the 
trial, "Eichmann wasn't caught by the Mossad, they just collected him" (Cesarani, 2004: 
14). For one thing, it surely contradicted the heroic narrative of "the untiring search 
lasting for fifteen years" (quoted in Aharoni and Diet! [1996: 84] with contempt directed 
clearly at Harel's narrative).42 The lack of Israeli interest prior to the trial certainly had a 
lot to do with the international situation of the young state living in the perception of 
permanent existential danger (cf. Wiesenthal, 1989: 74-77). As we know by now, the 
Mossad did not have a unit dedicated to the Nazis and appeared to be rather reluctant to 
pursue such tracks, perceiving them as diversions from the main cause of establishing and 
then defending the state oflsrael (Aharoni and Diet!, 1996: 79; Amit, 1996: 7). Yet, there 
might be internal, ideological and political reasons as well causing the Israeli Secret 
Service to show "remarkably little interest" (Cesarani, 2004: 14) in Eichmann, even, as 
we have seen, as actual information reached them about his whereabouts in Argentina. 
As Israeli historian, Tom Segev notes, while 
"[ ... ]the Jews of Palestine saw themselves as part of the Jewish people, 
denying neither Jewish history nor religious tradition [ ... ] were 
committed to Jewish solidarity and aid to the Jews of the Diaspora [ ... ] 
maintained that the Zionist project in the Land oflsrael was a project for 
42 Such a heroic narrative both suited the subsequent image of the trial and the diplomatic argument as well 
in order to justify in the first case the heated focus on the event and in the second an otherwise flagrant 
breach on the sovereigoty of Argentina at the United Nations- see below. For other instances of the heroic 
narrative see Pearlrnan (1963: 27, and Ch. 2) 
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all Jews", there was nevertheless "at the same time a strong counter-
tendency to 'negate the Exile', an aspiration to create a new, proud 
Hebrew race that could stand up and defend itself, part of a new, 
healthy, just, national society" (Segev, 2000: 108-109). 
The relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora had been paradoxical 
from the beginning of Zionism. On the one hand, there was full identification expressed 
in the state's status of being the Jewish state43 and in fundamental laws such as the 1950 
Law of the Right of Retum, which posited that any Jewish person of the Diaspora would 
receive automatic citizenship, should he or she wish to come to Israel. On the other hand, 
however, there was the phenomenon of the ongoing "negation of the Exile" and the 
promotion of a new, secular and muscular identity in the place of what was perceived as 
old, religious and defeatist one (cf. Almog, 2000; Dieckhoff, 2003; Elon, 1983; 
Kimmerling, 2001; Ram, 2003; Zertal, 1998, for various aspects of these problems). 
This "great spiritual divide" could not but regard the Holocaust as the ultimate 
culmination of the Diaspora's weakness and therefore the ultimate conclusion of the 
Zionist "negation of the Exile". The result of this ideological as well as, certainly, 
psychological situation was coined the "great silence". It was born out of arrogance, 
regret and shame. "Israelis", writes Segev, "refused to speak or even think about the 
Holocaust, almost to the point of denial" (Segev, 2000: 513; cf. Friedllinder, 1994; Zertal, 
1998, 2005: 92). What were possible to "identificate" with were the sole heroic parts of 
the ghetto fighters in general and the Warsaw uprising in particular, where those actors 
were rhetorically "Zionised" in many ways in their heroism (Zertal, 2005: 26-44). The 
rest, by consensus, reinforced the inevitable need of the Jewish state but was not 
internalised as an integral part oflsraeli(-Jewish) identity. As such, it could have hardly 
motivated such a risky operation as the one to capture ex-Nazis outside Israel could have 
been.44 
43 Cf. the State oflsrael's Proclamation oflndependence (2001) in 1948. 
44 Remarkably, the Law of 1950, under which Eichmann would be tried, was "passed to provide the Jewish 
state with means to bring to justice a handful of 'collaborators' from amidst the Jewish survivors 
themselves" (Zertal, 2005: 60; cf. 60-79). No one seems to have thought that once an actual Nazi would be 
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It was, however, precisely around the time of the trial that this very "Israel-
ideology'' came to be seen less and less viable (Elon, 1983; Kimrnerling, 2001; Segev, 
2000). The (Jewish) population of the state consisted more and more of people who came 
(after the Holocaust or after pressure being exerted on them in Arab countries) out of 
necessity, rather than out of principle. Coherence and cohesiveness appeared to be 
lacking and the recently developed Israeli culture was considered to be too thin (towards 
the newcomers, in any case) to create a unified (Jewish) national identity. Thus came 
about ageing Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's "last great national undertaking" 
(Zertal, 2005: 90).45 
Immediately after the capture of AdolfEichmann had become known, however, a 
diplomatic row erupted between Israel and Argentina, the latter claiming an infringement 
upon its sovereignty by Israel and requesting Eichmann be handed back. Israel, in the 
form of a letter by Ben-Gurion to Argentine President Arturo Frondizi (see Ben-Gurion, 
1972: 579-580), did not deny the formal breach of international law. Yet, the Israeli 
Premier pointed out, first, the kidnappers were not formally associated with the state, 
were only "survivors" and, second, their goal transcended the "formal violation of law" 
and carried a "supreme moral validity'' in itself. These arguments, pro and contra, did not 
change very much during the remainder of the diplomatic row either, only the scene did 
as the ensuing impasse was decided to be resolved at the United Nations. To collective 
tried in Israel. Likewise, the major "Holocaust trial" that preceded Eichmann's was that ofRudolfKastner 
(born Kasztner Rezso), a Hungarian Jew by origin who in 1952 became the spokesperson for the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry in Israel. Although starting as a simple libel trial against a certain Malchiel 
Gruenwald, who accused Kastner of dealing with the Nazis and benefiting "from Hitler's theft and murder" 
and being the "indirect murderer of my dear brothers" (quoted in Segev, 2000: 257). The trial quickly 
turned to be in effect the trial of the plaintiffKastner and, by association, of the ruling Labour Party ofBen-
Gurion. In the famous verdict of Justice Benjamin Halevi (later to be completely overturned by the 
Supreme Court), Kastner "sold his soul to the devil"- that devil, incidentally, was called Adolf Eichmann. 
On the KastnerTrial see Bilsky, 2004: Ch. 1-3; Lahav, 1997: Ch. 7; Segev, 2000: 255-310; Weitz, 1996. 
45 To what extent this can truly be called a "project" of Ben-Gurion or largely a side effect of an assertion 
of sovereignty directed towards the international community is still being disputed by Israeli scholars (see 
Yablonka, 2004: 46-54). What cannot disputed is Ben-Gurion's involvement It ranged from his dramatic 
announcement before the Knesset (see above) to diplomatic efforts with both the Argentine President and 
Jewish organisations (Ben-Gurion, 1972: 586-603; Keren, 1991). He wrote articles in Hebrew and English 
exclusively devoted to the trial (Ben-Gurion, 1960). He intervened in the job of the Attorney General 
bordering on the transgressing of separation of powers, such as proofreading (and correcting) the first part 
of the text of the indictment (see Yablonka, 2004: 83-87, 238). Whatever his conscious, well-defined goals 
with the trial were and however exactly they mapped later consequences, Israel's ageing Prime Minister, 
who had by then effectively lead the "country" (both in its fully-fledged and embryonic states) for thirty 
years implicitly and explicitly provided the framework for the trial (for an ideological overview of Ben-
Gurion's conception see Keren, 1991). 
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Israeli relief, the UN Security Council effectively judged that Eichmann may remain in 
Israel while "appropriate reparations" must be made to Argentina.46 
Even before the UN decision, frantic preparations commenced in Israel. First of 
all, a venue had to be found for the event. Eventually, instead of the house of the District 
Court in Jerusalem, it was the newly built (and finished just for the sake of the trial) Beth 
Ha' Am (House of the People)- a cultural centre by origin, with a huge auditorium- that 
held the proceedings. The trial was recorded in its entirety, but broadcasted on the Israeli 
radio "Voice of Israel" only in parts, with additional regular programs such as the daily, 
peak hour "Trial Diary'' and the summary of the week "The Week at the Eichmann 
Trial". TV-rights, much to the chagrin of local film studios, were struck with the 
relatively unknown American TV company Capital Cities (ahead ofNBC, CBS, or ABC) 
as it was "the only company prepared to take upon itself all the contractual conditions 
dictated by the Israelis, including a prohibition on making a financial profit from the 
filming, an obligation to supply all filmed material to anyone who wanted it, and the 
commitment to use videotape" (Yablonka, 2004: 58). Subsequently, however, even if it 
was the first televised trial in history, it was neither broadcasted in Israel (the 
government's subsequent attempts at public screenings failed as well47), nor was it filmed 
in its entirety as Capital Cities exploited not being obliged by the contract to do either 
(Y ablonka, 2004: 55-63). Apart from the radio, it was mainly through the written media 
that the Israeli and the worldwide public followed the trial. It is by the written word that 
the extraordinary publicity of the event was best evidenced: Journalists from all over the 
world travelled to Jerusalem, resulting in an outpouring of an unprecedented amount of 
material (newspaper articles, essays and numerous books), to the extent that the 
references in themselves filled a (comprehensive but by no means exhaustive) book-
length bibliography (see Braham, 1969).48 
46 On the diplomatic scene see Cesarani (2004: 238·239), Pearlman (I963; 62-79), Russel (2002: xxvii-
xxxiii), Si!ving (I96I: 307-338). 
47 There was no television in Israel in I 96 I, but the proceedings could have been shown in cinemas. 
48 Amongst the accounts of the trial undoubtedly Arendt"s is the most widely known. It was, however, 
covered by one of the most popular Israeli poet of the time, Chaim Gouri, as well as the Dutch novelist-in-
waiting Harry Mulisch, for instance (Gouri, 2004; Mulisch, 2005). Interestingly enough, Mulisch's 
impressions were very much like Arendt's, in every significant respect. 
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The trial of Adolf Eichmann trial started on April 11, 1961. The three judges 
included District Court Judges Benjamin Halevi and Yitzhak Raveh, presided by 
Supreme Court Judge Moshe Landau. The process of choosing the judges reflected the 
overall frenzy and uncertainty surrounding the case. By Israeli law it was Halevi, 
president of the Jerusalem District Court, who had the right to preside over the trial. Yet, 
his impartiality quickly came under scrutiny and was questioned as he had already 
conducted the infamous Kastner trial in 1954-55, with the extraordinary verdict ("he sold 
his soul to the devil") that not only "damned" Kastner but characterised the person with 
whom Kastner conducted his negotiations - Adolf Eichmann (see Bilsky, 2004: 88-89; 
cf. Ibid: 41-66). As a compromise, a special law was therefore created that enabled the 
president of the Supreme Court Yitzhak Olshan to pick the presiding judge out of the 
available Supreme Court Judges, while Halevi retained his right to choose the remaining 
two judges. One of his choices was himself(Cesarani, 2004: 255; Lahav, 1997: 147). As 
to the counsel for the defence, due to obvious reasons Israeli authorities preferred a 
foreign lawyer (for which they had again to amend Israeli law). It was the German lawyer 
Robert Servatius (with his assistant Dieter Wechtenbruch) that was chosen by the 
defendant (as Eichmann's family claimed that they could not afford the salary of the 
lawyer, it fell on the state of Israel to meet the defence costs). The State of Israel, as 
already noted, was represented by its (recently) appointed Attorney General, Gideon 
Hausner and his team comprising of Gabriel Bach, Y aacov Bar-Or and Jacob Robinson 
(Cesarani, 2004: 246-251; Hausner, 1966). 
In his indictment, the Attorney General charged Eichmann with fifteen counts 
under Sections I and 3 of the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (see fu. 
44). The first count, "Crime against the Jewish people", charged that "the accused, 
together with others, during the period 1939 to 1945, caused the killing of millions of 
Jews, in his capacity as the person responsible for the execution of the Nazi plan for the 
physical extermination of the Jews, known as 'the final solution of the Jewish problem" 
(quoted in Papadatos, 1964: Ill). After enumerating the particulars it also contained the 
proviso that "all the acts mentioned in this count were committed by the accused with the 
intention of destroying the Jewish people" (Ibid: 114). Later counts consisted of other 
sorts of "Crimes against the Jewish people" (Counts 1-4); "Crimes against Humanity" 
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committed against the Jewish (Counts 5-7) people, Polish and Slovene "civilians" 
(Count 9 and 10, respectively) as well as the Gypsy people (Count 11); "War Crimes" 
against the Jewish people (Count 8); "Crimes against Humanity" against the children of 
Lidice (Count 12); and finally "membership in hostile organisation[s]" (Counts 13-15). 
In line with the rather sensationalist indictment (as far as Jewish issues were 
concerned, at least), Hausner's portrait of Eichrnann was replete with "overblown chain 
of accusations", exemplified in his insistence on Eichrnann's "command and control of 
every aspect of the Final Solution" (Cesarani, 2004: 304, 261). As to the personality of 
the defendant, likewise, Hausner echoed the understanding of the popular biographies 
mushrooming after the kidnapping and offering a highly digestible, mythological image 
of the Nazi official (e.g. Clarke, 1960; Donovan, 1960). In his account of the trial (which 
in parts is based verbatim on it), Hausner uses terms such as "mystery figure" (Hausner, 
1966: 4), "diabolical" (!bid: 4), "demonic personality" (!bid: 6), "perverted" (!bid: 7), 
"strongest personification of satanic principles" (quoted approvingly in !bid: 13), 
"monster" (!bid: 265), "devil", "wild beast" (both quoted with approval in !bid: 353, 367) 
amongst others to describe the defendant. As these adjectives tellingly indicate, halfway 
between the (all-too-human) pathological and the metaphysical, the man in the glass 
booth turned to be a symbol, a myth in the Attorney General's conception. 
Again, this was down partly to historical necessity, partly to ideology and politics. 
The Prosecution's image of the Holocaust and Nazi bureaucracy was that of a smooth and 
centralised event, emanating from the strict hierarchical order of the Nazi ranks. 
Functionalist approaches to the Final Solution were not yet prevalent or even available· 
(Raul Hilberg's path-breaking book only got published in 1961, the year of the trial). In 
fact, not many scholarly books were available on the subject at all. 
Yet, this larger-than-life picture of Eichrnann was not merely due to a lack of 
historical knowledge or perspective. Quite simply, from a political perspective the man 
Adolf Eichrnann was not the point of the trial.49 Instead, it was Ben-Gurion's aim to 
assert Israeli sovereignty and its right to represent the Jewish people, coupled with an 
49 Cf. "But, really, I don't care what verdict is delivered against Eichmann. Only the fact that he will be 
judged in a Jewish state is important" (Ben-Gurion, 1960: 69). 
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explicitly expressed educational and unifYing aspect. While the former continued the 
mainstream Zionist line, the latter betrayed a remarkable novelty. The first aspect of the 
trial concentrated on the unity of the Jewish people and conveyed the age-long history of 
anti-Semitism with the redemptive conclusion of this struggle, the State oflsrae1.50 It was 
a message that had been characterising the state and the Zionist movement from its 
inception and, as such, was of no surprise. However, in claiming that the trial should 
assist the Israeli youth to "[ ... ]learn the full truth of what had happened, for only through 
knowledge could understanding and reconciliation with the past be achieved" (Hausner, 
1966: 292), the State of Israel commenced the powerful and multi-layered process of 
integrating the Holocaust in its national life. 51 
To achieve this latter "educational" goal of the trial and to create the project of 
"unity'', Hausner resorted to an arguably revolutionary method. As he himself 
remembered, 
"[ ... ]the proceedings [of Nuremberg] failed to reach the hearts of men 
[ ... ]. In criminal proceedings, the proof of guilt and the imposition of a 
penalty, though all important, are not the exclusive objects. Every trial 
also has a correctional and educational aspect. [ ... ]. It was mainly 
through the testimony of witnesses that the events could be reproduced 
in court[ ... ]" (Hausner, 1966: 292). 
50 Such concerns, naturally, dominated Hausner's grandiose opening speech: "As I stand before you, judges 
of Israel,[ ... ] I am not standing alone. With me are six million accusers". 
"Eichmann, alas, was always a Jewish problem", as Judith Shklar ruefully commented in her essay 
Legalism (Shklar, 1964: 155). Still, it is striking that the Attorney General, referring to 6 million victims, 
clearly and discriminately designates only Eichmann's Jewish victims as those he stands for, even though it 
is his own indictment that charges Eichmann for crimes committed against Poles (i.e. non-Jewish Poles), 
Slovenes, Gypsies. On the trial as a "Jewish problem" see below the issue of "crimes against the Jewish 
people" as well. 
51 As for the lack of knowledge and hence unity, Hausner's immediate explanation is indicative: "Our 
young generation, absorbed as it was in the building and guarding of the new state, had far too little insights 
into events which ought to be a pivotal point in its education [ ... ] There was a breach between the 
generations, a possible source of abhorrence of the nation's yesterday. This could be removed only by 
factual enlightenment" (Hausner, 1966: 292). 
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More than a hundred witnesses were called to testify, following careful 
psychological as well as ideological selection (Yablonka, 2004: Ch. 7). Some of them 
only tangentially related to Eichmann's deeds, or not at all. These witnesses were asked 
to tell their story, much in the way of later interviews or oral testimonies for historical or 
museological purposes (Langer, 1991; Young, 1988: 157-171). The judges tried to 
restrict the outpouring of emotions in the courtroom to what was considered relevant to 
the trial. Yet Hausner ultimately prevailed (Douglas, 200 I: Ch. 5). It was the survivor 
that became the symbol of the trial and it was "the result of this decision [of using that 
many witnesses] that the Eichmann trial 'created' the Holocaust in the consciousness of 
the world" (Bilsky, 2004: Ill; cf. Douglas, 2001; Felman, 2001).52 
Such a "creation" conveyed the Manichean picture of a monster against all-
innocence, especially since Hausner (for all his claims of "factual enlightenment") 
categorically and wilfully excluded the possibly troubling issue of the Jewish Councils 
from the testimonies (see Hausner, 1966: 295, 341). Thus, along with the grandiose 
picture of Eichmann, it was the witnesses "whose appearance and testimony gave the trial 
its powerful emotional charge. Their stories were dramatically and tragically 
unprecedented; they provided Israel with a catharsis that did not have to suffer the 
discomfort of intellectual debate" (Yablonka, 2004: 251). 
After eight months, Eichmann was unanimously found guilty on all counts 
(though not without modifying the indictment on certain crucial points) bar the thirteenth 
and on 15th December, 1961 he was sentenced to death. He appealed against the decision 
but the Supreme Court upheld both the verdict and the sentence on 19th May, 1962. On 
31" May, Eichmann applied for clemency but it was rejected by the President of Israel, 
Yitzhak Ben-Zvi. A couple of hours later the death sentence was carried out. 
52 Cf. with Peter Novick's analysis of the American scene: "The Eichmann trial, along with the 
controversies over Arendt's book and Hochhut's play, effectively broke fifteen years of near silence on the 
Holocaust. As part of this process, there emerged in American culture a distinct thing called 'the 
Holocaust' -an event in its own right, not simply a subdivision of general Nazi barbarism" (Novick, 2000: 
144). 
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While the political, ideological, and moral significance of the entire event have 
never been questioned, they were rarely analysed as immanent to the legal proceedings. 53 
Likewise, legal studies were not concerned at all with these aspects of their findings and 
those in the area of social sciences have regularly ignored the legal aspects of the 
proceedings and the connections between morality, ideology, politics and the law. If, 
however, one is to accept what is consensually alleged by various scholars, namely, that 
this trial virtually "created the Holocaust" (see above), then it is crucial to have a look at 
how and in what way this "creation" related or resulted from the legal proceedings 
them se! ves. 
There was, for instance, the intricate question of the legitimacy of Israeli 
jurisdiction, namely, that it contravened the received principle of territoriality. 
Eichmann's misdeeds were not committed in Israel and hence Israel's claim to try the 
man appeared to be of questionable legitimacy. That is, the state of Israel (the plaintiff, in 
short) did not even exist at the time those deeds were committed. Arguments based on 
received exceptions to the rule of "territoriality," such as the acknowledgment of a 
"linking point" or, more specifically, the principle of ''passive personality" circumvented 
rather than confronted the crucial dilemma. That is, the divergence between the obvious 
(?) of the link between Israel and the victims of the (Jewish) Holocaust; and the 
inevitable lack of any established formal legal link between the two. 54 Albeit these 
problems are, perhaps, at face value of purely legal interest (as evidenced by the neglect 
of subsequent non-legal scholars), the social and ideological dimension can be quickly 
grasped by two distinctive positions, one strongly criticising the rationale of trial and the 
other enthusiastically defending it. Thus, Stanford Professor of Law, Yosal Rogat alleged 
that "by trying Eichmann, and thus stressing crimes against Jews [ ... ] Israel [ ... ] took for 
granted its leadership of world Jewry and its right to speak for all Jews" (Rogat, 1961: 
53 There are apparent exceptions to this, such as the Attorney General's decision to elevate the witnesses to 
a hitherto unprecedented rank (see Bilsky, 2004: Ch. 4, esp. 113-114; Douglas, 2001: Ch. 4-5; Felman, 
2001). But neither of this could blur that virtually no one reflecting on the trial from the realm of 
humanities refer to legal work done on it (and vice versa), and legal problematics on the whole has been 
escaped the attention of social scientists or intellectuals in general (for sort of an exception see Parvikko, 
2000; and Silving, 1961) 
54 On the legitimacy of Israeli jurisdiction and the idea of the ,linking point" see Papadatos (1964: 50·52) 
On the principle of ,passive personality" see Arendt (1994a: 260), Kittrie (1964: 22-23), Rogat (1961: 28-
29), Silving (1961: 333) and Stone (1961: 9-10). 
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16-17).55 In contrast, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice, Michael Musmanno justified 
the legitimacy of Israeli jurisdiction by claiming that "if Eichmann had killed six million 
Americans in twenty different nations around the globe, could it seriously be argued that 
the United States would not have the right to take him into custody and try him here in 
the United States[ ... ]" (Musmanno, 1961: 10; cf. Silving, 1961: 331)? 
Furthermore, there was the issue of the nature of the offence. As already seen, the 
Law of 1950, under which Eichmann was charged referred to "crimes against the Jewish 
people" as well as the more traditional "crimes against humanity". Not that the latter was 
an unproblematic legal concept itself. The notion of "crimes against humanity" was 
troubled since its very inception at the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, where 
the Allies tried major Nazi war criminals after World War II.56 Yet, Nuremberg was at 
least a legal precedent. "Crimes against the Jewish people", however, was completely 
unheard of and smacked, for some, of illiberalism or ethnocentrism in that it "defined the 
crime in terms of the particular group injured, rather than in terms of the nature of the 
acts committed" (Rogat, 1961: 41; cf. Arendt, 1994a: 254-263; Osiel, 1997: 62; Taylor, 
1961 ). These claims were countered by pointing out that this evident idiosyncrasy of the 
law under which Eichmann was tried made "no material difference to either the course or 
the outcome of the trial" (Stone, 1961: 8), or by repeating the court's view that it was 
merely a particularisation of the original "crimes against humanity" concept (see Lasok, 
1962:356, 370; Kittrie, 1964:25, 27; Papadatos, 1964: 46). 
Self-evidently, then, the legal community of the time took up these issues. 
However, it was only in strictly legal terms that they treated the problems. As social 
scientists, in turn, neglected the legal questions altogether, any wider (social or 
ideological) significance of the trial as a legal event has become lost and not been 
recovered since. 
55 Cf. "By the very act of holding the trial[ ... ] Israel undertakes an aggressive defense of the last and most 
crucial bastion besieged by modernity - the self. It denies that personal identity can be created by 
individual action and freedom[ ... )" (Rogat, 1961: 21) For a study on the answer of three (legal) "children 
of liberalism"- Rogat amongst them- to the challenges of the trial see Lahav (1992). 
56 For the evolution of the concept of "crimes against humanity" see Bloxham (2001), Douglas (2001: Ch. 
2), and Robertson (2006). 
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Nonetheless, many other (extra-legal) aspects of the trial were frantically analysed 
and debated by social scientists and various sorts of intellectuals, then as now. As noted 
above, there has always been a virtually unanimous consensus that what the trial and its 
reception constituted a "turning point" in the approach of Israel and the United States to 
the Holocaust. The trial has recently been dubbed a "group therapy" (Segev, 2000: 11, 
351; cf. Elon, 1983: 215) or an entire "consciousness changing event" (Zertal, 2005: 95) 
in Israel. 57 In what did this "change" manifest and what were its consequences? 
To begin with, as was already pointed out the trial helped to terminate what is 
now termed to be the "great silence" (Segev, 2000: 185, 513; Yablonka 2004: 220; 
Zertal, 2005: 92), by raising the Holocaust into a discuss-able issue in Israel as well as in 
the United States. Likewise, influenced very much by the Attorney General's decision to 
lend voice to the survivors themselves (instead of mere documents), the trial helped to 
grant a prominent status to Holocaust survivors they could not enjoy before (Y ablonka, 
2004: 5, 162). Once again, in the place of shame, anger, and blame (very much expressed 
in the Kastner Trial), there was identification to come (Miller, 2002; Weitz, 1996). 
The trial, however, was a "turning point" in a broader sense. Either as an 
"undertaking" or a side-effect, it does appear to have achieved something like a united 
Israeli (Jewish!) national identity through the identification with the Holocaust and its 
victims. In Israeli historian, Hannah Yablonka's word, "the trial turned the Holocaust into 
a Jewish story, a major, and at times, the only component in the Israelis' sense of 
identity" (2004: 248; cf. Elon, 1997a: 267-274; Segev, 2000: 11, 361; Yablonka, 2004: 
166). Such identification, however, was not without further ideological and political 
consequences. For one thing, as some scholars point out, "signalling the end of Israeli 
ideology in Jewish history'' (Yablonka, 2004: 249) it was the Eichmann trial and its 
reception that began to push the state towards an ethno/theocratic course (Bilsky, 2004: 
12, 254-55; Zertal, 2005: Ch. 3). To be sure, as noted above, the State of Israel or the 
majority of Zionists before the establishment of the State never completely distanced 
themselves from Jewish history and tradition, and looked upon themselves as members of 
the Jewish nation or ethnos in fact. Yet there was at the same time the counter-narrative 
57 See Novick (2000) for con- and Lipstadt (1996) for somewhat dissenting as for the United States. 
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of the new, secular, and politically active Israeli or "Hebrew" nation that, according to 
some scholars, would have perhaps better fitted a conception of Israel as a democracy 
(Avishai, 2002; Elon, 1983, 1997a; Kimrnerling, 2001).58 
For many, the process that largely began with the Eichmann trial and reached its 
climax in the aftermath of the 1967 War means the victory, as it were, of the thesis over 
the antithesis. It was a shift illustrated dramatically by Israeli historian Idith Zertal's 
words on "the course Israel has taken along this time frame that is from a secular, 
nationally mobilized and collectivist society into a messianic-like entity displaying 
religious and meta-historic features" (Zertal, 2005: 91). Though undoubtedly overheated, 
it is nevertheless crucial to consider the connection that is drawn here by Zertal between 
the Eichmann trial and the War of 1967. To draw this connection is almost a common 
place in the literature on the collective memorial aspects of the trial (see Elon, 1983: 216; 
Lahav, 1992: 575; Miller, 2002: 131; Segev, 2000: 387-395). Many scholars attribute the 
"organized collective anxiety'' (Zertal, 2005: 121-124) that characterised the famous 
"waiting period" before the war and the enthusiastic welcoming of the "miracle" that was 
to come to the increasing presence of the Holocaust in Israeli public discourse. 
The Eichmann trial, then, did not only turn the Holocaust into a proper and 
discuss-able topic in the life of the Israeli (and American Jewish) society. It did not only 
change the position of those societies with regard to the catastrophe. Rather, it changed 
those very societies in as much as it integrated the ultimate catastrophe in their identity. 
Such is the trial and its public perception described in a nutshell. Yet any 
approach and even that of a nutshell must turn its attention to Hannah Arendt's Eichmann 
in Jerusalem. This book - quite against the wishes of those having tried to control the 
public perception of the event - became synonymous with the trial and one of the most 
crucial components of the debates around it. In the last subsection of this chapter, I will 
overview the "controversy" as well as the ceotral components of the book. 
58 Anyone, generally, of the so-called post-Zionists could be referred to here. For post-Zionism, see Nimni 
(2003), Silberstein (1999). 
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2.3 .2. Eichmann in Jerusalem and its reception 
There are virtually no accounts of the Eichrnann trial that ignore Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. Whether concurring or taking issue with it, this is the book that defined the 
trial for posterity and this is the account that is the basis of every other intellectual 
reflection. Partly, because this was a version that betrayed a sceptical or even hostile 
attitude towards those very political and ideological endeavours that motivated the 
discourse the Israeli authorities aimed to establish. 59 "The controversy'' (cf. Krummacher, 
1964), as the event simply came to be known raged on from 1963 for three years, 
mobilising unseen energies and seeing well over a thousand published written pieces: 
articles, reviews, essays, letters and even an entire book solely devoted to refute Arendt 
during that time-range (Robinson, 1965).60 It was a "civil war", as the participating 
Irwing Howe later metaphorised that "provoked divisions that would never be entirely 
healed" (Howe, 1983: 270, 273-274). Fittingly, contemporary scholars still refer to it as 
the "unparalleled public airing of historical issues relating to the Holocaust" (Cohen, 
1993: 30) or "the bitterest public dispute among intellectuals and scholars concerning the 
Holocaust that has ever taken place" (Rabinbach, 2004: 97). 
Prominent intellectuals from all over the world made their voice be heard, 
including Martin Buber, Ems! Simon, Leon Poliakov, Hugh Trevor-Roper, Gertrud 
Ezorsky, Israel Gutrnan, Marie Syrkin, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Bell, Dwight 
Macdonald, Bruno Bettelheim, Waiter Laqueur, to name (really) but a few. Even so, the 
intellectual level of the debate has often been questioned, historian Ylana Miller calling it 
bluntly an "organized and emotional attack that sought to place Arendt's work outside the 
scope of acceptable discussion" (Miller 2002: 141). Indeed, insinuations, ad hominem 
arguments or even, most pivotally, the explicit ''pathologisation" of Arendt by calling her 
59 Interestingly, early after its American publication, the Israeli publishing house Amikam bought the rights 
from Shocken Books and even commissioned the renowned publicist Boaz Evron to translate the book. 
According to his version, he even completed this task and received his salary for this. It was, however, not 
until 2000 that the book got published. Evron referred to the "hidden hand" that may have acted (cf. Zertal, 
2005: 131). It was very much in line with the reception in Israel in general, which was initially quite 
favourable. Arendt took notice of this situation and claimed to be "informed by reliable sources that Ben-
Gurion himself had intervened to change this atmosphere" (Arend~ 1978g: 273). 
60 For an extensive but incomplete bibliography see Braham (1969: 141-174. 
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a "self-hating Jew" were pervasive features of the reactions. 61 "Is the answer Jewish self-
hatred or possibly the assimilated Jew's aversion to all manifestations of organized 
Jewish life?", as Marie Syrkin (1963) ominously related, joining the company of, for 
example, Israel Gutrnan (cf. Cohen, 1993: 57 -58), Aryeh Tartakower (cf. Cohen, 1993: 
55-56), Eva Michaelis-Stem (quoted in Bamouw, 1990: 235) and the unsurpassable 
Interrnountain Jewish News that proclaimed in its heading: "Self-Hating Jewess Writes 
Pro Eichmann Series for New Yorker Magazine" (cf. Lipstadt, 1996: 206; Novick, 2000: 
131). 
Encountering such a public rage as well as interpretations that matched both in 
their simplicity and intensity these sorts of accusations, Arendt decided against answering 
her critics as early as during spring 1963 (Y oung-Bruehl, 2004: 349). What we know of 
her opinion - both from her private correspondence and from the few occasions she did 
publish her viewpoint - is that she regarded this controversy as an "organized campaign" 
against a "book which was never written" (Arendt, 1994a: 282, 283; cf. Arendt, 1963, 
2003: 17, 1978g: 272; Arendt and McCarthy, 1995: 146-148), or simply an "amazing 
amount of lies" (Arendt, 1993b: 227). This in turn evoked Waiter Laqueur's stunning 
reaction in their exchange in the New York Review of Books: "I think I can assure her [i.e. 
Arendt] that the Elders of Zion are not yet out to get her" (Laqueur, 1978: 279). This 
statement was transformed into a near-certainty by the time Laqueur later reviewed the 
debate, claiming that "Miss Arendt was certainly at the time in a state of near panic [ ... ] 
firmly convinced that the Elders of Zion had conspired to 'get her"' (Laqueur, 1983: 
113). 
It was, however, not so much the case of"reading too much anti-Semitic literature 
for her own good" (Laqueur, 2001: 58) - as Laqueur with breathtaking tastelessness 
intimated on another occasion -, but an assessment given on perfectly concrete 
experiences. As Arendt wrote in her response to Laqueur, she had been sent a letter by 
the acquaintance from her German years, Siegfred Moses, the former state comptroller of 
Israel, chairman of the Leo Baeck Institute in Jerusalem and spokesman for the Council 
of Jews from Germany (in Israel). Moses simply "declared war" on the book and later 
61 For a general overview see Cohen (1993, 2001). 
53 
lived up to his promise by publishing, for instance, a full-page statement in Aujbau 
against the book. Meanwhile, Arendt learned about the efforts of the Anti-Defamation 
league of B'nai B'rith to discredit her book (Arendt, 1978g: 272-276; cf. Young-Bruehl, 
2004: 347). On three occasions (11, 27 March and 28 May, 1963), brochures were 
compiled and then distributed to most Jewish organisations (Rabinbach, 2004: 98). 
Though the ADL memo generally cautioned against an "organized response and personal 
attacks" (Cohen, 1993: 45), it nevertheless urged the recipients to discourage other people 
from purchasing the book and, just in case, "crafted patterns of response to her book" 
(Cohen, 1993: 44) as an "information for book reviewers" (quoted in Miller, 2002: 142). 
One of these brochures included excerpts from what was later termed by Arendt's 
biographer the "most mindless attack of the entire affair'', by a certain Leo Mindlin 
(Young-Bruehl, 2004: 348). 
The ADL memos as well as a short to~the-point discrimination ("a propaganda 
pamphlet", according to Arendt [1978g: 262]) by one of Gideon Hausner's assistants at 
the trial, Jacob Robinson, reached the mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollek as well and 
were further distributed by him. His involvement in the event (unknown to Arendt) sheds 
perhaps some light on the general atmosphere into which Eichmann in Jerusalem arrived. 
As early as one month after Eichmann's capture Kollek informed interested parties that 
assistance would be given to former government personnel Moshe Pearlman in writing an 
account of the trial that ''would present appropriately not only the adventurous aspects of 
the story but the special fields in which we as a State are interested" (quoted in Miller, 
2002: 136). Such assistance came on the condition of Pearlman submitting his work for 
approval before actual publication; which he was naturally eager to do, acknowledging 
"the importance of public opinion" and of pre-empting possibly competitive versions 
(Pearlman quoted in Miller, 2002: 137). Pearlman's book was indeed published, but came 
too late to "pre-empt" the damage that was feared of beforehand (see Pearlman, 1963). 
Consequently, Kollek later advised to advertise it as a "response" to Arendt's account 
(Miller, 2002: 142). According to Ylana Miller, such preparations made sure that 
Arendt's book could "readily be seen not fruitful for discussion but rather as dangerous 
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competition". Hence, what evolved was not an "open intellectual debate but [ ... ] an 
attack" based "less on what she said than what was feared" (Ibid: 140, 141 )"62 
A campaign, then, it was. Yet, as many scholars do not hesitate to point out (even 
while acknowledging what has above been described) all of this is still not enough for an 
account of the intensity of the "controversy''. As Richard Cohen writes in his extensive 
history of the reception, Arendt's work 
"[ ... ] undermined received myths and memories of the past, shaking the 
foundations of a post-war Weltanschauung that had begun to integrate 
the Holocaust and the creation of the State of Israel as seminal moments 
in the history of the Jewish people. In her direct challenge to the myths 
lay the source of the controversy" (Cohen, 1993: 42; Cf. Cohen, 2001: 
255; Novick, 2000: 136; Rabinbach, 2004). 
What were those "myths"? One could immediately refer to the ceremonial 
character with which the event was commemorated. Certainly, it consensually ruled out 
certain forums and certain ways of speaking. Thus, critics could have seen The New 
Yorker - a popular though intellectually shallow magazine: "witty, entertaining, 
frivolous, intellectually pretentious and quite unserious" (Laqueur, 1983: 11 0; cf. Howe, 
1963; but see Alien, 1983: 121) -,as well as Arendt's noted ironical style as sacrileges in 
themselves. 63 Yet it nevertheless seems to be a gross over-simplification of the reception 
of the book that Arendt was "mainly attacked not for what she said, but how she said it" 
(Laqueur, 1983: 116). There were "myths" regarding not only form but substance as well. 
Arendt's book certainly blurred the line between the (collective) black and the 
white, and demolished a Manichean account of the Holocaust. There was no quasi-
62 Apart from those mentioned in the main body of my text, it should be noted that the World Jewish 
Congress distributed a pamphlet written by Nehemiah Robinson. It was based on the first draft of Jacob 
Robinson's book-length refutation of Arendt (see Robinson, 1965) that was available in a mimeograph 
format and was used- according to Arendt's biographer- by many of her high-profile reviewers/attackers 
(Young-Bruehl, 2004: 356). 
63 It must be noted, however, that irony nowhere covers the victims. 
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metaphysical Evil as there was no spotless Innocence either (as far as human collectives 
were concerned). Of course, this does not mean that she would have disputed the criminal 
responsibility of the defendant. What she did dispute was those "overblown chain of 
accusations" attempted by the prosecution as a pattern to convey a monstrous, demonic, 
satanic person. This, she suspected, was not so much deference towards victims and 
survivors but an ideological ploy, suiting the invisible "stage manager", David Ben-
Gurion's interests and confronting those of the trial where 'justice, and nothing else, is 
the end[ ... ]" (Arendt, 1994a: 5, 264-65). 
Justice required that Eichmann be treated as a human being, not as a symbol of 
the age-long anti-Semitism of the nations. And as for this human being, Arendt noted, 
"despite all the efforts of the prosecution, everybody could see that this man was not a 
'monster', but it was difficult indeed not to suspect that he was a clown" (Arendt: 1994a: 
54). Such an observation (if it was one) evidently countered any grandiose and larger-
than-life opinion on the Nazis and - even though Adolf Eichmann, ultimately, received 
maximal contempt from Arendt- could have surely been next to impossible to digest.64 
Even more so that Arendt expressed - and, stylistically, enhanced - this sentiment often 
in the form of oratio obliqua. If one realised the absurd content of some of Eichmann's 
contentions in Arendt' s rendering, this rhetorical tool in which those contentions were 
formally attributed to the narrator (i.e. Arendt) further strengthened that absurd character. 
64 Cf. the way Arendt renders Eichmann's farewell: "Adolf Eichmann went to the gallows with great 
dignity. He had asked for a bottle of red wine and had drunk half of it. He refused the help of the Protestant 
minister [ ... ] who offered to read the Bible with him: he had only two more hours to live and therefore no 
'time to waste'. He walked the fifty yards from his cell to the execution chamber calm and erec~ with his 
hands bound behind him. [ ... ] 'I don't need that', he said when the hood was offered him. He was in 
complete command of himself, nay, he was more: he was completely himself. Nothing could have 
demonstrated this more than the grotesque silliness of his last words. He began with stating emphatically 
that he was a Gottgliiubiger, to express in common Nazi fashion that he was no Christian and did not 
believe in life after death. He then proceeded: 'After a short while, gentlemen, we shall all meet again. 
Such is the fate of all men. Long live Germany, long live Argentina, long live Austria. I shall never forget 
them.' In the face of them, he had found the cliche used in funeral oratory. Under the gallows, his memory 
played him the last trick; he was 'elated' and he forgot that it was his own funeral. 
It was as though in those last minutes he was summing up the lesson this long course of human wickedness 
had taught us- the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-thought-defying banality of evif' (Arend~ 1994a: 252 
-emphases in the original). 
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If not, however, one could for instance believe that the narrator in fact presents Eichmann 
as a Zionist. 65 
However, it was not just the depiction of Eichmann that was presented in an 
unexpected way. Arendt raised the issue of Jewish complicity, and even that of 
institutional Jewish complicity. Again, this went against the tide as evidenced in the 
Attorney General's explicit decision not to touch on the issue of the Jewish Councils. 
Unity was to be created and some disturbing details would have embarrassed those 
efforts. The Israeli youth, as Ben-Gurion stated with characteristic and telling 
determination "should be taught the lesson that Jews are not sheep to be slaughtered but a 
people who can hit back as Jews did in the War of Independence" (Ben-Gurion, 1960: 
62). 
It is true, then, that Arendt contravened certain "myths" as well as an ideology 
that was based on the conception of eternal anti-Semitism, the categorical difference 
between Jews and Gentiles, and a metaphysical view of the Holocaust or even Jewish 
history in general. Her story was certainly not one for creating national unity. 
To be sure, Arendt's own account was close to such an "anti-ideological" or "anti-
mythical" account of her own activity as well as the basic dichotomy along which she 
perceived the trial (Arendt, 1993b). "Justice" was represented by the three judges versus 
''politics" and "ideology", which were represented by Ben-Gurion's proxy, the Attorney 
General. "Despite the intentions of Ben-Gurion and all the efforts of the prosecution, 
there remained an individual in the dock, a person of flesh and blood; and if Ben-Gurion 
did 'not care what verdict is delivered against Eichmann,' [Ben-Gurion, 1960: 62] it was 
undeniably the sole task of the Jerusalem court to deliver one" (Arendt, 1994a: 20). A 
''person of flesh and blood" as Arendt concretely expressed her own task as well as her 
subsequent denials to have arrived at something like a ''theory". No. She just listened and 
wrote down the objective truth. She might have been "cold" but was nevertheless right 
(cf. Canovan, 1994: 193). 
65 Amongst others, it is surely this famous charge (made for example by Abel [1963], Scholem [Appendix: 
I. 174-175], Robinson [1965: 48], and somehow still maintained by Wolin [1996, 2001]) that prompted 
Arendt to characterise Jacob Robinson's 400-page long rebuttal of Eichmann in Jerusalem as "a truly 
dazzling display of sheer inability to read" (Arendt, 1978g: 265). 
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Yet, and quite unsurprisingly at that, her detractors certainly did not and do not 
argue that she was right but cold- i.e. right from a universal perspective but wrong from 
a particular Jewish one (see Bilsky, 2004; Cohen 1993, 2001). Instead, her detractors too 
spoke about facts and events. They too offered interpretations. They too had their 
ideology just as Arendt had hers. Thus, Eichmann's biographer calls Arendt's version a 
"myth" too and (quite apart from the question of whether David Cesarani is right in what 
he means by this) it raises the question of what sort of interpretative decisions Arendt 
(and her detractors) did and did not make about the trial, Eichmann, and the Jewish 
Councils (cf. Cesarani, 2004: 4, 15, 345-346).66 Likewise, legal scholar Leora Bilsky 
criticises ''the prevailing view that Arendt adopted a narrow legalistic stance in Eichmann 
in Jerusalem". Instead, she urges us to analyse her position directing our attention ''to the 
political challenge that the trial posed to the Israeli court: whether the trial could bring 
Israel closer to its ideals of a democratic society or whether it would push it further in the 
direction of an ethnocratic society" (Bilsky, 2004: 11-12).67 
Notwithstanding their actual merits, shortcomings, or sophistication, it is these 
latter attempts that would come close to an account for what actually happened in both 
Arendt's book and in the controversy. This is, certainly, not to say that Arendt was not 
right. It is, however, to assert that scholarship should exceed the notion of someone being 
simply right. 
As indicated in the introduction of this chapter, I do not have the time and space 
here to go down this road. But it was introduced because it is this road on which I shall 
try to analyse the exchange between Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem. 
66 See, however Thomas Laqueur (2004) arguing that Cesarani's rendering of Eichmann in fact bolsters 
most of Arendt's contentions. 
67 As for the "prevailing view" of considering Arendt a legal purist, see Felman (2001) and Douglas (2001: 
I Il-l 13). Ironically, Arendt herself would have considered herself one. 
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2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter consisted of four more or less independent sections, in which I have 
attempted to layout the historical context of the event that is to be analysed in this thesis. 
At this point, it has hopefully become evident that the subject of this thesis is the public 
exchange, fall-out and bout of two extraordinary intellectuals with partly common and 
partly strikingly different life-stories and interests. This certainly does not mean that 
those differences should necessarily enter or influence their texts and even less so that 
analysis should be conducted according to them. But it does mean that by dint of these 
factors, the exchange of letter between Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem was no 
ordinary matter. 
Just what kind of matter it was will be my task to uncover in the bulk of this 
thesis. Again, I hope I have managed to establish the significance of the event. Nothing, 
however, replaces the actual analysis of the text. Before entering the realm of analysis 
though, I will briefly review the reception of the exchange, and position as well as defend 
my methodological approach with regard to this reception. If it was of such significance, 
many interpretations of it can be expected, after all. Why do we need yet another one? 
Furthermore, where would, methodologically, the originality of that "another one" lie? 
This is the topic of the next chapter. 
59 
3. Methodological and Theoretical Framework: Discourse 
Analysis on Balance 
3.1. Introduction 
As the task of this thesis involves the reading of a text, no fixed set of procedures 
can be expected as methodological principles. To introduce the kind of reading I envisage 
in producing an analysis of the exchange, I will therefore briefly introduce earlier forays 
into this region. I will start with the reception of the exchange and describe what sorts of 
readings, what sorts of analyses have been produced on it so far. It is the (rather major, in 
my understanding) shortcomings of these attempts to which I will contrast my take on the 
text. 
From then on, I will turn my attention to the three theoretical and methodological 
frameworks in the realm of social sciences that produce distinctive conceptions about the 
nature of texts and the analysis's task. After outlining the more or less common 
assumptions that discourse analysts work with, I will first introduce the radically bottom-
up approaches of conversation analysis and ethnomethodology where analysts' 
assumptions are claimed to be subordinated to the concerns of the participants. After 
pondering the worth and drawbacks of this orientation, I will consider the once self-
fashioned middle-of-the-road candidate, discursive psychology and recent developments 
in this area I will contrast early conceptualisations of this strand of discourse analysis-
where an attention to local, situated construction coexisted with an interest in broader 
emerging topics as well - with later achievements that appear to point distinctively 
towards the direction of conversation analysis, blurring virtually any difference between 
the two approaches. Having briefly considered debates that derive from this state of 
affairs, I will shift to the top-down approach of critical discourse analysis and elucidate 
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some of the assumptions that this approach displays in the programmatic assertions of its 
leading scholars. 
In conclusion, I will argue for the original, middle-of-the-road discursive 
psychology as an orientation fit for investigating more abstract, culturally embedded 
topics of political, ideological, and broadly moral nature while not losing from sight that 
these topics should nevertheless be the outcome of any empirical research, rather than the 
input of it. 
3.2. Quoting the Recondite Text: The Brief History of Reception of the Exchange 
between Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem 
There can be no surprise that one of the only moments when Hannah Arendt, the 
protagonist of "the bitterest public dispute" (Rabinbach, 2004: 97) of the century on the 
Holocaust, was actively engaged in the controversy has been preserved by the "collective 
memory" as the peak point of that dispute. Moreover, as documented in the previous 
chapter, the moment came in the form of a correspondence between two extremely highly 
regarded and distinctive intellectuals. This could surely be assumed to add further to its 
subsequent impact. 
Hence, the history of the reception of the debate frequently refers to the event of 
the exchange between Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem as the "famous exchange of 
letters" (Bilsky, 2004: 146; cf. Bemstein, 1996: 15, 1997: 128; Laqueur, 2001: 57; 
Kristeva, 2001: 103), the "famous letter'' (Marrus, 2001: 205), the "fabled exchange" 
(Wolin, 1996: 10) or the "well-known tempestuous clash" (Elon, 2003: 76) that was 
"deeply imprinted in the public mind" (Eddon, 2003: 55; cf. Eddon, 2006). Accounting 
for the fame (apart from the noted facts of the personality of the correspondents and of 
the letter being Arendt's sole significant contribution to the debate), it has been singled 
out that Scholem's were "the most authoritative words" (Howe, 1983: 273) and they 
"captured this collective bitterness" (Benhabib, 2000: 65; cf. Bamouw, 1990: 238; 
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Bemstein, 1996: 160, 1997: 128; Canovan, 1994: 193). We might conclude, then, that 
consensus not only takes the "fame" of this exchange for granted but allocates its 
significance as well. It has been considered representative of the entire debate. What 
Scholem stood for was, thus, nothing less than the entire offended community. 
"Famous and oft-quoted" (Laqueur, 2001: 59) as the exchange has since been, it 
is nevertheless worthwhile to have a brief look at how its meaning and actual importance 
have been reconstructed, partly by the very same reviewers that posit and sustain its 
prominence. What even a cursory glance encounters is the phenomenon that Antaki et al. 
(2003) singled out as ''under-analysis through over- or isolated quotations" in their 
review of deficiencies in discourse analysis. Though the criteria for this example of "non-
analysis" may in many cases be contested, there can simply be no doubt that in most of 
the essays and reviews where the exchange has been quoted, there is indeed an extremely 
"low ratio of the analyst's comments to data extracts" (!bid). Thus, that the exchange is 
"oft-quoted" does not mean that these quotations form the basis of analysis, commentary, 
or interpretation in any valuable sense. 68 
But perhaps they should not either. Perhaps the value and significance of this 
exchange lies in the very fact that it "speaks for itself'. Hence, in-depth analysis is not 
required at all. Perhaps this is where the genuine significance of the event lies. It just 
crystallises what in other cases remained obscure; it just enlightens the shade; and we 
merely have to "see" and not read (analyse, interpret or comment). 
Let us see whether this is indeed so, whether there is a consensus about what the 
exchange means, what social action it accomplishes, and how the verdicts of those that 
briefly comment on the exchange or paraphrase it are established. 
The reputation of the exchange is often concentrated on one utterance, where 
Scholem alleges that, 
68 For an extremely partial list where the exchange is quoted or referred to in order merely to illustrate 
something else, see Canovan (1992: 245), Felman (2001: 207), Fine (2000: 298), Herzog (2002: 92), 
Kristeva (2001: 106), Lipstadt (1996: 212-213), Parvikko (2003: 202), Wolin (2001: 54). 
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"In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet 
concrete enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: "Love of the 
Jewish people ... " In you, dear Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who 
came from the German Left, I find little trace of it" (lines 58-61).69 
The fame of this utterance almost equals that of the whole exchange. It appears 
sometimes that the phrase Ahabath Israel synechdochically stands for the toto. Hence, in 
what follows we shall take a fresh look at just how this "well-known charge" (W olin, 
1996: 10) or "old issue" (Laqueur, 2001: 59) features in later commentaries. 
Strikingly, Scholem is sometimes reported to "accuse" Arendt of lacking "love of 
Israel" (Zertal, 2005: 7), to "discredit Arendt" by turning "her formulations into 
expressions of a misguided individual, one who lacked [ ... ] 'the love of Israel' (Ahavat 
Israel)" (Cohen, 1993: 43), again, to accuse her "of the lack of love for the people of 
Israel" (Shapira, 2005: 27), or to charge Arendt "with the lack of Ahavat Israel, that is, 
love of Jewishness", explicating that "in so doing he wished to express that she did not 
feel obligated to the Jewish ethnos [ ... ]"(Diner, 1997: 182- emphasis in the original). 
"Jewish people", or "Israel", or "Jewishness", or "Jewish ethnos": it does not appear to 
matter. I have to make my point clearly here. It is not my main concern that certain of the 
reviewers cannot simply quote Scholem properly. Neither is it that they sometimes 
appear to paraphrase his words in any way they wish. Rather, my point is that these 
paraphrases are in none of the cases argued. While the "Jewish people", "Israel", 
"Jewishness", and "Jewish ethnos" are literally different, they certainly can be 
functionally equivalent in any given piece of discourse. And they might as well be 
equivalent in Scholern's. Yet, this is an assumption in all of these cases which, even if 
true, does not bring us closer to understand that phrase or that letter. It does not only reify 
its meanings, but displays a stunning paucity of interest in what it actually reifies.70 
69 All "line-numbers" in the forthcoming refer to the text of the exchange in the Appendix of this thesis. 
70 See Reicher's argument on the conservativism (meant politically) that the social sciences display in 
taking the categories in terms of which they conduct their research for granted and hence effectively 
reifying the status quo (Reicher, 1997; cf. Reicher, 1996, 2004; Reicher and Hopkins, 2001b). Again, what 
is astonishing in many of the texts that deal with the exchange is that they not only conserve, they have no 
apparent interest in what they actually conserve. 
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My contention is that this is a pervasive characteristic of the reception of the 
exchange. While its significance and high reputation is asserted, no one has paid closer 
attention to that very significance up until now. While the comments and various sorts of 
paraphrases posit meanings found in there, they do it without even the slightest effort to 
argue for that meaning and for the validity of the paraphrases. 
By the same token, as there are no qualms about paraphrasing/translating Jewish 
people/ Israel in apparently any sorts of unargued-for ways, there is an even wider variety 
of the same act with regard to the whole phrase, "love of the Jewish people". Sometimes 
it is "loyalty" to "her people" as it highlights "the contrast between the detached and the 
connected critic (a loving member of the community)" (Bilsky, 2004: 158, 146). 
Sometimes ''total, albeit highly sophisticated, commitment" (Aschheim, 200 I: 60). 
Sometimes mere "sympathy" (Young-Bruehl, 2004: 337). Or a special sort of"sympathy 
for the Jewish people" (Mommsen, 1991: 260). Or "solidarity with her people of origin" 
(Wolin, !996: 10). Or, to the contrary, "unquestioned Jewish solidarity'', "unquestioned 
and unquestionable belonging to the group" (Barnouw, 1990: 233, 237). Alternatively, 
again, it was "more patriotism, more emotional involvement" (Elon, 1997b: 29) that 
Scholem requested, instead of the "nationalistic fervour'' (Suchoff, 1997: 64-65) Arendt 
took this request to be. Lastly, to cite a unique voice: 
"[ ... ]in retrospect, one can only say that, sadly, Arendt missed the point. 
Scholem was far from advocating an unthinking Jewish nationalism (he 
was, along with Buber and Judah Magnes, affiliated with the lchud a 
small group of Palestinian Jews who sought to promote Arab-Jewish 
understanding). Nor was it his position [ ... ] that by criticizing one 
another Jews only provided aid and comfort to the 'enemy' [ ... ]Instead, 
Scholem's criticism concerned the unsympathetic and captious tone of 
Arendt's remarks as much as their content. [ ... ] Scholem was not 
summoning her to love all the Jews" (W olin, 1996: I 0 - emphases in the 
original). 
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Apparently, then, "love of the Jewish people" does not mean "to love all the 
Jews". Why not? Or why yes? Sadly, these questions are generously overlooked in this 
treatment. 
What all of this tells us has, certainly, not much to do with Ahabath Israel or 
Scholem's letter as such. Again, this is not to say that the phrase or the letter do not 
amount to a request for sympathy or solidarity or patriotism or unthinking nationalistic 
fervour or emotional involvement or unquestionable belonging or whatever. Or, 
incidentally, that they do. What it tells us is that all of these utterances mean virtually 
nothing until they are argued, defended, and analysed. Likewise, finding some apparently 
participant-independent phrase or dichotomy with which to elucidate what was going on 
(i.e. group vs. individual loyalties; particularism vs. universalism. Cf. Aschheim, 2001; 
Bilsky, 2004; Zertal, 2005) do not help and in an important sense do not mean anything at 
all as long as they are not embedded into the context of the text. They might or might not 
be right, just as "love of the Jewish people" might or might not effectively equal 
unquestioned belonging to the group orpatriotism.71 
We must get rid of the notion of the simple transparency that in effect appears to 
have been dominating the reception of the exchange. Instead of assuming that one sees 
through it and then attributing to it any sorts of meanings one pleases, we must take it at 
face value: as a text. To understand rather than posit the meanings constructed, we must 
pay attention to it and analyse it. Only then will there cease to be an astonishing 
contradiction between the reputation and the high importance attributed to this exchange 
and the lack of valuable analysis or commentary of it. "Seen but unnoticed", as Harold 
Garfinkel would call everyday meaning-making (Garfinkel, 1967; cf. Drew, 1992: 484). 
The divergence will only disappear once we, instead of positing them confront the issues 
71 Just as it does not matter, whether it is Israel or Jewishness that Scho1em's charge concerns, it is even 
less important whether it was her tone that was accused by "heartlessness" (Cesarani) or whether Scholem 
accused, upbraided or simply spoke for many, summed up, delivered a message, touched on major 
concerns; whether his letter was cruel (Benhabib), cryptic (Diner), authoritative (Howe), bitter (Barnouw) 
or acrid (Zertal). In many cases, certainly, it does not bear any significance either. Yet they illustrate wen 
the altogether much more important examples in the main body of my text of utter linguistic carelessness 
with which the exchange has been treated. To put it rather bluntly, an of these versions come without a 
minimal trace of attention (which they in some case deserve) and with a maximal practical devotion to the 
idea that what actuany was (and is) written does not matter the slightest bit 
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of meaning and significance as they are still buried within the letters that actually 
constitute it. 
3.3. Principles of Discourse Analysis 
The theoretical and methodological approach that is taken up in this thesis is that 
of discourse analysis (see Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002; van Dijk, 1997a, 1997b; 
Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 200la, 2001b). Though many and diverging orientations 
took it up as a way to conceive of and conduct social research, certain common 
assumptions may nevertheless be detected in the various sorts of endeavours coveting the 
umbrella term of discourse analysis for their own research activities. In outlining the 
theoretical and methodological underpinnings of this thesis, I shall start with these largely 
consensual issues. Yet, to reiterate, discourse analysis became such a wide term covering 
so many approaches that certain broad and distinctive types of understanding of notions 
such as "discourse" and "analysis" must be differentiated and subsequently addressed. In 
this sense, although the overarching feature of these orientations may still be considered 
discourse analysis, the difference between them appears to be as much (if not more) 
significant as the umbrella under which they allocated themselves. 
For a start, it must be pointed out that doing discourse analysis (DA) means 
having a certain conception of the object of analysis. As discursive psychologists Derek 
Edwards and Jonathan Potter put it, DA starts with a threefold assumption about 
discourse; be it written text or talk. It assumes that it is action-oriented, situated, and 
constructed/constructive (Edwards and Potter, 200 I; cf. Potter and Edwards 200 I; 
Edwards and Potter, 2005; Hepbum and Wiggins, 2007). 
The first assumption echoes the insights of the philosopher John Austin (Austin, 
I 962; cf. Potter, 200 I). Austin broke with the age-old assumption of the humanities that 
the site where sentences are assessed should be that of the truth-falsity dichotomy. He 
started with introducing another, rarely acknowledged cluster of sentences which he 
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called performative (as opposed to constative) and which, instead of a possible case of 
evaluation along the true-false dichotomy, appeared to carry out acts in the world.72 
Performatives are, in short, neither true nor false but accomplish things in the world, 
Austin argued. His legacy, however, has not been to concentrate on a hitherto 
underestimated type of utterances in the world or to restore it to the prominent role in the 
hierarchy. Rather, his main point was to get rid of thinking about constatives as a rule and 
performatives as the exception (or vice versa) and acknowledge that utterances are both 
(to an extent) constative and performative in their use. They both make statements about 
the world and carry out acts in or of it (cf. Potter, 2001; Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 16). 
While it cannot be said that Austin would have directly influenced discourse 
analysis in the social sciences, his break with viewing language and sentences solely in 
terms of truth and falsity- and hence solely as window to or a transmitter of a reality that 
precedes it and is independent of it - clearly chimes with the break discursively oriented 
social sciences carried out within their own disciplines. 73 Thereafter, utterances were 
taken as much to be doing the reality as they had earlier been taken to express it in social 
psychology, sociology (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), political science (Edelman, 1977) or 
cultural anthropology (Geertz, 1973; Lutz, 1988; Lutz and Abu-Lughod, 1990). 
Language-in-use was considered constitutive of the problem, not merely transmitting it. 
Philosophically, then, discourse analysis in the social sciences might be indebted 
to Austin. Edwards and Potter's notion of the situatedness of discourse (elsewhere: 
indexicality74), however, indicates the point where it parts company with him, or perhaps 
with philosophy in general (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 5; Potter, 2001; Schegloff, 
1984). In search of the "felicity conditions" in terms of which a performative is or is not 
"successful", Austin acknowledged the role of the context in which that utterance 
featured. However, his theoretical, made-up, and abstract examples prevented him from 
considering this context as constitutive of the utterance and the utterance as constitutive 
72 E.g. "I hereby name this ship Elisabeth". 
73 Billig (1996: 1-30) and Edwards (2004: 259) both point out that their respective positions were not so 
much responses for intellectual developments in the humanities. Rather, they evolved quite independently 
from reflecting on philosophical sources that could undetpin its practice theoretically only later, in 
retrospect. 
74 See Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998b; Garfinkel, 1967; Garfmkel and Sacks, 1970; Rester and Eglin, 
1997b: 11; Potter, 1996: 43-47. 
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of the context (Potter, 2001; Hester and Eglin, 1997c; Hester and Housley, 2002b; for 
philosophical accounts on this see Derrida, 1991; Fish, 1999: Ch. 2, 3, 6). Discourse 
analytic studies, helped by their empirical orientation soon explored that utterances 
cannot be statically characterised in terms of the actions they do and the relationship they 
display must be examined with regard to the here-and-now in which they feature and 
which they accomplish. That "with regard" might mean the simple orientation of an 
utterance to previous ones or the challenge it poses to them or even the challenge it might 
pose to ones that would possible undermine it. Overall, for discourse analysis, what an 
utterance does not depend on a pre-established set of abstract features philosophers 
ascertain but on a dynamic interplay between that utterance and various other relevant 
utterances featuring in the context the research is examining. 
This dynamic interplay brings us to the third and related assumption of discourse 
that is singled out by Edwards and Potter. The constructed/constructive dimension of 
discourse entails that any utterance is constructed by a participant and the researcher must 
investigate these acts of construction rather than assume some sort of mysterious 
preceding force (i.e. correspondence to reality; memory distortion etc.) that caused the 
utterance to be exactly that way. Yet, investigating how an utterance is constructed to 
appear to be exactly as it is tells only half of the story. As the emphasis is on doing 
instead of transmitting, an equal concern is what that "doing" will achieve, what its 
consequences will be. The utterance therefore is not only constructed but also 
constructive as it alters the context and the course of the entire discourse it features here 
and now in. 75 
As noted, these assumptions radically changed the practice of the sciences in 
which they were deployed. Invariably, the interest does not any more lie in something 
that is putatively beyond language but in language-in-use itself. This is well expressed in 
Edwards's programmatic book, Discourse and Cognition, where the author differentiates 
between three types of approaches towards language (Edwards, 1997: 24, 271-272; cf. 
Edwards, 2006: 42). Type one considers it a route to "reality'': to a non-/pre-discursive 
"reality'', that is. It takes descriptions to render information to us about what is "out 
75 Cf. "context-shaped" and "context-renewing" in Heritage 1989: 22-23. 
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there". The medium of description, in this conception, plays the role of an (optimally) 
neutral transmitter. If it is neutral, we indeed gain access to reality. Should it be tarnished, 
however, by whatever factor, it will distort that picture of reality and block our access to 
it. 
Type two acknowledges that such an attempt to gain uncompromised access to 
reality is illusory, but still maintains that language-in-use is the royal course towards 
those (collectively or individually originated) mental phenomena that mediate and hence 
construct or distort that reality. Even though "reality" is not something one can arrive at 
via discourse, cognition nevertheless is. There is, then, the idea remaining of 
investigating discourse for something that is beyond itself. 
Not so in type three - in discourse analysis - however. Discourse analysis, says 
Edwards, takes language-in-use as its topic in itself, not as a route to anything beyond. In 
this conception, "reality" and "mind" do remain topics, yet do not supersede the realm of 
discourse. Rather, they themselves become discursive problems and are to be analysed 
insofar as they are taken up in the actual utterance that is analysed as well as in terms of 
the ways in which they are taken up there (cf. Edwards, 1997: 68; Edwards and Potter, 
1992a: 10; Potter, 1996: 205; Wooffitt, 2005a: 72). 
It is clear that, in the broadest possible terms, such an approach seems to be 
satisfactory for tackling the problem I briefly outlined in the previous section. The gross 
neglect, that is, of the language used in the exchange between Arendt and Scholem, and 
the ensuing phenomenon that apparent acts of interpretation or commentary tended to 
collapse into projections and assumptions already held/known before actually entering 
into the realm of the correspondence itself. In theory, discourse analysis's tenets treat 
problems primarily in terms of the language those problems are constructed of and 
provide one with an important safeguard against such banal outcomes of alleged 
interpretations as expressed in Antaki et al.'s (2003) caveat: 
"Whatever kind of discourse analysis is being done, it has to amount to 
much more than treating talk and text as the expression of views, 
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thoughts and opinions as standard survey, ethnographic, or interview 
research often does". 
At a very basic level, this "much more" arguably encompasses the three features 
(action-orientation, situatedness, constructed/constructive) spelled out above and entails 
that what the analyst is primarily concerned with is not his/her own (however 
inescapable) preconceptions but what is actually said there by the participants. The 
prioritising of "participants'" over the "analyst's concerns" is an empirically useful 
consequence of many trends within the discursive orientation and allows one to withstand 
what Emmanuel Schegloff calls the tendency "[ ... ] for the formulated social-structural 
context to 'absorb' or 'naturalize' various details of the talk" and for features of talk 
being "thereby made unavailable, in practice if not in principle, for notice and analysis as 
accountable details of the talk" (Schegloff, 1991: 58).76 
While no claim can (should) be made about an analysis deriving from a tabula 
rasa (which is putatively the analyst's mind), attention may indeed be paid to the text and 
to the relevance constructed just there. It may be fruitful to forget who we know the 
participants to be and what equivalences we assume between certain categories in the 
world. If we are to learn anything from a text, we have to consider categories and 
identities flexible, negotiable, and bound to the context there and just there constructed in 
our text. One must not assume and thus reify those categories and identities achieving 
hence nothing but the maintenance of the status quo be it that of our preconception or that 
of the political order (see fu. 70). 
The lesson of discourse analysis, thus, is the importance of the emphasis put on 
language-in-use. Yet, as the focus of this dissertation is not language itself but a 
particular historical manifestation of it, it may be apt to attempt to answer the question: 
what do they know of discourse who only discourse (claim to) know? In other words, 
how do we proceed if our priority is discourse, language-in-use but our interest is, say, 
76 On further empirical work addressing the distinction between analyst's and participant's concerns see 
Antaki, Condor and Levine (1996), Antaki and Widdicombe (1998a), Rester and Eglin (1997a), Rester and 
Rousley (2002a), Widdicombe (1998). 
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mind ("views, thoughts and opinions"}, reality, or the correspondence between Hannah 
Arendt and Gershom Scholem? 
In what follows, I will consider certain threads of discourse analysis, contrast 
them, and ponder their worth in pursuing the empirical work that constitutes the main 
body of this dissertation. I will introduce the radically bottom-up versions of conversation 
analysis (CA) and ethnomethodology (EM}, the middle-of-the-road candidate discursive 
psychology (DP), and the top-down oriented critical discourse analysis (CDA). 
3.4. Ways of Analysing Discourse 
3.4.1. Bottom-Up: Conversation Analysis and Ethnomethodology77 
A methodological overview is to get started with the reductio ad absurdum of the 
three-part discursive principles expounded previously. For all their differences, both 
ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967, 2002; Button, 1991) and conversation analysis 
(Atkinson and Heritage, 1984; Psathas, 1995; ten Have, 1999; Wooffitt, 2005a) embody 
what might be called a "radical" empiricist orientation (Hepburn and Wiggins, 2007: 4; 
Wooffitt, 2005a: 72).78 
Both persuasions aim at "the description and explication of the competences that 
ordinary speakers use and rely on in participating in intelligible, social organized 
interactions" (Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 1), or, in other words, the "procedural 
infrastructure of situated action" (ten Have, 1999: 37, cf. 198). What makes them 
distinctive is their avowed and by intention exclusively "emic" approach. That is, their 
71 It is true that these approaches often do not count themselves under the umbrella of discourse analysis 
(see Wooffitt, 2005a). As I am working with a liberal concept of discourse analysis, which covers ways to 
analyse texts in the social sciences, their place is undisputable here, however. 
78 The account given here will be based mainly on conversation analytic writings. Some 
ethnomethdologists or those subscribing to the approach of member-categorisation analysis would certainly 
contest this choice (see Housley and Fitzgerald, 2002; Hester and Eglin, 1997a; Lynch and Bogen, 1994, 
1996: 262-287; Silverman, 1998: Ch. 5, 7; Watson, 1997; Widmer, 2002). They would not, however, argue 
the basic and fundamental distinction between analysts and participants' concerns that is governing this 
chapter and thus characterises all of these orientations as bottom-up approaches. 
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empirical claims are without exception warranted in terms that are claimed to be internal 
to the phenomenon they are analysing in the here-and-now. It is not the analyst's but the 
participants' understandings that are taken to be relevant; not the interest the analyst 
might have but those relevant for the participants. 
Of course, one could immediately counter that approaches addressing 
conversation and aim to give a structural account of the "machinery" or "mechanism" (cf. 
Zimmerman and Boden, 1991: 12; Psathas, 1995: 27; Sacks, 1984: 26-27; ten Have, 
1999: 41; Wilson, 1991: 22, 24) that underlie conversation as well as to uncover this 
"machinery" in "formal, logical, atopically contentless [ ... ]terms" (Psathas, 1995: 3; cf. 
Lee, 1987; ten Have, 1999: 42) are simply not fit for the purposes of this thesis. It is not 
structure and process but content and meaning that are my obvious goals. Hence, 
conversation analysis is obviously not viable as an analytical method here. 
While there is an apparent truth in this contention, one has to recognise that, in 
fact, conversation analysis's goals are wider than these explicit proposals might betray. 
Its approach poses a challenge even to those whose interest, admittedly, lies not only in 
processes displayed in conversation or talk-in-interaction but also in contents showcased 
in any kind of text. 
As the doyen of CA, Emmanuel Schegloff repeatedly points out in some of his 
programmatic papers; any kind of utterance may be subjected to infinite kinds of 
factually correct descriptions. "On what ground", Schegloff asks, "should some 
characterization of any of these aspects of a sociocultural event be preferred to another" 
(Schegloff, 1997: 166; cf. Schegloff, 1991, 1992a, 1992b)? In other words, the participant 
of the event may be a male, a cancer-patient, a QPR-supporter, a Catholic, and so on. 
Which, if any, of these categories should inform the analytical description of the 
situation? Schegloff here turns to prioritise those actually taking part in the interaction 
and replace the interests that preoccupies the analyst with what is displayed by the 
participants (Schegloff, 1997: 167). According to him, then, a category- in order to be 
not merely an accurate description of the scene but an adequate description of it- should 
be both "demonstrably relevant" to the participants themselves and "procedurally 
consequential" to their subsequent conduct (Schegloff, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1997). There 
72 
is a distinction, then, drawn between the analyst's and the participants' interests, 
concerns, and categories: "Discourse is too often made subservient to contexts not of its 
participants' making but of its analyst's insistence" (Schegloff, 1997: 183). 
The advantages of such a program are obvious, taking especially into regard from 
where we started. The major shortcoming of the history of the reception of the exchange 
appeared to be the very gross neglect of the language, categories, and interests of the 
participants that this radically bottom-up approach insists on thwarting. Instead of 
premature theorising and of "analytical rush" (Widdicombe, 1995: 108) to assume the 
relevance of certain contexts, categories, and identities, an approach working with the 
displayed perspectives of the participants can be expected to substantiate its claims more 
thoroughly. 
Appealing as it is for empirical research vying to avoid the pitfalls that were 
depicted to characterise the reception of the Arendt-Scholem exchange, there are 
conspicuous problems with this radically "emic" approach, even at first sight. No 
conversation analyst or ethnomethdologist to date seems to have been able to explain 
what "demonstrably"79 or "unmotivated" looking (Psathas, 1995: 45; Sacks, 1984: 27) 
might exactly mean according to which "relevance" itself is posited to be assessed. While 
this principle tries to pin down an analytical claim in the participants' conduct, it 
certainly cannot mean something like the "intention" or any kind of corresponding mental 
state of the participants. All of these, according to a bottom-up stance, would be matters 
internal to the talk/text-in interaction (see Heritage and Atkinson, 1984: 7; Edwards, 
2006: 43-46) and, hence, an object of the same sort of warranting has just been promoted 
to be part. Those who "demonstrate" and "observe" (and to whom they display both) will 
certainly be members of the scientific community. For all the pretence, then, it is 
ultimately the conversation analyst or the ethnomethodologist scientific community that 
is the arbiter and not the orientation or the "displayed perspective" (Hepburn and 
Wiggins, 2007: 1) of the participants (cf. Feyerabend, 1975; Rorty, 199la: 46-62, 35-45). 
79 An alternative to "demonstrable"t'demonstrably" is "observable"f'observablf' relevance: see Drew 
(2005: 170), ten Have (1999: 55), Wooffitt (2005a: 84). 
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Likewise, "procedural consequentiality" is, in fact, a criterion that only the 
scientific community can validate. Is it the next millisecond where the consequence must 
be displayed? Or the next sentence? The next utterance? Alternatively, are we dealing 
with political ideological consequences that may be observable weeks, months, even 
years later? All this undoubtedly depends not merely on what the participants themselves 
display but on what the researcher is after and what the consensus is in his/her scientific 
community. 
Correspondingly, laudable as the empirical orientation that these studies stand for 
is, there is at least a partial kind of dissatisfaction evolved with regard to conversation 
analysis's and ethnomethodology's microscopic angle and concerns (see Wetherell, 1998, 
challenging Schegloft). Morally, why, one might ask, should the appreciation of the 
participants result in the self-effacement of the analyst? Philosophically, how would that 
ever be possible? And ideologically, what does that allegedly microscopic concern 
actually cover and why should not what is currently absent inform our political 
evaluations?80 
One common (non-CA) answer is that these approaches are only at one extreme 
within discourse analytical studies but certainly not the only kind of them. Phillips and 
Jorgensen in their overview distinguish three types of discourse analysis: interactionist, 
post-structuralist, and synthetic (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 91). Likewise, Nigel Edley 
and Margaret Wetherell categorise present research in the area as bottom-up and top-
down while they argue for an orientation, which would "draw more eclectically on both 
styles of work and which study the ways in which people are simultaneously the master, 
and the slave [Barthes] , of discourse" (Edley and Wetherell, 1997: 206). By the same 
token, scholars invoke distinctions between research interest in the "how" and the "what" 
(Willig, 2001: 91); "process" and "content" (Taylor, 2001 15); "organisation" and 
"content" (Sani and Reicher, 2000: I 07); or whether the inquiry in question treats 
language as a "topic" in itself or a "resource" for investigating stricto sensu non-
8° For philosophical criticism of assumptions that underpin Schegloff's and CA's position see Feyerabend 
(1975), Rorty (1991a). For a moral one see Geertz (1973, 2001). For a direct ideological criticism, see 
Billig's exchange with Schegloff (Billig, 1999b, 1999c; Schegloff, 1999a, 1999b). For a more indirect 
challenge in the form of spelling out the connection between discourse analysis and ideological-critique, 
see Billig (1997, 1999a, 2006). 
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linguistic phenomena (Taylor, 2001: 15; cf. Wooffitt, 2005a).81 In what follows, I turn to 
an approach that has been considered somewhat "middle-of-the-road" in these terms. As 
Charles Antaki alluded to, without actually naming it, this approach 
"[ ... ] is certainly aware that meaningful work is achieved in the local 
organization of talk, but reaches up to bring in culturally charged 
content: themes, repertoires, concepts and other chunks of talk, not 
necessarily all in the same spot in the transcript, and not all necessarily 
spoken by the same person. So the 'action' that this talk does is almost 
automatically (and certainly by preference) 'action' of a rather 
metaphorical kind: the use of themes, repertoires and so on to do some 
work on the setting up or knocking down of social realities - to promote 
this version of sexuality, to exercise that power of authority, to institute 
such-and-such a change in the law" (Antaki, 1994: 120). 
The next subsection is to discuss a representative of this approach: discursive 
psychology. 
81 Perhaps the best way to characterise these various research traditions is Edwards's distinction between 
social constructionism in the "epistemological" and in the ~'ontological" sense, i.e. the distinction between 
"the constructive nature of descriptions" and the "entities that (according to descriptions) exist beyond 
them" (Edwards, 1997: 48). According to this categorisation, much of social constructionist research could 
be seen as "ontological". Namely, cultural psychology (Much, 1995; Wertsch, 2002), dialogic psychology 
(Shatter, 1993, 1995), narrative psychology (Bruner, 1990; 1991), some strands of discursive psychology 
(Harn\, 1995; Ham\ and Gillett, 1994) and even the main framework behind constructionist research as 
spelled out by Kenneth Gergen (1994, 1999). "Epistemological social constructionism", on the other hand, 
will cover discursive psychology in the tradition of the "Loughborough school", as well as conversation 
analytic and ethnomethodological research. The next sub-section is partly about this latter convergence. 
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3.4.2. Middle-of-the-road: discursive psychology 
The tag "discursive psychology" did not emerge widely until Derek Edwards and 
Jonathan Potter's 1992 book that bore this title (Edwards and Potter, 1992a). 
Nevertheless, the principles of discourse analysis had already been programmatically 
applied to psychological topics by that time from the middle of the 1980s onwards (e.g. 
Billig, 1985; Edwards and Middleton, 1987; Middleton and Edwards, 1990; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). It is from the earliest developments of discursive psychology that I will 
begin my overview: developments, whose relation to later orientations is by no means 
unequivocal. 
Virtually all reviews attribute the "birth" of discursive psychology to the 1987 
publication of Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell's book, Discourse and Social 
Psychology in which they sketched out a systematic program of reformulating traditional 
questions of social psychology in terms of the study of language in use (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987). Categories, selves, representations, and attitudes- phenomena oflong-
standing interest for social psychologies - were to ·be taken out of the head of the 
individual and considered features of the discourse where they are attended to and made 
relevant. Consequently, they were to be evaluated precisely in these terms and not in 
either their truth-value or their inherent mental characteristics. Instead of being 
embarrassed by it, Potter and Wetherell confronted the variability these allegedly mental 
phenomena displayed in talk or text and instead of seeking to explain away variability, 
they promoted it to the rank of the object of research. As they defined their project, 
discourse analysis was "interested in the ways in which texts are organized, and the 
consequences of using some organizations rather than others" (Potter and Wetherell, 
1987: 46). This dual concern has remained with discursive psychology since then; yet, as 
we shall later in this subsection see, one can maintain that its interpretation has become 
somewhat tendentious over the years. 
"Ways in which texts are organized" - or as Potter later called it, the 
"epistemological orientation" (Potter, 1996) of descriptions - emerged from the broadly 
post-structuralist insight that no description can map or mirror reality better than any 
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other; even though this is exactly what they ail want us to believe. 82 The "ever-present 
possibility of alternative descriptions" (Potter and Wethereii, 1987: 3; cf. Edwards, 1997: 
8) entailed discursive psychology's interest in the rhetorical fashioning of texts (be they 
pieces of naturally occurring talks, newspaper articles, or interviews), as they without 
exception orient towards those possible alternatives and either argue with them explicitly 
or attempt at undermining them implicitly. 
At about the same time Potter and Wethereii published their book, the 
argumentative side of human nature was likewise pushed to the fore of social 
psychological inquiries by Michael Biiiig (see Biilig, 1985, 1991; 1996; Biilig et al., 
1988). Biiiig expounded the rhetorical reconceptualisation of traditional social 
psychological problems. He based his proposal on the far-reaching claim that cognitive 
social psychology had largely reduced thinking beings to "cognitive misers" and 
"bureaucrats", who, unable to cope with the infinite complexity of reality, strip this 
reality of many of its features and through categorisation and schematisation effectively 
impoverish it. Biiiig's claim was not that there is no such thing as mental operations the 
way cognitive psychologists demonstrate them by experiments, but that it is only one side 
of human beings and it is by ignoring the essentiaily argumentative character of human 
thought that psychologists achieve the construction of these human beings as colourless 
automatons. Biiiig's rhetorical approach, in turn, started with the assumption that 
meaning is best located in argumentative contexts, rather than in an abstract space 
removed from them, and that it is only by restoring argumentative contexts and the 
moves utterances accomplish in them that we do justice to that other side of the human 
condition. Categorisation, then, would turn out to be a rhetorical option instead of a 
perceptual necessity; just as particularisation would cease to be an overlooked 
"impossibility'' and become another rhetorical move to be considered (Biiiig, 1985; 1996: 
Ch. 6). Although Biiiig's project made claims about the nature of human thinking while 
82 See Rorty (1979) for a philosophical and Edwards, Ashrnore and Potter (1995) for a social scientific 
criticism of the language as a window concept. See Edwards (1997: 226-227) for a treatise of the notion of 
"mapping" in a characteristic discursive psychological way. 
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Potter and Wetherell has remained silently sceptical about it (e.g. Wetherell and Potter, 
1988: 181), the significant overlaps of the two projects are obvious.83 
The rhetorical side of human thinking or human discourse, however, was not the 
full story for either of these forays. It is the "consequences of using some organization 
rather than others" (Potter and Wetherell, 1987: 46 - see above) to which we have to 
return now. What this might have meant for the just emerging discipline can be gauged 
from two rather different kinds of acknowledgements made throughout Potter and 
Wetherell's book. That is, to ethnomethodology and conversation analysis on the one 
hand and to post-structuralism (Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault in particular) on the 
other. 
As argued in the previous subsection, the former two entails a strictly ongoing-
interaction-inherent understanding of "consequences" and the in situ empirical 
reformulation of the speech act theory of Austin. This involves the analysis of the 
ongoing process of mitigation, blaming, justification, and other "actions" as they are 
manifested in talk-in-interaction, where these "actions" are carried out by speech events 
with a nominal relationship to psychology: attitudes, attributions, or expressions of 
identity. Yet, there was another understanding of "consequences" clearly displayed in the 
book as well as in Billig's work. They were "intetpretative repertoires" (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987: Ch. 8; cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1988; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), 
"ideological dilemmas" (Billig et al., 1988) or "ideologies" (Billig, 1991) emerging from 
the text.84 
Like many of Potter and Wetherell's main concepts, "intetpretative repertoires"85 
was taken as the reformulation of the mentalist concept of "representation" in cognitive 
83 Discursive psychology's by now rather confrontational attitude towards cognitive psychology has 
evolved with the years. It was not only Billig, but Edwards as well in some of his earlier publications that 
took a conciliatory position and a framework that did not preclude the possibility of cognitive psychology 
(e.g. Edwards, 1991: 525; Middleton and Edwards, 1990: 37; and even at many points in Edwards, 1997). 
Jonathan Potter, by contrast, appears to have been more confrontational in this aspect, a feature since then 
overtaking what may be called "mainstream" discursive psychology (see Potter, 1998, 1999, 2000). 
84 For a comparison of the notions of "interpretative repertoires" and "ideological dilemmas" see Condor 
(2000: 196-198). 
85 The concept itself was taken from Gilbert and Mulkay (1984). 
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psychology. 86 Elsewhere, they defined it as "building blocks speakers use for 
constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes and other phenomena" or ''patterns 
of recuning organizations" (Wetherell and Potter, 1988: 172, 177). These definitions 
(despite being rather vague attempts to delineate with precision the object in question) 
signalled nonetheless that a level of abstraction may be introduced into the analysis. Not, 
to be sure, the analysis of something non-discursive and categorically beyond the 
discourse, but something that, for one thing, aims at a higher level of cultural abstraction 
within the analysis of the text, and, for another, puts the text into a context of a long chain 
of other texts and beyond the strict here-and-now of the ongoing interaction. Clearly, 
through interpretative repertoires, discourse analysis could retain the primacy of . 
discourse while addressing broader political and ideological concerns. Broader, that is 
again, indicating not phenomena beyond the boundaries of discourse but always possibly 
beyond the boundaries of this piece of discourse. 
In a similar vein, Billig's work can be seen as the reconceptualisation of the 
traditional notion of ideology, its function seen not necessarily ''to suppress 
argumentation and thinking but provide the elements with which people can think and 
argue about everyday life" (Billig, 1991: 143). Or, to move a step further in line with this 
thought, elements, which people can re- and re-constitute by arguing and thinking in 
everyday life. 
How do later developments in discursive psychology map onto these ambitious 
starting points? As Derek Edwards noted recently, "one of discursive psychology's key 
concerns has been the ways in which talk manages subject-object relations, or mind-
world relations" (Edwards, 2007: 31). "Object side" meaning "how, in producing 
versions of things and events, speakers (or writers of text) build the factual status or 
objectivity of what they are saying", and "subject side" referring to the ways accounts 
"reflect a speaker's 'stake and interest' in the topic" (!bid: 31). Indeed, as early as in 1992 
Edwards, Potter, and Middleton defined discourse analysis as "the study of how everyday 
versions of events (including persons, things, and states of affairs) are constructed and 
86 This also covered the theory of social representation, which itself claimed to be a reaction to traditional 
cognitive psychology (see Flick, 1995; Moscovici, 2001; for criticism see Billig, 1988; Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987: Ch. 7; Potter and Edwards, 1999) 
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occasioned in talk and text" (Edwards, Potter, Middleton, 1992: 441 - emphases in the 
original). 
The side from where a specific psychological attention comes to this wide project 
has recently been described as threefold. The programme of discursive psychology 
consists of the re-specification of traditional topics of psychology; the investigation of the 
psychological thesaurus and how psychological categories are in use; and finally, the 
analysis of how psychological business (i.e. agency, intention, emotional investment) is 
handled in naturally occurring interactions (Edwards, 2004; Edwards and Potter, 2005). 
In line with its theoretical insights, discursive psychology does not wish therefore 
to move beyond language while investigating phenomena traditionally interesting for 
psychologists. Rather, it takes discourse at face value and analyses how those concerns 
are actually managed in talk or text by those participating in the interactions. Thus, 
questions of memory become issues in actual socially oriented remembering (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992a, 1992b; Edwards, Potter and Middleton, 1992; Middleton, 2002; 
Middleton and Brown, 2005; Middleton and Edwards, 1990); emotions are considered 
emotion discourse (e.g. Edwards, 1997: Ch. 7; 1999; 2005; Locke and Edwards, 2003); 
and attributions are taken out of individual heads and treated as ways of talking (Antaki, 
1988; Antaki, 1994; Edwards and Potter, 1992a; MacMillan and Edwards, 1999; Sneijder 
and Molder, 2005). Since its inception, discursive psychology has similarly re-specified 
traditional cognitive notions - i.e. category (e.g. Billig, 1985, 1996: Ch. 6; Edwards, 
1991; Edwards, 1997: Ch. 8, 9), script (Edwards, 1995; Edwards, 1997: Ch. 6), identity 
(Antaki, Condor and Levine, 1996; Antaki and Widdicombe, 1998a; Benwell and Stokoe, 
2006; Edwards, 1998), attitudes (Billig, 1996: Ch. 7; Wiggins and Potter, 2003), as well 
as the very idea of knowledge, cognition and the mind (Antaki, 2004; 2006; Edwards, 
2004; Potter, 1998) - in terms of the function they accomplish as a piece of discourse. 
Furthermore, discursive psychology is interested in how the psychological 
thesaurus is used in actual interactions. In other words, the everyday and situated use of 
psychological categories, the psychological "common sense" is investigated. As Edwards 
points out, "Rather than starting from the principle that folk psychology is an inaccurate 
and inconsistent theory of mind that needs to be replaced by the superior technical 
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vocabulary of experimental psychology or cognitive science, we investigate how it works 
in discourse" (Edwards, 2004: 263). In discursive psychology's understanding, thus, 
these categories ("I think", "I believe", "I don't know" etc.) are not there for the analyst's 
correction. But they do not merely reflect some inner state of mind or represent cognition 
either. Rather, they are to be investigated as pieces of discourse, in terms of what they 
achieve in a particular piece of argumentative discourse. 87 
Along these lines, the third concern of discursive psychology is the way people 
manage "psychological business". This concerns the various ways "how psychological 
themes (i.e. agency, intention, and emotional investment) are managed in talk without 
actually labelled as such (Edwards, 2004: 267; e.g. Edwards, 1997; Wiggins and 
Hepbum, 2007). 
What is interesting in all of these phenomena, once having severed their contact 
with the mental life of the individual, with the representations in his/her head and with 
(possibly) various biological substrates? The answer is that they become interesting in 
their own right, as ways of talking and ways of acting in the world. How are they 
constructed, how does their use construct a credible version of reality and what are the 
consequences of this reality in the interaction (Edwards, 1997)? 
It is this state of the discipline that Jonathan Potter aptly summed up in asserting 
that discursive psychology is "an approach that treats psychology as an object in and for 
interaction" (Potter, 2005: 739; cf. Potter and Molder, 2005: 2). For one thing, such an 
emphasis on interaction as the ultimate site of interest brings discursive psychology ever 
closer to conversation analysis. It is a claim that has increasingly been made by both 
discursive psychological and conversation analytic scholars recently (Edwards, 2004: 
258, 271, 2007: 31; Hepbum and Wiggins, 2007: 8; Kitzinger, 2006: 67; Potter, 2006: 
132; Wooffitt, 2005a: 90) and has empirically been bolstered by the fact that many 
conversation analytic or ethnomethodological studies could just as well feature as 
discursive psychological ones (e.g. Beach and Metzger, 1997; Drew, 1989; Goodwin and 
Goodwin, 1996; Lynch, 2006; LynchandBogen, 1996,1997, 2005; Wooffitt, 2005b). 
87 E.g. on "I don't know" or "I dunno" see Beach and Metzger (1997), Edwards (2004: 268), Wooffitt 
(2005a: 117-121), Wetherell (2001a). 
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While the advantages of such a convergence of disciplines appear to be taken for 
granted, questions must be asked about the rationale and consequences of this process, 
however. To begin with, the notion of "interpretative repertoires" or "ideologies" or any 
sort of political consideration per se appears to have vanished from discursive 
psychology. Considering the recent developments as well as the prevailing concerns 
sketched out above there is no real surprise at that. The question, namely, that discursive 
psychologists have increasingly been depicted to be concerned with was how versions of 
events are constructed to achieve various effects and not what those events constructed 
actually were. "Consequences" or "action-orientation" are, thus, in recent developments 
in discursive psychology taken to be a local, narrowly situational concern rather than 
broader, further reaching. 88 
There is something disconcerting about this schism as the focus on the content of 
an utterance should not be, at face value, excluded whilst analysing the process that had 
been fashioned to establish and legitimate that very content. Surely, looking at language 
as a topic in itself should not entail not looking at it as a resource as well. 
It was precisely such a unification of approaches, top-down and bottom-up; 
content- and process-oriented; language-as-source; language-as-topic that was attempted 
by Nigel Edley and Margaret Wetherell in the late 1990s, as if to counter the increasingly 
prevailing conversation analytic tendencies in discursive psychology (Edley, 200 I; Edley 
and Wetherell, 1997, 1999; Wetherell, 1998; Wetherell, 2001b). At first sight, again, 
there is a touch of common sense in claims such as "[ ... ] what counts as relevant context 
[ ... ] in analysing discourse depends on what we are studying - conversational activities 
versus modes of representations" (Wetherell, 2001b: 390), or such as that an interest in 
"broad cultural changes" should not (in fact, must not) exclude to maintain an "empirical 
focus on discourse" (Edley and Wetherell, 1997: 204), or such as that "in analysing our 
always partial piece of argumentative texture we [should] look also to the broader forms 
of intelligibility running through the text more generally" (Wetherell, 1998: 403). Indeed, 
in line with the notion of the "action orientation" of discourse, why could we not or even 
88 To be sure, there are exceptions (e.g. Tileaga, 2005, 2006). Yet, the point is that these exceptions are 
swimming against the tide and their orientations are theoretically not integrated into the programmatic 
papers published about the current state of discursive psychology. 
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should we not investigate the "social and political consequences of discursive patteming" 
(Ibid: 405)? Why could we not use the empirical research oflanguage as a means towards 
such ends, rather than, apparently, an end onto itself? 
The short answer is and has always been that we certainly can (even if we should 
not choose to do so). "There is a sense", Edwards characterises critics, 
''that language, or talk-in-interaction, is to be found only at the surface 
of things, and that inferences of a different kind need to be made, in 
order to get at what is going on below the surface. Nobody is claiming 
that discourse is all there is. However, the rush toward theorising about 
context and subjectivity is being done without close attention to what is 
available on the surface" (Edwards, 2007: 47). 
License is given, then, to investigate what appears to point beyond the here-and-
now, even though (surprisingly) a researcher with post-structural inclinations would 
actually concede that "discourse is all there is". Who would contend that a ''rush toward 
theorising" is counter-productive? (In effect, who would not recommend reading before 
producing our analysis?) But then comes the "sting in the tail": 89 
"To the extent that subjectivity is part of social life, and relevant to 
language and social interaction (the practices of inter-subjectivity), it has 
to be made available in mutually understandable ways. [ ... ] 
Increasingly, the study of talk-in-interaction reveals the richly detailed 
and orderly 'surface' workings of social interaction [ ... ]. It is here that 
we find contextual relevance and (inter-)subjectivity under active 
management in the course of social practices in ways that are essentially, 
89 
"Sting in the tail" is meant here in the technical sense Antaki and Wetherell (1999) propose it in their 
analysis of ostensible concessions in talk-in-intemction. 
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and necessarily, publicly performed, and by dint of that, and in terms of 
that, recordable and analysable" (Ibid: 48 - emphasis in the original). 
In terms of "workings of social interaction" and in the "course of social 
practices"? Such an orientation would surely not only advise against a "rush toward 
theorising" but also in many cases positively paralyse the analyst in looking at the 
political and ideological factors relevant to the text. Now "workings of social interaction" 
replace their product, now language-as-resource is completely rejected in favour of 
language-as-topic, now discourse cannot be about something, which is not in the first 
place its "workings". Something, that is again, not pre-discursive and "deep" but 
emerging from discourse, whose boundaries though cannot be maintained to be infinite, 
they cannot be defined a priori either. 
Compare this with conversation analyst Robin Wooffitt's elaborate reaction to 
Edley and Wetherell' s position. On the one hand, Wooffitt asserts that "many other 
discourse researchers have objected to conversation analysis's argument that it is 
necessary to ground analytical claims by reference to close description of the 
participants' conduct" (Wooffitt, 2005a: 170). A position to which, I think, no serious 
"discursive researcher" can object, and certainly no one that Wooffitt is arguing with ever 
did. His argument, however, takes a radically different course when claiming on the other 
hand that "to identify conversation analysis as a tool for the analysis of micro-interaction 
obscures its primary focus on generic properties of intelligibility, structure, and order, 
and constitutes a serious misunderstanding of its objectives" (Ibid: 166). Why would it be 
a misunderstanding? And what are those "generic properties" of intelligibility? 
Wooffitt criticises researchers using the notion of "interpretative repertoires" for 
their "interactional vacuum" (Ibid: I 71- I 79) and "impoverished view of human conduct" 
(Ibid: 174). What this charge semantically points to is conversation analysis's exclusive 
attention to language-as-topic, process, performativity, and action as opposed to 
language-as-resource, content, and constativity. The meaning that is produced in an 
interaction should not simply be abstracted from that particular interaction, assuming that 
interaction is a simple window towards non-interactive issues. Yet again, however, 
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consider Wooffitt's following claims that "analytically, [ ... ] in this post-structuralist 
account, much rests on the analyst's assumption that 'out on the pull' has a certain 
meaning [ ... ]largely independent of the context of its use, because of its embeddedness 
in wider cultural understandings [ ... ]" (Ibid: 174), that this kind of analysis is "restricted 
to the level of meaning" (Ibid: 184), and that it does not attend ''to the detail of social 
interaction" (Ibid: 199). The point is, then, simply that "out on the pull" should be 
considered with regard to its sequential place in the interaction, with regard to previous 
utterances, rather than simply assumed to have some meaning. 
Certainly, Wooffitt's is a valid case to defend. Until, that is, one realises that with 
such a methodological principle one would simply never arrive at anything but local 
''workings" of interaction. Not because one is empirically strongly focused but because 
one is theoretically predisposed to attribute anything and everything exclusively to local 
interactional workings. Indeed, there will always be one or more sequentially prior 
utterances, enabling the researcher to point just to them, as the observable, demonstrable 
cause of the next utterance. But that does not mean to be cautious and circumspect 
(instead of a "theoretical rush"), but to renounce the idea and aspiration of learning 
something about the world. 
Yet again, not about a pre-discursive world: as I noted, in an important sense it is 
discourse all there is. But it is precisely this state of affairs entailing that what precedes a 
piece of discourse and happens not to be on our tape is not something pre-discursive or 
deep or genuine but just another piece of discourse (cf. Wetherell, 200lb: 388-389; Pitch, 
1998). Ironically, the "assumption" that something "has a certain meaning [ ... ]largely 
independent of the context of its use" and is restricted to the "level of meaning" is 
patently not an analytical shortcoming but the very condition of understanding anything 
at all. Theoretically, then, this extreme reduction of content to process, language-as-
resource to language-as-topic, the ''what" to the "how" and meaning to interactional 
workings is, in fact, not reduction but fiction. Hence, if there is an "impoverished view" 
here on display, it is the fiction that the action that language performs must reveal itself 
within the range of couple of utterances and that the whole interaction is exclusively 
grounded in the "observable" (i.e. taped for research purposes) sequentially prior 
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utterances, rather than in any of the prior, theoretically unspecified and permanently 
ongoing (inter)actions. 
So far, I have claimed that it is the empirical approach of discourse analysis that is 
needed to recover the meaning and social significance of the exchange of letters between 
Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem. Instead of assuming the operations of certain 
meanings and identities, we should investigate how meanings in the text are constructed 
and what they are constructed to be. Yet, what is required is not an approach that 
considers this exchange happening in a vacuum and thus artificially reduces it to certain 
quasi-formal processes going on in it. Not because it is an illusion (which it is) but 
because it might lead to address problems where those "broader forms of intelligibility" 
will practically be excluded from consideration. This will occur by dint of either the 
sampling and collecting process of the data (i.e. no political, literary, philosophical etc. 
text to be analysed) or providing analysis in distinctively dissimilar terms from the reason 
one actual! y was drawn to the data. 90 
The approach I am trying to reconstruct and adopt would pay attention to the 
participants' concerns but would not absolutise them. It would treat the discourse's 
action-orientation both locally and "metaphorically" (see Antaki [1994] above); in terms 
of both this particular text and this particular world that we live in. Beyond this 
interrelatedness, however, it would acknowledge its moral and political interest being 
rather in this world than in this text i.e. the meaning of this text. Correspondingly, it 
90 One of the most conspicuous incommensurability of these tenns is still Edwards and Potter's re-
examination of cognitive psychologist Ulric Neisser's work on the Watergate-hearing and John Dean's 
testimony (cf. Edwards and Potter, 1992a, 1992b; Neisser, 1981). Leaving aside the shortcomings or merits 
ofNeisser's work, it is clear that his declared purpose was to find out whether Dean had lied or he tried to 
convey the truth. This seems to me a perfectly valid question, even more so that Neisser had the tape-
recorded version of the events Dean tried to remember. While not claiming that it is an easy exercise to 
distinguish truth from lies (and especially the effort of telling the truth from that of telling lies), it cannot be 
brushed aside as something of a non-scientific activity. Regardless of the merits or shortcomings ofEdward 
and Potter's re-examination: it is this very question that they did not attempt to answer. They, too, were in 
possession of the transcript of the tape-recorded events as well as Dean's recollections of the hearings, yet 
they only consulted the latter. In a debate on their paper and to Neisser's explicit question, Edwards, 
Middleton and Potter state quite correctly that"[ ... ] we make no claim that Dean way lying, any more than 
that he was telling the truth" {1992: 455; cf. Neisser, 1992). That, however, is precisely the problem: for the 
re-examination, then, simply poses different questions from the original paper and, as such, loses thereby 
all its relevance, as far as Neisser' s paper is concerned. 
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would fully agree with the orientation of Reicher and Hopkins's claim, made in line with 
Edley and Wetherell's priorities, that 
"[ ... ] it becomes necessary to elevate the process by which people 
negotiate and debate their identities [ ... ] to a central concern which has 
an independent and determining role in shaping of collective action. We 
must consider how versions of identity relate to the prophecies that they 
are designed to fulfil, how different versions of identity seek to fulfil 
different prophecies and how the different prophets seek to establish 
their words as the truth about identity and the words of others as false" 
(2001a: 43; cf. Reicher, Hopkins, and Condor, 1997: 101). 
Categories though undoubtedly help some sequentially posterior utterances into 
being, though they undoubtedly can be characterised in terms of the local action they 
achieve, they can nevertheless be analysed in terms of broader contexts as well. Surely, 
this is simply and naturally preposterous in certain cases. Yet in others it is helpful, and 
again in others almost inevitable or even a moral obligation. There is no reason in 
denying the unity of the "what" and the "how", the constative and the performative, the 
''nature of arguments" and "the means by which arguments are warranted" (Sani and 
Reicher, 2000: 107). 
3.4.3. Top-down: critical discourse analysis 
Having withstood the "lure" of the radically bottom(-up) approach and avowed 
the potential of broader concerns it is, however, vital to briefly review and investigate 
another strand of discursive social research. Even at a brisk glance, it is clear that critical 
discourse analysis is far more liberal in its use of notions such as "ideology'' or "politics" 
and makes invariably those "broader forms of intelligibility" (that are effectively 
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repudiated by conversation analytic research) its flagship. As prime proponent Ruth 
Wodak describes, CDA's main goal is "analysing [ ... ] structural relationships of 
dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, 
CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, signalled, 
constituted, legitimized and so on by language use (or in discourse)" (Wodak, 2001: 2). 
Though CDA in practice is even more varied than discursive psychology (let alone 
conversation analysis), such a delineation of interests is well in line with what is perhaps 
"mainstream" CDA's most stunning contention: "CDA is biased- and proud of it" (van 
Dijk, 1999: 96; cf. 2001: 307; Wodak, 2001: 9).91 
Seemingly, there is a kind of post-structuralist awareness in van Dijk's claim. 
There is no pretension for objectivity, the neutrality of the researcher, the non-partisan 
nature of his/her findings. Nonetheless, there are couple of intertwined questions to be 
asked here. What if someone's interest is, strictly speaking, not "inequality"? And what if 
someone sees inequality less of a straightforward issue? Is it viable to make a direct 
inference from an epistemological statement ("there is no such thing as non-discursive, 
non-political, non-moral truth") to a political-moral imperative ("CDA must be biased")? 
What, furthermore, are the potential empirical consequences of such an inference? 
It is CD A's approach to language and ideology that these questions pin down as 
there is a rather crude, top-down conception of ideology (and discourse) that appears to 
inform its programmatic statements (see Fairclough, 2001: 230; Fairclough and Wodak, 
1997: 258; Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002: 60-95; van Dijk, 2001: 300; Wodak, 2001: 10). 
It provides a view that is perhaps not altogether untenable, yet highly contentious 
nevertheless in the wake of the ideas of the French historian Michel Foucault's work 
(Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1978, 1984). Power, in Foucault's conception, does not in the first 
place legitimate inequality or help to sustain patterns of domination but establishes the 
very conditions of knowledge and meaning. It is horizontal, rather than vertical, not so 
much oppressing certain forms of lives and identities as creating them. Instead of "false 
consciousness", thus, it becomes the very basis of any kind of consciousness (cf. Hall, 
2001). 
91 For the various kinds of research done under the tag ofCDA, see Fairclough and Wodak (1997). For the 
various kinds of research and thought that influenced CDA, see Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999). 
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Foucault's work is not without its critics, in part exactly by dint of his conception 
of power being so pervasive and ever-present that it practically undermines chances for 
social or ideological criticism and change in society (cf. Rorty,1991e: 193-198; Walzer, 
2002: Ch. 11 ). Yet, it is one thing to spell out criticism of Foucault and quite another to 
evade the challenges he posed to theorists of the political and the ideological. CDA's 
answer in many cases, however, seems simply to address problems, which are apparently 
straightforward: anti-Semitism, racism, sexism, chauvinism (Fairclough, 2001: 237). For 
one thing, it is of course not difficult to take sides in these issues. For another, however, it 
is precisely this taking sides that might preclude the researcher from providing genuine 
answers/analysis to/of the problems and texts in question; as well as from being surprised 
(Antaki et al. 2003; Wetherell, 2001b: 385). While conversation analysis attempts to 
reduce meaning to workings of isolated local interactions, many examples of critical 
discourse analysis relegates language to a role of merely illustrating analytical claims 
about a wider state of affairs (see this criticism made by Widdowson, 2004). While CA 
gives a reductionist interpretation of the three-part list on the nature of discourse 
(situated, action-oriented, constructive/constructed), CDA at times seems to treat 
discourse merely as masking or conveying some underlying non-discursive reality. 
Let us consider, for instance, Reisigl and Wodak's conceptualisation of the 
problem of racism. As they state, 
"Today, it is undeniable fact for geneticists and biologists that the 
concept of 'race', with reference to human beings, has nothing to do 
with biological reality. From a social functional point of view, 'race' is a 
social construction" (Reisigl and Wodak, 200 I: 2). 
The term "social construction" acquires here a rather pejorative sense, being 
depicted as hiding some immoral, condemnable (un)truths. Racists should simply read 
geneticists and biologists, as we all do. They would then know what we do. Meanwhile, 
the task of the analyst is to remove the mask, to destruct the "social construct". 
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But things are clearly not that straightforward, not even in the seemingly black-
and-white case of racism. For one thing, racists would claim that those geneticists and 
biologists are ours and not theirs. For another, neither geneticists nor biologists help us to 
characterise a piece of discourse as racist. If racism is a social construction then so are 
our interpretative methods to describe, categorise, and condemn it. In turn, we describe, 
condemn, and praise our own non-racism, which consequentially turns out to be less of 
the unmediated product of "biologists" and "geneticists" but that of our social 
construction and moral sense (Rorty, 1991 a: 46-62). 
While rejecting above the assumption of radically bottom-up discourse analytical 
research that effectively prevented the pondering of broader political issues, I 
nevertheless started this theoretical-methodological overview with observing that what is 
required in analysing the exchange of Arendt and Scholem is an emphatically empirical 
approach, rather than one that is influenced by its assumptions from the outset. From this 
starting point, it is doubtful whether the approach that is to be preferred is one that 
operates with the idea of a constructed (i.e. racists' untrue) and an unconstructed (i.e. 
biologists' true) language. Likewise, it is doubtful whether the gross dichotomies implied 
in "dominance, discrimination, and control" are to be adopted as principles. There surely 
must be a way between Scylla's dissolving language-as-source in language-as-topic and 
Charybdis's doing effectively just the other way round. Bias (unless meaning something 
banally broad) should be the outcome, not the input of analysis. 
To further contrast the assumptions of CDA to that of conversation analysis; let us 
fmally review the characteristics of the discourse-historical approach advocated by Ruth 
Wodak and the Viennese school in a series of publications on Austrian anti-Semitism, 
racism and the construction of nationalism. "The distinctive feature", as Fairclough and 
Wodak put it, "of this approach is its attempt to integrate systematically all available 
background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of written or 
spoken text" (1997: 266). Alternatively, to integrate "historical background and the 
original sources in which discursive 'events' are embedded" (Wodak, 1999: 188; cf. de 
Cillia et al., 1999; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001: Ch. 2). 
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As can be seen, such an approach is the diametrical opposite to the bottom-up one 
characterising conversation analysis, ethnomethodology and increasingly the dominant 
strands of discursive psychology. Whereas in those cases no consideration was taken of 
any context, source, and information external to the ones participants themselves 
"demonstrably'' display as relevant, the discourse-historical approach would integrate 
"all" of them in interpreting our piece of discourse. 
Again, I have repeatedly renounced conversation analysis's theoretical 
pretensions about pure empiricism. Yet, for a start, even from the liberal perspective I 
adopted here, to aspire to integrate "systematically all available background information" 
in the analysis is, at best, a fiction. It would be a metaphysical, rather than an empirical 
endeavour and, as such, it certainly never happens in social research. We always have to 
stop somewhere in assembling background information. As fellow critical discourse 
analyst Teun van Dijk rightly pointed out, any research "must provide a practical limit to 
the infmite regress of boundless socio-political con textualism, by making explicit what is 
relevant of such contexts" (van Dijk, 2006: 162 - emphasis in the original). The 
emergence of the problem of "relevance", rightly posed and wrongly answered in 
conversation analysis, means the very real possibility that the reading of the text will be 
replaced by "background information"; a state of affairs further exacerbated by CDA's 
ultimate priority somehow being located beyond the texts themselves.92 
Clearly, neither the attempt to effectively eliminate context as such, nor the 
hidden removal of the question of its relevance will be satisfying answers. For one thing, 
both are fictional. For another, the first attempt might easily slip into the practice of 
ignoring all sorts of texts where cultural, political, and ideological aspects are clearly 
possible to enrich our understanding, and the second might easily entail our piece of text 
being simply assimilated to a pre-established context. 
92 See, however, Fairclough constant use ofinter-textuality (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Fairclough, 
2001). 
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3.5. Conclusion: Reclaiming the Middle-of-the-Road 
What, then, is the solution? The solution, I think, is that there is no real problem 
of a theoretical kind. In this sense, Schegloff is right in claiming that "[ ... ] 'rethinking 
context' [an allusion to the title of the edited volume his paper was published in] is not a 
task for single convention sessions or special volumes alone. If context is in the conduct 
itself, then rethinking context is the omnipresent job of analysis" (Schegloff, 1992a: 2 I 5). 
Where he is wrong is his aim to restrict this praxis to a fiction - i.e. "demonstrable 
relevance" and "observable procedural consequentiality" -, instead of "restricting" it 
simply to the community of researchers (cf. Rorty, 199Ia: 35-45). They will make the 
choices of what constitutes a data, a proper analysis, a valid context. There is simply no a 
priori commitment we can make. There is simply no use in insisting that our consensual 
ways of tackling our problems should be adopted by other research communities as weii, 
regardless of their particular problems.93 
Nevertheless, I certainly hnve to make clear my position with regard to my 
particular project. As I indicated. I do not have qualms about invoking any sorts of 
contexts and it would surely make sense to "embed" the text I am to analyse. These are 
two intellectuals at hand: "hy not use their other works to elucidate this piece? 
Alternatively, why not embed the correspondence into Jewish intellectual history of the 
twentieth century? Or post-Enlightcmnent? Or post-anything? 
Hermeneutical studies in the humanities would approach the problem in this way 
(Gadamer, 1975), as it is what a moderate discourse-historical orientation would 
reconunend as well. To be sure, any such readings could be studious, enjoyable, and 
enlightening. The fact that I will relatively rarely consult explicitly those contexts does 
not mean that I have any theoretical reason for it. It does not mean, furthermore, that my 
analysis cannot be corrected by or integrated into studies of a broader reach. 
93 This, ironically, is the "theoretical imperialism" that Schegloff attributes to critical approaches (1997: 
167). 
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In terms of the orientations within discourse analysis I have introduced above, my 
way of looking at the text is the closest to that of what might be dubbed as content-
oriented discursive psychology.94 
What it means is, firstly, to retain a strong empirical focus and, metaphorically 
speaking, to remain close to the text. As I admitted above, this thesis should primarily do 
justice to the correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem as a text. I shall 
read, rather than assume; explore the dynamics of argumentative discourse rather than 
reify categories apparently available: not many stones should remain untumed. 
Yet, secondly, the acceptance of the concerns, perspectives, and interests of the 
participants need not happen simply for its own sake. It is for our sake as well. To 
enfranchise our participants is achieved in order to talk and argue with them and not 
merely to listen passively. Hence, my approach will prioritise the "nature of arguments" 
over ''the means by which arguments are warranted" while acknowledging their 
inescapable interrelatedness. Such a premise can be contrasted with ethnomethodological 
studies claiming, "[ ... ] it is not the accomplishment of national identity that is at issue 
here but rather, and first and foremost, what activities are accomplished with the 
particular methodological resource of national identity" (Rester and Eglin, 1997b: 8). The 
choice that is to be made is not whether we want to analyse discourse in its own right or 
as a reflection of something: these aspects are ultimately intertwined. That "something" 
that the discourse allegedly reflects or is "about" is not different in kind; it is discourse 
itself as well. The real choice is where our interests lie. Do they in wider political 
consequences or local interactional workings? Or even in patterns of firing of certain 
types of brain cells? To do empirical research does not necessitate reducing our data to 
serve our empirical purposes. Certainly, we can always do this, just as we can always use 
a hammer as well, yet often decide not to (see Rorty, 1991 b). 
Thirdly, thus, I will conceptualise the "action-orientation" of discourse, the 
consequences of utterances or even performativity as such in a broad, iterative sense 
94 Some of this research actually does not characterise itself as "discursive psychology" or "discourse 
analysis" (cf. Reicher and Hopkins, 2001a, 2001b: 396-397; Reicher, Hopkins and Condor, 1997: 99-100). 
Yet what they do is analysing texts and expounding their consequences. For the present purposes, nothing 
more is required. 
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(Butler, 1993, 1997; Derrida, 1991). To quote Reicher and Hopkins, "The real 
significance of these arguments lies in their action-orientation. It is practical politics, the 
organization of collective action through the grounding of strategically organized identity 
constructions, which shapes these speakers forays into the past" (200 1 a: 151 ). The kind 
of specificity this politics acquires is an open question. Yet, though Reicher and Hopkins 
mainly focus on professional politicians in their work, there is no restriction in adopting 
their rationale in the broadest possible sense. The "real sense" of performativity lies in 
the insight that it is the construction of meanings that govern our world and inform our 
actions. 
This, fourthly and lastly, brings us to the problem of ideology and critique, 
objectivity and partisanship. Both the radically top-down and the bottom-up approaches 
have adopted clear positions on this and they were diametrically opposed to each other. 
Conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, and the kind of social research influenced by 
them practically disposed of these issues altogether. They claimed (ethno)methodological 
indifference/relativism with regard to the validity of the categories in use and left issues 
of evaluation to the participants themselves (cf. Edwards, 1997: 60-63; Edwards and 
Potter, 1992a 57; Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970; Potter, 1996: 5). Critical discourse analysis, 
on the other hand, boasted of its political engagement and "bias". In other words, whereas 
the former approaches contested the legitimacy of the notion of "ideology" in the dearth 
of any definitive, "neutral", ''non-partisan", "objective" version to which any particular 
statement could be compared to and found true or false, the latter pinpointed the 
unmasking of ideology as its prime goal. 
For all their difference, however, it is clear that there is a common denominator 
behind these approaches. Both of them aspire to treat "ideology" as an issue of truth and 
falsity of a non-discursive kind. By any means, it has then to be renounced by the strictly 
and locally action-oriented conversation analysis/ethnomethodology and affirmed by 
critical discourse analysis that often displays a practical neglect toward the constructive 
side of discourse. Hence, conversation analysis will choose topics displayed in what 
might be called an apparent ideological vacuum (see Billig, 1999b, 1999c) and critical 
discourse analysis will often choose topics where issues of truth and falsity appear 
unambiguous. How shall L however, treat these problems in a context that might be 
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connected to issues of domination, inequality and the likes but not obviously so; and that 
can be analysed all the way through without evaluating and considering the longer term 
effects and the meaning of the discourse constructed but obviously should not be. 
There is no easy solution but I would simply recommend the reappraisal of the 
common denominator, and the idea that ideology primarily concerns the true-false 
dichotomy, where the ultimate arbiter is non-ideological: not the Almighty (any more) 
but Objective Reality. 
"Ideologies are ways of thinking and behaving within a given society which make 
the ways of that society seem 'natural' or unquestioned to its members. [ ... ] ideology is 
the common sense of the society'', claims Michael Billig (2001: 217; cf. Jayyusi, 1991: 
244-45). The novelty of this view of the problem is that it snubs a naive true-false 
dichotomy but retains the capacity of evaluation. Ideologies become "forms of life", a re-
conceptualisation not alien to the theory of ideology or discourse if we think of the likes 
of Foucault, Althusser and many others amongst the post-structuralists (Althusser, 1971; 
Fish, 1989, 1999; Geertz, 1973: 188-233; Rorty, 1989; for an overview see Eagleton, 
1991 ). Consequentially, decisions made about utterances will involve decisions about 
values according to which one makes one's decisions. They will be true and they will be 
false; but those judgments will be as much of a moral as of an epistemological character. 
In fact, they will bear witness to the essential unity of traditional dichotomies, such as 
epistemology-morality, truth-rhetoric, opinion-fact, and discourse-reality (Rorty, 1999: 
xvi-xxxii, 23-90, 131-147). "We will choose, but not on the basis of the falsity or 
irrationality of the one or the other'', as one of the prime proponents of this worldview, 
the philosopher Chaim Perelman stated (Perelman, 1979: 113). 
As introduced above, it is the original, middle-of-the-ground position of social 
psychological discourse analysis that embodies the perspective from which this thesis 
aims to understand the "oft-quoted" yet substantially neglected public correspondence of 
1964. Not that insights from just about any discipline dealing with texts could not 
contribute to this project. The possibility is ever-present that people reading texts help to 
understand different peoples with reading different texts. 
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This entails, however, that in the centre of this thesis is a text. Not interactional 
''workings", not "discourse in its own right", not a psychological phenomenon in need of 
re-specification. A text, thick or rich it may be in itself (cf. Edwards, 2006), but definitely 
requiring the richness or the thickness of description (Geertz, 1973: 3-30; Walzer, 1994). 
In this sense, the toolkit I am carrying with myself is painfully impoverished, neglecting 
vast areas of human experience in encountering texts. Yet, just as one should not use a 
hammer, it is perhaps advisable not to aim at too high either. The balance I struck, here 
and now, will hopefully be satisfying. 
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4. Thou Shall Not Judge: Gershom Scholem on a Historical 
Judgment and the Act of Historical Judgment 
4.1. Introduction 
With this chapter, I begin the analysis of the public exchange of letters between 
Hannah Arendt and Gershom Scholem. The object of investigation in the coming two 
chapters will be Scholem's letter that initiated the exchange. What kind of construction is 
this and how does Scholem achieve that construction to be argumentatively convincing? 
In the following section, I will introduce the two basic questions that need to be 
analysed in addressing this text. First, the question of what actually the book, Eichmann 
in Jernsalem is about; what is its significance and what are the basic assumptions 
underlying its meaning? Scholem' s treatment of these questions will form the content of 
this chapter. Such a treatment will involve Scholem's efforts to appear convincing and to 
establish rhetorically those meanings recovered to appear to flow naturally from the book 
itself. To analyse this activity, I will draw on notions and concepts developed in 
discursive psychology, conversation analysis, and pragmatics. Nevertheless, another 
aspect of Scholem's utterances is not merely how Scholem fashions his construction to 
appear convincing but what those utterances actually are and what their possible political, 
cultural, or moral consequences might be. As I will show, Scholem's acts of 
interpretation convey the image of a manifestly immoral, anti-Semitic text- not merely in 
its outcomes but in its very assumptions. Yet, such a formulation of the book's content 
leads us, as it leads Scholem, to a second problem to be introduced in the following 
section and analysed in detail in the following chapter. 
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Why, namely, did this what happen? How could it happen? These questions, 
occasioned explicitly and implicitly in Scholem's letter, raise the problem of an account 
to be offered for the content of the book and the act of producing it. That account will 
inescapably touch on matters of personal and moral import, as the failure of the test will 
ultimately be explained as a personal and moral failure. 
Let us, however, turn first of all to the investigation of the general framework of 
Scholem's letter. Why is he writing? What is it that he deems to be relevant by producing 
this letter? 
4.2. Aspects of a Non-Factual Criticism: the What and the Why 
In analysing Scholem's letter, I will first investigate how he starts the entire 
correspondence. How does he characterise his contribution as well as build up reflexively 
his own "face" or subject position and that of Arendt? These matters are addressed in the 
very first paragraph of the exchange. 
Extract 4.1. 
7 [ ... ] I have not, let me say, 
8 gone into the question of the factual and historical authenticity of the 
9 various statements you make. To judge by your treatment of those 
10 aspects of the problem with which I happen to be familiar, however, I 
11 fear that your book is not free of error and distortion. Still, I have no 
12 doubt that the question of the book's factual authenticity will be taken 
13 up by other critics - of whom there will be many - and it is not in any 
14 case central to the critique I wish to offer here. 
15 [ ... ] 
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As we see, Scholem immediately dubs his concerns and the genre of his letter as a 
"critique". Yet, there are plenty offonns a criticism can display (e.g. scathing, full-scale, 
partial, benevolent, constructive etc. 95) and he does not stop short highlighting certain 
aspects of his criticism, aspects that his endeavour will focus on while other aspects that, 
by and large, are not promised to be dwelt upon in his letter. For one thing, however, 
there is a complex rhetoric going on during this sequence. Scholem makes his main point 
that his criticism is not factual on two occasions. He begins this sequence asserting this 
and then concludes with it, framing thus this entire introductory utterance. Doing so, 
however, he also makes his way to an easy and gross factual criticism; indeed, precisely 
by asserting that his critique is not a factual one does he construct a context where even 
blunt factual criticism is not in need of thorough justification. He does not have to prove 
his claims about the lack of factual authenticity in the book and can still maintain the 
claim of factual problems. Putting it as an aside, as something not central to his thesis, it 
requires no further attention, justification, and argumentation. 
In a similar vein, the letter works up in this sequence the criticising person as a 
partial insider. Scholem, as he writes, "happen[ s] to be familiar" with certain "aspects of 
the problem" (1. I 0) and such a stance, yet again, does not entail a detailed and thorough 
description of the distortion and error he attributes to the book. The latter procedure is left 
to "other critics" ("of whom there will be many"). Presumably, they will not be merely 
partially insiders, suggesting thereby that where he (who "happen[s] to be familiar") 
finds problems resulting in his conviction, experts will find many, many more. 
Having said all that, however, let us note that factual criticism that is pronounced 
nonetheless here is certainly damaging enough to this book that describes itself as a 
''report"96 - regardless of the lack of detailed focus given to these "aspects". Though 
Scholem refrains from putting too much explicit significance on them, the reader will 
arguably do so. Yet, it is exactly by dint of this state of matters that even without 
enumerating factual errors, a claim to their existence must be made credible to the reader 
of the correspondence. What is gained by the rhetoric of the aside (cf. Edwards, 2004: 
95 For various kinds of categorisations, see Barthes (2004), Young (1990), Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 32-
35), Walzer (1987), etc. 
96 See the subtitle of the book; lines 338-349 of this exchange in the Appendix; and Arendt (1993b: 227). 
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268; Wetherell, 200la), explicated in the previous paragraphs, might be lost as perceived 
arrogance. If Scholem's concern is admittedly not factuality, if he is admittedly not an 
expert on these "aspects", how dare he assert such sweeping and lethal generalisations? 
"Consensus-building" (cf. Edwards and Potter, 1992a; Middleton and Edwards, 
1990: 30-33; Potter 1996), with reference to "other critics [ ... ] of whom there will be 
many'', is an admittedly imaginary exercise in this sequence. Scholem does not refer to 
any existing body of work that would have already refuted the book's factual assertions 
but projects them to materialise in the future. This surely conveys the intensity of his 
conviction, but does not unveil or legitimate the conviction as such. Inevitably, lack of 
argumentation entails that it is the speaker's credibility and authority that must make the 
statement credible and authoritative. 
This brings us to the question of speaker positions or "counter-dispositionals" 
(Edwards, 2007), which are introduced in this sequence. The problem, namely, of who is 
giving as well as prompting the "critique" will be taken up here as Scholem's account of 
his activity and his motivations for doing the "critiquing" reflexively builds up his own 
position, making thus this very act of "critiquing" a respectable activity instead of one 
emerging out of lust and joy. 
With this in mind, let us observe the tiny verb "fear" in the sequence presented 
above: "I fear that your book is not free of error and distortion" (I. 11 ). At face value, it is 
puzzling that Scholem should qualify this statement as a subjective state of his. In a 
strictly logical sense, surely it does not bolster the credibility of his claims as to "error 
and distortion" in the book. To the contrary, it might even seem to undermine his 
rhetorical efforts to establish the existence of that "error and distortion". Is he perhaps not 
certain? Yet, if so, why would he claim in a proximate line later that he has "no doubt 
that the question of the book's factual authenticity will be taken up by other critics - of 
whom there will be many[ ... ]" (I. 11-13)? Is he, then, simply inconsistent within just a 
few lines? 
The answer may be gained from treating "I fear" not as an expression of some 
inner state of mind of uncertainty and apprehension as to the object in question (which 
would clearly contradict what pre- and succeeds this utterance), but as an emotion-
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concept in rhetorical use (cf. Edwards, 1997, 1999). Thus, it might not be directly 
concerned with the (certainty or otherwise of the) claim itself but builds up reflexively 
the identity and "counter-disposition" of the claimer and counters implicitly attributions-
of arrogance, prejudgement, ill intent, etc. -, that might arise as to his identity as a 
speaker and hence threaten to illegitimate his activity. 
From a pragmatic aspect, this strategy can justifiably be called "politeness". As 
theorists of politeness express, in public intercourse it is understood that "it is in general 
in every participants' best interest to maintain each other's face" (Brown and Levinson, 
1987: 61).97 Yet, while there seems to be no reason not to categorise this instance of"I 
fear" as an act of politeness, one might still object to the projected image of (intended) 
smooth operation in the realm of discourse. This is expressed in Brown and Levinson's 
summary: 
"In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in 
maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the 
mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's face depends 
on everyone else's is being maintained" (Ibid: 61). 
Instead of treating "polite" utterances as explanatory forces in themselves, 
discursive research will concentrate on the occasioned and rhetorical use of these 
utterances (cf. Antaki and Horowitz, 2000: 165). Thus, the utterance at our hands does 
not seem to mitigate the potential "face-threatening act" and is not likely to evoke the 
reciprocation of the maintenance of any "face". If there is a "face" which is of concern 
here, then it is that of the speaker and "I fear" does not mitigate the potentially damaging 
and confrontational aspect of the sequence quoted above. Rather, it aims at building up 
Scholem's credentials (Potter, 1996). That is, a respectable and credible identity of the 
speaker (and foreclosing any opposite impressions). An identity that would make those 
damaging and confrontational aspects (and many more to come) legitimate and credible, 
97 Following Erving Goffman, "face'' is here "the public self-image that every member wants to claim for 
himself[ ... ]" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 61). 
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inasmuch as they are constructed originating not from personal lust or bad intention but 
from a respectable position of reluctance and obligation. It is not that Scholem relishes in 
saying these things. It is that he has to. 98 Politeness, from this rhetorical perspective, does 
not leave "faces" intact, does not "respect" them, but constructs them as respectable. 
Or even to the contrary. Treating acts of politeness rhetorically also entails them 
ceasing to be disengaged utterances and their interpretation becoming context-bound.99 
Thus, it is of importance that while Scholem is working up his credentials and constructs 
his own "face" as a reluctant but obliged critique, what he "fears" is that the book is not 
"free of error and distortion" (I. 11 ). Let us note that both words are used here in the 
singular, suggesting not so much (or not merely) that a catalogue of errors can be found 
in the book but that the book as such, as a whole is of an erroneous and distorted nature. 
Furthermore, as a concept, "error" might convey the notion of a (however flawed) 
scholarly work, something we certainly expect from the author to have written. 
"Distortion", however, brings us to an altogether different realm. Not that it makes any 
inference as to the quantity of failures: any erroneous book may showcase just as many 
factual failures as a distorted one. The latter concept, however, involves at its origin not 
simply the lapse of awareness, scholarly quality etc., but that of the will and motivation. 
It is, in short, intended. 
Discursively speaking, it is the "empiricist" and "contingent" repertoires that are 
implicitly mobilised here by Scholem as ways of accounting for his and for Arendt' s 
activity. As Gilbert and Mulkay observe in their seminal discussion and introduction of 
these concepts, the empiricist repertoire "portrays scientists' actions and beliefs as 
following unproblematically and inescapably from the empirical characteristics of an 
impersonal [ ... ] world" (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984: 56). The use of the empiricist 
repertoire, therefore, provides Scholem with the device to suggest a neutral and, 
consequently, object-centred investigation on his part. This means that the driving force 
98 It is important to note that while the practice of disclaiming (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) and building up 
"counter-dispositionals" (Edwards, 2007) is certainly one aspect ofScholem's rhetoric of here, the subject 
position built up here is not that of the person that is merely "noticing" as opposed to "motivated scrutiny" 
(Edwards, !995: 335; cf. Woofitt, 2005b). Scholem is constructing himself to be motivated and engaged, 
both in the direction of her addressee and the topic. 
99 For a discursive and rhetorical orientation within the realm of"politeness" see Locher and Watts (2005), 
Terkourafi (2005). 
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behind his interpretation and assessments is the object of the investigation: Arendt's book 
and the historical events themselves. It is these objects that guide the treatise regardless 
(or sometimes even against) his own dispositions. To account in turn for Arendt's 
position, however, Scholem appears to deploy a contingent repertoire, which is available 
"to depict professional actions and beliefs as being significantly influenced by variable 
factors outside the realm of empirical [ ... ] phenomena". What is implicitly attributed to 
Arendt, then, is a subject-centred activity where it is her ''personal inclinations and 
particular social positions" that influences and thereby distorts her interpretation, rather 
than the events themselves and to account for her failure to represent those events 
properly (Ibid: 57). 
Overall, what we have learnt from Scholem's opening paragraph is, then, twofold. 
First, it told us that Scholem would present certain concerns of his with the book as well 
as that those concerns will not be of a factual nature. What that would exactly mean (that 
is to say, the sort of non-factual problems he has in mind) is left for later parts of his 
letter, just as the possible connection between a non-factual criticism he entertains and a 
factual one that he assumes to be more dominant in the field of reception. 
Yet he told us - or, rather, hinted at - more. His implied mobilisation of the 
empiricist and the contingent repertoires entailed that there would be concerns more of a 
personal type: concerns, that is, with the author. His implicit mobilisation of an empiricist 
vs. contingent repertoire, however, not only acquainted the reader implicitly with the 
dramatis personae but accounted for the possible connection between a non-factual 
criticism and the apparent errors in the book, factual or otherwise. It made it sensible that 
announcing a non-factual criticism yet appropriating sweeping accusations as to factual 
"error" might not (well, not simply) be rhetorical trickery in this context. It is, rather, a 
matter of conceiving and constructing the realm of the text as such derivative of another 
realm, where a list of factual inaccuracies certainly would not answer why they had 
happened (W etherell, 1998). That those inaccuracies will be exposed by "many" scholars 
or reviewers does not only tell us that they are transparent and relatively easy to spot on. 
Rather, it suggests that the main and singular task to do is to explain their genesis and to 
account thereby for "error and distortion". 
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It is, then, Scholem's acts of interpretation of the book that we shall first focus on 
and understand what it might mean that he is not concerned with facts. This is going to be 
the task of this chapter. There will be, however, another possible focus of attention 
afterwards, which will be addressed in the following chapter. It is, namely, how those 
factual as well as non-factual problems can be explained with regard to their origin: to 
Hannah Arendt as a particular human being. 
4.3. The What: Presenting a Historical Judgment 
4.3.1. Setting up the scene: the description of a book for criticism 
In what follows the utterance analysed in the previous subsection, we witness 
Scholem's first concrete engagement with the book. There, he is expected to present the 
book as well as perhaps his non-factual criticism with it. These two activities, however, 
might turn out to be more easily expected than actually observed and analysed. 
Extract 4.2. 
14 [ ... ] 
IS Your book moves between two poles: the Jews and their bearing in the 
16 days of catastrophe, and the responsibility of Adolf Eichmann. I have 
17 devoted, as you know, a good part of my time to a consideration of the 
18 case of the Jews, and I have studied a not insignificant volume of 
19 material on the subject. I am well aware, in common with every other 
20 spectator of the events, how complex and serious, how little reducible or 
21 transparent, the whole problem is. I am aware that there are aspects of 
22 Jewish history (and for more than forty years I have concerned myself 
23 with little else) which are beyond our comprehension; on the one hand, 
24 a devotion to the things of this world that is near-demonic; on the other, 
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25 a fundamental uncertainty of orientation in this world - an uncertainty 
26 which must be contrasted with that certainty of the believer concerning 
27 which, alas, your book has so little to report. There has been weakness, 
28 too, though weakness so entwined with heroism that it is not easily 
29 unravelled; wretchedness and power-lust are also to be found there. But 
30 these things have always existed, and it would be remarkable indeed if, 
31 in the days of catastrophe, they were not to make their appearance once 
32 again. Thus it was in the year of 1391, at the beginning of that 
33 generation of catastrophe; and so it has been in our own time. The 
34 discussion of these matters is, I believe, both legitimate and unavoidable 
35 - although I do not believe that our generation is in a position to pass 
36 any kind of historical judgment. We lack the necessary perspective, 
37 which alone makes some sort of objectivity possible- and we cannot 
38 but lack it. 
Where can in this paragraph "critique" of a non-factual kind or even any critique 
as such be found? And where is here a simple description and presentation of the book on 
which Scholem pronounces his criticism? What is it that is in the book? What is it that 
can only be found in Scholem's critical perspective? 
Apparently, there is nothing conspicuously or overtly critical in his first sentence. 
It seems simply to divulge information, to describe the book as he states that the "book 
moves between two poles" (1. 15). While it is certainly impossible to differentiate 
between the book's actual content and Scholem's critical perspective here, it does not 
seem to be necessary either. They appear to be the same. It is just the rough description of 
the book's content, devoid of any sort of"non-factual" criticism that is still to come. 
Yet, even such a basic statement as to the topic of Arendt's book implies certain 
things that raise the topic of description-versus-criticism just put aside here. Scholem's 
formulation suggests that the two poles are different, perhaps radically or qualitatively 
different issues. Eichmann's, the Nazi colonel's activity is described with the phrase 
"responsibility'', which carries moral or/and legal connotations: his actions must be 
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accounted for in moral or/and legal terms. "The Jews", on the other hand, are fashioned 
with a more neutral term. The concept of "bearing" (I. 15) does not perhaps completely 
exclude moral considerations, but it surely evokes more like a procedure of neutral, 
matter-of-fact description than of moral judgment. The "two poles" thus are not simply 
"two poles" of content, they are not simply two topics. Rather, they are two moral poles 
with the obvious connotation of perpetrator and victim. Hence, Scholem does not so 
much describe the two issues that Arendt's book addresses perhaps, but already pre-
formulates a moral-epistemological field according to which these issues must be 
addressed. 
What is even more, while there seems to be nothing contentious in pointing to 
"Eichmann", a solitary individual, as one of the book's poles, to allocate the other pole to 
"the Jews" might be less self-evident. A simple comparison of the phrase with the 
possible alternatives of "Jews" or "some Jews" tells us that while in the latter two cases 
there is a certain amount of Jews that is talked about, in the former case ("the Jews") this 
quantity is absolute. Nevertheless, scholars of pragmatics do not enlist the definite article 
amongst the markers of "scalar implicature", that is, of quantitative difference (see Horn, 
2004; Levinson, 1983). The reason being, presumably, that it is not so much its role to 
imply quantity but a qualitative kind of difference (see Abott, 2004). The use of the 
definite article ignores any division within the category and endows that category with 
the sense of unity, of "deep-rooted disposition" as opposed to apparent differences on the 
surface or on a personal level (Edwards, 1995: 329). 
It is therefore not only the implication of this apparently descriptive, neutral and 
"innocent" utterance of ''two poles" that moral or legal responsibility goes with one pole 
and not with the other, but that neither of the poles are divided, perhaps divisible as such. 
Both of them are treated as whales. 
Treated by whom? By Scholem, strictly speaking, although this does not tell us 
whether he merely re-presents Arendt's points or infuses them already with his own 
critical perspective, presenting hence not so much the book itself but the golden standard 
according to which he will pronounce his criticism. In any case, what appeared to be a 
simple act of uninterested, neutral presentation turned out to be something considerably 
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more ambiguous and complicated in that it appeared less and less a case of simple, 
neutral, straightforward description and more and more that of setting up an 
epistemological-moral scene. The scene, as it were, of Scholem's own critical 
perspective. 
Things, however, get even vaguer as Scholem's text progresses. In the first 
sentence, there was at least no initial uncertainty in anchoring references such as "Adolf 
Eichmann" and "the Jews" in the "days of catastrophe". As we shall see shortly, even this 
apparently straightforward anchoring of the subject becomes less and less well-defined as 
the text progresses. 
In what immediately follows, Scholem at first refers to "the case of the Jews" (!. 
18), which appears to reinforce the context established in the beginning. (Or, in any case, 
does not challenge it.) This is succeeded, however, by a reference to "aspects of Jewish 
history (and for more than forty years I have concerned myself with little else)" (1. 21-23) 
which inevitably broadens the context. What appeared to be unproblematic in alluding to 
the "days of the catastrophe" (I. 16) or the "subject" (1. 19) are less straightforward now. 
In short, while the former references involved by common sense clearly the Holocause00, 
the utterance just quoted (1. 21-23) extends the locus that would connect the "two poles". 
Clearly, it is not simply the "days of the catastrophe" alluding to the Holocaust that are 
spoken about here any more. Scholem cannot be said to have been concerned with "little 
else" and it is "Jewish history'' that he is explicitly talking about; a vastly larger category 
than the Holocaust and one which can be said to have concerned him throughout his 
entire life and career. 
This tendency of broadening the "subject" and the "event" (!. 20) is prevalent in a 
later instance of the paragraph as well: "But these things [i.e. weakness and heroism] 
have always existed, and it would be remarkable indeed if, in the days of catastrophe, 
they were not to make their appearance again. Thus it was in the year 1391, at the 
beginning of that generation of catastrophe; and so it has been in our own time"101 (!. 29-
100 Here as elsewhere, by "Holocaust" the Jewish Holocaust is understood. (Whatever it may mean.) 
101 The date in this sequence is not without ambiguity. Thus, in the Encounter version (republished in 
Arendt [1978] and transcribed in the Appendix here) it was 1931, without any apparent siguificant referent. 
In fac~ 1931 seems to be a simple matter ofmistyping. In the edition Gershom Scholem's letters, however, 
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33 -my emphasis). Again, the subject of the book ("the Jews") is not any more treated 
with a clear reference to the Holocaust ("the days of catastrophe") but within the next to 
infinite realm of the "always" of Jewish history, as the expulsion of the Spanish Jews is 
described with the same noun ("catastrophe") as the hardships of "our own" generation, 
the Holocaust. "The Jews", then, as the subject of Arendt's book are not a simple united 
entity but one without clear temporallimitation. 102 
Is, then, the apparent pinpointing of the book's topic, "the Jews and their bearing 
in the days of catastrophe" (1. 15-16), really an act of description? Or is it the all-too 
familiar act of interpretation where this act is always-already value-laden (cf. Fish, 1980, 
1989, 1999), where what will be rendered as criticism already depends on the rendering 
of its criticised object? In short, is Arendt really talking about the "two poles" in the 
clear-cut and moral sense Scholem conveys? Is she really talking about the Jews, rather 
than some spatial, temporal, or institutional sub-categories of them? In addition, what are 
these "Jews" and the "days of the catastrophe" as their anchoring became less and less 
well-defined? It is next to impossible to answer these questions at this point. 
Ambiguity, however, is not constrained to the presentation or description of the 
book. As Scholem implicitly broadened the context by referring to "aspects of Jewish 
history" (L 21-22), it is by no means clear what rhetorical function this might display. 
Having mentioned the two "poles", he immediately elaborated a context to this 
investigation. He established "complexity'' with addressing differing tendencies or 
"aspects" in "Jewish history'': the "near-demonic", the "fundamental uncertainty'', the 
"certainty of the believer" as well as "weakness" and "heroism" (1. 24-28). Yet again, are 
these "aspects" or "complexity'' a description of Arendt's book? Or is it Scholem's own 
critical perspective? In fact, even when there appears to be some straight element of 
criticism in Scholem's pinpointing the missing "aspect" from Arendt's book ("the 
the date is 1291 (see Scholem, 1994: 96; 2002: 395), again without apparent referent as to the "beginning 
of that generation of catastrophe". 1391 (which is known as the year when the first wave of pogroms 
occurred in many Iberian cities [Seville, Cordoba, Valencia, Barcelona] and widely seen as the first 
moment leading up to the eventual expulsion of the entire Spanish Jewish community from Spain in 1492) 
appears in the version of the correspondence that is published in the English translation of several of 
Scholem's essays (Scholem, 1976: 301). It is the only version that was definitely proofread by Scholem 
himself as noted by the editor in his preface (Scholem, 1976: xi-xiii). It is for these reasons that I use this 
version as the authoritative one here. 
102 Cf. Yerushalmi (1982) for mythical tendencies in Jewish historiography in general. 
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certainty of the believer") it does not tell us why this would be relevant. Granted, there 
are many more "aspects" of Jewish history or, for that matter, "world history" or 
''whatever" that is missing from Arendt's book. A simple enumeration of these missing 
"aspects" would be an infinite and surely futile exercise. Thus, the simple fact that 
Scholem's utterance appears to be a "criticism" fails to explain to us why it is relevant as 
a criticism. 
To sum up, in Scholem's addressing of the book what prima facie could have 
been taken as a straightforward and neutral presentation of the book's topic turned out 
hard to distinguish from Scholem's own historical-critical perspective. However, even 
where this critical perspective undoubtedly emerged, it was similarly unclear what its 
relevance was and in what sense it was a "non-factual" criticism. Said simply, it is stiii 
not clear what the problem with the book is. Where is the "error and distortion", the 
palpable failure? What, furthermore, is it here that would explain the mobilisation of the 
empiricist-contingent repertoire hinted at in the previous paragraph? 
This apparent ambiguity, incidentally, applies to Scholem's crucial remark, with 
which he concludes this paragraph; to that of "historical judgment" (1. 36). Scholem 
seems to construct here a fact. Inasmuch as "historical judgment" and its impossibility is 
grounded in the factor of "time" as the notion of "generation" and "perspective" appear to 
imply, it is not up for contention. Time is not subjective. Its lack is, quite simply, there. 
Still, while the implied thrust of Scholem' s conclusion appears to be that Arendt in fact 
exercises this act of "historical judgment" in her text, it is not at all clear what is meant 
by "historical judgment" and what its possible content might be. Presumably, it is not a 
sort of a priori no-poems-after-the-Holocaust. "Historical judgment" should apply to 
some sort of specific activity of writing and evaluating, not merely producing a certain 
version of the events. It might be argued that "historical judgment" contains the 
disambiguation of "weakness" from "heroism" (1. 28), or the address of both the 
"certainty of the believer" and the "fundamental uncertainty" (1. 25-26). That is, either the 
disambiguation of "complexity'' or the account for it as such. In any case, however, 
"historical judgment's" meaning, significance, and relevance are just as enigmatic as 
Scholem's previous manoeuvres of interpretation and criticism. It is merely the 
categorical denial of its possibility with respect to time what is readily available here. 
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What we may state with certainty regarding this utterance is that Scholem's acts 
of ambiguity concerned the book's basic orientation (i.e. "the two poles") and that this 
basic orientation, in turn, was constructed to touch upon the very age-long existence of 
the Jewish people. If we are to learn more about the ways "historical judgment" relates to 
these matters of all-importance, if we are to unveil the enigma that is its meaning, 
significance, and relevance, it is then inevitable to analyse further utterances of Scholem 
so that they might shed light on the rhetorical as well as possibly ideological subtleties 
we have encountered so far. 
4.3.2. Instances of"historicaljudgment": on the "weakness" of the book 
In what immediately follows the paragraph just analysed, Scholem builds upon 
the previous paragraph expressed in the anaphora, ''these questions" (1. 40). What "these 
questions" are is once again not clear at all. Yet, what is to come clearly conveys 
Scholem's assessment of Arendt's treatise of one of the ''poles", "the Jews, and their 
bearing": 
Extract 4.3. 
39 [ ... ] 
40 Nevertheless, we cannot put these questions aside. There is the question 
41 thrown at us by the new youth of Israel: why did they allow themselves 
42 to be slaughtered? As a question, it seems to me to have a profound 
43 justification; and I see no readily formulated answer to it. At each 
44 decisive juncture, however, your book speaks only of the wealmess of 
45 the Jewish stance in the world. I am ready enough to admit this 
46 weakness; but you put such emphasis upon it that, in my view, your 
47 account ceases to be objective and acquires overtones of malice. [ ... ] 
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Indeed, with this sequence an arguable instance of "historical judgment" and its 
criticism have ultimately arrived. It is the overwhelming tendency (i.e. "at each decisive 
juncture") to emphasise "weakness of the Jewish stance" (I. 44-45) that is Scholem's 
bone of contention and the book is evaluated subsequently as ceasing to be "objective" 
and acquiring overtones of"malice" (1. 47). 
Interestingly, however, while Scholem maintains that it is due to its emphasis on 
"weakness" that the book "ceases to be objective", he nevertheless remains true to his 
earlier renouncing of "questions of factual [ ... ] authenticity'' (I. 8). Even though 
"objectivity'' is explicitly alluded to, there is no factual dispute going on here in the strict 
sense of the word. 103 Though this construction is by no means necessarily self-defeating, 
it is certainly more than merely claiming lack of objectivity that is needed in order to 
establish a credible criticism. How does this occur? How is the book's lack of objectivity 
not simply claimed, but convincingly shown?104 
It is here that some of Scholem's earlier remarks acquire their relevance in that 
the single-handed judgment of"weakness" (1. 44) flies clearly in the face of"complexity'' 
and the entwining of "weakness" with "heroism" (1. 28). Arendt is constructed here to 
transgress precisely the order previously established by Scholem: she reduces the 
abundance of Jewish life to but one trait, to that of "weakness".105 This abundance or 
"complexity", however, was not simply claimed but grounded firmly by Scholem. When 
constructing "complexity'', he did not simply present his credentials, his competence, and 
knowledge in order to legitimate this interpretative decision. It was not only his 
knowledge ("I have studied a not insignificant volume of material on the subject[ ... ] I 
am aware that there are aspects of Jewish history (and for more than forty years I have 
concerned myself with little else)[ ... ]") that was evoked but an extreme-case formulation 
as well (Pomerantz, 1986): "in common with every other spectator of the events" (1. 19-
20). Gershom Scholem's, the scholar's undoubted knowledge and authority 
notwithstanding, reference to these "spectators" shifted the whole issue of contention to a 
103 I.e. Scholem does admit that "weakness", that is, he does not doubt the evaluation or description of 
certain events as "weaknesses". 
104 On the difference between the "claimed" and the "shown" see Schegloff(l984: 38-39). 
105 To "reduce" the abundance of Jewish life to one's own particular interest had been one of Scholem's 
main message as a historian throughout his entire career. 
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different level. It was a consensus, an extremely united consensus that was mobilised 
here, just as the direct, unmediated, "mere" glance (spectator) of the everyman instead of 
the knowledge, learning, and intellectual devotion of the scholar. This construction 
rhetorically foreclosed two options. For one thing, it excluded that it is intelligence and 
knowledge that could spot some sorts of single underlying characteristics (i.e. weakness) 
beyond the apparent complexity. For another, it also suggested that there is no special 
intelligence or scholarly devotion required to notice complexity. Thus, not just the 
event's complexity was grounded but this complexity's visibility, transparency, and self-
evident nature. In retrospect, it was this construction that makes Scholem's assessment of 
non-objectivity convincing. 
All of this, certainly, points to the question of what Arendt sees that is different 
from that of everyone else's experience and why Arendt could possibly not see what 
everyone else did. Such questions chime with the overall thrust of Scholem's argument, 
even if fall short of actually accounting for it. 
Namely, Scholem's concluding evaluation was not satisfied with the charge of 
lack of objectivity but pointed explicitly to a moral direction. It is not just that the book 
"ceases to be objective" (cf. "error'') but that it "acquires overtones of malice" (cf. 
"distortion"), where this latter expression exhibits finally the sort of non-factual problem 
with the book that was foreshadowed in the letter's first paragraph. Yet, what accounted 
for lack of objectivity does not by itself account for the text's attributed immorality. 
Neither the transgression of the order of "complexity'', nor the contradiction to both the 
scholar and the everyman explain a moral failure. That means that we have to investigate, 
where a moral dimension possibly resides in both "weakness" as an instance of 
"historical judgment" as well as in the choice of "weakness". To answer these questions, 
we certainly have to have a further look at the way Arendt's book and its emphasis on 
''weakness" are rendered in Scholem's text. 
While at this point it is not explicitly expounded further, what is taken to be 
''weakness", there is an analogous orientation to Arendt's that Scholem works up: the 
"question thrown at us by the new youth of Israel" (I. 40-41 ). The question of the "new 
youth" is one (''why did they allow themselves to be slaughtered?") that by its 
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grammatical formulation highlights the passivity of the Jews, betraying thus a similar 
orientation to that of Arendt's ''weakness". Hence, the figure of analogy (cf. Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 3 71-41 0) allows the reader to infer that, without any textual 
information to the contrary, characteristics of the "new youth" question apply to Arendt's 
book as well. 106 
It is not enough, however, to note a certain similarity between the question of the 
"new youth" and Arendt's text. The issue is whether by this analogy Scholem attaches 
other aspects to his topic, which might shed further light on Arendt's position and an 
interpretation of this ''weakness". In this respect, let us note first that the "question" of 
the "new youth" is not simply concerned with passivity. The subtlety is that "they" (I. 41) 
is grammatically in the active subject position, but the rhetorical meaning of the sentence 
is simply passive: they were slaughtered. With this divergence between grammatical units 
and rhetorical meaning, a normative horizon has been opened that raises the possibility of 
action (i.e. "they ... " is in the active subject position) but concludes that no constructive 
action of any kind was done (i.e. " ... allowed themselves to be slaughtered"). Activity, 
thus, is present but only in the form of a kind of self-destructive passivity. 
This formulation renders "passivity", ''weakness", or even "slaughter'' (actions 
one the "poles", that is) not as facts but as accomplishments; not as conditions but as acts 
by the grammatical "they'' (as well as, presumably, by those who actually and directly 
carried out the slaughter). Furthermore, inasmuch as Arendt's account addresses 
accomplishments and implies the possibility of alternative accomplishments and acts in 
the world, it becomes not merely the inconsistent, disorderly, or incorrect rendering of 
facts but an instance of moral criticism. 
And an unwarranted moral criticism, as it is. For, yet again, this construction lends 
significance retrospectively to the way Scholem started the problem with the (then) 
apparently descriptive notion of the book moving between "two poles: the Jews and their 
bearing in the days of catastrophe, and the responsibility of Adolf Eichmann" (1. 15-16). 
There, it was taken for granted that "responsibility'' - moral or legal - goes with the one 
106 Incidentally, it is the way Arendt herself understands this utterance, as we will see in a later chapter (see 
page 177·180). 
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pole (Eichmann), but not with the other ("the Jews"). "The Jews" are only available for 
neutral, non-evaluative description as implied in the concept of "bearing". Clearly, it is 
Eichmann and the Nazis who "slaughter'', and "the Jews" that "were slaughtered". Moral 
responsibility, without doubt, should go hand in hand with these acts, respectively. 
What was suspected can now be confirmed. At this point, Scholem's earlier 
remarks are more to be taken as description of his own critical perspective, than that of 
the book. Instead of the order of the book they were the appropriation of an 
(epistemological-)moral order. And it was this epistemological-moral universe that was 
transgressed by Arendt's text in its over-concentration on "weakness". It re-allocated this 
moral-legal issue in that it was this "they" (presumably "the Jews") that was both the 
granunatical subject and object in this action. Thus, it was "the Jews", in her version, that 
too become instrumental via their passivity in their own being killed and thus morally 
accountable. 107 
Scholem's treatment of ''weakness" shed some light on his notion of "historical 
judgment" as well as on his own non-factual criticism. "Historical judgment" was 
constructed to be a moral judgment, or, rather, an immoral judgment as it transgressed the 
consensual epistemological-moral order depicted earlier by Scholem. Ultimately, it is this 
that accounted for the description of Arendt's book of "ceasing to be objective" and 
"acquiring overtones of malice". 
These issues are further elaborated in Scholem' s letter as the motive of "historical 
judgment" as effectively moral judgment makes its appearance at a later p.oint. I turn my 
attention towards this issue. 
Extract 4.4. 
99 [ ... ) 
100 In your treatment of the problem of how the Jews reacted to these 
107 The difference between the "new youth" and Arendt must certainly not be overlooked. I will return to 
this issue later (see page 132). 
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101 extreme circumstances- to which neither of us was exposed- I detect, 
102 often enough, in place of balanced judgment, a kind of demagogic will-
1 03 to-overstatement. Which of us can say today what decisions the elders 
104 of the Jews - or whatever we choose to call them - ought to have 
105 anived at in the circumstances? I have not read less than you have about 
106 these matters, and I am still not certain; but your analysis does not give 
107 me confidence that your certainty is better founded than my uncertainty. 
108 There were the Judenriite, for example; some among them were swine, 
. 109 others were saints. I have read a great deal about both varieties. There 
110 were among them also many people in no way different from ourselves, 
111 who were compelled to make terrible decisions in circumstances that we 
112 cannot even begin to reproduce or reconstruct. I do not know whether 
113 they were right or wrong. Nor do I presume to judge. I was not there. 
[ ... ] 
[ ... ] 
122 Nevertheless, your thesis that these machinations of the Nazis served in 
123 some way to blur the distinction between torturer and victim - a thesis 
124 which you employ to belabor the prosecution in the Eichmann trial -
125 seems to me wholly false and tendentious. In the camps, human beings 
126 were systematically degraded; they were, as you say, compelled to 
127 participate in their own extermination, and to assist in the execution of 
128 fellow-prisoners. Is the distinction between torturer and victim thereby 
129 blurred? What perversity! We are asked, it appears, to confess that the 
130 Jews, too, had their "share" in the acts of genocide. That is a typical 
131 quaternio terminorum. 
132 [ ... ] 
As can be seen, in this sequence Scholem once again accuses Arendt of 
transgressing the moral order set up by him in his utterance on the "two poles". As we 
have seen in the case of "weakness", yet again, the point here attributed to the book is 
that of an (im)moral if not legal accusation levelled against ''the Jews". 
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However, with the progress of Scholem's text, Arendt's claim as reconstructed in 
this utterance differs in significant respects from that of ''weakness" analysed earlier in 
the form of ''they allowed themselves to be slaughtered" (I. 41-42). It is not "mere" 
passivity (however lethal or self-destructive) that ''the Jews" are charged with here and it 
is not merely that they too are available for moral accountability, blurring thus the two 
distinct poles and approaching both of them in terms of moral and legal responsibility. 
Rather, Arendt's book is claimed to have charged "the Jews" with the ultimate moral 
accusation ("torturer", "share' in the acts of genocide") and to have turned consequently 
the entire moral order upside-down. In this reconstructed claim Arendt enlists ''the Jews" 
among the perpetrators and in an unspecified sense equals them with the Nazis: the line is 
erased between them: those, who straightforwardly kill and those, who are 
straightforwardly killed. Hence Scholem's exclamation, "What perversity!" (1. 129), 
which does not of course imply a factual "error'' or even "distortion" (1. 11) but that of an 
inexplicable yet manifestly immoral transgression. It is not merely false but unnatural 
and repugnant in the sense that natural is what we normally and morally (should) do and 
feel (cf. Fish, 1989). 
Arendt is thus made to appear to have manifestly transgressed the consensual 
(epistemological-)moral assumptions Scholem alluded to and established in the 
beginning. With the exception, that is, of one amongst these. While unacknowledged, the 
book is constructed to live up to one expectation. It is about "the Jews". To use the 
category with the definite article (which Scholem does throughout his text) does not 
imply that there are no sub-categories existing within this group. It does imply, however, 
that these sub-categories are simply of no relevance from this particular topic's viewpoint 
and by consequence, it is always a statement about the entire category that any statement 
of a sub-category results. 
How does Scholem construct the unity and overwhelming relevance of the super-
category ("the Jews") in interpreting Arendt's book? The consistent use of the definitive 
article is a "banal" means of this but certainly not the only one (cf. Billig, 1995: esp. Ch. 
5). His strategy is discernible in the beginning of the sequence quoted above, especially 
that it must overcome a possible challenge to its logic. That is, the existence of a sub-
category, the Jewish Councils. 
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Though Scholem starts this sequence with the already noted pattern as it 
establishes that Arendt's problem was "how the Jews reacted" (1. 100, cf. "the Jews and 
their bearing"), what comes after is potentially disconfirming the unity of this category. It 
is the issue about a sub-category and Arendt's handling of the problem that is taken up 
and criticised. Tellingly, however, Scholem appropriates the term "elders of the Jews" (1. 
103-104); that is, not (at first) the "Jewish Councils". This description itself neutralises 
any possible connotations to the role or institutional/power difference of this group from 
the rest of those concerned as opposed to the other conventionally available version. 
Scholem's initial categorisation does not directly imply "power" or the capacity to make 
significant decisions as predicates bound to the category. As such, it does not imply any 
decisive or qualitatively significant division within the category of "the Jews". The 
difference between the "Jewish Elders" and the rest of the Jews is but in age.108 
Moreover, rhetorical unification and thus the accomplishment of the concept "the 
Jews" is similarly advanced in constructing the context of the object of Arendt's 
judgment. Before naming the concrete object ("the elders"), Scholem alludes to "extreme 
circumstances [ ... ] to which neither of us was exposed" (1. 101 ). Discursively speaking, 
the important point here is that by the use of the extreme case-formulation, the "elders" 
become uniform with other Jews suffering in other contexts of the Holocaust: with ghetto 
Jews, with Jews in the working camps and with those in the extermination camps or in 
the gas chambers. This interpretation- i.e. rhetorical "uniformisation" ofthe category by 
the means of "extreme circumstances"- is supported by the way Scholem's text further 
progresses. In the following paragraph (while the later occasioning of the ''torturer''-
"victim" distinction might invoke the circumstances of the ghettos as well - I. 128) 
Scholem immediately sets up the scene in the "camps" (I. 125), the arch-example of 
"extreme circumstances" (I. 101). This not only implies an essential identity between the 
scene of the ghettos (where the Jewish Councils functioned) and the potentially very 
different scene of the camps, but also extrapolates the entire issue allegedly addressed by 
108 It might be countered that the notion of the "Elders of the Jews" is not a neutral category at all, as it 
chimes with the well-known anti-Semitic forgery, The Protoco/s of the Learned Elders of Zion. In the 
original German version, however, Scholem used the word "altesten" and the German translation of the 
Protocols is Protokol/s der Weisen den Zion (Scholem, 1994: 98). I therefore do not attribute any 
significance of this feature of the English version. 
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Arendt so as to cover the entire Holocaust (and "the Jews" as they are consensually tied 
to it) instead of particular parts of it. Thus, from a limited investigation into the activities 
of the Jewish Councils, the object of Arendt'sjudgment is shifted into a judgment about 
the camps. This implies that Arendt's concern was not with that specific spatial-
institutional instance of "Jewish" acts in the ghettos, but with Jewish behaviour as such 
during the entire Holocaust. 
As a result, she is not only constructed here to exercise a(n) (im)moral judgment, 
but one on the Jewish population of the Holocaust in its entirety. Just as foreshadowed at 
the beginning, it is dealing with a whole as Arendt's topic is permanently taken to be the 
apparently homogeneous category of"the Jews". The only difference being that now she 
is not simply constructed to deal with this whole category, to describe its "bearing" but to 
pronounce a manifestly immoral judgment on it. What Arendt is charged with and 
claimed to have alleged in her book is not "simply" that she blurs the distinction between 
those who kill and those who die and turns the moral universe upside-down. It is still 
more to this, as she is reconstructed to accuse "the Jews" as such with killing, indirectly 
or otherwise. Clearly, any immoral act committed against a sub-category of a group or 
even an individual (such as accusing them/him/her of a "share" in their/his/her own 
destruction) will not necessarily be exempt from the charge that it was in fact committed 
against the whole group (Robertson, 2006; Wodak, 1997). However, it is by definition the 
case if the act is constructed to have been committed against the group as such. It is not 
any more an act of possible, but one of actual overtones of an immoral act against the 
entire category. Or, in fact, not even with "over''-tones as the claim "the Jews, too, had 
their 'share' in the acts of genocide" (1. 129-130) is an extreme and almost impossible 
version of the well-known anti-Semitic argument of"blaming the victims".109 
At this point, concepts that were used by Scholem previously appear to be less 
ambiguous. As already noted above, inasmuch as Arendt's verdict of "weakness" or the 
judgment as to the role of the "elders of the Jews" and "the 'share"' of the Jews in the 
"acts of genocide" are to be taken as instances of "historical judgment", it is clear now 
109 Scholem thus remains true to his characterisation of the "question of the new youth" and by implication 
of Arendt's "weakness". It is not "they" (i.e. the Judenriite) who "let them be slaughtered" (i.e. not 
primarily themselves but other Jews). Subject and object are co-terminous. 
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that "historical judgment" is to be taken as a mora/judgment. It contravened Scholem's 
appeal of "two poles", where "the Jews" are not available for moral responsibility. It was 
a manifestly and thoroughly immoral judgment. Indeed, it was an instance of gross anti-
Semitism. 
Not much more can be said, not much more serious accusation can be formed in 
the post-Holocaust world than the contention that what someone claims is an anti-Semitic 
claim. Especially so that this anti-Semitic claim is made with regard precisely to the 
Holocaust, to the very historical event that would illegitimate anti-Semitic accusations 
once and for all. 
From an analytical point of view, however, we cannot stop here, even if the two 
versions (i.e. his and Arendt's) that Scholem acquainted us with were presented to be 
simply and essentially incompatible. However transparent this issue has been rendered by 
Scholem and however straightforward Arendt's transgression as a moral transgression 
might be, we have to investigate what, according to his text, informs these versions. What 
are their basic assumptions and what is it that would constitute a morally just judgment? 
It is the analysis of these issues that will inform the reader where Arendt's book 
ultimately and profoundly failed. 
4.4. Assessment of the Act of Historical Judgment 
To start with, Scholem leaves little doubt about what it is that would constitute a 
morally just judgment in the case in question. This position is both conveyed in his 
version of the "two poles" (which appears to foreclose implicitly the chance for Jewish 
"responsibility'') and in his conviction expressed on the possibility of "historical 
judgment": 
Extract 4.5. 
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35 [ ... ] I do not believe that our generation is in a position to pass 
36 any kind of historical judgment. We lack the necessary perspective, 
37 which alone makes some sort of objectivity possible - and we cannot 
38 but lack it. 
39 [ ... ] 
Scholem's answer, plainly and simply, is that the morally just judgment is the act 
of non-judgment, of refraining from judgment. The ''pole" in question simply suspends 
our capacity for judgment. Not that this capacity as such should be forgotten, only that its 
application is not possible to evaluate these events with regard to the activities of "the 
Jews". What Scholem constructs here of the "case of the Jews" is, to use Giorgio 
Agamben's phrase, the "state of exception" (Agamben, 2005). Although Agamben talks 
about law and juridical norms, his logic appears to me likewise applicable to our case 
where these laws and norms are of moral nature. Thus, he claims, 
"in the form [ ... ] of the state of exception [ ... ] the status necessitatis 
appears as an ambiguous and uncertain zone in which de facto 
proceedings, which are in themselves extra- or antijuridical, pass over 
into law, and juridical norms blur with mere fact - that is, a threshold 
where fact and law become undecidable. If it has been effectively said 
that in the state of exception fact is converted into law[ ... ], the opposite 
is also true, that is, that an inverse movement also acts in the state of 
exception, by which law is suspended and obliterated in fact. The 
essential point, in any case, is that the threshold of undecidability is 
produced at which factum and ius fade into each other'' (Ibid: 29 -
emphases in the original). 
There is one thing of importance here to note, however. As Agamben constantly 
reminds us, this "state of exception" is always a decision of and is always proclaimed 
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upon a state of affairs by someone(s). However natural a "state of exception" appears to 
be, then, the questions immediately arise: who is the sovereign in question that decides 
that the object of Arendt's judgment is in fact exempt of the normal course of judgment 
and whose decision is it that Arendt arbitrarily overrules? In other words, Scholem's non-
judgment is a judgment of course, and our task here is to understand on what assumption 
and on what ground it is pronounced. 
As can be observed in the utterance I quoted above from Scholem in Extract 4.5., 
it is not just the idea of "historical judgment" that acquires its first explicit invocation, but 
the first person plural pronoun as well. It is ''we" (I. 36, 37) or "our generation" (I. 35) 
that cannot and do not 'judge". In Scholem's commencing paragraph it was the "I" and 
the "You" that were used and both could be described as anaphoras in that they referred 
to "objects that have already been introduced into a discourse" (Miilhiiusler and Ham!, 
1990: 9): the "dear Hannah" addressed in line 3, and the "Gershom Scholem" who signs 
the text in line 192. They were pinpointed as individuals. While their personal 
involvement in the matters under discussion was indeed highlighted, not much could be 
said about their subject positions with relation to any community "listening", however. In 
short, we were acquainted with the "ratified audience" (Goffman, 1981), but not with 
what Chaim Perelman called the ''universal" or "ideal audience" (Perelman, 1979; 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971). 
By a "universal audience" neither the potential over-hearers (such as the later 
readers of the exchange) nor Disengaged Reason Him/Herself should be understood here. 
Rather, it is the relevant community of subjects that is envisaged by the participants as 
their audience and, consequently, whose community they imagine themselves to be part 
of. Thus, the significance of this "ideal audience" is not simply that it literally overhears 
the debate but that by virtue of its contextual presence virtually defines it. For, as 
Perelman notes, 
"A rhetorical philosophy takes note not only of the existence of differing 
conceptions of the universal audience but also of the fact that each 
reasonable person is a member of a plurality of particular audiences, to 
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whose theses he adheres with variable intensity. [ ... ] It is always 
important to know with which of these particular audiences any concrete 
individual is going to identify himself in case of conflict"110 (Perelman, 
1979: 49). 
Who are ''we" and why the use of this ambiguous term (and some other definitive 
noun) to designate this group?111 
It has been noted many times that the first person plural pronoun is a major source 
of potential for creating ambiguity in public utterances (Billig, 1995: 87-93, 2003: 237-
240; Bull and Fetzer, 2006; Miilhiiusler and Ham\, 1990: 177-78, 200; Wilson, 1990: 56). 
It is certainly not for ambiguity's own stake but for various rhetorical functions: to forge 
"communalities", "consubstantiality" (see Billig, 2003; Burke, 1969; de Fina, 1995; 
Perelman, 1979; Perelman and Olberchts-Tyteca, 1971; Reicher and Hopkins, 1996), or 
to invoke simultaneously a particular "we" along a universal one (Billig, 1995: 90-91), 
and the likes. Thus, our analysis cannot stop the moment we acknowledge this ambiguity. 
Rather, the question is what the rhetorical function of this ambiguity might accomplish. 
Lack of clear meaning is surely not to be taken as a logical problem. It might be a 
rhetorical virtue. 
110 This interpretation ofPerelman's concept is admittedly particularist. For a more universalist exposition, 
see Golden (1986). 
111 To understand Scholem's position as well as his account for Arendt's it is of vital importance to analyse his 
construction of this group. The plausible answer is, certainly and without hesitation that this is the group of the 
Jews. Every later commentator of the exchange made use of this assumption, but none of them ever 
acknowledged it as an assumption. It was considered a fact. My argument will not be in the folio wings that "we" 
does not stand for the Jews. Rather, I am arguing that for my purposes such a simple substitution is without any 
analytical merit and use. First, it does not tell us in what sense are the Jews understood here. Second, it does not 
account for but neglects the fact that Scholem himself does not make this substitution explicitly anywhere 
throughout his text, and constructs a highly undefined and ambiguous category as a subject position that seems to 
encompass him, possibly Arendt - and a bunch of other people. Even if we have a probable intuition that "our 
generation" somehow stands for that generation of Jews that experienced in one way or another Holocaust, it is of 
significance that Scholem does not make this inference, even though he could easily have. As he wrote before that 
point, "Your book moves between two poles: the Jews and their bearing in the days of the catastrophe, and the 
responsibility of Adolf Eichmann. I have devoted, as you know, a good part of my time to a consideration of the 
case of the Jews[ ... ]"(- emphases mine). There is no indication given in either of these cases as to the connection 
between "you", "we" (or even: "I") and "the Jews". The latter is even used with the definitive article. For 
whatever reason, Scholem does not connect these two concepts and this state of matters must analytically be 
treated of significance (see Drew, 2005; Schegloff, 1984). 
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In our case, the lack of clear referent might contribute to an atmosphere of 
familiarity and casualness. We do not have to specify that vague part. We, after all, know 
who we are talking about, don't we? This vagueness might be taken to be an 
appropriation of the genre of a private letter to a friend, where it is apparently not 
required to make everything understandable to anyone, and conveys thereby familiarity 
and intimacy. It is this appropriation of ''privacy" that enables Scholem to "make strong 
claim to know the addressee and be known by him" (Drew, I 984: I 03); that is, to make a 
strong claim both about Arendt's knowledge and familiarity with the group and her 
belonging to it. 
Hence, it constructs a discursive situation where it is an implicit requirement 
directed towards Arendt to know what that category would mean, to be familiar with it, 
and to belong naturally to it. Not that such belonging seems to need any commitment or 
knowledge. Apparently, "our generation" neutrally and naturally designates a bunch of 
people (e.g. Jews) in their 50s or 60s with Scholem and Arendt undoubtedly amongst 
them. 
Yet, having created this innocent discursive situation, Scholem formufates a 
predicate to this category- the predicate of the impossibility of "historical judgment" that 
Arendt would throughout be constructed to transgress! As the question has been posed 
earlier in this section, the crucial thing here and now is on what grounds this conviction 
of non-judgment is pronounced. What is the sovereign authority that declares the "state of 
exception"? 
One possible answer already mentioned above (see page 1 09) is that non-
judgment is an objective description of the condition of ''us". As I also noted previously, 
given the reference to a "generation" (I. 35) it seems fair to assume that the lack of 
''perspective" that disables "us" to judge is a temporal perspective or a temporal distance. 
There is then no apparent hint that the disabling condition would be a special relation 
between the object of judgment and the subject. Inasmuch as the condition that disables 
''us" to judge is implied to be ''time", the reason that underlines a no-judgment stance is a 
natural matter. Hence, the predicate of non-judgment is more of objective, natural, and 
categorical, than of contingent, subjective nature. Just as "our generation" (I. 35) seemed 
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to be a descriptive category with no conspicuous subjective or moral connotations, so 
does the judgment appear to be more a transgression of a natural order rather than a moral 
one, even if its consequence might then turn out to be moral as they indeed did. 
According to this seemingly plausible interpretation, Arendt is constructed to transgress 
nature, instead of any given community. "We" cannot fly and cannot judge. Should we 
try either, it might result in disastrous consequences but neither of them has any 
(necessarily) conspicuous moral bearing. 
Consequently, whatever our intuition as to what this "we" might be, "our 
generation" appears here to acquire the connotation of "any reasonable people" rather 
than just a particular community (see Billig, 1995: 90-91).112 It sounds improbable that 
Scholem's formulation would imply a "them" who do not lack the "perspective" and who 
can therefore form a "historic judgment". Rather, the inference is of coming generations 
with more distance and with more retrospective wisdom in chasing objectivity. 
That is, however, only one third of the story. Curiously, on the one hand, Scholem 
appears to qualify this state of matters as he makes relevant his own activity ("I believe" 
I. 34) and therefore the subjective nature of his conclusion. "I believe" is not a 
"presupposition-trigger" (Levinson 1983: 179-182), which is to say it does not necessitate 
the objective validity of its predicate (namely, the requirement of non-judgment). This is 
somewhat counter-intuitive if we take the disabling factor to be temporal ''perspective". 
Furthermore, on the other hand, this "qualified" conclusion is drawn from an extreme-
case formulation, which once again suggests the suspension of any personal or subjective 
stance (Pomerantz, 1986) and confers the inevitability of objectivity: we cannot but lack 
it (I. 37-38). Thus, though "I believe" does not suggest necessity, the extreme-case 
formulation appears to do so. 
Rhetorically, of course, there is nothing paradoxical in combining a subjective 
conviction with an objective precondition. Such a construction emphasises the categorical 
and universal reasonableness of that personal conviction. As Billig observes, there is a 
duality in such kinds of expressions that "imply that the stance is subjective but at the 
112 To support this interpretation, let me point out that "every spectator" should not necessarily mean who 
were litemlly were there: just as Scholem was not there either. 
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same time they will be conveying that the reasons for the stance are universally valid and 
not merely subjective" (Billig, 2003: 238). 
Seen this way, "I believe" does not mitigate the subsequent predicate just as the 
pronouns "we" (twice) in the following sentence do not imply a possible present "them" 
to whom the extreme-case formulation would not apply and who would therefore 
immediately be fully equipped to judge. Rather, the selection of the pronouns and the 
representative verb ("believe", see Levinson [1983: 240] on this type of verbs) confer the 
"existential involvement" (Wilson, 1990: 76-79) of"our generation". 
It is therefore important to point out that Scholem not only cited instances of 
universal or natural import against a certain kind of act. He not only used an extreme-case 
formulation but by the constant use of various pronouns also transformed it to a human 
matter. The consequence of this was that his conclusion was not simply that one is not 
able to anive at a "historical judgment" but that we should not aim at it either. In this 
sense, for all the descriptive characteristics of the category "our generation" and the 
natural disabling condition of lack of temporal "perspective", refraining from judgment 
became a normative or moral matter as well. 
Yet, there is surely still more involved here than this. No hermeneutical 
excellence is needed to realise that the "state of exception" and hence the impossibility of 
"historical judgment" cannot rely merely on the factor of temporal perspective. Namely, 
Scholem's considerations are not universal or theoretical. Judgment here refers to a 
specific object. Should any other object be in question, he would hardly philosophise on 
the temporal perspective that is required to be lapsed in order to us be able to judge. 
The object here was "the case of the Jews" (I. 17-18). That, however, still does 
not make clear why we could not judge them. In order to arrive at an answer, we have to 
revisit a paragraph already analysed in certain aspects: 
Extract 4. 6. 
103 [ ... ] Which of us can say today what decisions the elders 
104 of the Jews - or whatever we choose to call them - ought to have 
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I 05 arrived at in the circumstances? I have not read less than you have about 
I 06 these matters, and I am still not certain; but your analysis does not give 
107 me confidence that your certainty is better founded than my uncertainty. 
[ ... ] 
112 [ ... ] I do not know whether 
113 they were right or wrong. Nor do I presume to judge. I was not there. 
114 [ ... ] 
Here, similar to my first example, the category of "us" is constructed being unable 
to judge. Furthermore, making relevant the time of writing ("today" - I. I 03) at the 
beginning of the utterance Scholem seems to formulate the plea for non-judgment yet 
again conditioned on the criterion of time (hence, inevitability and reasonableness). He 
thus leaves open whether coming generations of ''tomorrow" might be more acquainted 
with the possibility of historical judgment and why anyone of "us" would now desire to 
do so. 
The way he concludes the paragraph, however, suggests something more 
categorical as well as less "natural". There, Scholem arrives at a striking and definite 
conclusion as far as the prerequisites of judgment are concerned: "Nor do I presume to 
judge. I was not there" (1. 113).113 The sovereign authority which proclaims the state of 
necessity and assumes exclusively the act of judgment, is, then those who "were there". 
Where? What is it that is categorically impossible to judge? What are, really, the 
"state of exception" and the object of Arendt's judgment? As analysed in the previous 
section, although Scholem ostensibly touched upon the matter of the Jewish Councils, his 
formulation of the issue pointed well beyond them. As was analysed in the previous 
section, however, what is of prime importance here is that by invoking the "extreme 
circumstances" and immediately afterwards the "camps" Scholem did not simply create a 
uniform image of"the Jews". It was this extremity, as context, that made "the Jews"- the 
object of the judgment- uniform. 
113 In a later part of this section (cf. fn. 116), I will certainly try to account for this almost absurd 
requirement. What shall suffice for now is that Scholem thereby constructs the attitude of non-judgement as 
defmitive and thereby normative of the group. 
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It is important to understand that here this state of extremity inevitably means or 
invokes the gas chambers and the dead. There is, quite simply, nothing more extreme 
than these two with regard to the Holocaust (and Scholem himself occasions the "camps" 
as well-!. 132). If the entire context is constructed to be of extreme nature, then the gas 
chambers bear their deadly mark on every single instance of this entire context. It is them 
that there is nothing beyond. Such a construction, then, conveys the implicit message that 
the event as such was not built up of more or less normal, more or less unnormal, and 
totally and extremely abnormal parts, but was and must be treated, on the contrary, 
extreme to the literal core. In this context the situation of the "elders" will be essentially 
the same ("extreme") as that of any other Jew involved in the event. And the situation of 
"any other Jew involved in the event" will be essentially that of the dead. 114 The moral 
status of the dead is thereby accorded to those who perished as well as to those who did 
not. To those who had some sort of institutional power as well as to those who did not 
have any at all. Thus formulated, the "extremity" not only infuses "the Jews" with a 
uniform identity but also with the moral authority of the dead. In retrospect, they all are 
"dead" and they were all ''there"- even if they did not actually die. 
As Scholem characterises these people, in the camps "human beings were 
systematically degraded; they were, as you say, compelled to participate in their own 
extermination, and to assist in the execution of fellow-prisoners" (l. 125-128).115 This 
formulation is by definition the characterisation of the status necessitatis, with reference 
to which the "state of exception" may be proclaimed. It is a situation where external 
factors that rule upon human subjects "compel" them to oblige to whatever ends: even to 
the event of their own destruction. What Scholem implicitly draws upon is that "our'' 
normal capacities attuned to normality and everyday life must necessarily fall short of the 
possibility of arriving at a balanced judgment when facing a situation that is essentially 
and qualitatively different from mundane situations. 
114 This is not an absurd (or immoral) notion at all. They, too, were meant to be dead. 
115 This description is in line with other observations about the camps and the act of remembering the 
camps; not the least with that of Arendt in her The Origins of Totalitarianism. For problems of 
representation in the face of this experience of the camps, see Friedliinder (I 992), Lang (1988), Langer, 
1991), Young (1988). 
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Certainly, this constructed uniform "extremity" of the context (along with its 
implicit invocation of the camps and the gas chambers) overhauls comprehensively the 
earlier appeal to the factor of time. Or, rather, it endows that "perspective" with moral 
qualities. Due to the essential qualitative difference of the situation, the object and the 
subject of judgment becomes co-terminuous and the moral authority of judgment is 
thereby exclusively rendered to the "dead" (which, as noted, includes the Elders, 
regardless whether they were actually at the camps and actually died). Consequentially, it 
renders it a moral imperative for us to accept their authority and not to judge. Ever. 116 
As a clear and striking divergence from the preceding, then, this plea for non-
judgment and the category ''us" attached to it is solely grounded in the object of judgment 
and in the moral authority of those who "died", expressed in the idea of "being there". 
The amount of time lapsed between the event and our judgment simply does not matter at 
all. Thus, while in the earlier example there has been a balance between the descriptive 
and prescriptive, this later formulation approaches the act of judgment in this situation 
not as impossible or un-reasonable but immoral. Hence, the category of "we/us" as such 
becomes much less (if at all) of a descriptive than a prescriptive, moral kind, grounded 
nowhere else but in the relationship between ''us" and those who "died". "Lack of 
perspective" would not be a temporal but an existential matter: it is our and not someone 
else's generation as we can never distance ourselves from them. Otherwise, we would 
cease to be "us", in the moral sense of the group. 
To sum up, the authority that has thus been invoked to proclaim the "state of 
exception", to invalidate "historical judgment" and to delegitimate Arendt's choice of 
exercising "historical judgment" (or, alternatively, to account for her illegitimate choice) 
is the moral authority of the "dead" of the Shoah. Consequently, what has been 
undermined by Arendt's act of judgment is precisely this moral authority. Literally, of 
116 Taken literally, this position places the Shoah outside the realm of history, as in this discipline 
"historical judgment" is mostly arrived at on the proviso that the writer was actually not at the scene when 
it happened. If, however, we do not take this assertion and requirement literally (see Edwards [2000] on the 
non-literal uses of ECFs), it still retains the firm element of non-judgment- with regard to them, and us-
as an obligation. (If we take it to be literal, then all Scholem's previous notions about knowledge [or indeed 
all ofScholem's previous notions] would be redundant.) 
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course, it is not the "dead" that speaks here. In a moral sense, however, it showcases 
precisely the fundamental difference between Scholem and Arendt. Whereas the former 
either confers the sovereign moral authority to the "dead" or accepts their claim with 
regard to this- the latter rejects both. 
There is, then, one ultimate question beyond the ultimate assumption. Why and on 
what grounds does Scholem confer (or accept) and does Arendt reject the moral authority 
of the "dead"? To answer this question entails the analysis Scholem's account for 
Arendt's moral failure in producing a manifestly immoral text. 
4.5. Conclusion: Towards the Why 
This chapter narrated a complex story but not, hopefully, one without direction. 
With all his subtle and often ambiguous rhetoric, I tried to decipher Scholem's text as 
establishing an ever-damaging textual criticism and the implicit (im)moral assumption 
this text was constructed to be based on. 
At first, Scholem established the text as manifestly immoral in its central claims. 
This construction was accomplished through juxtaposing Arendt's version with an 
apparently consensual moral frame and with the only possible responsible and moral 
understanding of the events, which this and only this moral frame could produce. Thus, 
Arendt was constructed to turn this moral universe "upside-down" and implicate the 
victims in a position in the genocide that is usually, naturally and, surely, morally 
maintained for the Nazis. Furthermore, as analysed, this moral failure was enhanced by 
attributing to Arendt this judgment made about the Jews, that is, not simply about some 
sub-category of co-operators or even collaborators but about the category in toto. In 
Scholem's construction it was those who were killed (the Jews) who were charged in the 
book and such a state of matters certainly meant that Arendt did not simply exercise 
moral judgment but a palpably immoral one. In short, what was reconstructed was a 
thoroughly anti-Semitic text. 
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However consensual Scholem's moral framework was presented to be, I 
nevertheless undertook to produce an account for it. That is, to scrutinise the basis of this 
framework and the basis that, consequently, Arendt has throughout been constructed to 
effectively transgress. This moral basis and assumption conferred the authority of moral 
judgment to that of the "dead" of the Holocaust. It thus proclaimed in their name the 
Holocaust a "state of exception", where everyday moral judgments are not applicable. 
However, it had to be pointed out that Scholem's authoritative version of the "two poles" 
derived its legitimacy from the authority of the "dead", where this "dead", curiously, was 
constructed to comprise of the actual dead as well as the actual not-dead. The actual 
"absolutely'' powerless as well as the relatively powerful. They were the ones retaining 
the capacity of judgment, exclusively. 
Arendt did judge, however, and the act of judgment was constructed to be 
connected with the content of this judgment itself. The failure at the former entailed the 
failure of the latter: it was the rejection of the moral authority of the "dead" that 
transgressed the moral order of the "two poles". Yet, inasmuch as both of these factors-
the choice and the outcome - appeared to be manifestly immoral, the question might 
inevitably arise in the reader: why? What is it that accounts for such choice and such 
outcome? Is it deliberate? Is it by chance? Or is it, perhaps, by some sort of necessity? 
To be sure, this is not just a question that arises in the reader, out of inevitable 
curiosity. Echoes can be heard here of the foreshadowed "error and distortion" in that 
Scholem's conclusion as to Arendt's exercise of "historical judgment" (apart from 
"perversity" - I. 129) was "wholly false and tendentious" (1. 125) and having arised out 
of a "demagogic will-to-overstatement" (1. 102-1 03). "Wholly false" (cf. "error'') itself is 
enough to destroy rhetorically the epistemological or moral basis of the book and is in 
line with attributing a manifestly immoral judgment underlining Arendt' s text. 
"Tendentious", however, implies arguably even more than this, in a way not unlike 
"distortion". It implies, namely, that such a manifestly immoral claim cannot be 
appreciated as a merely innocent misreading of the events and it cannot be corrected by 
pointing out some of the factual inaccuracies undoubtedly involved in its construction. It 
is "willed". 
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Consequently, it is even more of the critique's task than to point to the whole book 
in its assumptions and in its outcome as a moral failure instead of some or even plenty of 
errors in it. Rather, it is a motivation, an intention, a tendency instrumental to its 
existence that must be addressed. By the same token, the exercise of the immoral, the act 
of "historical judgement" resulting in a manifestly immoral claim cannot be due to bad 
luck or even to the lack of circumspection. There must be a reason for it. As was 
foreshadowed in the beginning, Scholem directs our attention not only to a manifestly 
immoral book but also to the reason that could underlie its existence and likewise a 
reason underlying the moral choice of Scholem, that of the acceptance of the moral 
authority of the "dead". 
In the next chapter it is these aspects ofScholem's letter that will be discussed. 
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5. Beyond a Boundary: 
The Genealogy of an Anti-Semitic Book 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I will analyse Scholem's construction of an account for the 
manifestly immoral act and content of Arendt's historical judgment. What are, namely, 
the pre-conditions and enabling factors underlying the actual judgment as Scholem's 
project is more to produce a "diagnosis" than a "description" (for this distinction see 
Hester, 1998)? What do we learn about the dancer from the dance? And what do we learn 
if that dancer is Scholem? The unmasking of the source from which Arendt's manifestly 
immoral choice and the subsequent book evolved must go hand in hand. with an 
exposition of the nature of the morality to which Scholem allies himself. 
5.2. From the Text to a Person 
Indeed, we can learn about the dancer. The act and the responsibility for the act 
may eventually go hand in hand as moral questions may ultimately touch human beings 
and not simply their products (Walzer, 2000: 287-89), be they whole books or shorter 
utterances. Not that there would be a "non-discursive human core" existing somewhere 
beyond the bunch of utterances but that it is a human being that is capable of arguing, 
producing further utterances, and an be an active participant in discourse; in the terrain of 
morality (cf. Billig, 1991: Ch. 9,1996: 238; Jayyusi, 1991). 
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The point, however, is that it is not simply moral theory but Gershom Scholem 
himself who differentiates between "dancers" and hence occasions the difference 
between the book, the utterance on the one hand and the person, the actor on the other. 
Thus, in the case of the "new youth of Israel" (1. 41 ), its orientation was used as an 
illuminating analogy to Arendt's approach. It was the very locus of the origin of that 
utterance that accounted for it in a way that was dissimilar to that of Arendt. What was 
implied there was that the question of the "new youth" might hurt, their act of uttering 
this question might be aggressive ("the question thrown at us"), but they are a bunch of 
inexperienced people in terms of both their overall life experience and having not lived in 
the age of the "catastrophe". These factors certainly influence and alleviate the evaluation 
of their otherwise serious and painful utterances. It is, then, one thing when the "new 
youth" says something and quite another when Hannah Arendt- who self-evidently must 
be assessed as well as should conduct herself according to different standards- does. 117 
Even more importantly, as already noted (page 111 ), her book's failings were 
constructed to contradict the view of the historian ("for more than forty years I have 
concerned myself with little else" - I. 22-23) and that of the everyman too ("I am well 
aware, in common with every other spectator of the events" - I. 19-20). The "events", 
then, were constructed to be "complex" both at face value and after a lifelong scrutiny. 
As it was hinted by me this construction not only worked at legitimising the event-
understood-this-way, however; it did not only strive to be far more convincing than 
Arendt's later presented "version" and accomplish its ultimate non-objectivity. Rather, it 
too established that it is not only that no more persuasive alternative is available, but that 
no reasonable alternative as such is available at all. This way of presenting the issue did 
not even allow for the question of whether Arendt's alternative ''version" is more 
convincing, but focused implicitly on how she could arrive at a (radically) alternative 
''version" at all. Quite simply, the implied question was how Arendt could contradict 
117 It can be argued, and with justice, that such a state of matters will result in the collapse of the distinction 
I have been using here between the content and the origin of that content Thus, attributing this content to 
the "new youth" arguably does not leave its (immoral) content intact while withdrawing moral 
responsibility from the speaker (i.e. the "youth"). This way of accounting bears its mark on the 
interpretation of the utterance as well. Yet, it is just what possibly happens in the case of any contextual 
information occasioned by the speaker (i.e. Scholem, here). This is, thus, not to argue against the content-
genesis distinction as a heuristic analytical tool, even more so if it follows the practical reasoning of 
Scholem here, and that is what I will try to show. 
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someone who researched the subject for forty years; and, more poignantly, how she could 
possibly not see what "every other spectator" did. From this point on, the basic question 
suggested was not simply what Arendt's manifestly immoral text consists of but how we 
can explain that with regard to the origin, from which it evolved. 
There was, hence, a "discursive void" constructed here with a lack of account for 
Arendt' s approach and an implied thrust to fill this. In line with this, at other points in 
Scholem's text we have already encountered utterances that implied the ultimate 
reckoning being concerned with this accounting in terms of Arendt's motives. The 
notions of "distortion" (I. 11) as well as "wholly [ ... ] tendentious" (I. 125) pointed 
towards the existence of a motive somewhere beyond the text and as such responsible for 
its moral failings. As I analysed it, Scholem appeared consistently to hint at some 
contingent factors as an explanation for the book's failings; 
The notion, however, that there is something behind the text yet within the sphere 
of accountability for it is not confined to the implicit register of Scholem's text. It is put 
simply and explicitly in the following utterance: 
Extract 5.1. 
50 [ ... ] How is it that your version of the 
51 events so often seems to come between us and the events - events which 
52 you rightly urge upon our attention? Insofar as I have an answer, it is 
53 one which, precisely out of my deep respect for you, I dare not suppress; 
54 and it is an answer that goes to the root of our disagreement. [ ... ] 
This utterance moves beyond establishing a text in its content: it is its origin that 
is addressed. "How is it...?" indicates that the state of matters perceived in Arendt's book 
should not have happened, that it could have happened otherwise and that, having 
happened, it must be accounted for. Having established the scholarly as well as morally 
dubious nature of the book Scholem now explicitly signals a move to go beyond the text. 
This move concludes the process of the non-factual criticism foreshadowed in the 
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beginning. What he is now after are not problems with the surface or with the text and its 
underlying assumptions (however ''perverse", "malicious" they may be), but with the 
"root" (1. 54). It is from this "root" that failures of the surface are presumably to be 
understood.118 
Extract 5.2. 
54 ( ... ] It is 
55 that heartless, frequently almost sneering and malicious tone with which 
56 these matters, touching the very quick of our life, are treated in your 
57 book to which I take exception. 
58 [ ... ] 
On the face of it, this sentence offers an explanation of their "disagreement" -
which in fact is not a disagreement as Scholem constructed throughout Arendt's as a 
morally inferior, rather than but an epistemologically different position. He used the 
contingent repertoire and any reader could or would attribute the concepts enumerated 
here (heartless, sneering, malicious) to the person, rather than merely to the text as it is 
explicitly put there.119 A "malicious" and "heartless" motive appears to be behind a 
"malicious" book, in contrast to the attitudes of a respectful reader. Is this, however, only 
discursive hair-splitting to concentrate on what precisely is said? Would the only reason 
why Scholem explicitly ties "malice", "heartlessness", "sneering" to "tones" and not 
directly to Arendt be not to appear overtly offensive? Indeed, would his message be that 
simple that it is the existence of certain de-contextualised motives (as is put in a later 
instance: "demagogic will-to-overstatement" -I. 102-103) that are accountable? Could 
118 Let us note at the same time that accounting for his own position, Scholem once again seems to adopt 
the empiricist repertoire. His comments are not rooted in personal lust or any sort of bad will towards 
Arendt; to the contrary, they emerge from a "deep respect", suggesting not merely Scholem's neutrality but 
more a downright disinclination to address the matters as he does (Edwards, 1995, 2007). That his 
reluctance is eventually overcome must again be attributed to the sense of obligation. However, just as in 
the case of "fear", where his accounting for his own activity was coupled with the suggestion of firmly 
opposite motives from Arendt's side ("distortion"), here, too, the followings hint at a striking contrast 
manifest in Arendt's attitudes to that ofScholem's so as possibly to explain the "root of our disagreement". 
119 See Cesarani (2004: 349), for instance, making this fallacy. 
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they be the explanation themselves: malice for malice's sake? 
The proper answer to these questions may be arrived at by having a closer look at 
the precise way "tones" are used by Scholem. Doing this, let us first note that he does not 
only enumerate undesirable "tones". The "tones" in themselves do not constitute the 
"root" of the problem, another condition is mentioned: the "matters, touching the very 
quick of our life" (1. 56). Thus, Scholem connects the tones to a "matter'' and this 
"matter" immediately to a community, to "us". The tones therefore do not stand in 
themselves and, thus, they do not constitute the "root" of the problem. They are 
constructed to stand intertwined with the "matter" and "us", where it is arguably the three 
together and their mutual relationship that constitutes the moral issue.120 In this context, it 
might be reasonable to assume that heartlessness, sneering, and malice are not really the 
explanations in themselves. It is a relation to a community that makes them emerge. 
Looking at other instances in Scholem's text seems to warrant this interpretation. Let us 
observe three other occasions where Scholem uses the concept of the "matter'': 
"A discussion such as is attempted in your book would require - you 
will forgive my mode of expression - the most circumspect, the most 
exacting treatment possible - precisely because of the feelings aroused 
by this matter, the matter of the destntction of one-third of our people 
[ ... ]" (1. 61-66). 
"To the matter of which you speak it [i.e. the "flippant tone"] is 
unimaginably inappropriate" (1. 69-71 ). 
''To speak of all this [matter], however, in so wholly inappropriate a tone 
[ ... ] this is not the way to approach the scene of that tragedy" (1. 94-98 -
all the emphases mine). 
120 In fact, it was the case in point even in Scholem's rhetorical question, where Arendt's text was charged 
with alienating a community, "us", from the "events". 
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As we see, talking about or hinting at ''tones" Scholem invariably raises the 
spectre of a ''matter'' and a "community". The "discussion" and the ''tones" cannot help 
but being in a relationship with an event and with a community. This implies that the 
''matter'' or "the scene of that tragedy", therefore, is not interpretable in any kind of way. 
A community already "sees" (i.e. "every spectator"), "feels" (i.e. the "feelings aroused by 
this matter"), "interprets" (i.e. "scene of that tragedy") it somehow. It "always-already'' 
lends meaning to them and any further reflection or interpretation "must" orient itselfto it 
and must be in a participating dialogue with it. 121 
There are good reasons, then, not to treat malice, heartlessness, and sneer as 
explanations in themselves. Neither are they de-contextualised mental or emotional 
entities residing somewhere in Hannah Arendt's bosom. Rather, they are characteristics 
of her interpretative orientation or "approach" (I. 97). As much as they are the problem, 
they constitute the "root" of the problem only insofar as they emerge from a (troubled) 
relationship between the speaker and a community, ''us", with regard to the "matter". 
What they exhibited was that Arendt's approach ignored or even wilfully neglected a 
shared overall attitude and it is this neglect and its nature that constitutes both the moral 
and the epistemological problem. To put it simply, the problem is, therefore, not malice 
as such but an orientation to a community, of which malice is merely the outcome. 
All of this does not necessarily contradict yet the possibility of an empiricist 
repertoire accounting for Scholem's stance and a contingent one for that of Arendt. Even 
though there is a community here with regard to which Arendt's (and Scholem's) 
approach is assessed, this community still might be of universal import. Accepting the 
moral authority of the "dead" and proclaiming subsequently the "state of exception" on 
the object of our judgment could (or even should) indeed evolve from a universal 
morality. 
121 The obvious anachronism aside, there is a sense in which these notions of Scholem are not unlike to that 
of literary theorist Stanley Fish regarding "interpretative communities" as the ultimate and only authorities 
in questions of constructing meaning to any kind of stimulus from the world (Fish, 1980; cf. Rorty, 1999: 
131-147). Cf. Scholem's essay Revelation and Tradition as Religious Categories in Judaism in this respect 
as well (Scholem, 1971: 282-303). 
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Yet, the following might support our intuition that the problem here actually is not 
with contingent repertoires as such, but with this sort of contingent repertoire that Arendt 
displays. Scholem, then, might not in the first place be the neutral observer of humanity, 
even if his conclusion and the perceived anti-Semitism of the book might coincide with 
an assessment made from a humanist position. This means that both Arendt's and 
Scholem's position may exhibit, as well as be determined by the sort of attachment they 
display to a particular community and morality. Hence, Arendt's immoral and a distorted 
text does not originate in transgressing the rules of a Universally Valid Rationality but 
betrays the wrong sort of attachment (i.e. neglect? ignorance?) to this particular 
community and morality. 
It is the exhibition of these "repertoires" that is my task here as they appear to 
form the ultimate account for the book's deep moral failures, as well as Scholem's 
morally just position: what is this community? What is this morality? 
5.3. "Us" and "You": The Unbearable Lightness of"Being" 
5.3.1. The right sort of morality 
The paragraph to be analysed here follows immediately Scholem's exposure of 
the "heartless, frequently sneering, and malicious tones" (1. 55) in his previous utterance. 
As such, we might expect to be provided with an answer to Scholem's question as to the 
"root of our disagreement" as well as to the problematic relationship between Arendt's 
subject position and that of ''us" with regard to the moral authority of the "dead". 
Extract 5.3. 
58 In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete 
59 enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: "Love of the Jewish 
60 people .... " In you, dear Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who came 
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61 from the German Left, I find little trace of it. A discussion such as is 
62 attempted in your book would seem to me to require - you will forgive 
63 my mode of expression- the most old-fashioned, the most circumspect, 
64 the most exacting treatment possible- precisely because of the feelings 
65 aroused by this matter, this matter of the destruction of one-third of our 
66 people - and I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no 
67 other way. [ ... ] 
There is no possible "deeper'' account than referring to the origin of a text. At this 
instance, Scholem is no longer concerned with presenting or scrutinising the "versions"; 
either his or Arendt's. Here, he is solely concerned with the locus where they come from 
and what is to account for their "disagreement": one version with and another partly or 
even wholly without Ahabath Israel. It is this notion and what it stands for that will 
account for the subject position of Arendt and Scholem. It is the ultimate authority that 
stands behind the moral or immoral choices and assessments made by them. 
My first task here will be to ·analyse the authority that Ahabath Israel stands for, 
turning then to Arendt's relationship to this authority. 
The central phrase - "Ahabath Israel: love of the Jewish people", which "we 
know" and which there is "little trace" in Arendt of- is extremely vague and Scholem 
does not at all expound it further. What it does imply, nevertheless, is the existence of a 
homogenous community and some sort of orientation that is required towards it. One 
would be inclined to say that it is an "emotion". It is important to note, however, that 
Ahabath Israel is preceded by its categorisation and Scholem does not refer there to an 
"emotion" or appeal to Arendt's subjective feelings; on the contrary, Ahabath Israel is a 
"concept" that "we know". 
Yet, his formulation does not imply either that the only thing required would have 
been Arendt looking up this "concept" in the Encyclopaedia Judaica122 and acquainting 
herself with it so as to produce a factually and morally acceptable book. This "concept" is 
"' Where, in fact, one finds "little trace of it" as well. See Encyclopaedia Judaica (2006). 
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"hard to define", where the problematic nature of possible definition indicates that it 
cannot be captured by mere cognition. Mere "knowledge" and pure "definition", hence, 
are neither required nor in fact perhaps possible. 
What is it, however, that is neither an emotion but nor mere knowledge? What is 
it that is "known" but cannot (easily) be defined? How do we "know" it if we cannot 
quite tell what it is? 
Such a fonnulation appears to present an entity that is not of semantic but of 
practical knowledge: a way of life, a practice instead of pure theory, disembodied 
reflection, or "Reason".123 It is, then, this way of life or practice, which is the nature of 
the morality of the position from which Scholem speaks. However, it is such (and, 
perhaps, the only such) an authority that pennits one to arrive at what would otherwise be 
considered reflective or intellectual qualities: "the most circumspect [sachlichen], the 
most exacting [griindlichen] treatment possible" (1. 63-64). As such, it exposes the 
contingent repertoire needed in order to arrive at the right choices, both factually and 
morally. Instead of acquiring the Encyclopaedia, it is the adoption of a way of life 
Ahabath Israel stands for that is the road towards a morally just and factually authentic 
book. 
Yet, to conclude that the authority that infonns Scholem's choices and verdicts is 
a way of life is at best one-third of the story. What is still required is, on the one hand, an 
understanding of what sort of way of life, what sort of authority it is and, on the other, 
what Arendt's subject position is with regard to this way of life. 
In analysing the nature of this authority, it is of importance that as the origin of 
this "concept" Scholem introduces the "Jewish tradition" or, in the Gennan version, 
"Jiidische Sprache". Interestingly, he thereby not only points to the objectification of an 
intetpretive practice but also neutralises and "modernises" this practice. That is, he does 
not expose its arguably foremost character, namely, that it had been a religious practice 
throughout the centuries. "Jewish tradition" does not expose this state of matters 
("Jiidische Sprache" even less so) and Scholem so brings this intetpretative practice to 
m Cf. Scholem's description of the interest that preoccupied him in his youth and presumably afterwards: 
"Was Judaism still alive as a heritage or an experience, even as something constantly evolving, or did it 
exist only as an object of cognition?" (Scholem, 2003: 165) 
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the position of authority without indicating or confronting its prima facie non-secular 
nature. What it indicates, however, might not be mere rhetorical trickery in order to erase 
those possible and otherwise existing distinctions but an ideology that simply does not 
acknowledge this existence. In this reading, it either discards the secular-religious 
dichotomy altogether or, in any case, subscribes to an apparently unproblematic 
continuity between the two. 124 
Nevertheless, let us analyse how Scholem introduces this authority, this way of 
life through Ahabath Israel. This he does beginning with the Hebrew version, indicating 
not only the "foreignness" and the originality of the concept, but along with this also that 
a translation is a necessarily pale substitute. Were the concept completely commensurable 
with an English term, Scholem would hardly need the original in the first place. His using 
the Hebrew term, thus, suggests rhetorically a gap between Ahabath Israel and "love of 
the Jewish people"; one loses something removing Ahabath Israel from the context or 
culture (i.e. the "Jewish tradition") it naturally features in. That is, it is something 
impossible to be perceived if one does not live this certain way of life (German?, 
English?, Kantian?, liberal? etc). Ahabath Israel is, thus, a concept that is difficult to 
capture. First, because it resists definition and "yet [is] concrete enough" in general. 
Second, because one cannot even properly translate it into another language. 
The authority, then, that is conferred to the coming expression of "love of the 
Jewish people" derives from a source that is ancient, yet without any qualitative 
difference that would disable its use in modernity. It is distinctive and singular, yet it is 
124 It can be claimed that even by raising the possibility of the secular·religious divide; I am bringing 
something into the evaluation of Scholem's text that is simply unwarranted from the text's point of view. 
That is, that I am using a concept of my repertoire and not one from that of Scholem. To counter this claim, 
I would like to point out, that, for one thing, the secular-religious distinction is one which cannot but inform 
a Western discussion which Scholem here (if reluctantly) takes part in. For another, however, he himself 
makes use of this distinction as well at an earlier point. Cf. "I am well aware that there are aspects of 
Jewish history (and for more than forty years I have concerned myself with little else) which are beyond 
our comprehension; on the one hand, a devotion to the things of this world that is near-demonic; on the 
other, a fundamental uncerlainty of orientation in this world - an uncertainty which must be contrasted 
with that cerlainty of the believer concerning which, alas, your book has so little to report" (I. 19-27 -
emphases mine). 
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this singularity that deprives one from properly translating it to understand its 
authority.125 
It is all the more intriguing, then, that Scholem already "half-(mis)translates" this 
concept when introducing it in Hebrew. For all the showing its implicit foreignness, its 
originality, any Western reader could make sense of at least one-half of it. Namely, it 
displays the concept Israel, something that is readily available in the reader's vocabulary. 
It refers to a state, founded in 1948. Certainly, this Israel here does not and cannot refer 
(exclusively) to the state. Even less so that it is implied to be something foreign, 
unintelligible in a Western vocabulary. Yet, it is there and it does refer. The element of 
something familiar, something ready at hand is therefore introduced. In line with his 
apparent rhetoric, Scholem could have used Yisrael instead of Israel to foreclose or at 
least mitigate any possible hint to the state of Israel. He did not do it, blurring hence quite 
conspicuously the distinction not only between a spiritual and a secular-national 
collective, but also between the state, the Jewish people, and the traditional concept of 
(Y)Israel by a mistranslation of a Hebrew/English/German word to English/German! Or, 
again, not merely "blurring" existing lines, but theoretically discarding the possible 
separation of those collectives altogether.126 
125 Enhanced by the sheer fact that, for the reader of the Encounter magazine, Ahabath Israel as such is an 
alien word. What operates in the mind of the reader is, therefore, its non-cognitive, "form of life" qualities 
leading the "attention" thus to the non-theoretical, practical side of life. As Middleton and Brown write 
analysing a somewhat similar instance where a foreign word was introduced in an English account, the out-
of-place utterance accomplishes a "visceral force" and"[ ... ] utterances like Kyotuskeh have an affective 
force that compels recipients to engage with some aspect of the past that is instantaneously made actual in 
the present" (Middleton and Brown, 2005: 135). 
126 Cf. Israeli historian Tom Segev quoting and commenting former Education Minister Ben·Zion Dinur: 
"The goal of the Nazis, Dinur said, was 'to obliterate the name of Israel.' Dinur's use of the term Israel to 
indicate the Jewish people was intentional; it not only reflected the common tendency to fall into a 
traditional, literary style whenever the Holocaust was the subject but reinforced the thesis that the murder 
of the Jews was a crime against the State oflsrael" (Segev, 2000: 434- emphasis in the original). 
Meanwhile, in Aviezer Ravitzky's treatise on Jewish religious radicalism, the theological aspect of the 
Hebrew concept of Israel: "Although not drawn directly from ancient sources, so that one might believe it 
to be free of historical and eschatological hopes, it [i.e. the State of Israel or Medinat Yisrael] too is 
encumbered by the freight of the past and the accompanying tensions between part and whole, the political 
and the theological. Indeed, this particular example [ ... ] hovers between the sacred and the profane. [ ... ] 
"The State of the Jews thus refers to concrete people in concrete distress, to their individual and collective 
lot and to the question of their concrete political freedom. 'Israel,' on the other hand, is a term laden with 
metahistorical, theological associations" (Ravitzky, 1996: 4- emphases in the original). 
On further aspects of Jewish religion and secular politics, see Hazony (2000), Kimmerling (2001), 
Leibowitz (1992). On the relationship between Jewish history and Jewish historiography see Yerushalmi 
(1982). 
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Similarly, though the authority of Ahabath Israel is presented not only as 
applicable but also as alien, something next to impossible to be captured, defined, or even 
understood fully, it is exactly this context of ambiguity that enables Scholem to translate 
it. That is, to define it, capture, and make it understood- while treating at the same time 
any possible translation as such imperfect by necessity. Its translation and definition 
comes on condition of its untranslatability and undefinability. It is on the condition of 
being "different" that Scholem is entitled to translate the concept. Yet, doing so, he 
creates a context where one can always recur to this substantively "different" original, 
stating its different originality. The act of translation, then, is parasitic on its 
untranslatability and this very condition enables the agent to resort to the untranslatable 
original, whenever this is required. Be that as it may, however, let us now see eventually 
the "unequal-equivalent" Scholem constructs to his original Ahabath Israel. 127 
Strangely enough, one of the prime proponents of twentieth century Hebrew 
scholarship uses - strictly speaking - a mistranslation. What would equal the "Jewish 
people" or "Juden" semantically is the Hebrew (am) Jehudim; the standard translation of 
the word Israel or Yisrael is "Israel". His (mis)translation- "the Jewish people"- can be 
understood to highlight selectively only one feature of this traditional collective 
([Y]Israel). What is largely left out of or, in any case, downplayed in the expression "the 
Jewish people" is religious or spiritual connotations of the traditional term of (Y)Israel. 
Whereas the translation "Israel" would clearly indicate spiritual connotations, the "Jewish 
people" is readily understandable according to secular and political categories. What is 
highlighted, thus, is an aspect, which differs significantly from the traditional concept: 
the latter containing spiritual connotations that cannot be overlooked and that the secular-
political concept of people or nation does not appear to have. Though Scholem was at 
pains to indicate the originality, incommensurability, and authenticity of this authority, in 
translation he readily "assimilates" it to an arguably secular-political context. Its 
authenticity, then, does not compromise its smooth applicability as an authority in the 
present context. "The Jewish people" (as opposed to "Israel" in English [and on the 
127 I have deliberately used the word "constructs" instead of"finds", to suggest that the act of translation is 
by no means automatic, and it is no one but Scholem who chooses a particular version. In short, this is a 
rhetorical act disguised as translation (cf. Niranjana, 1992: 47-87; Simon, 1996: 134-168) 
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condition it does not denote the state! 128]) makes perfect sense as a secular concept and 
inasmuch as it is still read as a component of a religious concept, yet again, its use erases 
any possible discontinuity between the sacred and the secular. 129 
Scholem, thus, hides but presents a traditional-spiritual and a secular-national 
concept of Israellthe Jewish people.130 Given the context and the language of the debate, 
though it is the former use that infuses his rhetoric with authority, it is the latter that he is 
inevitably working with on the conscious and cognitive level of meaning. Thus, Scholem 
does not confront and does not clarify whether or where the people in a secular-political 
sense and people in the traditional-religious sense might possibly merge or in fact part 
company. Rather, it is the unproblematic continuity, the essential unity of these two 
realms that is constructed along with the similarly implicit assumption that there is no 
essential problem in translating a "religious past" to a "secular present" and evaluating 
this present with the means of that past. 
To sum up, then, accounting for the authority that informs his moral stance as 
well as accounting for the failure of Arendt's text, Scholem rhetorically accomplishes a 
move from the realm of the "ancient", the origin, the sacred and the spiritual to the realm 
of the actual debate, to that of the apparently secular and political while retaining the 
authority of that original and sacred. This move is not made explicit and is accordingly 
not problematised either: the distinctive line between these two realms is either not 
exposed or not existing at all. Scholem's construction of Ahabath Israel, then, implicitly 
builds continuity or even unity between the sacred and the secular, while retaining the 
authority of the ancient and the original. 
128 See next footnote. 
'" It might be argued that it is for obvious reasons that Scholem refrains from translating Israel as Israel. 
For, in the English, it would clearly suggest something, which Scholem apparently does not want to draw 
upon. Namely, the state oflsrael, the political nation that came to formal existence in 1948. A "traditional 
concept", as Ahabath Israel is, originates by definition much earlier than the birth of the state and denotes 
an altogether different collective. Consequentially, as the argument would go, it is to evade a possible 
inference that Scholem recurs to the "Jewish people" instead of"Israel". Yet, firs~ it is that rhetorically the 
act of mistranslation in this exchange accomplishes a shift or an overlap in any case from a spiritual 
community to a secular-national one. And second, tha~ as I have already pointed out in the main body of 
my text, contrary (?) to the appearance, Israel as such does feature in Scholem's formulation: not in the 
English/German translation, but already in the original, Hebrew term. 
130 By the same token, he withdraws and exposes (the state of and the spiritual-national community of) 
Israel at the same time. 
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Ahabath Israel signified some sort of"Jewish" way of life and morality yet it was 
all but impossible to be sure, in what sense precisely it was a Jewish way of life. But that 
might precisely be the point. It was not a call for an orthodox or any other sort of 
"religious" Jewish way of life. Ahabath Israel was not constructed to be a concept that 
would allow for the secular-religious division and as such created a uniform "we" 
(presumably the "Jews" that "know" it) in quite an inclusive fashion. 
The question, now, is where this leaves Harmah Arendt. Where is her place and 
where should that be with regard to this way of life and to "us", the Jews? Furthermore, 
why should it leave her anywhere, anyway? Why is it important at all to position her 
anywhere vis a vis this "we"? 
It is these questions, which I will try to provide an answer to in the remainder of 
this chapter. 
5.3.2. The eternal procedure: un- and re-making a Jew 
5.3.2.1. A description that is not really one 
One of the reasons this utterance can be considered pivotal is that here, for the 
first time Scholem not only makes a direct attribution to Arendt's subject position ("in 
you, dear Harmah") but opposes Arendt in a way explicitly to that of the relevant 
community and the morality to which it subscribes. However, as the questions at the end 
of the previous section pointed out, it is far from clear in what way and to what extent 
Arendt is opposed to the relevant community through her displaying "little trace of'' 
Ahabath Israel. Is this just a mitigated expression for "no trace at all", hence the 
complete exclusion from ''we", the Jews? Is, then, Ahabath Israel the definitive category, 
the sine qua non of''we"? Alternatively, is Arendt still one of"us" even if she completely 
lacks in Ahabath Israel? As noted, neither the Encyclopaedia Judaica nor the Sulchan 
Aruch is of help here. What is of help, perhaps, is to have a look at further aspects of this 
utterance. 
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Extract 5.4. 
61 [ ... ] A discussion such as is 
62 attempted in your book would seem to me to require - you will forgive 
63 my mode of expression- the most old-fashioned, the most circumspect, 
64 the most exacting treatment possible - precisely because of the feelings 
65 aroused by this matter, this matter of the destruction of one-third of our 
66 people - and I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no 
67 other way. 131 [ ... ] 
This is a curious utterance. In what immediately preceded this utterance it 
appeared that Arendt was constructed to be simply not amongst "us" that "know" 
A ha bath Israel and that by consequence lead that morally just way of life, or, in any case, 
distanced from this group. In this second part of the paragraph, however, there is nothing 
at face value that would raise any such kind of problem. Nothing seems to overtly 
indicate an exclusive-we with regard to the position of Arendt. She is simply of "our 
people", as asserted on two occasions (1. 65-66 and I. 66). 
Yet, what would in this case be the function and the sense of that latter clause: "I 
regard you wholly as a daughter of our people" (1. 66)? In Gricean terms it would be a 
"flouting", a conspicuous transgression of the maxims of conversation (Levinson, 1983: 
109-113), namely, that of the maxim of relevance and quantity (Grice, 1991). Having 
"shown" that Arendt was a member of"us", Scholem simply seems to repeat this state of 
matters as his "claim". The sole difference between the first, matter-of-fact assertion (1. 
131 Scholem's expression "daughter of our people" seems to be of obvious significance. There is no trace at 
all, however, of the family-gender metaphor in the original German text of his letter:"[ ... ) ich bettachte Sie 
durchaus als Angeh6rige dieses Volkes und als nichts anderes" (Scholem, 1994: 97; cf. in Krummacher: 
208). As I was not able to get hold of Scholem's proofreading for the English publication in Encounter, I 
will not pay attention to the connotations of the metaphor. (For the document of Arendt's proofreading. See 
The Hannah Arendt Papers At the Library of Congress; Series: Adolf Eichmann File, 1938-1968; 
Correspondence, Scholem, Gershom: 1963-64. The relevant correspondence is available on the interne!: 
httn://memorv.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?co11Id-mharendt pub&fileName=03/ 
030170/030 170page.db&recNum-32&itemLiniP%2Fammem%2Farendthtml%2FmharendtFolderP03 .htm 
l&linkText=7 
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65-66) and the concluding formulation (I. 66-67) appears to be that the latter points out 
the speaker's conunitment to the former fact. 
However, if the former is unproblematic and taken-for-granted (as presented 
here), why should Scholem stress his own commitment to this? Is this just another 
instance of enhanced "existential involvement" through a selection of pronouns (Wilson, 
1990: 76)? If so, why exactly there? In short, what is the relevance, here and now, of that 
concluding utterance? Due to all these considerations, the interpretation of this utterance 
requires an investigation as to the i/locutionary (i.e. rhetorical) function it accomplishes: 
"While propositions describe [ ... ] states of affairs and may thus be 
plausibly characterized in terms of the conditions under which they 
would be true, illocutionary forces indicate how these descriptions are to 
be taken or what the addressee is meant to do with a particular 
proposition that is expressed e.g. for an assertion the addressee may be 
meant to believe the proposition expressed" (Levinson, 1983: 246 -
emphasis in the original).132 
That "sole" difference of "I regard" (i.e. indicating Scholem's subject position 
and involvement) is in fact a crucial difference between the two utterances as the latter 
makes the personal perspective of the speaker relevant in producing the statement.133 This 
focus on the actor as the origin of an utterance implies that this matter-of-fact might not 
be a matter-of-fact from the point of view of different subjects (Riggins, 1997). Hence, it 
does not so much describe the world than it contrasts implicitly a description having been 
provided here with that of others; namely, perhaps with that of the ratified hearer 
(Arendt), or with those "overhearing it (the readers) or with that of the "ideal audience" 
(or even with a possible assumption about that of Scholem as well). As such, in the form 
ll2 It is important to note that I am not saying that it is just a special class of utterances, which have 
illocutionary or rhetorical force. What I am saying is that although in theory this force is ubiquitous, this in 
itself does not warrant that we should practically treat every utterance along these lines. The "I regard" 
utterance, on the other hand, due to its formulation reflexively highlights its rhetorical orientation. 
Ill To repeat, the two utterances in question are: "the destruction of one-third of our people" (I. 65-66) and 
"I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people" (I. 66-67) 
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of a "representative" (Levinson 1983: 240) it is fashioned to elicit agreement: as the 
speaker displays his own commitment to the validity of the subsequent assertion, so is the 
hearer (any hearer including Arendt) expected to do. Arendt, then, is a matter-of-fact-
Jew, contrary to what others (Arendt, overhearers, ideal audience, presumed "Scholem") 
might believe. 
However, there is still considerably more to be said here. Even if the relevant part 
in Scholem's concluding utterance is the "I regard you ... " part as a personal commitment 
and we take the two uses of "our people" (1. 65-66 and line 66) simply and purely as 
descriptive ones, the paragraph (i.e. Extract 5.3.) as a whole is still ambiguous. 
It must be reiterated that the previous use of the first person plural pronoun in this 
paragraph ("which we know as Ahabath Israef' - I. 59) appeared rather to exclude or 
distance at least Arendt from "us", as it was one that "knows" Ahabath Israel whereas 
Arendt was found lacking in it. If we take the both present uses of "our people" (1. 65-66 
and I. 66) inclusive then it indicates an interesting paradox. It would either entail that the 
first use of the first person plural pronoun excludes Arendt and the second use includes 
her or that one can indeed lead a morally just, Jewish way of life even with "little traces" 
(complete lack perhaps) of Ahabath Israel. 
Yet, having a closer look at the apparently descriptive and inclusive uses of "our 
generation" (1. 65-66 and 66) might require some revision of what I have just concluded. 
Namely, there is reason to suppose that these uses of "our people" might not be entirely 
descriptive and inclusive. As such, it might be supposed that a measure of ambiguity has 
already been introduced into this apparently innocent part of the paragraph. That is to say, 
the ambiguity may not simply reside within different uses of the first person plural 
pronoun, but within single uses, such as those ones at line 65-66 and 66. 
Arendt is here yet again described to perform disregard or neglect of the 
predicates of this matter-of-fact-Jewishness. It is not just that her way of writing is 
implied to be "non-circumspect" and "non-exacting" but that it disregarded the "feelings 
aroused by this matter [ ... ] of the destruction of one-third of our people" (1. 65-66). 
Coupled with the description of "our people" this construction not only suggests, again, 
that Arendt flew in the face of the community but that she, in a way, even disregarded her 
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own feelings which are established as a consequence of her matter-of-fact, descriptive 
belonging. In sum, even though the first use of "our people" (1. 65-66) here seemed to 
formulate Arendt's inclusion and her embracing of that people as something beyond 
question, we have to conclude that a measure of ambiguity has indeed already been 
introduced and concerns her performance with respect to her belonging to her identity. It 
is, then, not only with respect to the whole paragraph that ambiguity can be perceived. It 
too holds for this "micro"-context just surrounding "the matter of the destruction of one-
third of our people". 
Putting the "I regard you ... " utterance in this context provides us with a different 
reading, the utterance reflecting upon this already ambiguous situation where, at the very 
least, Arendt is a Jew but does definitely not act accordingly. In short, this utterance 
reflects upon a normative dimension where reference is made to activities, which should 
be bound to a certain category. Thus, what Scholem does when asserting that he regards 
Arendt a "daughter of our people" suggests not only, or not in the first place, that she 
might not regard herself as such and she should, but that being a Jew puts one in the 
requirement of a Jewish way of life. What is therefore made relevant here by the apparent 
repetition is the gap between social identity as a fact and social identity as a performance. 
In the former sense, there is no possible evidence that could disprove Arendt's 
Jewishness. Whatever she does wherever, she remains a Jew. No Ahabath Israel, no 
connection with the tradition, no way-of-life is required. In the latter sense, however, that 
is, if identity is seen as a performance or as a moral category, Arendt's activities are not 
parasitic on belonging to a community but constitutive of it. Transgressing those 
activities (i.e. implicating "the Jews", abandoning the "one-third", lacking in Ahabath 
Israel) might mean the effective rejection of the whole of "our people"-in-the-moral 
sense. 
Of course, the point is, most emphatically, that there are no two Arendts here 
reconstructed by Scholem: one that is a Jew and one that does not act accordingly. 
Scholem does not use the descriptive- "us" in its pure form: hence the ambiguity of the 
very category ("us") and of the interpretation of the "I regard you" utterance. "I regard 
you ... " is not an affirmation of a fact, a simple description but the construction of a 
"fact"-that-always-already-prescribes. The descriptive and the prescriptive senses, thus, 
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go hand in hand and it is their tension that creates the basis of Scholem's rhetoric with 
regard to Arendt's subject position. Scholem's central suggestion- being a Jew one has 
to leave a Jewish life - entails that there is no pure descriptive sense in the use of "us". 
There is no matter-of-fact belonging to a category, as this matter-of-':fact" always-
already requires and prescribes a way of life. 
But if this being-Jewish even in the descriptive sense always-already entails or 
obliges one to act according to a certain morality and if even the descriptive use turns out 
to be in effect a prescriptive one: why does not Scholem simply discard the "descriptive" 
aspect of the category altogether? Why is it important to maintain ambiguity and tension? 
Why does he say, for all that "I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people" and does 
not conclude instead that he indeed does not? Why is it important and what does it 
therefore mean that while Scholem is at pains to suggest to the reader that Arendt is not 
with us-in-the-moral sense and that the matter-of-"fact"-us is always-already an us-in-
the-moral sense, she is still stressed to belong to "our people". Why do we need a ':fact" 
if its predicates are presented to contradict the very ':fact" itself? That is, why do we need 
a "fact" if it is always-already a moral obligation (hence, it is actually not a fact) and 
where this moral obligation has already and constantly been presented to be transgressed? 
Why is ambiguity and tension needed there? 
One possible answer is that because it is the demonstration of the very concept of 
Ahabath Israel and the "knowledge" of it. That even though Arendt does her best not to 
be regarded as one of the Jewish people, Scholem, harbouring Ahabath Israel, still does 
not sever her from this community. 134 Such an answer might be persuasive, yet it leaves 
one puzzled as it still provides no answer as to the place of this "regard" in the ideology 
Scholem constructs. The ultimate question, therefore, is not whether "I regard you ... " 
demonstrates such an ideology or not, but what this utterance's place is in constructing 
that very ideology in accounting for Arendt's moral failure in Eichmann in Jerusalem. 
134 To support this inte!]uetation, let me point out that in the German version "Love of the Jewish people" 
and "dear Hannah" sound "Liebe zu den Juden" and "Liebe Hannah", the alliteration implying that in his 
orientation towards Arendt Scholem in fact demonstrates the morality he found Arendt wanting (see 
Scholem, 1994:97 and inKrummacher, 1964: 208). 
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To reiterate my second question that precipitated this subsection (see page 145): 
why should Arendt be positioned vis a vis this community at all? 
5.3.2.2. A prescription that is not really one 
In pursuing an answer to this question, it is worthwhile to analyse yet another part 
of this paragraph, which in its implication might appear to contradict my thesis of 
constant ambiguity and tension. Let us notice that Arendt does not in herself stand in 
some sort of opposition to the (prescriptive) "us"-in-the-moral sense in her (partial or 
total) lack in Ahabath Israel, but as a member of the "German Left" (1. 61 ). It is perhaps 
indicative that Scholem, for instance, did not say German-Jewish Left. Especially so that 
even if "German-Jewish Left" had been used, there would have only been a 
"descriptive", superficial similarity with "us"-in-the-moral sense. Even the expression 
"German-Jewish Left" would have certainly gone along with associations of atheism, 
secularism, and the subsequent ignorance or downright contempt towards elements or the 
totality of the Jewish tradition. Yet, Scholem does not even allow for this. Why is this? 
For a start, certainly, it might indicate the total incompatibility between Arendt's German 
leftist stance and "us"-in-the-moral sense. The prescriptive, then, might simply erase the 
descriptive. The "German Left" is simply not with "us", regardless of which sense we 
mean "us". This being so, however, does it not contradict my thesis of tension and 
ambiguity? Does it not contradict my interpretation of "I regard you ... "? Does it not 
indicate that those on the German Left and Arendt amongst them, simply ceased to be 
Jews in any sense? 
I do not think so, as the implication that the "German Left" is markedly not with 
"us"-in-the-moral sense appears to come on the condition and only on the condition that, 
indeed, it is with "us" in the descriptive yet always-already prescriptive sense. That it is, 
really, the German-Jewish Left ("Jewish" here as an indication of the "fact", the origin of 
the group's members) and not the German Left in general about which Scholem is 
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talking. Such a contention is true if (and only if) we agree that he would presumably not 
ask Gentiles to "know" Ahabath Israe/. 135 
This is in line with Scholem's text, where Gentiles, apparently are not upbraided 
for the lack inAhabath Israel and rightly so. There certainly are other sources of morality 
for writing on the Holocaust in a morally just way. That is, while it is not entirely clear 
why such a Jewish morality would necessarily lead to the moral assumptions (i.e. the 
moral authority of the dead and hence the adherence to "two poles"), underlying 
Scholem's critique of Arendt's text, it is indeed entirely clear that there are other sorts of 
moralities that are perfectly capable of honouring those basic moral standards. 
But if this is so, why could Arendt not choose one of these other sources in 
Scholem's logic? Why could she not choose Catholicism, Kant, liberalism or anything 
else? Why must Scholem's account be in terms of a morality to which Arendt and the 
German(-Jewish) left do not subscribe? Why not in terms of something different if, that 
"something different" can possibly be just as morally righteous. These questions are 
troubling enough if we want to understand Scholem's text. And this text, I believe, 
provides us with only one possible answer. 
Because she is a matter-of- ''fact" -Jew. Because Scholem, as a bearer of Ahabath 
Israel, "regards" her as one of "our people": "I regard you" is not any more a simple hug 
demonstrating the benevolent and inclusive way of life of Ahabath Israel (towards Jews, 
that is) but the utterance that creates the very problem and the tension. In the absence of 
this descriptive-that-always-already-prescribes Jewishness, it would hardly be necessary 
or even possible to use the prescriptive one. For if Scholem's claim of Ahabath Israel is 
not of universal validity136, it is not just that the descriptive use of the category (that 
always-already entails the prescriptive one) turns in this respect to be a prescriptive, but 
that the prescriptive requirement itself comes on the condition and only on the condition 
of this "descriptive". There is, then, not only no pure descriptive sense of being Jewish 
but neither is there a pure prescriptive sense. It is always-already-dependent on the 
135 Cf. fu. 137. 
136 Cf. fu. 137. 
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descriptive. Being Jewish one has to lead a Jewish way of life, then, does not in this text 
entail in order to be Jewish, but given that one is Jewish. 
But if once a Jew always a Jew, then it might imply something that is actually 
explicated in the hitherto unaddressed last and quite enigmatic phrase in the paragraph. 
Scholem, that is, does not simply say, "I regard you as a daughter of our people" but that 
"I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people", adding immediately: "and in no other 
way" (1. 66-67;- emphasis mine). What would that "wholly" as well as "and in no other 
way" mean? 
What they do mean cannot be but that it is Arendt's being Jewish that is the 
always-available-relevant aspect of her identity for Scholem. Hence, it is not only that 
she is a Jew (in the descriptive-prescribing sense), not only that she is always a Jew but 
that she is nothing but a Jew. It is the all-embracing, all-relevant aspect of her identity 
and as soon as it becomes relevant, any other aspect is reduced to this. 
The moment "I regard you ... " is uttered, then, it does not just give here birth to 
the tension between the "descriptive" that is always-already prescriptive and the 
"prescriptive" that always-already depends on the descriptive. It is not only the creation 
of a tension and a problem but also the creation here of an eternal and an exclusive 
problem, an eternal and exclusive tension. It implies what "and in no other way'' 
explicates: once this "descriptive" (i.e. the descriptive-always-already-prescribing) is 
kicked off, then even the absence of the "prescriptive" is accounted ultimately for in 
tenns and only in terms of this "descriptive". 
That one never ceases to be a Jew, that there is no way out, and that there are no 
alternative ways. This, consequently, means that it will not only be the matter of case that 
a Jew is always available for an account in Jewish terms but that it is those terms 
exclusively that he or she is accountable to, whenever those terms might possibly be 
deemed to be relevant. 
The picture is hopefully clearer now. One nagging question, however, remains 
that I have not addressed yet. Namely, if there are alternative sources of just moralities 
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that are, in theory, perfectly capable of producing a morally just account of the 
Holocaust, what is it, then, that warrants the applicability of the very morality in this 
question. 137 Why must Arendt's possible embracing of Catholicism, Hinduism, Kant, 
liberalism etc. be accounted for in no other way but Jewish?138 Why must the descriptive 
and prescriptive aspects of Jewishness (i.e. being and way of life) be all but intertwined 
in both ways? Why must the former exclusively entail the latter? And why must even the 
lack of the latter be accounted for in terms of the former? Why does one not have the 
right to be not with "us"-in-the-moral sense? 
The answer I have given to it- that Arendt is a Jew- is valid but only once we 
have accepted that morality of Ahabath Israel. Yet what is it that warrants this morality 
as such and its "in no other way'' approach? Why would, then, Scholem's utterance "I 
regard you a wholly as a daughter of our people and in no other way" be more convincing 
than Arendt's quite conceivable answer: "But I do not regard myself so in the sense you 
do (i.e. 'wholly') and I do also regard other aspects of my existence just as relevant and 
hence irreducible to this one". 
If we acknowledge that there do indeed exist other sorts of just moralities (with 
regard to the Holocaust)139, then it means, for one thing, that Scholem must answer these 
questions in order to warrant the morality he adopts to this case; and for another, that this 
answer, contrary to what I have been claiming so far, cannot come from the moral 
authority of Ahabath Israel, otherwise it is simply self-circulating. "Little trace" of 
Ahabath Israel, then, cannot be the answer, but only the indication of it. 
137 This is the assumption on which the rest of the analysis is entirely based. That is, that Scholem does not 
a priori exclude alternative cultures from giving a morally just evaluation of the Holocaust. While I do not 
think that such an argument would be in contradiction to what Scholem actually writes, there is no evidence 
either that he would occasion this argument here and now in his text. 
138 Which is not to say that there is a necessary incompatibility between any of these plus the etceteras on 
one hand, and the practical knowledge, the way of life represented by Ahabath Israel. It is only to say that 
the latter and only the latter will always be the standard and not, say, the worth of those religions, ethics, 
philosophies, or ideologies in themselves. 
139 Cf. 137. 
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5.4. Warranting for a Moral Position: The Genealogy of a Pathology 
Thus, the last and ultimate problem that this chapter has to answer is what 
warrants here the applicability of this authority. What is, so to say, the authority of the 
authority? It is presented without hesitation and argumentation that the Jewish tradition 
and its concept as such are of an authoritative nature. As an authority, it was indicated to 
be untranslatable and incomprehensible both within and from without its own terms. On 
the one hand, then, it was precisely this lack of speech that created the authority, the 
ancient, the original, the singular, while on the other, its authority too derived from its 
overwhelming presence and thus its acknowledgment of no barriers, not, most notably, 
that of the secular-religious or the past-present distinction. 
The authority, then, is speechless, yet obliges one to talk in certain ways. It cannot 
be translated yet it was. It cannot be. Yet it was. 
Therefore, to understand the applicability- i.e. the authority of the authority- one 
cannot simply analyse its content. Scholem created a context that ensured that even the 
erasure of this content must be accounted for in terms of that moral authority. However, 
the problem I am addressing here is precisely this: why is the Jewish way of life, and 
more pointedly its lack, relevant here? The content Scholem reconstructed to Eichmann 
in Jerusalem was, surely, manifestly immoral but not only from a Jewish perspective. It 
was not "Jewishly immoral", but immoral, full stop. Likewise, the moral authority of the 
"dead" is not something one leading any sort of way of life would discard or reject. In 
short, anti-Semitism is not a Jewish concept even if its objects are certainly the Jews. 
To answer the question, then, where the authority of the moral authority of 
Ahabath Israel comes from; that is, to answer why we should accept that Arendt be 
regarded "a daughter of our people and in no other way'', we have to scrutinise further 
Scholem's text. 
With this in mind, let us have a look at a later part of the letter: 
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Extract 5.5. 
142 [ ... ]The heroism of the Jews was not always the heroism of 
143 the warrior; nor have we always been ashamed of that fact. I cannot 
144 refute those who say that the Jews deserved their fate, because they did 
145 not take earlier steps to defend themselves, because they were cowardly, 
146 etc. I came across this argument only recently in a book by that honest 
14 7 Jewish anti-semite, Kurt Tucholsky. I cannot express myself, of course, 
148 with Kurt Tucholsky' s eloquence, but I cannot deny that he was right: if 
149 all the Jews had run away - in particular, to Palestine - more Jews 
150 would have remained alive. Whether, in view of the special 
151 circumstances of Jewish history and Jewish life, that would have been 
152 possible, and whether it implies a historical share of guilt in Hitler's 
153 crime, is another question. 
154 [ ... ] 
Before analysing this paragraph, it is useful to observe its sequential position. It 
comes immediately after the utterance quoted in Extract 4.4., where Scholem establishes 
the ultimate immoral content of Arendt's text, consisting of turning the moral order 
''upside-down". The closure of that paragraph read: 
Extract 5. 6. 
128 [ ... ] Is the distinction between torturer and victim thereby 
129 blurred? What perversity! We are asked, it appears, to confess that the 
130 Jews, too, had their "share" in the acts of genocide. That is a typical 
131 quaternio terminorum. 
132 [ ... ] 
What is discernible here is that Scholem further opposes Arendt's acts from the 
category's viewpoint: we are asked. Certainly, as has been the case in the earlier 
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examples, mere moral difference does not by itself entail exclusion from the category. 
Yet, here Scholem's ("our'') opposition is not simply a moral one as in previous 
occasions but one in the moral extreme, the powerful indignation enhanced by the 
exclamation mark: "What perversity!" What is of prime importance here, however, is not 
so much the displayed "intensity" of his reaction but that he does not even argue against 
this (reconstructed) claim (something he did do on previous occasions), and thereby his 
opposition is not displayed in the form of argumentation but in that of demonstration 
(Perelman 1979: 9-15; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 1-14). Similarly, his 
subsequent proposition ("We are asked [ ... ] to confess [ ... ]") is not argued against either, 
while the lack of explicit verbal contention certainly does not suggest that Scholem 
would be ready for this "confession" and the acceptance of the proposition it would 
entail. What it does suggest with the rhetoric of demonstration is the absurdity of 
Arendt's claim in an epistemological sense and its shocking immorality in a moral one. 
The issue is thus not only depicted black-and-white to the extent that any argument would 
just mitigate its essential absurdity and immorality but exposes an ever more fundamental 
rift between Arendt and ''us". 140 As Perelman noted, "[ ... ] argumentation, unlike 
demonstration, presupposes a meeting of minds: the will on the part of the orator to 
persuade and not to compel or command, and a disposition on the part of the audience to 
listen. Such mutual goodwill must not only be general but must also apply to the 
particular question at issue [ ... ]" (Perelman 1979: 11 - my emphasis). "Mere" moral 
divergence within members of the group as well as a temporal position that one adopts in 
a debate outside the group does not necessarily entail that one's membership in the group 
is rejected from either side. Yet, the moral claim attributed here to Arendt is by any 
means thoroughly and outrageously immoral and Scholem's rhetorical use of 
demonstration appears indeed to place Arendt, if temporarily, beyond discussion or 
argumentation with the category "us".141 
140 That "we" is suffused with a moral position is an argument that it is not a simple instance of the well-
known plura/is maiestatis. 
141 
"The outsider, Hemy Zukier writes, "typically is not a total stranger, but a familiar, yet deviant figure, 
and it is precisely this familiarity which threatens to upset the social order and the group's sense of inner 
cohesion and integrity. [ ... ] The outsider undermines respect for the group's fundamental values, blurs the 
moral distinction between in-group and out-group, and subverts the group's 'collective consciousness.' In 
this dynamic, the familiar outsider is more threatening, for he is in many respects similar to the dominant 
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It is, then, after this significant build-up that the paragraph I quoted comes. At 
face value, Scholem there expounds a personal reading of his about a certain Kurt 
Tucholsky's book. 142 While it is inevitable to assume that this reading will be in some 
sort of relationship with Arendt's book, clearly more than mere assumption is needed 
from an analytical perspective. Even more so, that what we are interested in is not 
whether Tucholsky's book is in some sort of relationship with that of Arendt, but what 
sort of connection is there. 
Scholem invokes his readings on several occasions (e.g. I. 85-90, 132-137), but 
those readings are juxtaposed with what Arendt wrote and are therefore used 
contrastively to be enlisted in a consensus against Arendt's text (on consensus building 
see Edwards and Potter [1992a, 1992b]; Potter [1996]). 143 This is clearly not the case here 
with Tucholsky. No distance is given between the two books and while this state of 
affairs surely does not suggest that the two wrote identical books, it might be fruitful to 
suppose that there is some sort of important similarity. This similarity comes to sight 
when Scholem assesses Tucholsky's overall argument and considers his supposed value-
judgement instead of the facts he presents: "[ ... ] whether it implies a historical share of 
guilt in Hitler's crime, is another question" (1. 152-153). Relevantly enough, Scholem 
concluded the previous paragraph with the same notion of rejecting the allegation of the 
group; his rejection occurs, therefore, in full awareness and cannot be attributed either to ignorance or to 
the outsider's overall oddity" (Zukier, 1996: 1117-1118). 
142 Kurt Tucho1sky (1890-1935): German-Jewish journalist, satirist, and writer. One of the most important 
journalist during the Weimar Republic. A left-wing democrat and pacifist, who lost his citizenship and saw 
his book burnt with the Nazis coming to power in 1933. (Why he would have deserved Scholem's epithet 
"honest anti-Semite" as well as what work Scholem refers to in the exchange is not at all clear to me. Cf. 
Elon, 2002: 365-367.) 
143 The instances are: 
"I too have read Adler's book about Theresienstadt. It is a book about which a great 
many things could be said. But it was not my impression that the author- who speaks of 
some people, of whom I have heard quite different accounts, with considerable harshness 
- it was not my impression that Adler ever spoke of Baeck in this fashion [i.e. as Arendt 
did] either directly or indirectly" (I. 85-90). 
"Recently, I have been reading about a book, written during the days of catastrophe in 
full consciousness of what lay ahead, by Rabbi Moses Chaim Lau orPiotrkov. This rabbi 
attempted to define as precisely as possible what was the duty of the Jew in such 
extremities. Much that I read on this moving and tenible book - and it does not stand 
alone- is congruent with your general thesis (though not with your tone)" (1. 132-137). 
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Jewish "share" in the crime of the Holocaust: "We are asked, it appears, to confess that 
the Jews, too, had their 'share' in these acts of genocide" (I. 129-130). In that case, 
however, this idea of the "share" of guilt and its refusal was made as a comment on 
Arendt 's book. There is, thus, an implied similarity constructed between Arendt and 
Tucholsky as to their respective arguments. 
As we are seeking to account for Scholem's construction of Arendt as a person 
here, it is of significance that Kurt Tucholsky's description was, "that honest Jewish anti-
semite" (I. 146-147). This tells us, first, that being "naturally'' a Jew while being morally 
or politically against the Jews as such is not a contradiction in terms for Scholern. Even if 
anti-Semitism might be taken as the anti-thesis of the entire Jewish condition, to be a Jew 
does not disqualify one to be an anti-Semite at the same time. The possible outcome of 
Scholem's construction of a tension between a "natural" belonging and a "moral" attitude 
or act does not fall short of denying in one sense or even totally that "natural" aspect of 
one's own existence.144 
Of course, Scholem tells us much more here than this as he characterises 
Tucholsky's argument in a way pointing to the similarity (the historical "share" of guilt) 
to that of Arendt and calls the author an anti-Semite. Following Harvey Sacks's 
"consistency rule", this in itself would raise the question of whether that tag "anti-sernite" 
might be able to be applied on Arendt as well. 145 Yet, let us point out the use of the 
adjective "honest" in connection with the "anti-semite" Tucholsky. Why is the adjective 
used here? Its use certainly entails that there are in fact anti-Semites, even Jewish anti-
Sernites, who are not honest. Professing anti-Semitism - either to the reader or even 
perhaps to oneself- is, thus, not the sine qua non of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism or 
Jewish self-hatred is simply there, ready to be observed and attributed. But Scholem does 
not merely make a theoretical argument here concerning the nature of anti-Semitism. The 
use of the adjective "honest" here and now cannot but imply that there is another, 
144 The origin of the concept of Jewish self-hatred is found in Lewin (1948). For recent expositions, 
analyses, and uses of self-hatred and Jewish anti-Zionism see Finkielkraut (1994: 57-80), Gilman (1990), 
Laqueur (2006: 165-166). For a criticism of Lewin's article and the rhetorical use of the concept, see Finlay 
(2005). For further rhetorical and political criticism, see Butler (2004), Cockbum and St. Clair (2003). 
145 
"[ ... ] if some population of persons is being categorized, and if a category from some device's collection 
has been used to categorize a first member of the population, then that category [ ... ] may be used to 
categorize further members of the population" (Sacks, 197 4: 219). 
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dishonest or, in any case, un-confessed or un-confirmed anti-Semite in the room. 
Someone not widely known as an anti-Semite, perhaps not even to herself. Yet, she is 
one. Sapienti sat ... 
For one thing, at the risk of repeating myself, it is hardly possible to overstate the 
severity of this implication and accusation (see page 93). For a Jew in particular (as well 
as for any morally just human being in general) the accusation of being a post-Auschwitz 
anti-Semite is damaging for the person's moral existence. 
For another, the reader might say, there is surely no surprise in this conclusion of 
Scholem's rhetoric, however. Should we have expected something different, after all? 
The case was not constructed that there are elements, sentences, phrases in Arendt' s book 
that are anti-Semitic. It was not the case that there might have been lapses of 
consciousness or even of moral sense. It was what underlay the entire book's logic that 
was constructed to be anti-Semitic and it would be hardly ingenuous to pretend that the 
claim that this through-and-through anti-Semi tic material originated from an anti-Semitic 
source, from an anti-Semitic author is worthwhile to be wondered about, let alone 
analysed to the extent I have been doing here. To claim this, one should pretend that the 
distinction between utterances and the moral responsibility of the person is an absolute 
one and even after saying, for instance, that someone's every single utterance in his/her 
life was immoral, it would still be a huge step and surprise to shift this immorality from 
the utterance to the person. 
In a similar vein, it is far from clear why Ahabath Israel would be interesting in 
this respect and in what way the conclusion that Arendt is an anti-Semite would establish 
its authority. As already noted, while there is presumably no dilemma about whether an 
anti-Semite will or will not embrace Ahabath Israel, there can be equally no question 
about whether one "knowing", caring, feeling nothing at all about Ahabath Israel would 
automatically turn to be an anti-Semite. Certainly not.146 
If there is an important, ultimate point that is to be made here, it then must be 
something entirely different from simply claiming that it was not only the content of the 
book but its author as well that is anti-Semitic. Yet it was not the main problem I 
146 See fn. 137, however, for a caveat, as well for a challenge to this interpretation. 
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addressed in this section either. That question was why Ahabath Israel with its 
establishment of Arendt as a "natural" Jew is needed in Scholem's text. Why was 
Ahabath Israel presented with singular authority and relevance in this whole issue? 
As this was the question, let us observe that what Scholem implied was not 
simply that Arendt is an anti-Semite but that she is a Jewish anti-Semite. The relevant 
part is the phrase as a whole, not simply anti-Semitism. This brings us back to my 
analysis and the authority of the moral authority Scholem constructed previously. 
Why is Scholem not content with saying "anti-Semite"? Why is it relevant to say 
Jewish anti-Semite? Surely, the content is the same. The "Jewish anti-Semite" is not 
more and not less anti-Semitic than the Jewish one. Likewise, as already noted, the 
rejection of the moral authority of Ahabath Israel cannot be the cause of anti-Semitism. 
Simply, neither of this explains why the "Jewish" is needed here, neither of this explains 
why the moral authority of Ahabath Israel is relevant here while it is precisely this moral 
authority that is relied upon in proclaiming Arendt to be a Jew, in the already analysed 
descriptive-yet-always-already-prescribing sense. 
There is only one explanation, I think. It is that the relation to Ahabath Israel in 
certain cases proves to be a successful tool in detecting or predicting anti-Semitism. 
These certain cases, certainly, consist of the population that the ideology of Ahabath 
Israel regards as a "daughter[/ son] of our people". It does not tell us that those who are 
anti-Semitic will reject Ahabath Israel. Not because they will not do (surely, they will) 
but because there are plenty of others who similarly do but are no anti-Semites at all.147 
What it does tell us is that there is a fair chance that those whom Ahabath Israel 
proclaims to be a Jew, but who do not "know" Ahabath Israel will turn to be anti-
Semites. 
Thus, the point of Scholem's using Ahabath Israel and establishing Arendt as a 
Jewish anti-Semite is that he provides us with the genealogy of a certain type of anti-
Semitism. Once a Jew: always a Jew. The only possible choice that can be made here is 
not that of the non-Jew (Catholic, Kantian etc.) in a moral sense but that of the Jewish 
147 Again, see fn. 137, however. 
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anti-Semite. This is the only possible orientation for an Ahabath-Jew with regard to 
Jewishness. 
This provides us with an account for and understanding of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem. It is not anti-Semitic because its author is anti-Semitic per se. Rather, because 
its author turned its back to the Jewish way of life, "hard to define yet concrete enough" 
(I. 58-59). This ultimate moral choice was, has been, and is being made. Inasmuch as the 
end product of this choice is the (Jewish) anti-Semite, however, this choice is not 
primarily a moral choice at all. Rather, it is a choice indicating pathology (see Finlay, 
2005). 
Whether the anti-Semite is the inevitable end-product of this choice or a mere 
probabilistic one, we cannot know for sure. Yet, Scholem's lack of search for any other 
factor, proclaimed in his clause "and in no other way", might point towards quite a 
deterministic direction. That is, if in this case nothing more was needed to be said, if 
"little trace" (1. 61) of Ahabath Israel was enough to account for Jewish anti-Semitism, 
then we might conclude that this end product, indeed, might be inevitable. Talking about 
"Jewish" cases, we do not know whether "little trace" of Ahabath Israel is the sine qua 
non of (Jewish) anti-Semitism. What we might suspect, however, is that it is the 
differentia specifica of it. In any case, we would better watch out whenever we suspect 
"little traces" of Ahabath Israel. 148 
148 There is at least one possible counter-claim, shattering my argument, however. Was Ahabath Israel that 
much to be asked for? Surely, not much is required. A little bit of solidarity with the Jews, that is all. And, 
yes, if that little bit is non-existent, then one turns to be an anti-Semite. However, if that was simply the 
case, if it was the least common denominator only pinpointed by Scholem in anyone that is not an anti-
Semite: why the use of Jewish ttadition in some unspecified sense where it (in Scholem's formulation) 
clearly does not apply to Arendt? Again, this "little bit of solidarity" is not something specific Jewish, it 
can surely be expected from any member of the Earth. Such a restricted use would therefore not warrant the 
application of Ahabath Israel- especially not in a case where it does not apply. 
Moreover, Scholem could have made a clear minimal claim, which he did not. It was a claim mobilising the 
"Jewish ttadition" and discarding with the secular-religious divide. Neither of these is a feature of a 
minimalist claim, even if it was implicitly depicted to cover the Jewish people in quite an inclusive fashion. 
What it tells us, then, is not that it was a minimalist claim but one whose applicability is flexible, if not 
arbitrary. Had Scholem said "keeping of the Shabbat" instead of Ahabath Israel, it would have been a clear 
call, even if not one which could possibly be maintained in this discussion. The point of Ahabath Israel, 
nowhere expounded here, is not that it is minimalist claim but that it is depicted to be broad and (almost) 
all-encompassing. What it means is not that its force of prediction as to Jewish anti-Semitism is good or 
perfect, but that it can be used quite flexibly to account for the perceived Jewish anti-Semitism or even to 
establish it, pro- or rettospectively. Here, this last claim does not simply mean the "little ttace" of Ahabath 
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5.5. Prospective Conclusion 
We have arrived at the end of this journey. Meanwhile, we have encountered an 
anti-Semitic book, an anti-Semitic author, and "little traces" in her of Ahabath Israel that 
ultimately accounted for both of the former. We have encountered what ultimately 
proved to be pathological (Jewish self-hatred) and the genealogy of this pathology. So 
far, I have mainly been synoptic with Scholem's argument. At this point some distance 
must be indicated. 
The task of the analysis, as was in this sense quite correctly demonstrated by 
Scholem, cannot remain at the surface. It requires a critical eye, which is an account and 
an evaluation of the textual practices produced here. 149 In this respect, questions arise. 
What if Scholem's is a misreading? Would that mean that Arendt, after all, has some 
more traces of Ahabath Israel in her bosom? Or would that mean that, after all, Ahabath 
Israel is not needed at all to write a morally just book about the "catastrophe"? 
The problem here is that we are presented with Scholem's choice (that the book is 
anti-Semitic to the core) but not with the validity of this choice on which the rest of his 
analysis relies. What is it that accounts for his choices? His summary of the book, his 
construction of Arendt's transgressing the authority of the "dead" and his attribution and 
account for Arendt's identity as a Jewish anti-Semite? The question that a critical reading 
should therefore pose is whether we should conceive of Ahabath Israel as an account for 
Arendt's book and personality, something that is suggested by Scholem. Or, alternatively, 
Israel but an account for Scholem's interpretation of the book, something which in itself pointed towards 
anti-Semitism, Jewish or non-Jewish. This is to be covered in the conclusion of this chapter. 
149 This is a moral choice of mine. Nothing is there that necessitates this choice, except from my (far from 
idiosyncratical) choice that here something gravely morally is at stake i.e. when X claims that Y is greedy 
and Y counter-claims that X is mean then it would be hardly necessary to come up with a consensual 
verdict. Firstly, it would be time-consuming and secondly, because the analyst does not give a damn about 
it, because it is just so banal. (although not for X and Y, certainly.) Here, however, I chose to confer gravity 
and dignity to my participants and thiok that it does matter, indeed, it is the only thing that matters, whether 
someone is an anti-Semite or not, why she is named as one, if she is not and why would we say that she is 
not one. Etc. 
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it is not an account in the proper sense of the concept. That is, it is perhaps not something 
that exists outside the realm of Scholem's reading (of both the book and the author as 
anti-Semitic/anti-Semite); once the reading established then explaining its origin. Rather, 
it might account for Scholem 's reading and interpretative practices as such. It might be 
the case that once the yardstick of Ahabath Israel was adopted, Arendt's book (and 
herself) was always going to be "anti-Semitic". 
It is harder than hard to come clear with these issues, to account for Scholem's 
interpretative choices, at least for two reasons. First, the meaning of Ahabath Israel was 
not made clear by Scholem. It was not like a clear-cut call for (say, "keeping the 
Shabbat"), but a consensual, flexible and (as a consequence) all-encompassing standard: 
"hard to define yet concrete enough". Yet, it was precisely because it was consensual, 
flexible, and all-encompassing that its meaning remained vague in the extreme. Indeed, 
whatever vague meaning could have been accessible through the translation, it was 
immediately withdrawn as the primacy of the original, "hard to define yet concrete 
enough", ruled. 
The second reason is that, by dint of an almost complete lack of his acts of 
interpretation in his text any connection between Eichmann in Jerusalem, the Holocaust 
and Ahabath Israel remained unable to be confirmed. Scholem though inevitably 
presented an interpretation, it was nevertheless constructed to be more like a (convincing) 
assertion about the book's content. We have hardly met any quotations from Arendt. 
This, by necessity, meant that we were unable to assess the way Scholem arrived at his 
interpretation. Certainly, this was part of his rhetoric: there is no point in lingering on 
specific points if the book is "wholly false and tendentious" (1. 125-126). In line with this, 
Scholem's summaries of Arendt's book were certainly anti-Semitic but, then, they were 
Scholem 's summaries. Hardly any possible checks and balances were introduced. What 
was the eye of the beholder like? We cannot know for sure. What we only can is what the 
beholder already saw was repugnant. But, again, we cannot know whether we would see 
the same, standing in his place. 
So is it an anti-Semitic book? Or is it just that Scholem claims (i.e. distorts) it to 
be? Is it that from Ahabath Israel's point of view it really is but not from that of any 
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other? Theoretically, an affirmative answer to the first two questions would be clear and 
simple. To the third, however, would require us to make a choice. Here, Scholem is 
perfectly right: that choice will be one of a morality, a way of life. 
With these prospective problems, it is time now to turn to Hannah Arendt's 
counter-version. 
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6. Ecce Textus: Hannah Arendt and 
The Reformulation of the Debate 
6.1. Introduction 
With this chapter, I now turn to the analysis of Hannah Arendt's response. The 
structure of the analysis will follow a similar pattern to those of the previous two 
chapters on Scholem. My first question will be what content, meaning · and 
significance Arendt constructs to her own book Eichmann in Jerusalem. Inevitably, 
Arendt's rendering will not stand on its own but comes as a response. Whatever she 
has to say about the book, it will at the same time be read as an assertion on Scholem 
and as reflexively orienting to and working up Scholem's interpretative practice. 
This means, firstly, that Arendt will have to convince the reader that it is her 
version that is the real one. Scholem's is a misreading, either in parts or as a whole. 
Secondly, however, this practice of working up Scholem's acts of misreading while 
presenting the book's real content might lead to another, related problem, paralleling 
again Scholem's practice. What, namely, is the account for that flawed textual 
practice? Why did this happen? Indeed, how could it happen? 
Metaphorically speaking, these sorts of problems point again beyond the text, 
and beyond the practice of interpretation as they deal with a broader belief system or 
morality (or the lack of them) the person in question subscribes to. Just as Scholem 
provided us with a version not only of a book but of the source from where that book 
originated, Arendt, likewise, not only presents her book as contrasted to Scholem's 
interpretation of it, but makes relevant the locus of that failed interpretation: the 
person of Gershom Scholem. 
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6.2. Reformulating Significance, Reformulating Fundamentals 
As a first step, I will investigate the way Hannah Arendt frames the debate. We 
already saw how Scholem worked up the issue along with the practice of accounting for 
his and Arendt's subject positions. Namely, Scholem's reflections on the debate 
presented the controversy as something grave and serious, touching a realm beyond that 
of facts. Scholem's position, correspondingly, was formulated as that of the reluctant yet 
obliged critique. That of Arendt, however, was not simply of a person behind a failed 
book but the aura of suspicion later to be explicated cast its shadow on her textual 
activity. In any case, the way Scholem presented the debate and the role of his 
contribution was highly indicative and indeed constitutive as to his acts in it. 
Having a look at Arendt's related textual practice and to her construction of the 
debate, we find something entirely different. 150 This is how she first engages herself with 
the substance of Scholem's letter: "There are certain statements in your letter which are 
not open to controversy, because they are simply false. Let me deal with them first so that 
we can proceed to matters which merit discussion" (I. 203-206). Straightforward as it is, 
concluding the argument at the end of her letter, Arendt is even more confrontational: 
Extract 6.1. 
391 In conclusion, let me come to the only matter where you have not 
392 misunderstood me, and where indeed I am glad that you have raised the 
393 point. You are quite right: I changed my mind and do no longer speak of 
394 "radical evil."[ ... ] 
[ ... ] 
397 It is indeed 
150 As noted in the historical background chapter, this has been a usual rhetorical strategy of Arendt in the 
debate (see section 2.3.2). 
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398 my opinion now that evil is never "radical," that it is only extreme, and 
399 that is possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension.[ ... ] 
This utterance is even more categorical than the one with which Arendt started 
her engagement with Scholem's critique, by dint of accomplishing the extreme-case 
formulation (Pomerantz, 1986), ''the only matter where you have not misunderstood me" 
(1. 391-392). The extreme case-formulation (ECF) certainly emphasises Arendt's claim as 
for a huge failure in Scholem's text. Yet, it is important to understand what exactly is said 
here. Is there not anything qualitatively more said than in the first and initiating 
utterance? 
But can this concluding assertion actually be taken literally at all? And what 
would the word ''matter'' (1. 391) refer to? These are the two aspects of this utterance that 
we have to challenge in order to understand it. Arendt certainly does not mean by this 
every single grammatical unit, sentence, or even paragraph (save the one about the non-
radicality of evil) that Scholem would have misunderstood. But, then, that would not be a 
powerful claim either, only a clearly absurd one. 
At the same time, it has been suggested that "the sheer extremity [ ... ] of ECF's 
makes them available for a range of 'as if,' 'essentially so,' nonliteral or metaphoric uses 
and uptakes" (Edwards, 2000: 365). Arendt's use indeed seems to involve this 
"essentially so" aspect. That, however, does not make her claim any less forceful, for 
what would then be referred to would not be a change in the scope of these 
misunderstandings (i.e. less than everything) but a change in their quality. It would not 
mean a simple step back from the ultimately untenable contention of misunderstanding 
every single utterance but the step forward towards the altogether more tenable one of 
misunderstanding every single significant utterance: to make the regular and pervasive 
act of misunderstanding indicative of a dispositional tendency (Edwards, 2003; cf. 
Edwards, 1995). Non-literal use, then, does not emasculate the rhetorical power of the 
ECF, precisely because it retains the capacity of literalness in an unspecified sense 
implying significant utterances. What is actually changed, then, is not the force but the 
focus of the claim. It will not any more simply maximise the amount of particular 
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misunderstandings but unite them - regardless of their quantity - in one, overall, 
essential, and total misunderstanding. 
Framing the discussion as Arendt does certainly canies a more general thrust as to 
the nature and worth of the whole correspondence, which, then, could hardly be posited 
any more radically different from Scholem's. If the "only matter" where Arendt was not 
understood comes in the very last paragraph (of both Scholem and Arendt), then one 
might end up thinking that by dint of the abundance of misunderstanding no real 
discussion or debate is going on before. Where Scholem saw the "quick of our lives" (1. 
54) and the "root of our disagreement" (I. 56), Arendt only sees misunderstandings. 
Or does she? There is an utterance in Arendt's response that reflects on the debate 
while invoking the notion "our most fundamental differences" (I. 375-376). Does this 
perhaps emulate the debate to a level closer to the one envisaged by Scholem? Does this 
fashion it with some worth and gravity? 
Extract 6.2. 
373 I regret that you did not argue your case against the carrying out of the 
374 death sentence. For I believe that in discussing this question we might 
375 have made some progress in fmding out where our most fundamental 
376 differences are located. [ ... ] 
Hardly - to answer the questions just posed.151 It is not an enthusiastic call for 
engagement; rather, an elegiastic final conclusion of its impossibility. 
151 One could hardly miss the irony either that here it is an allegedly "pro-Eichmann", "anti-Ahabath" 
stance that is arguing for executiOn or, as it were, eradication of the "evil" and an "anti-Eichmann", "pro-
Ahabath" one that argues to the contrary. Arendt further stresses the ironic paradox when taking up "in 
conclusion" the issue of "banal" versus "radical" evil. Namely, that it is Scholem, thinking that evil is 
radical, who does not endorse the execution of the death sentence. Arendt, who thinks that evil is never 
radical, does endorse the execution. It is obvious that this chiasmic structure carries certain tension. And 
this tension is not intended to be alleviated, since Arendt refrains from commenting on the consequences of 
her notion of the "banality of evil", and accepts to move on a philosophical ground, leaving the readers in 
embarrassment about the actual meaning of this "banality" or "radicality". Especially when, as in this 
instance, "radicality" (and an allegedly pro-Jewish, anti-Eichmann stance) entails the argument against the 
execution, whereas "banality" (an allegedly anti-Jewish, pro-Eichmann stance) leads to the argument for it. 
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The projected "some progress" as to these "fundamental differences" does not 
concern the future as Arendt in her formulation of "might have made" (I. 374-375) uses 
the present perfect tense to indicate a state of affairs that has been accomplished, made 
irreversible, and hardly possible to improve on. She could have used future tense but did 
not. The emphasis, then, is put on the finality of the miss, rather than on the real 
prospective possibility of it. 
Arendt, however, not only presents this chance for "some progress" as one 
already and irreversibly missed but accounts implicitly for these attributes as weii in this 
utterance. Her expressed "regret" effectively serves as a disclaimer (Hewitt and Stokes, 
1975) to foreclose any attribution as to her personal motives in this question. The reason, 
then, must come from some other direction. It is noteworthy in this respect that the very 
notion of "some progress might have been made" invokes the present and already 
analysed dire reality, replete with misunderstandings. The first is a (conclusively missed) 
potential, the second, however, is the reality. Again, this reality should not necessarily 
have been invoked here. The overaii thrust of Arendt's argument, devaluing the niveau of 
the debate, would have cast a heavy shadow on the prospects of future progress, anyway. 
Yet, she was not content with this and included that devaluation in this very utterance. As 
such, even the ostensible future hope is presented along the direness of the immediate 
present. This, to be sure, explains her elegiastic giving up the hope of even "some 
progress". 
Furthermore, this present state of affairs is once again characterised with an 
implied extreme case-formulation. The allocated adjective ("some") of the 
wished/desired (but missed) progress hints implicitly again at its counter-part as for the 
reality of progress. The relationship between desire and reality is not that "some" 
What is not made explicit is the possibility, that Arendt and Scholem may not discuss evil in 
common sense, but in philosophical categories. It is by the (never explicitly asserted) intrusion of the 
philosophical categories to the everyday language game that Arendt creates the trope of chiasmus and a 
rhetorical subversion in this everyday language game. Radicalism, which is usually associated with 
seriousness, commitment and the like is connected to the rejection of Eichmann's execution; banality, 
which is associated with non-commitment, shallowness etc., is connected to the endorsement of the 
execution. The irony and eventual subversiveness of this paradox could in fact be dissolved theoretically by 
making clear that the categories of "radical" and "banal'' are not the usual ones used in an ordinary 
language game (I. 391-407). This clarification, though, does not happen, the cause of which is far from 
Arendt being careless but her exploiting rhetorically the subversive and ironic potentials of this intrusion. 
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progress has been made but "more" (let alone "even more") c/should have been made, 
had Scholem argued for the suspension of the death sentence. Using the adjective "some" 
Arendt suggests that no progress at all has been made. Again, this implicit extreme case-
formulation by any means explains, as well as bolsters the claim of why that "progress" 
could not be made and why it cannot even possibly be hoped for. 
The utterance, therefore, that addresses the "most fundamental differences" and 
the possibility of "progress" towards the understanding of it; the utterance, that is, that 
could have formed a basis of a significant debate is fashioned so as to deny the debat-
ability of these "fundamental differences" and the possibility of a significant debate. The 
"question" and the opportunity are described finally, entirely, and perhaps even 
necessarily as features of the past. They are but missed opportunities, whose function 
here is exclusively rhetorical in the sense that they are used to construct and reinforce the 
debate's intellectual level as a very low one. 
Nevertheless, Arendt goes on to present where their "most fundamental 
differences" might (have) be( en) located: 
Extract 6.3. 
376 [ ... ] 
377 You say that it was "historically false,"152 and I feel very uncomfortable 
378 seeing the spectre of History raised in this context. In my opinion, it was 
379 politically and juridically (and the last is actually all that mattered) not 
380 only correct- it would have been utterly impossible not to have carried 
381 out the sentence. The only way of avoiding it would have been to accept 
382 Karl Jaspers' suggestion and to hand Eichmann over to the United 
383 Nations. Nobody wanted that, and it was probably not feasible; hence 
384 there was no alternative left but to hang him. Mercy was out of question, 
385 not on juridical grounds - pardon is anyhow not a prerogative of the 
386 juridical system - but because mercy is applicable to the person rather 
152 I.e. the death sentence 
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387 than to the deed; the act of mercy does not forgive murder but pardons 
388 the murderer insofar as he, as a person, may be more than anything he 
389 ever did. This was not true of Eichmann. And to spare his life without 
390 pardoning him was impossible on juridical grounds.[ ... ] 
What is discernible here is a conspicuous lack of real debate and argumentation. 
Arendt renders Scholem's alleged point in a rather concise manner and then flatly (that is, 
non-argumentatively) contradicts it. She does not argue for it but simply states her point 
that "History'' has no place in problems such as this. "Politics" and 'jurisprudence" are 
given as factors that do have to do with the death sentence and their absolute distinction 
from "History'' is implied. Why? This we cannot decipher. The only thing which we 
know of Arendt's opinion is that she finds the emergence of "History'' in a question like 
this "uncomfortable". But this, to be sure, is not an argument, only the consequence 
perhaps of an un-presented argument. Arendt is, thus, just as authoritative here as she 
regrets Scholem to have been. She says that it is a pity that Scholem does not argue for 
his opinion. Her reply, in turn, is just as assertive, however. 
In a similar vein, when Arendt immediately afterwards seems to argue for the 
death sentence, she de facto argues from a position that has already and "un-
argumentatively'' taken - from the position that history has no card given in these 
questions. The ground of disagreement (the in- or exclusion of historical considerations 
as far as a death sentence is concerned) is visibly evaded. Thus, in these quoted 
utterances Arendt's argument is, strictly speaking, not with Scholem: she has already 
taken the very perspective or starting point that Scholem is said to contend. As a 
consequence, their allegedly differing views on the "death sentence" - an issue which 
could have lead to "some progress" in their debate had Scholem argued for it - is, yet 
again, not argued for in any substance by Arendt either. 
The issue of the "death sentence", then again, seems only to be interesting insofar 
as its discussion was - and, perhaps, must have been - missed. Rhetorically, it might 
appear subordinate here to Arendt's aim to present the whole debate as one that is not 
worth pursuing. This was true, first, of the way Arendt fashioned this presentation of the 
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(already missed) possibility of progress, and, second, the way she, then, (non-)expounded 
this location of the "fundamental differences". The utterance (referring to "some 
progress" and "our most fundamental differences") is, then, not fashioned to contradict 
those alluding to series of "misunderstandings" or to one total and comprehensive 
misunderstanding. Rather, it reinforces that ''progress" could not but be missed. 
Nevertheless, let us revisit the part of Scholem's letter in contention. What did he 
actually state there and in what connection is that with Arendt's assessment? 
Extract 6. 4. 
155 [ ... ] I have read both the 
156 text of the judgement delivered by the Court, and the version you 
157 substituted for it in your book. I find that of the Court rather more 
158 convincing. Your judgment appears to me to be based on a prodigious 
159 non sequitur. Your argument would apply equally to those hundreds of 
160 thousands, perhaps millions of human beings, to whom your final 
161 sentence is relevant. It is the final sentence that contains the reason why 
162 Eichmann ought to be hanged, for in the remainder of your text you 
163 argue in detail your view - which I do not share - that the prosecution 
164 did not succeed in proving what it had set out to prove. As far as that 
165 goes, I may mention that, in addition to putting my name to a letter to 
166 the President oflsrael pleading for the execution not to be carried out, I 
167 set out a Hebrew essay why I held the execution of the sentence -which 
168 Eichmann had in every sense, including that of the prosecution, 
169 deserved- to be historically wrong, precisely because of our historical 
170 relationship with the Gennan people. I shall not argue the case again 
171 here.[ ... ] 
There is no surprise now why Scholern actually "did not argue" his "case against 
the carrying out of the death sentence" (1. 373-374). He did not quite have a "case". As 
can be seen here, Scholem primarily concentrates in this extract not on the question if 
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Eiclunann should have been hung, but on the opposing views of Arendt and that of the 
Court as to why. It is clear that he is in favour of the Court's decision (which in outcome 
if not in reasoning is similar to Arendt's) as it is equally clear that his proposal for the 
death sentence not to be carried out marks, according to his logic, no fundamental 
opposition of any kind to the Court or to Arendt. What is obvious from Scholem's text is 
that he does not at all oppose the verdict on juridical ground; he only thinks that it should 
have been overwritten by insights from an a posteriori, historical perspective. His 
arguments relate to an altogether different level of the trial. These considerations come 
only after the final (that is, the verdict of the death sentence) and are not constitutive of it. 
That is why he uses the phrase "I may mention" (1. 165), which implies hesitation, 
pondering if the following is relevant to the topic at all. It is put more like an aside, even 
if it does the rhetorical job of working up the credentials of "Scholem", the reasonable 
speaker. It is used as a prolepsis or disclaimer (Billig, 1996: 269, 271; Hewitt and Stokes, 
1975), warding off any potential criticism of over-concentrating on the Jewish issue, of 
neglecting other people - of nationalism, in short. A "Scholem" is built up, then, that is 
not at all vengeful or, for that matter, chauvinistic. He is not solely concerned with the 
"Jewish" aspects of the trial, he does care about the relationship with the German people 
and, last but first perhaps, he dismisses any possible theory of collective guilt. 
To repeat, Arendt reconstructs the argument leaving out the analysis of her and 
the Court's sentence - that is, the parts that form the emphatic and contrastive side of 
Scholem's argument - and presents the one that has originally been formulated by 
Scholem as an aside. In brief, she constructs the category of the "might-be missing route 
towards the fundamental point" by concentrating on a particular and rather 
"insignificant" part in Scholem's text and assigning to it a central characteristic which by 
no means was attained in Scholem's text.153 
But the conclusion that should be drawn here is not at all that Arendt, in a way, 
distorts Scholem's text in order to render it blameworthy for the lack of argumentation 
and hence for the total lack of "progress". Rather, it highlights another tendency in 
Arendt's text, largely unaddressed in my analysis thus far. Namely, Arendt's point here 
153 Cf. Billig (1985, 1996: Ch. 6) on categorisation and particularisation as rhetorical activities. 
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might not so much be that the debate as such is of no importance but that it is on the 
terms Scholem deems of importance that there is no significance in it whatsoever.154 What 
might be of significance, however, is what Scholem does not think so, what he does not 
investigate yet uses, and what he is apparently unaware of. 
Arendt's emphasis on the insignificance of the debate being conducted on a pre-
intellectual level might, then, be precisely the point of significance. The point, therefore, 
might not be that Arendt's formulation displays a total lack of engagement by dint of the 
intellectual niveau of the debate, but a fundamental lack of engagement with Scholem and 
the terms along which he constructed the debate. That those terms amounted to the utter 
intellectual insignificance could be the issue in itself. But such an issue has subsequently 
to be unveiled and explained solely by Arendt. In this sense, what might be offered by 
Arendt is another sort of diagnosis where the "niveau-less", pre-intellectual, complete 
misunderstanding that Scholem produces is not only to be presented but to be accounted 
for (see Hester, 1998). Scholem and his text are, then, important, but contrary to the 
reasons he deems so. Why they are important in their failure; it must be exposed by 
Arendt. 
Such an orientation would clearly not contradict but complement the one that has 
been offered until now in that it would confront and eventually account for the perceived 
conspicuous and ever-present misunderstanding. That Arendt was analysed not to do it 
when referring to "our most fundamental differences" does not mean that she will not do 
it elsewhere. In fact, the more it is devaluation that prevails, the more it creates the 
requirement for explanation. Especially so, if, as analysed earlier, the point does not even 
appear to be the quantity of misunderstanding but the quality, the essentiality of it. If 
Scholem is presented to misunderstand Arendt completely, then the reader might 
reasonably think that it is indeed relevant what this dubious text of his is and who it is, 
after all, that could produce such an essential and complete misunderstanding. 
154 Cf. "You [i.e. The New York Times] asked for a statement on Judge Musmanno's review of my book 
'Eiclunann in Jerusalem.' I find it hard to comply for two reasons: One is that the interesting point of this 
matter is your choice of a reviewer rather than the review itself. And the other reason is that the predictable 
result of your choice produced a 'criticism' of a book which, to my knowledge, was never either written or 
published" (Arendt, 1963). 
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Although it should be clear by now that Arendt has an important point here and 
one that is beyond the assertion of the debate's insignificance, it is equally clear that this 
point is self-evidently not that Scholem or his text are simply dumb. Surely not, just as 
Scholem's point was not that Arendt had simply been malicious and cold in heart. 
Whatever his text is and whoever he himself is, there is something more to suspect here 
than a simple low-level debate of no real concern for Arendt. 
Understanding Arendt's general reflections on the debate this way, we can focus 
on two broad topics in what follows. One is how Arendt answers Scholem's charges. 
Powerful as her dismissive remarks could have been, they are nothing but bubbles unless 
she connects them to specific points of Scholem's critique. It is not enough to claim that 
Scholem constantly misunderstood her. Such a state of matters must be demonstrated. 
Reluctant as Arendt presents herself to be, this requires an engagement with Scholem's 
text (partly) on its own terms. In the present chapter, I will be concerned with these acts 
of Arendt. 
Such a textual practice, however, can be expected to go hand in hand with the 
process of accounting for what appeared to be Scholem' s essential misunderstanding. As 
Scholem was not content with sketching out a highly unfortunate, undesirable and 
unnatural state of affairs but accounted for it, so will Arendt. Her text, then, seems to be a 
mirror-image of Scholem's construction. As Scholem did, so will Arendt first point out a 
problem. And as Scholem, so will Arendt then analyse its "root" or "fundament". This 
latter practice will be the topic of my next chapter. 
6.3. On One Statement, that is "Simply False": the Naturalisation of Jewish 
Identity 
Let us, then, have a look at the way Arendt reconstructs and answers "certain 
statements in your letter which are not open to controversy, because they are simply 
false"(!. 203-204). The first example of this is Scholem's rendering her being "one of the 
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intellectuals who come from the German Left" (I. 60-61 and 207), to which Arendt 
single-handedly opposes: "I am not one of the 'intellectuals who come from the German 
Left'. You could not have known this, since we did not know each other when we were 
young. [ ... ] If I can be said to 'have come from anywhere,' it is from the tradition of 
German philosophy" (1. 207-214). There is, thus, a statement and its straightforward 
denial, as foreshadowed in the introduction of "simply false" statements. At the same 
time, an account is given for Scholem's (incorrect) proposition: the lack of his experience 
in these matters. Scholem, thus, makes an inference which is wrong. Had he known 
Arendt in their youth, however, he would not have made that false inference. 
So far, this response has not been substantially confrontational. What is pointed 
out may be a major mistake, but it is hard at this moment to see what major significances 
it could have in the exchange. All the more so that Arendt does not expound this 
significance either as she moves quickly to "another statement of yours". Things get more 
complicated, however, with the reconstruction of this other "statement" that is, again, 
"simply false": 
Extract 6.5. 
215 As to another statement of yours, I am unfortunately not able to say that 
216 you could not have known the facts. I found it puzzling that you should 
217 write "I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no other 
218 way." The truth is I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in 
219 any way other that I am, and I have never even felt tempted in that 
220 direction. It would have been like saying that I was a man and not a 
221 woman- that is to say, kind of insane. I know, of course, that there is a 
222 "Jewish problem" even on this level, but it has never been my problem 
223 - not even in my childhood. I have always regarded my Jewishness as 
224 one of the indisputable factual data of my life, and I have never had the 
225 wish to change or disclaim facts of this kind. There is such a thing as a 
226 basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and 
227 was not, could not be, made; for things that are physei and not nomo. To 
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228 be sure, such an attitude is pre-political, but in exceptional 
229 circumstances - such as the circumstances of Jewish politics - it is 
230 bound to have also political consequences though, as it were, in a 
231 negative way. This attitude makes certain types of behavior impossible 
232 - indeed precisely those which you chose to read into my 
234 considerations. 
[ ... ] 
238 [ ... ] My stand in these 
239 matters must surely have been known to you and it is incomprehensible 
240 to me why you should wish to stick a label on me which never fitted in 
241 the past and does not fit now. 
Let us first have a look at how Arendt's "puzzlement" is constructed and what it 
entails. She first identifies a statement which is false and then makes clear that she cannot 
account for it in the way she did in the previous example. To find something "puzzling" 
(1. 216) only indicates a state of mind whereby Arendt constructs herself as someone who 
does not understand this statement. Not semantically, certainly, as it is branded to be 
"simply false". Rather, as it were, "ontologically": how could such a false statement be 
made at all? Whereas regarding her as having come from the German Left might have 
been evolved from Scholem's natural "experience-deficiency'', this statement could not 
have. To find it ''puzzling" indicates that no natural account, no immediate explanation 
can simply be given here and now. That the explanation Arendt would be "naturally'' 
inclined to offer is the one deployed earlier (that is, simple lack of knowledge/experience 
in the matter) is stressed by using the contrastive "as to another statement of yours" (1. 
215). It relates the first statement to the second and her displayed displeasure upon arrival 
at her subsequent findings, expressed by the modal term "unfortunately'' (1. 215). The 
latter does not only present Arendt in a favourable light, someone who wants to have a 
straight and rather innocuous explanation, however. It also characterises implicitly the 
hitherto unexpressed account as something more serious than a simple lack of 
acquaintance in the early years of age. Some other - unspecified but "unfortunate", 
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perhaps - motive must lurk behind. As to this motive, though, we do not receive any 
further guideline as yet. 
What this state of being "puzzled" presupposes is, paradoxically, that the issue of 
the statement of contention must be clear-cut. No place for ambiguity as such can remain 
left. The ensuing "statement" is implied to be uncontroversial and little of a matter for 
debate. For all the mist of being puzzled, one thing is sure, then: there is a definite, non-
arguable reason for being puzzled. What is to come is disarmingly simple and simply 
false. 
But what is puzzling as well (for the reader in this case), is that the "statement" of 
Scholem is literally the same that Arendt is about to make. He said that he "regards" 
Arendt as a "daughter of our people"155 and Arendt answers that she, too, regards herself 
as Jewish.156 Semantically, therefore, she displays an agreement with Scholem's 
statement while characterising that statement as "simply false" and displaying her 
reaction as ''puzzled", indicating whereby not merely that it is false, but false beyond any 
account. 
Yet, as I analysed in the previous chapter, Scholem's statement is by no means an 
innocuous one whose illocutionary or rhetorical meaning would smoothly collude with 
the literal one. As proposed in that chapter, a possible intetpretation is available that 
would take the "I regard" part of the utterance of relevance. 157 That is, it is Scholem that 
regards Arendt Jewish, implying (or even insinuating) that she herself might not. Arendt 
appears to intetpret the utterance this way and that is why her consent to this statement is, 
in reality, perceived as a confrontation. First, she states clearly that she regards herself as 
a Jew and has always done so. Second, by constructing such a straightforward claim, she 
exposes an innuendo in Scholem's statement. The point taken up is not Scholem's 
suggestion that Arendt might not regard herself as a Jew, but (this suggestion being 
presented as utterly unwarranted) the very act of making such a suggestion. 
155 As noted previously, the family metaphor ("daughter") is not present in the original, German version of 
the correspondence. As I could not hold onto Scholem's proofread of the English translation, I prefer not to 
pay attention to the phrase. 
56 Importantly enough, however, she does neither pay attention to Scholem's "wholly" neither to his uand 
in no other way" (I. 66-67). 
157 Cf. page 146-147. To remember, it was not the interpretation though that I finally accepted in itself. 
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Certainly, such a construction necessitates that accounting for her Jewishness, 
Arendt' s attitude must be as unequivocal as it can get. Otherwise (i.e. in the case where 
doubt might reasonably be cast on this attitude), Scholem's "statement" acquires 
significance in its own terms and not merely in Arendt's. Rather than an innuendo, 
Scholem's utterance would become a claim of intrinsic interest. As can be observed, 
Arendt attempts to evade such an ambiguity by putting her own attitude and her being 
Jewish as a matter of fact. 
A matter of (natural) fact. Arendt makes repeated references to facts of life in this 
short sequence. First, she likens the problem in question to that of being a man or a 
woman- to a natural fact,physis, as it is later characterised- where the subject's position 
is either accepting (regarding) or denying (disregarding/contradicting) a fact. 
Let us admit at this point, however, that from an analytical point of view these 
matters are far from that unequivocal: neither Arendt's regard, nor the faultiness of 
Scholem's statement. What Arendt is doing is not merely answering and refuting 
Scholem's implications (to a degree where the very genesis of those implications is the 
one to inquire about) but discarding implicitly the assumptions that informed those 
implications. Whether or not Scholem's statement was "simply false", the framework 
Arendt constructs in her answer appears to differ quite significantly from that of 
Scholem. 
Namely, as I analysed in the previous chapter, Scholem's framework was based 
on the very interdependence of the descriptive and prescriptive, of "given" and "made", 
of ''physis" and "nomos". No pure "given" and no pure "made" existed there. But this 
entailed that the rhetorical meaning of the "I regard you" utterance began to shift from 
the one Arendt attributes to it, where "our people" and "Jewish". are taken to be 
descriptive categories, givens. As we remember, Scholem's suggestion was not simply 
that one has to accept his/her Jewishness, but that given that one is Jewish one must act in 
the world accordingly. It was, in short, a moral and political conception. 
Arendt' s refutation, however, does not appear to be based on the acceptance of 
this interdependence and, hence, of the formulation of the problem as a moral and 
political issue. In her framework, what is left for human beings in this case is merely the 
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affirmation or the denial of a pre-existing fact. The issue is whether one accepts this fact 
or denies it. She, certainly, accepts it. There is no self-denial of the Jewish kind on her 
part. Full stop. Arendt thus not only constructs her attitude as being simple and 
categorical ("always" [1. 223], "never even had tempted" [1. 219]), but constructs the very 
problem of the "Jewish question" as being simple and categorical as well. As it is about a 
"given" and its acceptance by the subject, it forecloses a political and moral 
understanding of the problem and relegates/promotes it to that of the personal and the 
psychological. This is explicitly displayed in Arendt's immediate assertion: "such an 
attitude is pre-political" (I. 228). Rather than contradicting a specific implied proposition 
of Scholem, then, Arendt answers and constructs a problem of her own. 
That said, one should not infer quickly that Arendt would have misunderstood 
Scholem, who is, now, proved to be right in his statement. On the contrary, what is 
exposed is that their "disagreement" is "fundamental" indeed, and cannot simply be 
settled by pointing out who is right and who is wrong. There are no objective standards 
shared by both of them, readily available at this point to assess their respective statements 
and arguments: what Arendt implicitly contested was precisely those standards used by 
Scholem. 
On the other hand, however, one should not be impatient and prematurely preach 
about incommensurability either. If things cannot be settled easily, it does not mean that 
they cannot be settled at all or to any extent. That we cannot compare these statements 
directly and immediately does not mean that we cannot have a look at the broader 
framework they occasion. Indeed, we have to pay close attention to the way these 
ideologies look at the world, the way they construct events, the standards they deploy. 
Right and wrong will not be, in this case, questions merely of factual nature, but of moral 
and political one as well. 
In addition, one could though claim that it appears quite questionable to make a 
political-moral inquiry into a framework that is avowedly moral and political and one 
that is avowedly non-moral and non-political, this is surely not a problem here, not even 
in the terms of the participants. First, because we can recall that for Scholem even the 
lack of Ahabath Israel was accountable in terms of Ahabath Israel; even the lack of a 
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prescriptive characteristic was understood with regard to the "descriptive"158 : there was 
no escape from moral accountability. But it is not only Scholem's framework that is 
ready to contest the attitudes occasioned here by Arendt. As Arendt herself claims 
(admittedly contradicting her own stance): "To be sure, such an attitude is pre-political, 
but in exceptional circumstances - such as the circumstances of Jewish politics - it is 
bound to have also political consequences though, as it were, in a negative way. This 
attitude makes certain types of behavior impossible - indeed precisely those which you 
chose to read into my considerations" (I. 227-234). 
There is, then, a common ground of political orientations. What we have to do in 
the rest of this chapter is to expose the basic difference with regard to this common 
ground. That is, to confront the manifestation of the "attitude" of ''political consequences 
[ ... ] in a negative way'' (I. 230-231) with "certain types of behaviour [ ... ) which you 
chose to read into my considerations" (I. 232-234 ). 
It is in line with this objective that in the remainder of this chapter I will analyse 
and compare Arendt's interpretation of her book with that of Scho1em. 
6.4. On "Misunderstanding" and "Misrepresentation": Arendt's judgment 
6.4.1. What she said and what she did not say 
With this m mind, we shall address the reconstruction of other 
"misunderstandings" of Scholem, in this case with regard to his rendering of Arendt's 
book. Again, the question is how Arendt formulates statements and her counter-
statements as evidences of "misunderstandings": 
Extract 6. 6. 
298 [ ... ) I 
158 As this "descriptive'9 , to remember, is always-already-prescribing. 
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299 never asked why the Jews "let themselves to be killed." On the contrary, 
300 I accused Hausner of having posed this question to witness after 
301 witness. There was no people and no group in Europe which reacted 
302 differently under the immediate pressure of terror. The question I raised 
303 was that of the cooperation of Jewish functionaries during the "Final 
304 Solution," and this question is so very uncomfortable because one 
305 cannot claim that they were traitors. (There were traitors too, but that is 
306 irrelevant.) In other words, until 1939 and even until 1941, whatever 
307 Jewish functionaries did or did not do is understandable and excusable. 
308 Only later does it become highly problematical. This issue came up 
309 during the trial and it was of course my duty to report it. This constitutes 
310 our part of the so-called ''unmastered past," and although you may be 
311 right that it is too early for a "balanced judgment" (though I doubt this), 
312 I do believe that we shall only come to terms with this past if we begin 
313 to judge and to be frank about it. 
314 I have made my own position plain, and yet it is obvious that you did 
315 not understand it. I said that there was no possibility of resistance, but 
316 there existed the possibility of doing nothing. And in order to do 
317 nothing, one did not need to be a saint, one needed only to say: "I am 
318 just a simple Jew, and I have no desire to play any other role." Whether 
319 these people or some of them, as you indicate, deserved to be hanged is 
320 an altogether different question. What needs to be discussed are not the 
321 people so much as the arguments with which they justified themselves 
322 in their own eyes and in those of others. Concerning these arguments we 
323 are entitled to pass judgment. Moreover, we should not forget that we 
324 are dealing here with conditions which were terrible and desperate 
325 enough, but which were not the conditions of concentration camps. 
326 These decisions were made in an atmosphere of terror but not under the 
327 immediate pressure and impact of terror. These are important 
328 differences in degree, which every student of totalitarianism must know 
329 and take into account. These people had still a certain, limited freedom 
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330 of decision and of action. Just as the SS murderers also possessed, as we 
331 now know, a limited choice of alternatives. They could say: "I wish to 
332 be relieved of my murderous duties," and nothing happened to them. 
333 Since we are dealing in politics with men, and not with heroes or saints, 
334 it is this possibility of "nonparticiation" (Kirchheimer) that is decisive if 
335 we begin to judge, not the system, but the individual, his choices and his 
336 arguments. 
[ ... ] 
[ ... ] 
350 That the distinction between victims and persecutors was blurred in the 
351 concentration camps, deliberately and with calculation, is well known, 
352 and I as well as others have insisted on this aspect of totalitarian 
353 methods. But to repeat: this is not what I mean by a Jewish share in the 
354 guilt, or by the totality of the collapse of all standards. This was part of 
355 the system and had indeed nothing to do with Jews. 
As we can see, it is Arendt's argument concerning the substance of her book that 
is presented in this extract. The way she starts as well as concludes her "text"-
presentation indicates a confrontational stance from her side. There is no evasiveness, no 
mitigation, just clear and plain opposition to what Scholem claimed. 
Thus, she begins with saying "I have never asked why the Jews 'let themselves to 
be killed.' On the contrary, I accused Hausner of having posed this question to witness 
after witness" (1. 298-301). Both assertions are here of significance. Arendt starts with a 
straightforward disclaimer. That is, she does not allow for any possibility that she might 
have said something that could be interpreted in this way. The issue appears through her 
simple and uncompromising denial as plain and clear-cut. She just did not say this. 
Categorical as it can get, this is not the end of the story of this utterance, though. 
The "question" is indeed attributed to someone and that "someone" is Attorney General 
Gideon Hausner, one of the protagonists (or, rather, antagonists) in Arendt's book. That 
it was not only not her but her main rhetorical opponent in Eichmann in Jerusalem that 
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actually uttered (and uttered even frequently) this "question" is a rhetorical move 
advancing the aims of the straightforward disclaimer. Thus, it not only charges Scholem 
with attributing something to her but with attributing something that is in fact not simply 
"attributable" but the self-avowed and literal position of someone opposite the author. 
This construction thereby not only showcases a misinterpretation of the author by 
Scholem ("I never asked") but shows a striking misreading ("I accused Hausner of 
having posed ... "). 
But Arendt accomplishes even more here. Namely, she not only points to the 
Attorney General but presents her own stance towards him, who literally posed this 
question, as an "accusation" (1. 300). Thereby she not only disclaims this question, not 
only points to the person who actually asked it and distances herself from the meaning of 
this question altogether. Rather, if attributing this question to someone is an "accusation", 
a very serious charge, then Scholem's activity is as dubious as the one with which he 
charges Arendt. Scholem's activity is thus characterised reflexively as an "accusation" 
and inasmuch as it is depicted to be groundless, the moral transgression is not any more 
concerned with Arendt's conduct but with that of Scholem. 
Rebutting another central assertion of Scholem appears likewise in the paragraph 
(1. 350-355), with which Arendt concludes this sequence. In contrast to the beginning, 
however, the conclusion there consists not only of a disclaimer but of a positive claim as 
well. That is, we do not only learn what Arendt had not said in the book but also the gist 
of what she had: "That the distinction between victims and persecutors was blurred in the 
camps, deliberately and with calculation, is well known, and I as well as others have 
insisted on this aspect of totalitarian methods. But to repeat: this is not what I mean by a 
Jewish share in the guilt, or by the totality of the collapse of all standards" (1. 350-355). 
The point of this utterance is, then, twofold. First, Arendt dismisses Scholem's outrage at 
the "blurring" of the distinction between "torturer'' and "victim" (1. 123). At this point, 
this is not made because it is claimed not to have happened. The implication of this 
utterance is that as in the camps it was absolutely and exclusively abnormality that was 
the order of the day, whatever Jews did or did not do was of the Nazi's own making and, 
consequently, responsibility. This is a rebuttal of Scholem, but is not the main argument 
here. The latter comes not in supporting but confronting this thesis. Arendt's concluding 
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claim is that, outside the camps, there was indeed "a Jewish share" in the guilt and, there, 
the "totality of the collapse of all standards" was not entirely the Nazis' responsibility 
(even if they certainly bear the sole responsibility for triggering this collapse). 
This is something highly confrontational, for, contrary to the starting disclaimer, 
Arendt here not only charges Scholem with alleging something about the book, which is 
simply not there but provides a powerful summary of her thesis. No, ''the Jews" did not 
have a "share in the acts of genocide" (I. 130). But yes, there was "a Jewish share" (1. 
353) in it. 
The analytical intricacy is that- Arendt's powerful rhetoric of disclaiming aside 
- the moment she utters something positive, the question might immediately arise 
whether it is not essentially what Scholem claimed her having said. Thus, Arendt 
indicated her repulsion towards the Attorney General's question as well as, reflexively 
that it was a repulsive accusation directed to her. Yet, there is still no definitive argument 
presented against the viewpoint that what she actually said could have been essentially 
taken to have the thrust of this question. That it could have, perhaps, implied it.159 Such a 
state of affairs, however, means that what Arendt has to refute is not so much whether she 
literally asked such a question (which she did not but which Scholem did not claim 
either) but whether she effectively did it. By the same token, though the share of ''the 
Jews" and "a Jewish share" appear literally different, the ultimate question is whether and 
in what sense they are essentially different. 
. Thus, Arendt has to make clear whom and in what way she actually judged and 
whether these choices are categorically different from the reconstructed question of 
Scholem and his presentation of what was a manifestly immoral book. Disclaiming is not 
enough. Rhetorically speaking, positive assertion and elaboration is required. 
159 As we can remember, neither did Scholem straightforwardly say that Arendt would have made a claim 
"why did they allow themselves to be slaughtered?" (I. 41-42) The direct attribution was that it was the 
"new youth" whose orientation can be captured in this query. Certainly, Arendt does not misread Scholem 
here. Indeed, his point was that it was effectively that Arendt asked this question, not verbatim. 
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6.4.2. "The Jewish functionaries": Constructing an Object for Judgment 
It is for the reasons just spelled out that Arendt immediately launches into the 
reiteration and elaboration of her real points after disclaiming the "why did they let 
themselves to be murdered?" question: "The question I raised was that of the cooperation 
of the Jewish functionaries during the 'Final solution,' and this is so very uncomfortable 
because one cannot claim that they were traitors" (1. 299 and 302-305). 
There are two main contentions occasioned here opposing Scholem's version. 
First, the object of her judgment, ''the cooperation of the Jewish functionaries" and, 
hence, the possible subject of "a Jewish share" of the guilt. Second, a different sort of 
inquiry from what Scholem presented her having done. At face value, the "Jewish 
functionaries" (I. 303) simply do not equal ''the Jews" (1.15, 18, 100, 104, 129-130) and a 
"question raised" (I. 302-303) surely does not appear to be a categorical verdict (even if it 
was indeed a question where both Scholem and Arendt detected a judgmental 
implication).160 To understand that in what way Arendt claims to have exercised a 
different sort of')udgment" than the one attributed by Scholem, we have to analyse these 
two aspects of her reconstruction of the related points of Eichmann in Jernsalem. What is 
the object of judgment and what is the actual judgment pronounced on it? 
To analyse the way Arendt constructs her object of judgment- "a Jewish share in 
the guilt"- as available for such a judgment, let us first note that it is a time-span and an 
activity that is demarcated: "[ ... ] the cooperation of Jewish functionaries during the 
'Final Solution', and this question is so very uncomfortable because one cannot claim 
that they were traitors. (There were traitors too, but that is irrelevant.) In other words, 
until 1939 and even until 1941, whatever Jewish functionaries did or did not do is 
understandable and excusable. Only later does it become highly problematical" (1. 303-
308). Such a demarcation in tune means that the problem of concern is not an essential 
but a relational activity. What is indicated here is that the acts that form the object of 
160 The latter, incidentally, is both supported in Arendt's conclusion of the frrst and the second paragraph 
just quoted: "[ ... ] I do believe that we shall only come to terms with this past if we begin to judge and to be 
frank about it". and "Since we are dealing in politics with men, and not with heroes or saints, it is this 
possibility of 'nonparticipation' (Kirchheimer) that is decisive if we begin to judge, not the system, but the 
individual, his choices and his arguments" (I. 33-36- the second of the emphases is mine). 
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judgment are non-objects for judgment outside this time-span. Had there not been 
"unusual" circumstances (i.e. the "Final Solution"), there would not have been any sort of 
malfunction either. 
Yet, this is not by dint of their total absence in the pre-Final Solution era. As 
Arendt opts for the term "cooperation" (1. 303) instead of collaboration and single-
handedly dismisses the problem of ''traitors" (1. 305), it is clear that the activities she is 
making relevant are not swfacing during the "Final Solution". What both the concepts 
collaboration and treason would imply is some sort of sui generis immoral and 
condemnable activity; in contrast to Arendt's stance that what are at the moral stake here 
are activities that otherwise would have been normal, ''understandable", morally more or 
less acceptable as they did not originate from evil intentions. Evidently, this does not 
apply for either collaboration or treason. 
Arendt, thus, refrains in her formulation from both essentialising and 
intentionalising the problem. Neither essentially wrong activities, nor intentionally 
committed wrongdoings are to be discussed here. These actions immorality emerges from 
the relation and as a consequence with the context of the "Final Solution". 
What is, however, in this context that makes the selfsame activities not 
''understandable" and not "excusable" (1. 307)? What is it that the "functionaries" did and 
they should, in their capacities, not have done? Intriguingly, there is no answer at all to 
these apparently fundamental questions in Arendt's response. We do not learn which 
aspect of "cooperation" should have been avoided and which pursued. What we learn 
about the available and morally just counter-option is the following: "I said that there was 
no possibility of resistance, but there existed the possibility of doing nothing. And in 
order to do nothing, one did not need to be a saint, one needed only to say: 'I am just a 
simple Jew, and I have no desire to play any other role.' [ ... ] Since we are dealing in 
politics with men, and not with heroes or saints, it is the possibility of "nonparticipation" 
(Kirchheimer) that is decisive if we begin to judge, not the system, but the individual, his 
choices and his arguments"161 (1 .317-318 and 333-336). 
161 Otto Kirchheimer (1905-1965): German-Jewish legal scholar, who - having been forced to leave 
Germany before World War I! - moved to the United States and taught at several universities. Gained 
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The alternative choice, the alternative decision and course of action, which, 
according to Arendt, realistically existed and upon which we are able to "begin to judge" 
(I. 312-313) is stated indeed clearly. It seems that the morality of "cooperation" (a 
distinction between just and unjust kind) is not deployed because it is "cooperation" as 
such that is highly problematic. The alternative option, that of "doing 
nothing"/"nonparticipation", is not one kind of "cooperation" but noncooperation. By 
implication, it is not a form of a Judenrat, but the complete dismantling of the entire 
institution. 
However, the possibility of distinguishing life from morality and "cooperation" 
from "doing nothing" comes on the condition that there is a need to distinguish. That for 
some reason it is better to "do nothing" than do something. This is an important proviso 
as "cooperation" is, again, not collaboration. It is not by definition a suspicious activity 
and might have involved the alleviation of pain, the attempt to reduce the casualties and 
so on even during the "Final Solution". Yet, what appears to be the only just choice in 
Arendt's categorical construction does not allow for this. It requires complete passivity 
and therefore the relinquishing of having any chance to influence the events. The 
rationale of her choice must, then, be explicated. 
Likewise, the possibility to compare an actual unjust choice to an imagined just 
one comes on the condition that one is provided with the capacity of the freedom of 
choice. In this case, as the existence of the "Jewish functionaries" dates here back before 
the "Final Solution", the moral question is not so much of"simple Jews" becoming ones 
with "roles" but "functionaries" (failing) to opt for being "simple Jews" (I. 318). Yet, it is 
precisely the constitutive existence of an abnormal context, the "Final Solution" that 
raises the question of whether anything but this "cooperation" could have been 
achievable or could in retrospect be expected. 
To sum up, then, having categorically distinguished "cooperation" from "doing 
nothing", there are two central questions remains to be answered by Arendt's moral 
judgment. What is, namely, the "possibility" that existed for opting for non-cooperation? 
widespread reputation for his work Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedures for Political Ends 
(1961), which remains a classic in the field of the intersections between politics and the law. 
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And what is it about "cooperation" (and not "collaboration") as such that is so 
problematical? Let us concentrate on these problems in analysing the following extract: 
Extract 6. 7. 
323 [ ... ] we should not forget that we 
324 are dealing here with conditions which were terrible and desperate 
325 enough, but which were not the conditions of concentration camps. 
326 These decisions were made in an atmosphere of terror but not under the 
327 immediate pressure and impact of terror. These are important 
328 differences in degree, which every student of totalitarianism must know 
329 and take into account. These people had still a certain, limited freedom 
330 of decision and of action. [ ... ] 
There is a distinction drawn here between the "concentration camps" and the 
ghettos. As we have already seen Arendt's conclusion to reiterate it (I. 350-355), no 
moral inquiry is possible in the former case, however terrible things happened there; and 
that, for the lack of choice. But the main point is certainly not this, but the assertive claim 
for the legitimacy of a post festa moral inquiry into the ghettos' life; and this, for the 
existence of free choice, if a "limited" one. 
It is clear, on the one hand, what "limited" does not mean here. As Arendt said 
earlier, ''there was no possibility of resistance" (1. 315). Yet, what does "limited" involve, 
on the other hand, in opting for "doing nothing"? What sort of choice would that have 
been? To what extent was that choice, in the ghettos, "limited"? This is self-evidently a 
crucial question as the less "limited" the freedom to make the choice for 
"nonparticipation", the less clear-cut a moral assessment might be. The answer comes 
from the analogy Arendt deploys immediately after the quoted instance: 
Extract 6.8. 
329 [ ... ] These people had still a certain, limited freedom 
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330 of decision and of action. Just as the SS murderers also possessed, as we 
331 now know, a limited choice of alternatives. They could say: "I wish to 
332 be relieved of my murderous duties," and nothing happened to them.162 
333 [ ... ] 
This example tells us what the "limits" were of opting for "doing nothing". There 
were no limits: "nothing happened to them" (1. 332). That ''nothing" is of course not a 
literal expression. "SS murderers", relinquishing their "duty'', could not expect to be 
awarded with the Iron Cross or a raise in salary, could, however, expect to be exposed to 
any sort of hardships in life. But the point is that essentially nothing happened to them: 
they were not executed. There were, then, self-evidently plenty of threats in relinquishing 
one's duty but existential threat was not amongst them. And by analogy, not amongst the 
threats faced by the "Jewish functionaries". 
Conceptually, this means that "terror" in the ghettos stopped at the threshold of 
passive resistance, of "doing nothing". "Limited" choice does not mean that there was a 
very, very "limited" possibility to revolt and a less "limited" possibility to "do nothing". 
Rather, it means that there was no realistic possibility of revolting at all, but a more or 
less complete freedom to choose "doing nothing". To come back to the first question 
spelled out earlier, the ''possibility" of choosing "doing nothing" was complete and 
uncompromised. Hence, a moral inquiry into the failure of having made the wrong choice 
is also uncompromised by other factors. To make that choice had, in Arendt's words, 
''nothing to do with the system" (1. 355). It was entirely up to the individual. 
It is telling, however, why I was ready to interpret (and the reader, hopefully, to 
accept it) ''nothing happened to them" as meaning something like "lots of uncomfortable 
things but not execution", on the one hand, yet dubbing it as complete freedom of choice, 
on the other. Is it not a contradiction? Are "lots of uncomfortable things" themselves not 
a severe limit onto the freedom of choice? But there is no contradiction in fact and (I 
hope) I was perfectly warranted here to paraphrase what effectively amounted to "lots of 
162 At this poin4 I would just like to register that I am certainly wholly aware that this analogy is 
breathtakingly striking. But it is not the right time for me to be concerned with this aspect 
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uncomfortable things but not execution" as total freedom. For this was based on the 
assumption that in the context of killing people there is nothing else required than not to 
be executed, and that in choosing not to kill one does not/should not require any other 
guarantee but not to die. 
This being so, however, brings us back to the other question yet unexplicated by 
Arendt: what was the problem with "cooperation" as such? Why is it constructed as a 
homogeneous activity when opposed to "doing nothing"? 
Basing ourselves on the analogy Arendt presents, the answer is clearly that 
because it was essentially nothing but killing; indirectly sending people to death. And 
could not be otherwise as it was the sine qua non of the institution. That is, other and 
surely beneficial activities of the "functionaries" existed and could only exist parasitically 
on this duty. They had to "cooperate" in packing the trains, in maintaining order and 
morale precisely to accomplish smoothly this activity. Certainly, this was the Nazi's 
foremost and essential concern. And if "cooperation" (in any of its manifestations) 
effectively equalled killing, it is the relinquishing of "cooperation" and only the total 
relinquishing of"cooperation" that is morally acceptable in retrospect. 
Thus, what we can recover from Arendt' s analogy here are three characteristics of 
the "Jewish functionaries". First, it reinforced and rationalised what has previously been 
implied, namely, that the "Jewish functionaries" as "functionaries" did not do anything 
but acts essentially of destructive, lethal, and murderous consequences towards their own 
community. Second, that this state of matters was available for them to grasp, hence they 
should have realised this state of matters. And third, that they had absolute freedom to 
relinquish their role, their duty, to become "simple Jews" and "do nothing". Absolute 
freedom meaning here, simply but significantly: the lack of basic existential threat along 
their choice of non-choice. That is, they would not have been executed.163 
To put it bluntly: they killed; they knew that they killed; and they could have 
chosen not to kill. 
163 These assumptions that were uncovered to underlie Arendts constructions certainly cry out for further 
analysis. This simply cannot be done here. There is neither space enough here, nor the historical knowledge 
present that would clearly be required. 
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Yet, if this is so - that is, if we accept these propositions of Arendt -, could we, 
then, not regard any such Jew as a collaborator? As a traitor? Or, as Scholem put it in 
vulgo, as a swine (I. I 08). On the other hand, however, if we are here with Arendt then 
are we not against Arendt as well, as she categorically excluded these possibilities of her 
considerations (1. 302-313)? But murdering innocent people in whatever way is not a 
normal activity in "peace-time" or just before the "Final Solution" either. One might say 
that there is a contradiction exposed here in that it is precisely those considerations that 
Arendt has previously discarded that she later implicitly justifies her claim to judge and 
her actual judgment. That Arendt presents her problem as being not concerned with 
inferior motives and intentions and yet she effectively attributes those intentions to the 
"functionaries". 
There might not be a contradiction here, though. Rather, what is surfacing here is 
the very concept unsaid in the letter until the last paragraphs but ubiquitous in the book: 
the "banality of evil".164 
The ''totality of the collapse of all standards" had not meant that people became 
inhuman or immoral· in the camps. In Arendt's conception it is of no real interest, for, 
morally speaking, this did not even happen. Sure, the acts were there. But the freedom to 
do anything substantially different on any other basis than one being a "saint" did not 
exist. Yet the "collapse" is, again, not even that people outside the camps became 
immoral and inhuman. That certainly happened as it is expected to happen in any such 
situation. Traitors and collaborators there were there, but such has been the case for ages. 
What Arendt is concerned with and what is denoted by the "totality of the collapse of all 
standards" is an inquiry into immoral acts committed without immoral intentions. There 
is a deed - killing people - which is of evil nature. And there are actors who do not 
intend (that is, they do not intend to do anything they deem to be wrong) yet 
systematically accomplish it. This is what Arendt introduced as the "banality of evil", 
where banal is not the deed but the person and his/her intentions. Morally (not un)just 
164 
"Ubiquitous" meaning here not that the concept of"the banality of evil" is literaUy used very often in 
the book. In fac~ its only appearances are in the subtitle and on page 252 (Arend~ 1994a). Ye~ it is 
nevertheless this concept that is expounded throughout the entire book. 
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people in the everyday sense started to become murderers while remaining morally (not 
un)just throughout. 
Strikingly, then, it is Arendt's words on Eichmann that become relevant here with 
regard to the "functionaries": "he [ ... ] never realized what he was doing" (Arendt, 1994a: 
287 - emphases in the original). That is, sthe did know it. But did not realise. 
6.5. Conclusion 
As reconstructed, Arendt's is an extremely serious and extremely painful 
allegation. And not simply because in this conception he, who "kills" is the persecuted 
himtherself. Rather, it was a judgment on a collective as "cooperation" (i.e. indirect, 
unintentional but systematic murder) was taken synonymous with ''the Jewish 
functionaries" by definition. Though, theoretically, passive resistance can in fact be of 
institutional nature, what Arendt's dichotomy between a "role" (1. 318) and "doing 
nothing" (1. 316) implied was that here it did not happen. The collective in her 
formulation thereby became the anti-thesis of the only possible moral behaviour 
realistically available for Jews during the Final Solution. That is, in-built in Arendt's 
requirement was the demand from the "functionaries" to renounce their role, to disband 
their institution, as it was the institution qua institution that effectively collaborated and 
effectively killed. "Cooperation" or "doing nothing"- that was the question. Choosing to 
remain a "functionary" or choosing to be a "simple Jew". Tertium non datur. What is 
therefore condemned here is not "merely" some Jewish individuals, but a Jewish 
institution. 
Still, it was not "the Jews" that were condemned, as Scholem claimed. In Arendt's 
construction a considerable amount of them (in the camps) were not even available for 
judgment and another considerable amount of them ("simple Jews" in the ghettos) were 
simply morally just. It is, then, a "misunderstanding" of Scholem. 
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Surely it is not. What must be clear by now is that even though Arendt claims 
Scholem's acts of interpretation to be "misunderstandings", they are not quite presented 
as such. And rightly so as Scholem was precisely aware as to what constituted Arendt's 
object of judgment in the first place. He too addressed the problem of the "elders of the 
Jews". Yet he concluded that this - i.e. judging a Jewish institution - was in effect a 
manifestly immoral, collective judgment on the Jews as it transgressed the moral 
imperative of the authority of the "dead". What Arendt does here, however, is not 
accepting this assumption and then proving Scholem to have concluded falsely - that is, 
that he "misunderstood" something - but confronting, undermining, and dismantling that 
very assumption. 
Scholem's direct inference and subsequent shift from the "elders" to "the Jews" 
was informed by his assumption that the former was not different from the latter in any 
relevant sense. What created this unity was the supra-liminal, extreme situation. 
Whatever institutional distinctions were there, the basic unity erased those distinctions. 
The "elders [ ... ] or whatever we choose to call them" (1. 103-104), too, lived in the 
twilight "state of exception", where facts and laws are indistinguishable and where, 
hence, later moral assessment must step back and give way to honouring the authority of 
those people, (in their being) the "dead". With her judgment, as the argument went, it was 
this moral obligation that Arendt has transgressed. However refined, however elaborated 
an outcome of such a transgression might be, it is a profoundly and inherently immoral 
account. 
It was precisely this moral framework, which has just been destroyed by Arendt, 
however, by reference precisely to historical and sociological considerations. Namely, by 
pointing out that the situation in the ghettos and in the camps was fundamentally different 
(i.e. fundamentally, from a moral point of view). Whereas in the case of the latter, true, 
any sort of judgment smacks of immorality, there was indeed freedom enough to validate 
the act of moral judgment in that of the former. Supposing that Arendt' s evaluation is 
more or less correct, her distinction is more or less valid - it is the powerful refutation of 
Scholem's framework. 165 
165 Cf. fu. 163. 
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This, however, would still be an example of some sort of misunderstanding, if of 
a more general nature. Arendt's implied point is, however, not "merely'' that Scholem's 
assumptions are historically invalid. Rather, what is suggested by her is that such 
assumptions are informed by hypocrisy, ingenuity, and grave immorality of the first 
order. 
For one thing, Arendt's distinction involves that it is exactly with regard to the 
"simple Jews" that the "functionaries" must be accounted for. These immoral or even 
criminal acts were committed against no other but morally just Jewish subjects, who -
along with Arendt's only standard - did "not desire to play any other role" than their 
"simple" Jewishness. It is not just that there was, thus, "a Jewish share in the guilt" but 
that that "share" had been committed against the Jews. Yet, on the other hand, Scholem 
now claims the authority of the morally just, the "simple Jew", the homo sacer to be 
transferred to the "functionaries".166 It is their enforced as well as self-avowed passivity, 
haplessness (whether in Arendt's moral or in a plain descriptive sense), their moral 
victim-hood that is used to defend the "functionaries" - who were not passive but active 
and who did choose to play "any other role". In short, the authority that Scholem fashions 
the "elders/functionaries" with is precisely the authority that they squandered and against 
whom they committed their acts. It is the moral authority of the victim that serves to hide 
the sins of those who had a "share in the guilt". 
"What perversity!", as the learned elder of the Jews could have said. It is surely 
not a "misunderstanding" but a basically immoral position that is disguised in Scholem's 
argument. That putative moral high ground is reconstructed to be demanded on a 
thoroughly immoral basis and the accusation has been turned back on the accuser. 
Scholem's basic assumption and orientation with regard to the Holocaust was 
contextualised by Ahabath Israel and our forthcoming task will be to render the look 
Arendt has at this "concept". This look, however, quite contrary to Scholem's rhetoric, 
will not be that of admiration but of scrutiny and, possibly, political, and moral criticism. 
166 The allusion to the "homo sacer" here is meant in the way Giorgio Agamben uses the concept in order to 
elucidate the "inclusion of bare life in the political realm" (Agamben, 1998: 6) and the case of a person 
who is "simply set outside of human jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law" (!bid: 
82, cf. 166-180). 
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7. Ecce Homo: The Treason and Loyalty of the 
Intellectual 
7 .I. Introduction 
As has been witnessed thus far, Arendt did not appear to be satisfied at all with 
the way her correspondent phrased and framed the debate and, correspondingly, her own 
book. Such a discontent was observable in her construction that suggested a challenge to 
those very ideas, rather than accommodation and adaptation to them. What it entails is 
that Arendt does not simply excuse herself and her work. This is evidently part of the 
process but is most emphatically not the ultimate aim of it. Rather, in representing her 
original notions, Arendt reformulates Scholem's construction, evaluation, and criticism as 
well, producing hence a virtual mirror image of what Scholem had done in his letter. 
Arendt not only counters Scholem's judgment as to her manifestly immoral text 
and the dubious assumptions that gave birth to this text but focuses on the 
unreasonableness of that judgment of Scholem. As noted, her presentation is scattered 
through with remarks about the "misunderstandings" of Scholem, amounting to the 
extreme-case formulation as Arendt invokes the (non-discussed) "question we might have 
made some progress in finding out where our most fundamental differences are located" 
(I. 374-376). Such an intellectual devaluation of Scholem would prompt a serious 
investigation in itself. How is it, namely, that someone - being nominally an intellectual 
-arrives at such amount of misunderstandings or, rather, at such a single, comprehensive 
and complete misunderstanding? This question that Arendt's construction implies 
indicates that just as Scholem's construction did not stop short of giving an account, an 
explanation to the textual characteristics, so will Arendt work on a version that makes 
Scholem's apparently unreasonable construction "understand-able". 
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However, there might even be more to come. As analysed in the concluding 
section of the previous chapter, in reconstructing Scholem's underlying assumptions 
Arendt appeared to shed different light on his textual activities than those implied in the 
notion of "misunderstanding". Namely, it was not merely some sort of epistemological 
failure committed by Scholem that resulted in the "misunderstanding" and the subsequent 
false accusations. Rather, it was made to appear a moral failure, where the alleged 
honouring the "dead" solely masked the exploitation of the moral authority of the literally 
hapless, the morally just beings, the "simple Jews" in the service of the "Jewish 
functionaries". From what appeared to be a noble utterance and standard, we did not 
simply arrive at the affirmation that Arendt's text was exempt from those charges. 
Rather, we were presented with a version where it was those very noble- and morally-
just-sounding standards that were the crux of the matter and the ultimate instances of 
immorality. 
What is to be our task in this chapter, then, is, first, the analysis of the account 
Arendt gives for Scholem's "misunderstanding". It remains to be seen whether this 
account will be given in a "merely" epistemological or in a moral sense. However, it is 
surely only one side of the coin, as (mirroring again Scholem's activity) the account of 
Scholem's acts and the reconstruction of his subject position constructs reflexively the 
position of Arendt and the account of her texts, here or in the book. It is, then, Arendt's 
recovering of the "roots" of the positions identified in the previous chapter and the 
assumptions underlying that we will analyse in this chapter. 
7.2. Ideology versus Independence: the Beginning of an Account 
Part of an account for Scholem's "misunderstanding" in fact already precedes the 
actual treatise of his notions on the case of the "elders of the Jews"/"Jewish councils" and 
the callous question of ''why they let themselves to be slaughtered?" (1. 298-313). As 
earlier I was engaged in deciphering Arendt's reconstruction of Scholem's interpretation 
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with regard to her original text, I did not venture into an analysis of her practices of 
accounting for that interpretation. What would have been untimely then is high time to 
consider now. 
Extract 7.1. 
287 It is a pity that you did not read the book before the present campaign of 
288 misrepresentation against it got under way from the side of the Jewish 
289 "establishment" in Israel and America. There are, unfortunately, very few 
290 people who are able to withstand the influence of such campaigns. It 
291 seems to me highly unlikely that without being influenced you could 
292 possibly have misunderstood certain statements. Public opinion, 
293 especially when it has been carefully manipulated, as in this case, is a 
294 very powerful thing. [ ... ] 
The account given in this passage seems to be a relatively straightforward one. 
Scholem was, simply, "manipulated" and "influenced" by the external forces of a group. 
Had it not been for these, he would have understood the book and those "statements". 
Rhetorically speaking, it is the appearance-reality device (Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1971: 415-42) that Arendt is basing her argument and account of Scholem's 
position on. The appearance being that it is Scholem that "misunderstands", 
"misrepresents", and ''puzzlingly'' misreads, whereas the reality shows that it is not 
Scholem that does all of this but the "'establishment"' (1. 289). 
On one hand, such a construction surely seems to "save Scholem's face", his 
credentials and allocate the blame to this vague "'establishment"'. Scholem qua "dear 
Gerhard" (see I. 192), as Arendt addressed her beginning her answer, receives absolution 
as the construction implies the essential problem lying not with him but with the 
"'establishment"'. It is 'just" that he was carried away. Yet, on the other hand, such is far 
from a whimsical and lightweight accusation in itself. For one thing, while Scholem's act 
of "misunderstanding" (1. 292) is rather innocuous in moral terms here, the same cannot 
be said about the "campaign of misrepresentation" (I. 287-288), or the carefully 
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''manipulated" "public opinion" (1. 292-293) conducted by this ominous "Jewish 
'establishment"' (1. 288-289). Even though, admittedly, there is lack of definitive textual 
evidence, this "campaign" is made to be seen rather dubious in origin and vulgar or 
populist in execution. It is this alleged divergence in kind between the "campaign", the 
'"establishment"', and the "dear Gerhard" that prompts the question of how the latter 
could not have been able to "withstand" in the face of this campaign of pre-intellectual 
origin and, as it will later turn out, ideology-driven nature. What else is expectable of 
anyone who has the capacity for being reasonable and is worthy of the name intellectual? 
Namely, while the presence of that "campaign" surely accounts descriptively for 
many, many "misunderstandings" arising in many people reading Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, it certainly does not account for why "dear Gerhard" was not able to 
withstand this campaign; why someone with the implied capacity could not do so; and 
why he could not do so when a "few" (1. 290) people were indeed able to do so. As 
Arendt makes it relevant that there were "few" that were able to withstand, she suggests 
that ''withstanding" is an existing practical option and thereby the explanation for 
whether one ''withstands" or lets him/herself get carried away can be found in those 
people, who were exposed to that influence, and not simply in the power of the 
"campaign" and "manipulation". 
Seen from this perspective, the question of why Scholem was not able to 
withstand certainly implies an answer that we should not discard. Namely, that it is the 
very presumption that Scholem would have been able to understand the book, had there 
not been the "campaign" that is thrown into doubt by him giving in and letting himself be 
carried away. More abstractly, it is that the appearance does not cover essential reality 
but questions and implicitly implicates it. Were we to accept this interpretation, it would 
mean that this "appearance-reality" device here is not merely a loophole designed to save 
the correspondent's face but to imply the possibility that that face might not even exist in 
fact. That would suggest that the "reality" opposing the "appearance" is but a fiction, that 
"dear Gerhard" is not a hijacked essence but a "mere" idea, the authentic norm, and that 
the reason the real Scholem did not withstand the manipulation of the '"establishment"' 
is, simply, that he is part of it. 
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The point is, however, that Arendt is not unequivocal. Scholem's responsibility is 
not clear here and neither is, therefore, his subject position constructed in Arendt's text. 
We do not know for sure, whether we can count on a "dear Gerhard" who would have 
understood the book, had there been no campaign or Scholem had already been of the 
"'establishment"'. In any case, how are we to explain those "few" that did not get carried 
away? Why was the "few" capable of something the many and Scholem were not? And 
why was Scholem incapable of something that "dear Gerhard" was expected to be 
capable? I do not see any way to solve these ambiguities here as yet. It is to be imagined, 
however, that Arendt's course of accounting for both Scholem's and her textual acts will 
follow questions such as these. It is these aspects that I am to analyse in the following 
utterance. The utterance comes around the end of Arendt's response. 
Extract 7.2. 
356 How you could believe that my book was "a mockery of Zionism"167 
357 would be a complete mystery to me, if I did not know that many people 
358 in Zionist circles have become incapable of listening to opinions or 
359 arguments which are off the beaten track and not consonant with their 
360 ideology. There are exceptions, and a Zionist friend of mine remarked in 
361 all innocence that the book, the last chapter in particular (recognition of 
362 the competence of the court, the justification of the kidnapping), was 
363 very pro-Israel - as indeed it is. What confuses you is that my 
364 arguments and my approach are different from what you are used to; in 
365 other words, the trouble is that I am independent. By this I mean, on the 
366 one hand, that I do not belong to any organization and ·always speak 
367 only for myself, and on the other hand, that I have great confidence in 
368 Lessing's selbstdenken for which, I think, no ideology, no public opinion 
369 and no "convictions" can ever be a substitute. Whatever objections you 
167 Arendt is referring here to Scholem's famous allegation:"[ ... ] your description ofEichmann as a 
'convert to Zionism' could only come from somebody who had a profound dislike of everything to do with 
Zionism. These passages in your book I finds quite impossible to take seriously. They amount to a mockery 
of Zionism; and I am forced to the conclusion that this was, indeed, your intention. Let us not pursue the 
point" (I. 171-176). 
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370 may have to the results, you won't understand them unless you realize 
371 that they are really my own and nobody else's. 
Yet again, Arendt might at face value seem to be unequivocal in this utterance. As 
to Scholem's position, there is not any kind of respect-talk or even the possible loophole 
for a misled but reasonable "dear Gerhard" under the influence of the "campaign of 
misrepresentation" here. There is no "dear Gerhard" here distinguishable from those 
following the "beaten track". There is no potential member of "us" here. No realistic 
chance to see "dear Gerhard" coming forward, only temporarily and apparently 
influenced by "them". Neither is, therefore, Scholem a virtual puppet any more, whose 
"only" sin would be that all-too-understandable inability to withstand. Appearance 
simply matches reality. Scholem is an active representative of the category of "them"; 
''their" agent, evidently one of the "many people in Zionist circles" who is "incapable of 
listening to opinions or arguments which are off the beaten track" (1. 358-359), whose 
letter is but one instance in that "campaign of misrepresentation". There is, then, no such 
thing as an essential authentic dear Gerhard apart from the idea, the nonn that is though 
actualised by the "few" as well as presumably by Arendt - is not only not actualised by 
positively jeopardised by Scholem. 
Meanwhile, the direct account of "misreading" and "misunderstanding" appears 
to be constructed as a diametrical opposite to Arendt's own stance by occasioning a 
dichotomy here between "ideology" (1. 368), observing the "beaten track" (1. 359), 
"public opinion" (1. 368) versus "independence" (1. 365), and "se/bstdenken" (1. 368). 
Rather than a neutral account, then, Arendt's practice is the advancing of her counter-
critique of Scholem's letter. The terms in which the account is given for his 
"misunderstanding" as well as Arendt's book, respectively, are constructed to be 
discernibly normative and value-laden. Not much dispute can be reckoned to go on here 
as to who the bad and who the good guy is. 
As I indicated in section 3.2. above, for most commentaries on the exchange this 
is indeed the end of story. Yet, to be satisfied with knowing who the good and who the 
bad person is and learning that it was "ideology" that distorted Scholem's thinking 
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whereas Arendt's selbstdenken made her immune to it is still a rather romantic (as 
opposed, here, to analytical) approach to the correspondence. Upon closer inspection, 
while certain broad aspects of that preliminary understanding of Arendt's account might 
remain unchanged, others will appear to be far less crude in fact. In short, Arendt's 
account is far more undefined and far less unequivocal as any "analytical" shortcut would 
be able to expose. 
Let us note, first, that Scholem's relation to that '"establishment"' is still 
constructed as a considerably ambiguous matter. As pointed out, his belonging to that 
''many people in Zionists circles" (I. 357-358) was constructed beyond doubt, and that 
category ("Zionist circles") did in fact betray certain similarities with the 
"'establishment"' (e.g. they both were implied to be the out-group; they both were 
described to carry out activities opposite to reason and rationality; they both were 
Jewish). Yet, whatever the connection between the two of them might be, they were not 
presented to be the same. Furthermore, nor were those ''many people in Zionist circles" 
and their totalising "ideology" simply uncovered in their being. Rather, it was again that 
they "have become" (I. 358) prone to produce ''puzzling" (1. 216) statements and 
''mysterious" (1. 357) misunderstandings. As much as they were implied to be the active 
"campaigners", they too were depicted as passive bearers. It is by no means clear, 
whether it is that "ideology'' itself that makes Scholem and those "many people in Zionist 
circles" the member of the '"establishment'", whether there is an inherent predilection in 
that "ideology'' to exclude anything but the ''beaten track", or it is that very 
"establishment" that distorts their thoughts and induces that blind ideological faith in 
them. Thus, just as it has been buried, a closer inspection reveals that Arendt still sustains 
the appearance-reality device. There still is the possibility constructed that the real 
Scholem might exist, that he might prevail. There still is a chance that the real Scholem, 
the "dear Gerhard" is not merely an idea but exists in fact, somewhere, somehow. To 
repeat, that it was ')ust" carried away. 
Yet, as far as ambiguities are concerned, this is just the beginning of the story. 
"Ideology", "'conviction"', ''public opinion", and the attitude that considers only its 
"beaten track" tolerable belongs to either the realm of appearance or reality; that is, either 
essentially to Scholem or to the '"establishment"'. Yet- whatever might be the case-
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while it is presented as the only direct account for "misunderstanding" (I. 292), 
"misrepresentation" (1. 288), "statement [that is] puzzling" (1. 215-216), and the 
"complete mystery"(!. 357) that Scholem's stance means to Arendt, there is simply no 
clear guidance as to what that "ideology" might precisely be. And what, for that matter, 
the opposite values of "independence" and "selbstdenken". Self-evident as they might 
have sounded, one cannot but equally wonder what the positive side of that distinction 
might exactly mean. 
What is, namely, the sense in which Arendt takes "independence"? Is it a 
philosophical position and a modernist credo in the power of reason and the lack of other, 
distortive motives? Is, subsequently, Arendt disengaged from "peoples" and the 
ideologies and convictions directing their lives, watching them disinterestedly from under 
the sun, the light of truth? Is Arendt, in short, "an outsider, a spectator, a 'total stranger"' 
(Walzer, 1987: 38)? Defending Reason against irrationality and Humanity against some 
sort of particularistic movement: has she taken the critical "path of discovery'' (Ibid: 3-
32)? Or, has she taken the word "independence" to be a political term where it would not 
mean disengagement from the people but from organisations and institutions? Is she, 
then, Michael Walzer's "connected critique" (Ibid: 38;· cf. Rorty, 199lc, 1991d), 
defending her people, her community against some vested interests arising from within? 
Against groups that claim to represent the whole group while effectively destroying it? 
Either way, what is the warrant for adopting these stances? Apart, that is, from Arendt 
"confidence" (1. 367). 
There is no conclusive answer to this and I think that an honest analysis must 
admit its own confusion at this point.168 While any preliminary thought as to Arendt's 
hostility to Scholem's position, any perception that it is better to be "independent" than 
an "ideologue" - let alone to play a role in the "campaign of misrepresentation" and the 
"manipulations" of the "Jewish "'establishment"'- is certainly valid, it must be clear by 
now that such shortcuts are just as hollow as unshakeable. We do not know what 
168 There are indications to both directions. Expounding her position of "independence" she both refers to a 
political sense ("!do not belong to any organization" and "Whatever objections you may have to the results 
[i.e. of Arendt's thinking], you won't understand them unless you realize that they are really my own and 
nobody else's) and to an epistemological one ("for which [ ... ] no ideology, no public opinion and no 
'convictions' can ever be a substitute"). The notion of selbstdenken can be found at several points of 
Arendt's oeuvre, see Arendt (1968: 8-11, 1997: 89-91). 
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"ideology" is in our hands, and we do not know what sort of "independence" is opposed 
to that. In short, we do not know who Arendt and Scholem are, apart from the former 
being the good person, the latter the bad. However, the author being called Hannah 
Arendt, it is hardly a swprise. 
Yet, some things are clear and it is important now to enumerate them. We might 
not at this point know who Arendt takes them exactly to be, but there are indications as to 
who they definitely are not. That is, while it is certainly disturbing logically that Arendt 
uses unspecified and under-defined words, it is from a rhetorical aspect that we approach 
her text. From this aspect, it is of interest rather than a matter of dismissal as to what is 
left in the shade and what is made crystal-clear. Thus, whether or not Scholem is part of 
the "'establishment"', it is rendered transparent that Arendt's argumentative bout -
neither in particular nor in general - is not with the Jews. Arendt does not characterise 
Scholem's position or that ideology as arising merely from the particular, the parochial as 
such, as opposed to a transcending, universal point of view. What she is arguing against 
is not the Jews but "the Jewish 'establishment"', whomever they might claim to speak in 
the name of. 
Likewise, though it is not clear what that "ideology" might be and how the 
"'establishment"' relates to it, what is indeed perfectly clear again is that this "ideology" 
we are after does not equal Zionism. The case is not that these "many people" are simply 
Zionists who, for some external or internal reason, became incapable of listening. To 
support this, Arendt is careful enough to include the experience of a "Zionist friend" of 
hers, who "remarked in all innocence that the book, the last chapter in particular 
(recognition of the competence of the court, the justification of the kidnapping), was very 
pro-Israel- as indeed it is" (1. 360-363). Such a sequence makes it all but clear that the 
debate is not between a Zionist position and Arendt's own. Indeed, the "innocent" Zionist 
perceives "the book" as "very pro-Israel" (my emphases), indicating that (though Arendt 
is not claiming that she is a Zionist or that her book is a Zionist book) there is even more 
than mere compatibility between Eichmann in Jerusalem and a Zionist position. Hence, 
whether or not Arendt conceives Zionism of an "ideology", the problem does not lie with 
that, as the only distinctive adverb attached to that "Zionist friend of mine" is that her 
remark was made "in all innocence" (1. 360-361). What "contaminates", what makes 
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people mysteriously ''misunderstand" and "misrepresent" is, thereby, not Zionism but an 
"ideology": nominally within its ranks but by no means identical with it. 
These delineations are of obvious significance. Whatever the "Jewish 
'establishment"' was, whoever the "many people in Zionist circles" were and whatever 
their "ideology'' meant, none of this was constructed to stand for the particularity as such. 
It is not the Jewish position and it is not the Zionist position. That is, Scholem is not 
speaking in the name of either the Jewish people or Zionism and Arendt's argument is 
not merely with particularism or parochialism in the name of Universal Reason. Just as 
Arendt opposed the "simple Jews" (1. 318) to the "functionaries" (1. 303), so does the 
notion of"Jewish 'establishment"' (1. 288-289) and the "many people in Zionist circles" 
(I. 357-358) leave the rest of the Jewish people or Zionists intact. 
Thus, while Arendt is not using the first person plural pronoun very often (hence 
expressing no explicit identification with any group in any sense, be they the "Zionists" 
or merely "the Jews"), she is very much aware to imply that she is not inimical or 
neglectful towards them at all. While her lack of positive rhetoric of the first person 
plural pronoun suggest a position that might transcend particularities as such, it does not 
necessarily indicate a lack of de facto political or moral identification with the Jews or 
even "innocent" Zionists. This, however, is a question for further investigation, rather 
than the conclusion of this section. 
As far as that conclusion is concerned, let us note that Arendt's practice of 
accounting has again mirrored that of Scholem. Rather than being a "mere" account, it 
turned out to foreshadow an exercise in political and moral criticism. The reason for 
Scholem's misreading - the inability to leave the "beaten track" of "ideology'' - was 
single-handedly opposed by "independence" and "selbstdenken ". Ironically, however, 
what is clear at this point is what this opposition is not as well as who Scholem and 
Arendt is not. We know, namely, that the debate according to Arendt is not between the 
Jew and the non-Jew, the particular and the universal. Neither is it between the Zionist 
and the anti-Zionist. 
Between whom it is remains to be seen in the coming sections. My aim there is to 
find out more about what exactly that "ideology" is that Scholem seems to express in his 
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letter and of what Arendt's avowed counter-position of "independence" consists. In 
pursuit of these matters, it is now time to turn to the paragraphs where Arendt takes up 
the issue that constituted the core of Scholem's admonition. As was the case with 
Scholem, it is at Ahabath Israel that they are constructed to rise or fall. 
7.3. TheDarkFormofZionism 
7.3.1. "To come to the point": building up a confrontation 
The utterance that is to be analysed in the following two subsections comes in-
between the two concrete instances of "misunderstandings" that were taken up in the 
previous chapter: Arendt's reflections on Scholem's statement that he regards her as "the 
daughter of our people" and the attribution of the question "why did they let themselves 
to be murdered?" to her book. Such a position seems to indicate the central location of 
the following and Scholem's main concept in understanding what is going on in the 
debate. Let us now have a look at how Arendt re-presents Scholem's idea. 
Extract 7.3. 
242 To come to the point: let me begin, going on from what I have just 
243 stated, with what you call "love of the Jewish people" or Ahabath 
244 Israel. (Incidentally, I would be very grateful if you could tell me since 
245 when this concept has played a role in Judaism, when it was first used in 
246 Hebrew language and literature, etc.) You are quite right - I am not 
247 moved by any "love" of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in 
248 my life "loved" any people or collective - neither the German people, 
249 nor the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of 
250 that sort. I indeed love "only'' my friends and the only kind of love I 
251 know of and believe in is the love of persons. [ ... ] 
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Indeed, the acceptance ofthe centrality of Scholem's concept is seemingly further 
bolstered by Arendt's starting her reflection with the phrase ''to come to the point" (I. 
242). She thereby appears to address the problem as the origin of all the other problems, 
pre- and succeeding it. The positioning as well as the introduction of the concept is, then, 
in line with Scholem's understanding of the issue where he introduced it referring to the 
"root of our disagreement" (I. 54). 
Yet, as suggested by Arendt's acts of construction in the previous chapter, such an 
agreement as to what constitutes the centre of the debate might not be taken to indicate 
consent as to the meaning, relevance, and actual significance of it. As we may 
remember, it was the very intellectual insignificance of Scholem's remarks, which were 
of significance, in Arendt's construction. 
Such an interpretation of Arendt's former rhetorical acts is in no way inimical to 
her uptake and apparent avowal of the centrality of Ahabath Israel here either. For it is 
noteworthy that before naming Scholem's main concept- "the point"- the self-avowed 
gist of his charge, Arendt deploys the tiny cautionary utterance, ''what you call" (I. 243). 
For one thing, with this qualification Arendt constructs a distinction between what is and 
what ''you" call. For another, she thereby also distances the object of that "call" from 
herself. 
Stressing that something is said ("called") rather than simply be might not suggest 
by logic its untrue nature, but does undermine its taken-for-grantedness and makes 
relevant the activity of Scholem in the frrst place. The "rhetorical stake" (Edwards and 
Potter, 1992) has therefore clearly been opened as what you call this way implies that 
someone else might call it otherwise. If not "someone else" in general, then me (i.e. 
Arendt) definitely, suggesting that this centre might be conceived entirely differently in 
its substance and significance by the two participants, their apparent agreement in its 
centrality notwithstanding. 
In a similar vein, suspicion may be perceived to be cast on another related term 
used by Scholem: "love" in "love of the Jewish people" (1. 243). As we can see, there are 
two ways which Arendt makes "love" visible. One is presented with (I. 24 7, 248), and the 
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other without quotation marks (1. 250). It is constantly the former deployed whenever 
Arendt is talking about the "love"-s Scholem is perceived to have requested from her. On 
the one hand, certainly, they are the "loves" supposedly quoted from Scholem. Yet, as 
they are opposed to those love-s presented without quotation marks that Arendt actually 
claims to harbour, it can be suggested that quotation marks might not merely display the 
neutral function of signalling a quotation. Rather, just as "what you call" implied the 
rhetorical meaning of caution, suspicion, and a warning that we should not accept those 
terms and standards as taken for granted, the graphical "suspension" of these "loves", 
likewise, might be taken to indicate not simply that they were requested by Scholem but 
that they are, from where Arendt stands, suspicious "loves" and suspicious requests. 
Certainly, we do not know at this point what this divergence as to the meaning of 
the "point" and the indicated suspicion as to Scholem's acts might consist of. We do not 
know why Arendt would hesitate using these phrases and appropriating them as her own. 
It is, however, clear that in some sort of, yet unspecified, aspect there is no agreement on 
the use of "the love of the Jewish people or Ahabath Israef'. This suggests that instead 
of being the golden standard, the starting point according to which the debate is lead, the 
very ground of Ahabath Israel might subsequently become a matter of contest instead of 
taken for granted. What is to be expected is, then, "the point" being taken in a wholly 
different way from what Scholem would aspire.169 
Even more so that, as can be noticed, amongst these signs of caution and 
suspicion Arendt unashamedly displays within brackets her own lack of knowledge as far 
as Ahabath Israel is concerned. In fact, the closing "etc" (1. 246) within the brackets 
accomplishes an extreme case-formulation, suggesting that any information about the 
concept is welcome and, by implication, that Arendt does not know anything about it. 
Clearly, no mitigation of any sort is going on here, no pretension, just the display of the 
complete lack of knowledge. As such, instead of "defensive detailing" (Drew, 1998), it 
seems to be more like offensive detailing. The uncompromising indication (the ECF) of 
the complete lack of knowledge suggests that there is no problem with it and that what is 
lacking is, in one way or another, not central to the debate going on here. Scholem's main 
169 Cf. Billig's analysis ofProtagoras' "if you like" in his dialogue with Socrates and later on his conunents 
on Noam Chomsky's role in the Faurisson-affair (1996: 54-55, 251).) 
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and normative charge is reformulated thereby as something not at all essential m 
constructive terms to the current debate. 
Moreover, professing her complete lack of knowledge Arendt not only challenges 
the importance of the concept but also affirms actually the observation of Scholem that 
there is "little trace" of Ahabath Israel in her. "You are quite right", as Arendt says; that 
is, she literally and pointedly agrees on this important point which was carefully and 
emphatically fashioned as a moral breach and as the cause for the book's immorality in 
Scholem's account. Surely, in the rhetorical context of the debate this "agreement" is 
actually the sign that they disagree just about everything (cf. Lynch and Bogen, 1996: 
171). 
Scholem's remark about the lack of Ahabath Israel, as analysed at length in the 
chapter 5, was not a simple descriptive statement, carrying in it some truth-value. It was a 
recognisable rhetorical act, that is, action done by words. And as an action it was 
certainly an implicit reprehension and a call for its opposite: the request or even the 
imperative to display Ahabath Israel.· Consequently, Arendt's agreement rhetorically 
does not in the first place affirm the descriptive-constative statement. Its upshot is the 
opposite, since while it "agrees" with the explicit content, its "literal" recapitulating of 
Scholem's stance indicates a straightforward and full-scale opposition to his implicit 
message and to the rhetorical-prescriptive side of the original utterance. This firm 
disagreement with the implicit, rhetorical meaning, and the prescriptive aspect of 
Scholem's utterance is further enhanced by the words "indeed" (1. 250) and, earlier, 
"quite" (1. 246) in Arendt's answer. Hers is the right and, in fact, the only appropriate 
orientation. Hence, what was fashioned from one side as a moral charge is countered 
from the other as a credo. 170 
To sum up, Arendt's rhetoric has thus far indicated that instead of conformation, 
confrontation is to come; instead of adopting Scholem's discourse and adapting to it, she 
will take up and challenge it as a whole. She has no argument to appease him, no 
17° Cf. "The rejection ofthe two attitudes- pleading innocent or pleading guilty- amounts to a rejection of 
the moral accusation device, since they are the two possible programmes often accused in that device[ ... ] 
The suspicion of the denunciator not only prepares the rejection of the accusation, it opens the space for a 
redefinition of who the denunciator 'really' is" (Widmer, 2002: 124). See also Lynch and Bogen 
(1996:11 0-111) for the strategy ofrecontextualising a potentially damaging attribution as praise. 
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rhetorical move to soften her position in retrospect. No "mitigation" (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987), no "defensive detailing" (Drew, 1998), no "preference for agreement" 
(Pomerantz, 1984) is going on. Not even tricky "concessions" (Antaki and Wetherell, 
1999) are on offer. 
The "what you call" phrase, the quotation marks with which Scholem's "loves" 
were presented, the displayed complete lack of knowledge, and the enthusiastic 
affirmation of what had been constructed by Scholem as a moral breach are all rhetorical 
tools in reconstructing the participants' disagreement being not about a simple statement. 
The disagreement is about what this statement means and entails; about the discursive 
context that would give meaning and value to this statement. That Scholem's ''point" is 
the centre of the debate is solely by dint of their evaluations differing fundamentally as to 
this ''point"; that is, by being capable of exposing their fundamentally different 
standpoints. Thus, it is "spirit of contradiction" (Billig, 1996) that prevails. 
Having analysed all these indications of a confrontation, let us, then, have a look 
in the following on the ensuing clash itself. How is Ahabath Israel reconstructed by 
Arendt in substance? And what is it that she finds so problematic in it that would warrant 
a counter-critique and the confrontation of values? How is, briefly, a shift accomplished 
from Arendt's activity and self-justification to that of Scholem - and his moral 
implication? 
7.3.2. From Ahabath to Love: the reconstruction of a call for chauvinism 
It is Arendt's engagement with Ahabath Israel that is to be analysed here in this 
subsection. It is an engagement, to be sure, that might turn out to be the cornerstone of a 
final and ultimate disengagement, just as Arendt indicated throughout her virtually 
complete dissatisfaction with Scholem's standards. How are, however, those standards 
reconstructed here and what is it that Arendt takes to be Ahabath Israel? The 
reconstruction already starts with Arendt's, formally, private inquiry. 
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Extract 7.4. 
244 [ ... ] (Incidentally, I would be very grateful if you could tell me since 
245 when this concept has played a role in Judaism, when it was first used in 
246 Hebrew language and literature, etc.)[ ... ] 
As already noted, Arendt appears to profess her complete lack of knowledge of 
the concept in this utterance. She was taken thereby to imply the irrelevance of the 
concept in constructive terms to the debate. There is, however, surely more to this. At the 
very least, this utterance is a request to learn more about the concept and an inquiry into 
it. Thus, it is of importance that displaying her lack of knowledge in the most scientific 
and historical kind of inquiry, Arendt not only constitutes a context where this lack of 
knowledge is treated as a matter of course, but also highlights implicitly the relevance 
and significance of the concept in question in the realm of knowledge and cognition. It is, 
in brief, not (or should not be) a concept of practical importance in the first place but an 
object of cognition. Something that should be studied and inspected rather than (or 
before) actually lived. From Arendt's standpoint, which is marked by a scientific and 
historic curiosity (that is, by an intellectual orientation), the proper place of Ahabath 
Israel is therefore not so much in the realm of a way of life, of practice but primarily in 
the realm of criticism, of theory, at least as far as its present relevance is concerned. 
Arendt, thus, advocates the inherently discontinuous position of the "critic" to 
scrutinise, rather than automatically adopt concepts of practical relevance of calls to lead 
our lives in certain ways. Calls, however, that Scholem performed, objects that he did not 
scrutinise. Had it been otherwise, there would be no necessity for Arendt here to perform 
her inquiry whereby hinting at the utterance that Scholem should have made, the 
approach he should have adopted with regard to Ahabath Israel. 
This reconstruction of their respective approaches and the implied divergence 
between them is but the first step on the road. Being wary of concepts from the past and 
of adopting a way of life might be an advisable position. What is, however, the warrant 
for its relevance in this particular case? The critical attitude that Arendt seems to be 
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adopting will surely not in itself do in illegitimating the concept and its embrace. 
Similarly, it does not entail the actual primacy of a reflective and critical stance towards it 
against a practical adoption of it as a way of life. What is the danger? What is the reason 
for the confrontation Arendt suggested earlier? Arendt has to spell out her actual 
problems with the concept and Scholem's call for it. They come immediately after the 
brackets. 
Extract 7.5. 
246 [ ... ] You are quite right - I am not 
247 moved by any "love" of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in 
248 my life "loved" any people or collective - neither the German people, 
249 nor the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of 
250 that sort. I indeed love "only'' my friends and the only kind of love I 
251 know of and believe in is the love of persons. Secondly, this "love of the 
252 Jews" would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something 
253 rather suspect. I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part 
254 and parcel of my own person. [ ... ] 
Arendt explicitly spells out her "reasons" for adopting the stance with which 
Scholem charges her here. Formally, her statements merely seem to be simple personal 
ones about un-discussable and incomparable private features. It is her introducing 
affirmation ("You are quite right") that explicitly puts her subsequent ideas into 
confrontation with Scholem's reconstructed charge, however. As already noted above, to 
come up after a complaint or accusation with the firm affirmation of the reprehended 
position does not primarily orient to the original complaint in a factual manner to display 
personal consent. Rather, in emphasising and reflexively affirming Arendt's own stance 
these ''private" statements are to construct the normative and thereby public counter-
ground, which should be attained by anyone. Thus, though Arendt literally tells us what 
she does not love and whom she does, what she rhetorically does is instructing us what 
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ought not to be loved and who ought to be. 171 These statements are, thus, not private 
matters but public examples. It is not despite of but through them that we have to 
decipher what Arendt finds enormously problematic in Scholem's Ahabath Israel. 
Let us first observe, however, that Arendt's construction not only re- or counter-
evaluates Scholem's utterances, not only reflects on something that is merely already 
given but again and again re-constructs those very claims. In her examples, Arendt 
completely ignores Ahabath Israel, the idiom, and uses exclusively the "love of the 
Jewish people" version, the syntagm. There is no attention at all paid to the original 
Hebrew concept, embedded in "the Jewish tradition" and, likewise, there is no surrogate 
translation here either. Ahabath Israel can be without any problem transferred from one 
culture to another and mean nonetheless the same. Or, more precisely, it can perhaps be 
transferred from "the Jewish tradition" to the German/English language to assess what it 
really means. Here, we arrive at two distinctly Western categories from the Hebrew 
idiom: the secular public-political entity (Jewish people) from Israel and a Western 
private-emotional concept (Love) from Ahabath. It is this formulation that makes it 
possible both to evaluate the connection between the object (people) and the p·redicament 
(I love) and to compare this particular syntagm with different ones with the same 
structure. Hence, to treat "love of the Jewish people" as a surface actualisation of the 
root-phrase, "I love you" .172 
As far as this "root-phrase" is concerned, Arendt broadly refers to two 
possibilities. It is the noted two sorts of "loves" that we encounter, a legitimate and 
desirable sort that Arendt affirms and which she presents without quotation marks, and 
the illegitimate and suspicious sort, suspended by the quotation marks. As to the former, 
we learn that the only objects Arendt loves are friends whereby she constructs the proper 
place of love only in private, intimate, face-to-face relationships. By consequence, of the 
objects- "peoples"- that Arendt does not love and no one presumably should, it is their 
171 Cf. "Personal feelings and impressions are often expressed as widely shared value judgments" 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971: 179). 
172 Before we cry orientalist, however, let us not forget that it was Scholem and not Arendt first, who 
translated the concept. His rhetoric to the contrary, he had no problem with the translation; no problem with 
mistranslating the Israel part to ''the Jewish people"; no problem to use Israel instead of the available 
Yisrael in the idiom; and no problem to use words such as uheartless" and "Herzenstakt" to effectively 
suggest continuity instead of discontinuity. See my argumentation in chapter 5. 
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aspect of collectives that is implied to be relevant. The hint, then, is that what Scholem 
requests here is a collective emotion. 
Whether or not that is a shattering verdict in itself, we shall move on to 
investigate the actual candidates for this sort of suspicious "love". The German, French 
and American peoples are, first, the ones amongst which Arendt spent her life. The 
message, therefore, appears to be that one should not generalise from his/her own life 
experience on the public-political platform. Secondly, however, the inclusion of the 
"working class" (1. 249) explicitly lends a further aspect to these collectives. Since the 
notion "love of the working class" arguably invokes the political position of the extreme 
left, of communism, it inevitably ''politicises" those "loves" of the American, German, 
French (and, by analogy, Jewish) peoples as well. They will be read as particular 
examples of right wing politics. What is suggested here, therefore, is not merely that 
Scholem expects her to display emotions towards collectivities, but to let her private 
feelings into the public-political to inform her political allegiances. 
All of this may be true, but would hardly sound convincing, however. That is, 
Arendt would perhaps be right on a theoretical level but could still be far removed from 
reality, where any sort of politician could spell out his/her love towards anything and 
without much further dangerous consequences. Arendt would in fact sound quite 
theoretical, quite abstract, and quite didactical. Had she, that is, not introduced the 
"German people" (1. 248). The self-love of the German people brings her arguments as 
down to Earth as they can get. What in the American and the French cases were scenarios 
that one cannot easily pin down historically or politically, in that of the Germans is one 
all-powerful reminder on the quasi-egoistic, racist self-love and the collective 
irrationalism of Nazi Germany. 
Although Arendt certainly does not claim that the "love of German people" would 
equal Nazism and even less so that the "love" of the Jewish!French etc. people would, 
she does indeed imply that what Scholem requested in his letter was essentially a political 
path that had once already concluded in the gas chambers. It is, therefore, not merely that 
what was constructed a "concept" and an instance or metonym of practical "knowledge" 
was reconstructed - or, rather, unmasked - as an object of cognition, of theoretical and 
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critical knowledge. Rather, that it was but an instance of quasi-racism and collective 
irrationalism. While Scholem, at appearance, presented a solemn call or loving duty, 
. Arendt represents it as being on the path of political extremism. Hardly any more serious 
counter-charge is imaginable. 
In these passages, then, Arendt justified her previously implied stance that 
Scholem's "concept" should be approached with a cautious, critical eye. The "concept" 
itself and the orientation it informed were reconstructed as manifesting tendencies of 
collective irrationalism and egoistic, racist self-love. This practice can certainly be taken 
once again as the mirror image of Scholem's rhetorical acts, coupling the process of 
accounting with an implicit but extremely serious allegation and thereby not so much 
accounting for the position of her correspondent as illegitimating it. 
From the address "dear Gerhard", we have arrived to the uncovering of a quasi-
racist, quasi-chauvinistic call of collective irrationalism. Reprehensible as such a call was 
reconstructed to be, it is still left for us to recover the roots of such a call, however. What, 
namely, is the "ideology'' that manifested itself in such a call? What is it that those "many 
people in Zionist circles", misguided or otherwise, became adherent to, and - to 
paraphrase the classic again -"how is it" (I. 50) that "dear Gerhard" adopted what was 
implied to be a quasi-racist position? These will be the topics of the next subsection. 
7.3.3. The leap of chauvinism: the ideology of religious Zionism 
This subsection, then, is to deal with the origin of Scholem's request of Ahabath 
Israel. As, in Arendt's text at least, such a call betrayed or masked a quasi-racist attitude, 
it is of the utmost importance where Arendt might locate it. What is that "ideology" that 
speaks this language and whose language Gershom Scholem speaks? 
Such a task is especially daunting that Scholem himself, as analysed in chapter 5, 
did not offer a clue as to where such logic would come from, apart from implying the call 
being "Jewish". Hence, without explicitly identifying Ahabath Israel with the Jewish 
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people, without explicitly claiming that opposing this concept one would oppose the 
people as such, the implied thrust of the ''un-specification" of the concept accomplished 
nevertheless precisely that. Such a construction implied, furthermore, that the moment 
Arendt disengages from or criticises Ahabath Israel, she disengages from and criticises in 
effect the Jewish people in toto. 
Thus, as long as Ahabath Israel is something integral to the Jewish tradition and 
remains undistinguishable from the Jewish people, its criticism is on dangerous and 
possibly self-defeating grounds.173 No surprise, then, that Arendt quickly counters such 
rhetoric and its diffuse localisation. If we recall for a last time her notions presented 
within brackets "(Incidentally[ ... ]" -I. 244-246), a contrastive rhetoric can be observed. 
While Scholem spoke about "the Jewish tradition" as the background of the concept 
suggesting an ever-present consideration and hence both the virtual unity of past and 
present, and "the Jewish people" represented by Ahabath Israel, Arendt inquires as to the 
"first" occurrence and introduction of this concept to "Judaism" (1. 245). Thus, she 
rhetorically severs the concept from the Jewish tradition or Judaism as such. Inquiring 
about the "first" occurrence, this invocation of temporality questions implicitly the role 
and relevance of the concept as it removes Scholem's implied "eternal" bond between 
Ahabath Israel and the Jewish tradition or Judaism. They are not the same. There is 
Jewish tradition without Ahabath Israel then and, theoretically, now. One does not need 
Ahabath Israel in order to be Jewish. Rather, specific interests, specific purposes in 
specific circumstances make one reach for it. 
To remember, such an act of distancing and isolating has been a consistent 
rhetorical effort in Arendt's text at other points as well. Thus, Arendt did imply that what 
she is confronting is not the Jewish people and, consequently, not some sort of Jewish 
stance as such, but the "Jewish 'establishment"'; that is, a mere subgroup and its "sub-
thought" within those. Though there is an obvious connection between the Jews and the 
"Jewish 'establishment"' they are not merely different, but the quotation marks indicate 
that there is even something illegitimate, suspicious, well, not kosher about that 
173 Reicher and Hopkins (1996, 200Ja) make the point that politicians, even of allegedly non-nationalistic 
orientation, typically construct the largest possible ingroup as their natural allies. In the sphere of traditional 
party politics, it is inevitably that of the nation. On the rhetoric of inclusion see, furthermore, Reicher et al. 
(2006) 
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"'establishment"'. Thus, it is not just that the "'establishment'" obviously does not equal 
the Jews; it does not personify the category and is not to be taken to speak in its name 
either - whatever the '"establishment's"' claims might be to the contrary. Likewise, 
being practised in "Zionist circles", though the "ideology" that Scholem's "mysterious" 
interpretative practice finally came down clearly had something to do with Zionism, it did 
not equal it. 
However, if Ahabath Israel is but one concept in the ocean of Judaism, if it is by 
no means "the Jewish people" but the "Jewish 'establishment"', and if it is not Zionism 
as such but an "ideological" degeneration within it; there are certain questions to be 
asked, then. What, namely, are that group (the "'establishment"') and what is the 
"ideology", which present themselves as the sole legitimate representatives of "the 
Jewish people? What is behind the "mask" of the intellectual, the loving critique? Who is 
using or, rather, abusing Ahabath Israel? 
As to this problem, let us consider the utterance with which Arendt immediately 
follows up her two "reasons": 
Extract 7. 6. 
242 [ ... ] let me tell you of a 
243 conversation I had in Israel with a prominent political personality who 
244 was defending the - in my opinion disastrous - non-separation of 
245 religion and state in Israel. What he said - I am not sure of the exact 
246 words any more - ran something like this: "You will understand that, as 
247 a Socialist, I, of course, do not believe in God; I believe in the Jewish 
248 people." I found this a shocking statement and, being too shocked, I did 
249 not reply at the time. But I could have answered: the greatness of this 
250 people was once that it believed in God, and believed in Him in such a 
251 way that its trust and love towards Him was greater than its fear. And 
252 now this people believes only in itself? What good can come out of 
253 that? -Well, in this sense I do not "love" the Jews, nor do I "believe" in 
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254 them; I merely belong to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or 
255 argument. 
256 [ ... ] 
This personal "conversation" is with obvious significance for the exchange itself 
and as to Scholem's opinion. The way Arendt finishes her story equals the Jewish 
people's "belief' in "itself' (which was the politician's point or request) with the Jewish 
people's "love" in themselves, which was Scholem 's point and request. In this way, the 
position and the argument against that Israeli politician might vicariously be read as the 
position and argument against Scholem, especially that Arendt makes it relevant that she 
did not come upon an answer then. That is, she virtually carries on the conversation and 
finding it relevant to answer it here and now to Scholem, she places him implicitly in the 
respective position of the former participant. As such, even if the actual conversation's 
first part took place historically with the politician, it is Gershom Scholem that is 
constructed rhetorically as the actual or virtual participant in that conversation. 
Even more so that Arendt's rhetoric is to play down the importance and thereby 
the historic singularity of that actual past conversation. Let us note first, that Arendt did 
not even bother herself to name the actual-historical participant.174 This suggests yet 
again that the identity of that historical conversationalist is not important beyond the fact 
that she or he was a politician, that is, someone whose point of view is important as far as 
the policies of the state are concerned. What is of importance is the point of view, not the 
scene as an exact historical one. Moreover, Arendt further blurs the distinction between 
that once-happened past, the "historical conversation", and the present by putting the 
exact wording into irrelevance. The point is certainly not whether she is being honest or 
dishonest when claiming to be unable to "recall", but that thereby she rhetorically makes 
his otherwise unverifiable "exact words" of no significance. Thus, Arendt's construction 
174 Moreover, this politician was (contraJy to what the personal pronoun indicates) Golda Meir. See Young-
Bruehl (2004: 332-333). Cf. "Yesterday, I was invited to meet Golda Meir, snfwe quarrelled until one in 
the morning- but without falling out, since she's American- it was almost amicable. The issues-
basically the question of constitution, the separation of church and state, the banning of mixed marriages 
along the lines of the existing Nuremberg Laws, in part quite outrageous" (Arendt and Bliicher, 1996: 361 ). 
(Israel, to this day, does not have a written constitution. Cf. Avishai, 2002) 
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suggests that it is not the actual historical conversation that matters. Neither is it the exact 
wording. It is not that situation that matters. This one is "that", Her dispute is with 
Scholem as the politician's position is implied to be that of Scholem. 
It is in this regard that the topic of the "conversation" is of highest importance. It 
is assigned to "the - in my opinion disastrous - non-separation of religion and state" (I. 
244-245), where the other participant of the conversation wishes to defend this view. 
Separation of religion and state, the sacred and the public-political is a ''matter-of-fact 
bedrock" of any post-Enlightenment, secular democracy. Indeed, as Arendt states 
elsewhere, the secular achievement.175 What she highlights in the line of defence of that 
"disastrous" "non-separation" is that certain concepts, feelings, and attitudes that once 
had been directed ultimately to the highest Being and thereby constituted absolute, non-
disputable values - i.e. "to believe" and "to love" (1. 253) - are now redirected to a 
supposedly non-sacred and non-absolute entity. That is, to the state and the people. 
Concepts that were used in the language game of the Absolute are transferred to a 
language game of a secular-relative kind, yet retain their absolute claims. In her view, 
such a move is certainly illegitimate. Secular politics means first and foremost to discard 
the absolute entity and it is only through this that the process of rational (whatever that 
might be) deliberation can obtain its place in the practice of liberal democracies. It is one 
thing to believe in God (even that, we have to note, is described with the past tense in her 
formulation) and quite another to believe in a people and thereby endow it with sacred, 
un-criticisable qualities. What Arendt's ultimate concern is, thus, is a concept's path from 
one vocabulary or language game to quite another: from an absolute and sacred to a 
relative and secular; from absolute love towards the Highest Being to racist and egoistic 
self-love of a people. 
If my interpretation as to the rhetorical meaning of this recalled "conversation" to 
the whole exchange is acceptable, it helps us then to reconstruct Arendt's way of 
conceptualising the whole dispute with Scholem. It tells us what that group is that lets 
175 
"( ... ] secularization as a tangible historical event means no more than separation of Church and State, of 
religion and politics, and this, from a religious viewpoint, implies a return to the early Christian attitude of 
'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's' rather than a loss 
offaith and transcendence or a new and emphatic interest in the things of this world" (Arendt, 1998: 253). 
Cf. Arendt, 1994c; Rorty, 1999. 
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Ahabath Israel into the political realm and unwittingly degenerate to simple racism, and 
it tells us what that group is whose "ideology" accounts for the ''mysterious" and 
''puzzling" interpretations of Scholem. It is an essentially religious Zionist political 
stance. Neither the politician, nor Scholem realise that the moment Ahabath Israel enters 
that realm of secular politics, it is not Ahabath Israel anymore but a quasi-racist call of 
"love of the Jewish people". 
As is clear now, there is indeed agreement between the participants that Ahabath 
Israel constitutes the centre of the debate. However, what was a normative call for 
authentic representation in Scholem's text is a manifestation of a religious Zionist 
masquerading of a quasi-racist ideology in Arendt's. 
As I maintained throughout, Arendt produced a mirror image of Scholem's 
construction. It was not merely that she reconstructed a misreading and the background 
assumptions of that misreading, not merely that the misreading turned thus out to be 
(im)morally motivated. On the top of all this, Arendt traced all these phenomena back to 
a basic mindset: accounting for Scholem's text hence meant uncovering the basis of 
Scholem's political and moral position. 
In one respect, however, that image in the mirror is still incomplete. What 
Scholem's critique came eventually down to was a subject position with regard to the 
Jewish people. Such an aspect of the problem prompts, on one hand, the question of 
where the "independent" thinker, the critique stands and who· s/he stands for. And for 
whom, one asks on the other hand, the religious Zionist. Who does the former feel 
threatened by the impending disaster? How is it that the latter did not realise it? 
7.4. Being Used by or Abusing Ahabath Israel: From Ideology to Rhetoric and 
Back 
What is to be analysed now is Arendt's conclusion to the topic of Ahabath Israel. 
In the paragraph that immediately succeeds the previous one Arendt explicitly proposes 
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to discuss the issue in "political terms", promising whereby the expounding of "the love 
of the Jewish people" as well as her counter to it as political positions. 
Extract 7. 7. 
269 We could discuss the same issue in political terms; and we should then 
270 be driven to a consideration of patriotism. That there can be no 
271 patriotism without permanent opposition and criticism is no doubt 
272 common ground between us. But I can admit to you something beyond 
273 that, namely, that wrong done by my own people naturally grieves me 
274 more than wrong done by other peoples. This grief, however, in my 
275 opinion is not for display, even if it should be the innermost motive for 
276 certain actions or attitudes. Generally speaking, the role of the "heart" in 
277 politics seems to me altogether questionable. You know as well as I how 
278 often those who merely report certain unpleasant facts are accused of 
279 lack of soul, lack of heart, or lack of what you call Herzenstakt. We both 
280 know, in other words, how often these emotions are used in order to 
281 conceal factual truth. I cannot discuss here what happens when emotions 
282 are displayed in public and become a factor in political affairs; but it is 
283 an important subject, and I have attempted to describe the disastrous 
284 results in my book On Revolution in discussing the role of compassion 
285 in the formation of the revolutionary character. 
286 [ ... ] 
Again, we have to face that this paragraph is ambiguous in many respects. For one 
thing, Arendt appears to start here with the appropriation of the venerable position one 
can adopt with regard to its people or nation: patriotism. As has been remarked by many 
scholars of the topic, patriotism is often invoked, explicitly or implicitly, to advocate a 
positive affiliation to the people or the nation, yet one that is in contrast to the likes of 
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nationalism and chauvinism.176 The implied difference is patriotism's alleged "positive 
attachment" towards one's nation (or people), in contrast to negative feelings and 
hostility against out-groups that, in addition, characterise nationalism and chauvinism. 
Hence, regardless of the actual scientific validity of this distinction, it would be 
reasonable to suppose that Arendt invokes here "patriotism" precisely to oppose it to its 
vicious and outwardly destructive dialogical counter-parts (nationalism or chauvinism or 
tribalism), so as to contrast her own position with that ofScholem. 
Things are not, however, that simple. To start with, we do not learn much here 
about this ''patriotism". It might stand for the positive and opposing value to Ahabath 
Israel but, in any case, it is not made explicit by Arendt. Nor is the connection between 
her subject position and "patriotism" clear at all and there is no explicit ground in this 
utterance to prove that she constructs herself here as a "patriot". Moreover, her 
construction of Jewishness as a given rather than a made, her tagging this construction 
''pre-political" as well as her remark just before the utterance dealt with here "I merely 
belong to them [i.e .. to the Jewish people] as a matter of course, beyond dispute or 
argument" (1. 266-267), appear even to exclude any political stance with regard to the 
"Jewish people".177 
Yet, again, the way Arendt continues betrays both a certain connection to 
''patriotism" as well as to its value. Namely, the personal "confession" that "wrong done 
by my own people naturally grieves me more" (I. 273) echoes the notion of ''permanent 
opposition and criticism" (1. 271 ), which was constructed to be the literal sine qua non of 
''patriotism". Arendt does not specify the nature of that "opposition" and it is left in 
ambiguity whether it is inside or just outside of that political position.178 But the point of 
importance is not this either. On one hand, it is this unspecified and vague "opposition" 
that guarantees the very existence of that political stance of "patriotism". On the other, 
one can suppose that the lack of ''patriotism" would not mean the immediate and neutral 
176 See Bar-Tal, 1993; Mummendy et al., 2001. For criticism of the dichotomy see Billig, 1995; Condor, 
2001. 
177 As noted in chapter 2, Arendt was more outspoken about her belonging in a political sense in her earlier 
writings and did even call herself a "patriot". Cf. Arendt, 2007: 169, 171, etc. 
178 Again, in some of her essays in the 1940s, Arendt was explicit as to where this opposition belongs and 
to what it contributes to. Cf. "Every believer of democratic government knows the importance of loyal 
opposition" (Arendt, 1978e: 184). 
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vanishing of that political position. Rather, its immediate degeneration and relapse into 
something like an atavistic and chauvinistic political position. Why is there the need for 
that ''permanent opposition and criticism" and why the normative stance of permanent 
"grief' otherwise?179 Therefore, though we are acquainted neither with a clear sense of 
this ''patriotism", nor with that of Arendt's position with regard to that, the threat of its 
absence or degeneration can nevertheless be assessed. There is no patriotism without 
dissent, and there is a "disastrous" remainder one can imagine without patriotism. 
Where does this, however, leave Scholem? Is his approach of Ahabath Israel an 
instance of "patriotism" or not? This question is only partly disingenuous and fake-naive. 
Albeit Arendt's downright opposition to the call for a "love of the Jewish people" and her 
likening it to the egoistic racist self-love of "the German people" make him hardly a 
convincing candidate, interestingly enough, Arendt's statement as to the indispensability 
of ''permanent opposition" for ''patriotism" is bolstered by what is constructed to be 
Scholem's explicit involvement. Arendt characterises her position as being "no doubt 
common ground between us" (1. 271-272). Furthermore, the same agreement is imagined 
to Arendt's assertion of the second half of the paragraph, describing the danger in certain 
acts as "you know as well" (1. 277) and "we both know" (1. 279-280). 
Constructing this consensus, Arendt certainly once again presents her own 
position as a reasonable one. We do not know what "patriotism" here might be conceived 
of, but it can nevertheless be presumed to be a reasonable, constructive thing. We do not 
know, what and where "permanent opposition" might be, but we do know that Arendt's 
stance is indispensable for it. As she does not expound either of these concepts, 
rhetorically speaking it is the construction of consensus that does the job. 
Yet, to achieve consensus and reasonability, it would not have been necessary to 
single out Scholem's affirmation. The universal "we" would have certainly been enough. 
The constant and explicit inclusion of Scholem in making these statements shifts 
therefore the emphasis from these positions being reasonable positions to them being 
179 Again, I take the utterance "wrong done by my own people naturally grieves me more than wrong done 
by other peoples" normative, rather than just private and personal because of the use of"naturally". The 
necessity this adverb communicates cannot conceivably be biological. Just as with Arendt's "personal" 
examples of whom she loves and whom she does not, therefore, this statement reveals what every relevant 
person in question ought to do. 
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Scholem 's positions. It is, thus, not merely that Arendt makes reasonable statements. It is, 
emphatically, that they are Scholem 's (or "dear Gerhard's") convictions as well. 
All the more it is striking, then, that it is this very position and this very 
conviction that Scholem in practice is constructed to have transgressed in the selfsame 
moment/line: 
Extract 7. 8. 
277 [ ... ]You know as well as I how often those who merely report certain 
278 unpleasant facts are accused of lack of soul, lack of heart, or lack of 
279 what you call Herzenstakt. We both know, in other words, how often 
280 these emotions are used in order to conceal factual truth. [ ... ] 
Even though Arendt uses the general subject to describe the acts of those who 
"accuse" and aspire to "conceal factual truth" (1. 280), the acts performed by this general 
and implied "them" are clearly the ones that were performed by Scholem. "Lack of heart" 
(1. 278) is an inevitable hint to "heartlessness" (1. 55) and "Herzenstakt" (1. 73 and 279) is 
the exact word Scholem used. Even if he "knows" (1. 277), then, his acts transgress and 
contradict that "knowledge". It is the appearance-reality device that has surfaced here 
again as the reasonable Scholem, that is, the one that is on the " common ground between 
with us" - who knows "as well as I" and whom ''we both now" with - is immediately 
contrasted here by an unreasonable one, who appears to contravene the very content of 
that "knowledge" and "common ground". 
Nevertheless, what has happened here is more than a simple reminder of 
Scholem's call of Ahabath Israel and the implied quasi-racist tendencies in it. While 
Ahabath Israel has already been introduced by Arendt, actions such as "accusation" (I. 
278) and "concealing" (1. 280) have not. This state of affairs signals a conceptual change. 
Until this point, Ahabath Israel has been treated, at worst, as an "emotion" or an 
''ideology" that "has become" intolerant to any diversion from its "beaten track" and 
hence caused Scholem's "misunderstanding". As is demonstrated in Arendt's comments 
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on her own "grief', however, she does not conceive of "emotions" as private entities of 
interest. "Grief' (as well as "love", one supposes) can be an "innermost motive" but it 
must not be displayed in public (I. 274-276). To quote from the relevant passages of On 
Revolution: "To bring the 'irrationality' of desires and emotions under the control of 
rationality was, of course, a thought dear to the Enlightenment, and as such was quickly 
found wanting in many respects, especially in its facile and superficial equation of 
thought with reason and of reason with rationality'' (Arendt, 1990: 95). The concern, 
therefore, is not with "emotions" ("ideologies", interests, motives etc.) per se, and not 
any more (or not primarily) why Scholem was overcome by "emotions", "ideologies", 
however "dark" or racist they may be. Rather, why and for what purpose he uses them. 
Such a re-conceptualisation of the main concern leads to two subsequent 
entailments. First, as damaging as Arendt's analogy of the "love" of the "German people" 
was, it only depicted a situation that exposed the political-moral position of someone that 
was for some unknown reason - by chance, necessity or somehow by deliberation: we 
could not know- overcome by collective emotions, ideology, convictions. Explicitly, it is 
some "larger-than-life" forces that were on display, not the persons. However, by 
locating the field of contest in the public (discourse), instead of the private (thought), by 
continuing in the letter"[ ... ] when emotions are displayed in public[ ... ]" (I. 281-282), it 
is an explicit agent and an action that have been constructed by Arendt. One is not merely 
overcome by emotions; one "uses" them. Thereby, it is one's· political and moral 
responsibility that becomes the heart of the matter. The emphasis therefore is not on 
Scholem having been "influenced" (whereby the political-moral responsibility would 
mostly be shifted to the '"establishment"') but that it is him that "accuses", him that 
"conceals" , him that "manipulates" rather than being influenced by manipulation, and 
him that causes "misunderstanding" rather than being the victim of a "campaign". 
Yet, it is not him. He, after all, "knows" as well as Arendt (I. 277). It is those 
"who accuse with Jack of Herzenstakt" (1. 277) 
However, we must not neglect the second aspect of the shift from "emotions" as 
private qualities to "emotions" as rhetorical tools either. What are the likes of Ahabath 
Israel aimed at? What are they "used" for? To return to our question posed in the 
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beginning of this chapter: what does that "independence" and what that "ideology'' stand 
for? However vicious and reprehensible that quasi-racist "ideology'' of religious Zionism 
was implied to be, what it did not question was the positive attitude Scholem's call for 
Ahabath Israel expressed towards the in-group, towards the Jewish people, that is. Little 
wonder. How on Earth could "love" not be benevolent to its object? True, it might 
neglect the out-group. It might be downright hostile to them but its main concern is, 
nevertheless, the in-group. It is here that we encounter the main conundrum. 
For regardless whether Arendt or Scholem are themselves in fact patriots, the 
main point here is that Arendt's projected approach was depicted as the sine qua non of 
"patriotism", while Scholem's circle uses of"emotions" is about to destroy it. Those who 
"accuse of lack of soul, lack of heart or lack of [ ... ] Herzenstakt" others that "merely 
report certain unpleasant facts", those who use "these emotions [ ... ] in order to conceal 
factual truth" (I. 277-281) will clearly not tolerate any sort of "opposition", let alone a 
"permanent" one (I. 271 ). Those who use these emotional concepts as rhetorical tools will 
not simply be hostile to the "out-group" but will aim at stifling internal dissent and 
thereby destroying patriotism. 
The fundamental conflict is therefore not being conceptualised here by Arendt as 
primarily a ·conflict between "human" and "Jewish" interests. While she contests 
Scholem's standard and does not hesitate to reject the authority of Ahabath Israel, she 
does accept the field of interest (that of the Jewish people) and does not claim to serve 
other, let alone higher ones. Thus, the political position expressed by the call for Ahabath 
Israel is not so much treated here as an inwardly comforting, outwardly aggressive 
ideology, but one whose main attempt is to silence dissent and to achieve uniformity 
within the ranks. What this "ideology'' of religious Zionism does is not the retention of 
the authenticity, the recovery of the spirit and protection the soul of Judaism. It simply 
exploits what once used to be a religion, to advance and make un-criticisable its own 
political ends. Instead of solemnity, the use of such concepts merely masks not only an 
essentially racist enterprise but also a downright totalitarian one that - far from 
embracing ''the Jewish people" in effect -is the enemy of ''patriotism" and, one should 
concede, of that very Jewish people itself. 
227 
"Dear Gerhard", then, appears to be all but gone. Though no conclusive answer 
can be given as to Scholem's subject position, Arendt's is a rather desperate picture. He 
might just have been overcome, "influenced" (I. 290) and ''manipulated" (I. 293). But 
there is simply not a single positive action in Arendt's letter that would distinguish him 
from the '"establishment"'. An '"establishment"' that, to be sure, speaks not for the Jews 
but against them. Who will speak for the Jews? That must be the "independent" thinker. 
That s/he does not claim to do so should not embarrass our judgment. After all, the 
'"establishment"' derived its authority from its "love" of the community. Yet, that 
authority was used in order to choke that community. The "independent" thinker surely 
cannot be expected to outbid the '"establishment"' in its rhetoric and to answer, ''No, we 
love the Jewish people!"180 The invocation and the rhetorical endearment of the 
collective, s/he would feel immediately corrupting. Nevertheless, that independence of 
hers/his is less of the philosopher than, say, that of ''the reporters, the historians, and 
finally the poets" (Arendt, 1978g: 276). Not that it is without thinking-qualities, of 
course. But it primarily characterises a person who is amidst the cave, within its people, 
rather than under the sun and separated from them. 
His/her concerns are with that of the cave and her people dwelling in it. Fiat 
veritas, et pereat mundus, slhe does not say.181 
7.6. Conclusion 
The mirror image has thus been accomplished. Intriguingly, the concerns of our 
participants were the same, while pointing to diametrically opposite directions. Thus, 
though Arendt claimed not to "love" the Jewish people and unmasked such a call as a 
180 Legend has it that "on one occasion[ ... ] when Ahad Ha-Am met [Max] Nordau in this life, Nordau 
asked: 'Are you a Zionist, or not?' and Ahad Ha·Am replied: 'I am a Zionist', with the emphasis on the 
first personal pronoun" (Translator's introduction to Ahad Ha'Am [1970]). 
181 Latin proverb: Let justice be done though the world may perish. 
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demand for Jack of criticism/dissent, her "naturally" felt "grief' could have just as well 
branded as love. Indeed, having categorically rejected love, she finishes the paragraph: 
"Well, in this sense I do not 'love' the Jews, nor do I 'believe' in them; I merely belong 
to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or argument" (1. 265-267). In this sense, she 
does not. In what sense does she? 
That "grief', moreover, constituted the political position of ''patriotism", which, 
again, Arendt did not claim to be her own. "Opposition", "independence", differing 
"opinions" were never explicitly tied to the interest of the Jewish people or to Zionism. 
Yet, just as without explicitly claiming to do so Arendt turned out to speak for the 
"simple Jews", her rhetoric - regardless of its actual veridicality- ended up attacking the 
religious Zionist ideology of the '"establishment"' for the position of the patriot. 
The intellectual, then, did not betray Rationality, Reason, Humanity, or the likes. 
The secular revolution means discarding God in questions of politics, not merely 
replacing him. What was betrayed was his/her community. Yet again, not that it is the 
proper kind of love that is needed. That, presumably, s/he would feel immediately 
corrupting. Loyalty is shown, rather than claimed. Just as in the parabola on Kurt 
Blumenfeld: 
Extract 7.9. 
225 [ ... ] There is such a thing as a basic 
226 gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and was 
227 not, could not be, made; for things that are physei and not nomo. To be 
228 sure, such an attitude is pre-political, but in exceptional circumstances -
229 such as the circumstances of Jewish politics - it is bound to have also 
230 political consequences though, as it were, in a negative way. This 
231 attitude makes certain types of behavior impossible - indeed precisely 
232 those which you chose to read into my considerations. (To give another 
234 example: In his obituary of Kurt Blumenfeld, Ben-Gurion expressed his 
235 regret that Blumenfeld had not seen fit to change his name when he 
236 came to live in Israel. Isn't it obvious that Blumenfeld did not do so for 
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237 exactly the same reasons that had led him in his youth to become a 
238 Zionist?)[ ... ] 
This is the parabola of independence and, surprisingly perhaps, of Zionism. The 
"authentic" (Ben-Gurion's position) is presented here as a mere facade, a mere 
appearance and the reality (Blumenfeld's position) as something counter-intuitive and 
non-conformist. Whether such could possibly be, a "reason" to become Zionist might 
seem rather incredible. Whether one can be a Jewish patriot or just, in certain 
circumstances, a "simple Jew" on that basis might make one lament. In any case, "dear 
Gerhard" changed his name: Gershom, by the way, originally meaning "I have been a 
stranger in a foreign land" (Exodus, 2:22). We are at home, then, somewhere. 
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8. Conclusion 
We are certainly not home, as yet. 
Up to now I have attempted to present the arguments of the participants and 
resisted from evaluating them. As far as discourse analysis goes, this is to approach 
texts with the celebrated notion of ethnomethodological indifference, where those 
evaluative aspects (i.e. beauty and truth) are completely left to the participants 
themselves. 182 Local constructions of something being true, false, beautiful etc. are 
to be analysed, rather than these judgments "imposed" on participants, according to 
the scientific or moral standards of the analyst. To be sure, as related to in the 
methodological chapter, that indifference in this sense is neither wholly possible, nor 
necessarily desirable. Hence, I would ascertain that to evade explicit acts of 
evaluation here was done merely out of convenience. I did not want to interrupt the 
flow of arguments. 
At this point, however, I do not think that pretending the absolute worth of 
ethnomethodological indifference is useful. What is, namely, an analysis that 
presents us with powerful alternatives in significant questions, and yet does not aim 
at answering who is actually right or, better, what it entails if one of the alternatives 
is right? 
Is Arendt's an essentially anti-Semitic book? And is lack of Ahabath Israel 
(kind of a normative, Jewish way of life) an indication or even a cause of the Jewish 
author being in the state of quasi-pathological, Jewish self-hatred? 
Or, alternatively, is Eichmann in Jerusalem a perfectly moral book? And is 
Scholem's interpretation itselfthe·exploitation of those who really suffered the most, 
in the interest of the "Jewish functionaries"? Is his Ahabath Israel, instead of the 
solemn call of an interpretative community, a rhetorical tool to mask religious 
Zionist ideology and the attempt to choke public dissent and criticism? 
182 For exceptions see footnotes 114, 162, 163, 165 for example. 
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Two things must be perfectly clear. For one thing, one cannot shy away from 
these questions. In a way, they are the crux of the matter and without even raising 
and measuring them the analysis is, at best, incomplete. For another, however, they 
are not easy questions either. What discourse analysis in this thesis did was not 
helping us with easy answers as to who is right but, on the contrary, to appreciate 
how complex exactly the answer to these sorts of questions is. It was pointedly not 
the case that our participants accepted each others' standards upon which we, now, 
could allocate truth and falsity. It was that they contested those very standards and 
this, as the analysis hopefully brought it out, was done not merely in the name of 
truth and falsity, but in that of morality and politics. 
Thus, it is vital to note that for all her efforts to establish it to the contrary, it 
was not the case that Arendt simply unmasked Scholem's acts of interpretations and 
showed that his version - while invoking the idea of the category "the Jews" - was 
but a cover-up for the interests of the "functionaries" at the detriment of the "simple 
Jews". It is not that Arendt's superior knowledge of the concentration camps and the 
ghettos pointed out some epistemological deficiencies in Scholem's construction. 
Arendt's representation of the dividing lines within the Jewish community is no 
more accurate as to the real situation than Scholem's unified description of it. It is 
no more accurate to claim the Shoah being extreme in cases and extreme as such. 
Rather, while Arendt concentrates on, say, sociological and historical 
variables, Scholem concentrates on the fact that, yes, all Jews were essentially meant 
to be dead. Faced with such a choice, it must be acknowledged that it is neither an 
absurdly inaccurate representation of the event, nor a merely immoral one that masks 
the interests of the "functionaries". Taken metaphorically, it is neither absurd, nor 
immoral to talk about every single Jew (functionary or not) as dead and conceive of 
his/her actions within the framework of death. There is no more accuracy in 
analysing their freedom of choice in terms of their sociological status than in 
conferring extremity (and, hence, the irrelevance of freedom of choice) to their 
existential status as Jews-to-die. To evaluate these two constructions, then, the first 
choice that must be made is whether we wish to see those subjects of genocide as 
Jews or as general subjects to certain instances of Nazi policy, and whether it is the 
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Jewish tragedy that we would like to emphasise or that ''totality of the collapse in 
moral standards".183 The latter is not to argue that it is an unimportant aspect of the 
genocide that its victims of this were the Jews. Rather, it is to understand them as not 
being constitutive of the nature of this crime. 
This choice is not easy to arrive at all, especially that it is not made 
unequivocally by the participants either. In one sense or another, Arendt considers 
these subjects' Jewish identity as taken-for-granted in both her book and in the 
correspondence. She nowhere questions that this "identity" was meant to be 
exterminated. Likewise, Scholem's "I was not there" - which is the ultimate 
conclusion of his conceptualisation of the moral status of the subjects as essentially 
dead- should theoretically thwart judging those "saints" and "swines" (1. 208-209) 
that he does judge nonetheless. 
Yet, to concentrate on them being Jews as mostly relevant/constitutive or 
irrelevant of the nature of the matter does result in certain political consequences. 
This can be seen somewhat more clearly in considering the issue of Ahabath Israel. 
To repeat the questions: is Ahabath Israel a legitimate call for a way of life and 
for a Jewish politics? And is the Jew that is not paying honour to it probable to fail from a 
moral point of view? Or is "love of the Jewish people" but a call for chauvinism and a 
mere rhetorical ploy to stifle internal dissent? And is Ahabath Israel simply a rhetorical 
mask on this state of affairs, to abuse the past in order to gain advances in the present? 
Again, these questions come down to the ultimately cultural, moral, and political question 
of who we conceive the subject of these utterances to be. While both participants make 
gestures as to this subject being a Jew and even a Zionist, there are considerable rifts here 
on display. As I noted in the conclusion of chapter 7, commendable as Kurt Blumenfeld's 
(Arendt's ideal Zionist's) independence was, it is hard to see why anyone would become 
a Zionist just because of independence. How would and could anyone conduct Jewish 
183 Not that such choice would make either of the versions spotless. In Arendt's case, the very analogy 
between the "Jewish functionaries" and the "SS-murderers" is begging for account and justification. In 
Scholem's case, what must be accounted for is a bit more intricate. It is his own use of Jew relying and 
mobilising Jewish history and tradition while appropriating the Nazis definition as to who should count as a 
Jew, hence, who should die. Jewish tradition had not much say in it. Moreover, even that Nazi definition 
and verdict was not unequivocal. In practice, who is a Jew, a half-Jew, a quarter-Jew and who of these 
should die (i.e. who is "dead" in Scholem's construction) varied almost from situation to situation and 
presented Nazi policymakers with considerable problems. 
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politics without the use of concepts specific to the adjective (i.e. Jewish) in the 
construction? By the same token, though Scholem undoubtedly concentrated on the 
adjective (Jewish), and at times seemed to present it as entirely immanent and exempt 
from standards not contained already within itself, he himself clearly contradicted this 
very construction. While using Ahabath Israel, there did not seem to be any problem in 
translating it to English/German and using this translation's connotations; and likewise, 
there was no apparent problem with using the German word Herzenstakt elucidating 
aspects of this criticism- an emphatically Jewish criticism. 
And so it should be. One could, after all, claim that for all the efforts to 
establish extremes - the self-contained Jewish politics and the non-Jewish Jewish 
politics -, neither of them can in itself work, not, in any case, without contradicting 
its own definition. This brings us to a problem (the problem more precisely) 
underlying this exchange and spelling out its political consequences. On one hand, it 
concerns the question of where the emphasis should be in Israel being a Jewish 
democracy, if there should be an emphasis at all. On the other, it raises the painful 
question of the Diaspora Jew's relationship to that country (which announces 
him/her to be her automatic/potential citizen) and to the group of the Jews in general 
(to which the ideology of Nazi Germany and/or Jewish tradition allocate him/her so 
single-handedly). 
Again, there are clear-cut answers: one deriving from the complete separation 
of the citizenship/state and religionlethnos and another from the complete or at least 
un-reflected unity of them. Though neither of these principles will do the job in 
itself, let me for once put the emphasis on the importance of choosing one of them. 
Even if they are abstractions or ideals, it does matter which ideal one wishes to 
pursue. 
In relation to this, let me tell of a scene I once thought being the most 
idealistic at the time I encountered. A friend of mine -having survived the Holocaust 
in the ghetto of Budapest as a baby, he immigrated to Israel in the 1970s and opted 
subsequently then to live in the Netherlands - told me of an imagined Israeli Jew 
wandering somewhere abroad. Presented with an option, he naturally chooses the 
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companionship of a country-mate of his (an Arab, of course), instead of a stranger 
from a country he never heard of and with whom no language, no religion and no 
history(!) binds him together. (A Jew, certainly.) 
The lesson seemed to be (meant to be) clear and idealistic, as it surely is. It 
would envisage a country that belongs to its citizens, rather than to just one ethnic 
group within (or beyond!) its boundaries. It would prevent cultural or religious 
problems intruding into the realms of politics and the Jaw. Leaving everything else 
aside, however, more and more I found myself thinking about the very simple 
question of what, according to this cheerful scenario, would happen to the third 
person. Who is s/he supposed to talk? Who would listen to his/her dysfunctional, 
catastrophic memories? No one, of course. This is just as well to say that politics is 
better off without anachronistic identities and catastrophic memories. 
That third person will hopefully understand this and somehow dissipate from 
the scene smoothly. 184 In the cheerful march of progress, there is no place for even a 
streak of elegia. 
184 If they let him/her, that is. 
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Appendix 
"Eichmann in Jerusalem"- An Exchange of Letters between 
Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt185 
1 Jerusalem, June 23, 1963 
2 
3 DEAR HANNAH, 
4 
5 Six weeks have passed since I received your book on the Eichmann 
6 trial; and, if I write belatedly, it is because only now do I have the 
7 leisure to devote myself to a proper study of it. I have not, let me say, 
8 gone into the question of the factual and historical authenticity of the 
9 various statements you make. To judge by your treatment of those 
10 aspects of the problem with which I happen to be familiar, however, I 
11 fear that your book is not free of error and distortion. Still, I have no 
12 doubt that the question of the book's factual authenticity will be taken 
13 up by other critics - of whom there will be many - and it is not in any 
14 case central to the critique I wish to offer here. 
15 Your book moves between two poles: the Jews and their bearing in the 
16 days of catastrophe, and the responsibility of Adolf Eichmann. I have 
17 devoted, as you know, a good part of my time to a consideration of the 
18 case of the Jews, and I have studied a not insignificant volume of 
185 The exchange was originally published in the Encounter magazine (January, 1964) and reprinted in 
Arendt (1978: 240-251). The present version is the line-by-line transcription of the latter except for the date 
"1391" (instead of 1931, see Arendt (1978: 241) in line 32. The reasons for this see in fn. 101. 
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19 material on the subject. I am well aware, in common with every other 
20 spectator of the events, how complex and serious, how little reducible or 
21 transparent, the whole problem is. I am aware that there are aspects of 
22 Jewish history (and for more than forty years I have concerned myself 
23 with little else) which are beyond our comprehension; on the one hand, 
24 a devotion to the things of this world that is near-demonic; on the other, 
25 a fundamental uncertainty of orientation in this world - an uncertainty 
26 which must be contrasted with that certainty of the believer concerning 
27 which, alas, your book has so little to report. There has been weakness, 
28 too, though weakness so entwined with heroism that it is not easily 
29 unravelled; wretchedness and power-lust are also to be found there. But 
30 these things have always existed, and it would be remarkable indeed if, 
31 in the days of catastrophe, they were not to make their appearance once 
32 again. Thus it was in the year of 1391, at the beginning of that 
33 generation of catastrophe; and so it has been in our own time. The 
34 discussion of these matters is, I believe, both legitimate and unavoidable 
35 - although I do not believe that our generation is in a position to pass 
36 any kind of historical judgment. We lack the necessary perspective, 
37 which alone makes some sort of objectivity possible- and we cannot 
38 but lack it. 
39 
40 Nevertheless, we cannot put these questions aside. There is the question 
41 thrown at us by the new youth of Israel: why did they allow themselves 
42 to be slaughtered? As a question, it seems to me to have a profound 
43 justification; and I see no readily formulated answer to it. At each 
44 decisive juncture, however, your book speaks only of the weakness of 
45 the Jewish stance in the world. I am ready enough to admit this 
46 weakness; but you put such emphasis upon it that, in my view, your 
4 7 account ceases to be objective and acquires overtones of malice. The 
48 problem, I have admitted, is real enough. Why, then, should your book 
49 leave one with so strong a sensation of bitterness and shame - not for 
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50 the compilation, but for the compiler? How is it that your version of the 
51 events so often seems to come between us and the events- events which 
52 you rightly urge upon our attention? Insofar as I have an answer, it is 
53 one which, precisely out of my deep respect for you, I dare not suppress; 
54 and it is an answer that goes to the root of our disagreement. It is that 
55 heartless, frequently almost sneering and malicious tone with which 
56 these matters, touching the very quick of our life, are treated in your 
57 book to which I take exception. 
58 In the Jewish tradition there is a concept, hard to define and yet concrete 
59 enough, which we know as Ahabath Israel: "Love of the Jewish 
60 people .... " In you, dear Hannah, as in so many intellectuals who came 
6 I from the German Left, I find little trace of it. A discussion such as is 
62 attempted in your book would seem to me to require - you will forgive 
63 my mode of expression- the most old-fashioned, the most circumspect, 
64 the most exacting treatment possible - precisely because of the feelings 
65 aroused by this matter, this matter of the destruction of one-third of our 
66 people - and I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no 
67 other way. Thus I have little sympathy with that tone - well expressed 
68 by the English word "flippancy" - which you employ so often in the 
69 course of your book. To the matter of which you speak it is 
71 unimaginable inappropriate. In circumstance such as these, would there 
72 not have been a place for what I can only describe with that modest 
73 German word- "Herzenstakt"? You may laugh at the word although I 
74 hope you do not for I mean it seriously. Of the many examples I came 
75 upon in your book - and came upon not without pain - non expresses 
76 better what I mean than your quotation (taken over without comment 
77 from a Nazi source!) about the traffic with the armbands with the Star of 
78 David in the Warsaw Ghetto, or the sentence about Leo Baeck "who in 
79 the eyes of both Jews and Gentiles was the 'Jewish Fiihrer' .... "The use 
80 of the Nazi term in this context is sufficiently revealing. You do not 
81 speak, say, of the "Jewish leader," which would have been both apt and 
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82 free of the German word's horrific connotation - you say precisely the 
83 thing that is most false and most insulting. For nobody of whom I have 
84 heard or read was Leo Baeck- whom we both knew- ever a "Filhrer" 
85 in the sense which you here insinuate to the reader. I too have read 
86 Adler's book about Theresienstadt. It is a book about which a great 
87 many things could be said. But it was not my impression that the author 
88 - who speaks of some people of whom I have heard quite different 
89 accounts, with considerable harshness - it was not my impression that 
90 Adler ever spoke of Baeck in this fashion, either directly or indirectly. 
91 Certainly, the record of our people's suffering is burdened with a 
92 number of questionable figures who deserve, or have received, their just 
93 punishment: how could it have been otherwise in a tragedy on so 
94 terrible a scale? To speak of all . this, however, in so wholly 
95 inappropriate a tone - to the benefit of those Germans in condemning 
96 whom your book rises to greater eloquence than in mourning the fate of 
97 your own people - this is not the way to approach the scene of that 
98 tragedy. 
99 
I 00 In your treatment of the problem of how the Jews reacted to these 
101 extreme circumstances- to which neither of us was exposed- I detect, 
102 often enough, in place of balanced judgment, a kind of demagogic will-
! 03 to-overstatement. Which of us can say today what decisions the elders 
104 of the Jews - or whatever we choose to call them - ought to have 
I 05 arrived at in the circumstances? I have not read less than you have about 
I 06 these matters, and I am still not certain; but your analysis does not give 
I 07 me confidence that your certainty is better founded than my uncertainty. 
108 There were the Judenriite, for example; some among them were swine, 
I 09 others were saints. I have read a great deal about both varieties. There 
110 were among them also many people in no way different from ourselves, 
111 who were compelled to make terrible decisions in circumstances that we 
112 cannot even begin to reproduce or reconstruct. I do not know whether 
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113 they were right or wrong. Nor do I presume to judge. I was not there. 
114 Certainly, there were people in Theresienstadt - as every former inmate 
115 can confirm - whose conduct is deserving of the severest judgment. But 
116 in case after case we find that the individual verdict varies. Why was 
117 Paul Epstein, one of these "questionable figures," shot by the Nazis for 
118 example? You give no reason. Yet the reason is clear enough: he had 
119 done precisely that which according to you he could afford to do 
120 without serious danger - he told people in Theresienstadt what awaited 
121 them at Auschwitz. Yet he was shot twenty-four hours later. 
122 Nevertheless, your thesis that these machinations of the Nazis served in 
123 some way to blur the distinction between torturer and victim - a thesis 
124 which you employ to belabor the prosecution in the Eichmann trial -
125 seems to me wholly false and tendentious. In the camps, human beings 
126 were systematically degraded; they were, as you say, compelled to 
127 participate in their own extermination, and to assist in the execution of 
128 fellow-prisoners. Is the distinction between torturer and victim thereby 
129 blurred? What perversity! We are asked, it appears, to confess that the 
130 Jews, too, had their "share" in the acts of genocide. That is a typical 
131 quaternio terminorum. 
132 Recently, I have been reading about a book, written during the days of 
133 catastrophe in full consciousness of what lay ahead, by Rabbi Moses 
134 Chaim Lau of Piotrkov. This rabbi attempted to define as precisely as 
135 possible what was the duty of the Jew in such extremities. Much that I 
136 read on this moving and terrible book- and it does not stand alone- is 
137 congruent with your general thesis (though not with your tone). But 
138 nowhere in your book do you make plain how many Jews there were 
139 who acted as they did in full consciousness of what awaited them. The 
140 Rabbi in question went with his flock to Treblinka- although he had 
141 previously called on them to run away, and his flock has called on him 
142 to do likewise. The heroism of the Jews was not always the heroism of 
143 the warrior; nor have we always been ashamed of that fact. I cannot 
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144 refute those who say that the Jews deserved their fate, because they did 
145 not take earlier steps to defend themselves, because they were cowardly, 
146 etc. I came across this argument only recently in a book by that honest 
147 Jewish anti-semite, Kurt Tucho1sky. I cannot express myself, of course, 
148 with Kurt Tucholsky's eloquence, but I cannot deny that he was right: if 
149 all the Jews had run away - in particular, to Palestine - more Jews 
150 would have remained alive. Whether, in view of the special 
151 circumstances of Jewish history and Jewish life, that would have been 
152 possible, and whether it implies a historical share of guilt in Hitler's 
153 crime, is another question. 
154 I shall say nothing concerning that other central question of your book: 
155 the guilt, or the degree of guilt, of Adolf Eichrnann. I have read both the 
156 text of the judgement delivered by the Court, and the version you 
157 substituted for it in your book. I fmd that of the Court rather more 
158 convincing. Your judgment appears to me to be based on a prodigious 
159 non sequitur. Your argument would apply equally to those hundreds of 
160 thousands, perhaps millions of human beings, to whom your final 
161 sentence is relevant. It is the final sentence that contains the reason why 
162 Eichrnann ought to be hanged, for in the remainder of your text you 
163 argue in detail your view - which I do not share - that the prosecution 
164 did not succeed in proving what it had set out to prove. As far as that 
165 goes, I may mention that, in addition to putting my name to a letter to 
166 the President of Israel pleading for the execution not to be carried out, I 
167 set out a Hebrew essay why I held the execution of the sentence -which 
168 Eichrnann had in every sense, including that of the prosecution, 
169 deserved - to be historically wrong, precisely because of our historical 
170 relationship with the German people. I shall not argue the case again 
171 here. I wish to say only that your description ofEichrnann as a "convert 
172 to Zionism" could only come from somebody who had a profound 
173 dislike of everything to do with Zionism. These passages in your book I 
174 find quite impossible to take seriously. They amount to a mockery of 
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175 Zionism; and I am forced to the conclusion that this was, indeed, your 
176 intention. Let us not pursue the point. 
177 After reading your book I remain unconvinced by your thesis 
178 concerning the "banality of evil"- a thesis which, if your sub-title is to 
179 be believed, underlies your entire argument. This new thesis strikes me 
180 as a catchword: it does not impress me, certainly, as the product of 
181 profound analysis- an analysis such as you gave us so convincingly, in 
182 the service of a quite different, indeed contradictory thesis in your book 
183 on totalitarianism. At that time you had not yet made your discovery, 
184 apparently, that evil is banal. Of that "radical evil," to which your then 
185 analysis bore such eloquent and erudite witness, nothing remains but 
186 this slogan - to be more than that it would have to be investigated, at a 
187 serious level, as a relevant concept in moral philosophy or political 
188 ethics. I am sorry- and I say this I think, in a candor and in no spirit of 
189 enmity- that I am unable to take the thesis of your book more seriously. 
190 I had expected, with your earlier book in mind, something different. 
191 
192 GERSHOM SCHOLEM 
193 
194 
195 
196 New York City, July 24, 1963 
197 DEAR GERHARD, 
198 
199 I found your letter when I got back home a week ago. You know what 
200 it's like when one has been away for five months. I'm writing now in 
201 the first quiet moment I have; hence, my reply may not be as elaborate 
202 as perhaps it should be. 
203 There are certain statements m your letter which are not open to 
204 controversy, because they are simply false. Let me deal with them first 
206 so that we can proceed to matters which merit discussion. 
242 
207 I am not one of the "intellectuals who come from the German Left." 
208 You could not have known this, since we did not know each other when 
209 we were young. It is a fact of which I am in no way particularly proud 
210 and which I am somewhat reluctant to emphasize- especially since the 
211 McCarthy era in this country. I came late to an understanding of Marx's 
212 importance because I was interested neither in history nor in politics 
213 when I was young. If I can be said to "have come from anywhere," it is 
214 from the tradition of German philosophy. 
215 As to another statement of yours, I am unfortunately not able to say that 
216 you could not have known the facts. I found it puzzling that you should 
217 write "I regard you wholly as a daughter of our people, and in no other 
218 way." The truth is I have never pretended to be anything else or to be in 
219 any way other that I am, and I have never even felt tempted in that 
220 direction. It would have been like saying that I was a man and not a 
221 woman- that is to say, kind of insane. I know, of course, that there is a 
222 "Jewish problem" even on this level, but it has never been my problem 
223 -not even in my childhood. I have always regarded my Jewishness as 
224 one of the indisputable factual data of my life, and I have never had the 
225 wish to change or disclaim facts of this kind. There is such a thing as a 
226 basic gratitude for everything that is as it is; for what has been given and 
227 was not, could not be, made; for things that are physei and not nomo. To 
228 be sure, such an attitude is pre-political, but in exceptional 
229 circumstances - such as the circumstances of Jewish politics - it is 
230 bound to have also political consequences though, as it were, in a 
231 negative way. This attitude makes certain types of behavior impossible 
232 - indeed precisely those which you chose to read into my 
234 considerations. (To give another example: In his obituary of Kurt 
235 Blumenfeld, Ben-Gurion expressed his regret that Blumenfeld had not 
236 seen fit to change his name when he came to live in Israel. Isn't it 
237 obvious that Blumenfeld did not do so for exactly the same reasons that 
238 had led him in his youth to become a Zionist?) My stand in these 
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239 matters must surely have been known to you and it is incomprehensible 
240 to me why you should wish to stick a label on me which never fitted in 
241 the past and does not fit now. 
242 To come to the point: let me begin, going on from what I have just 
243 
stated, with what you call "love of the Jewish people" or Ahabath 
244 Israel. (Incidentally, I would be very grateful if you could tell me since 
245 
when this concept has played a role in Judaism, when it was first used in 
246 Hebrew language and literature, etc.) You are quite right - I am not 
247 
moved by any "love" of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in 
248 
my life "loved" any people or collective - neither the German people, 
249 
nor the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of 
250 that sort. I indeed love "only'' my friends and the only kind of love I 
251 know of and believe in is the love of persons. Secondly, this "love of the 
252 Jews" would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something 
253 
rather suspect. I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part 
254 
and parcel of my own person. To clarify this, let me tell you of a 
255 
conversation I had in Israel with a prominent political personality who 
256 d " d' th . . . d' . f was e1en mg e - m my opm10n tsastrous - non-separatiOn o 
257 
religion and state in Israel. What he said - I am not sure of the exact 
258 
words any more - ran something like this: "You will understand that, as 
259 
260 
a Socialist, I, of course, do not believe in God; I believe in the Jewish 
people." I found this a shocking statement and, being too shocked, I did 
261 
not reply at the time. But I could have answered: the greatness of this 
262 people was once that it believed in God, and believed in Him in such a 
263 
way that its trust and love towards Him was greater than its fear. And 
264 
now this people believes only in itself? What good can come out of 
265 that?- Well, in this sense I do not "love" the Jews, nor do I "believe" in 
266 them; I merely belong to them as a matter of course, beyond dispute or 
267 
argument. 
268 
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269 We could discuss the same issue in political terms; and we should then 
270 be driven to a consideration of patriotism. That there can be no 
271 . . "th . . d . . . . d b patnotlsm WI out permanent opposition an cnt1c1sm IS no ou t 
272 
common ground between us. But I can admit to you something beyond 
273 that, namely, that wrong done by my own people naturally grieves me 
274 
more than wrong done by other peoples. This grief, however, in my 
275 · · · " di I "f. h Id b th . . " opm10n IS not 10r sp ay, even 1 1t s ou e e mnermost motive 10r 
276 
certain actions or attitudes. Generally speaking, the role of the "heart" in 
277 politics seems to me altogether questionable. You know as well as I how 
278 
often those who merely report certain unpleasant facts are accused of 
279 lack of soul, lack of heart, or lack of what you call Herzenstakt. We both 
280 know, in other words, how often these emotions are used in order to 
281 
conceal factual truth. I cannot discuss here what happens when emotions 
282 
are displayed in public and become a factor in political affairs; but it is 
283 
an important subject, and I have attempted to describe the disastrous 
284 
results in my book On Revolution in discussing the role of compassion 
285 in the formation of the revolutionary character. 
286 
287 It is a pity that you did not read the book before the present campaign of 
288 misrepresentation against it got under way from the side of the Jewish 
289 "establishment" in Israel and America. There are, unfortunately, very 
290 few people who are able to withstand the influence of such campaigns. 
291 It seems to me highly unlikely that without being influenced you could 
292 possibly have misunderstood certain statements. Public opinion, 
293 especially when it has been carefully manipulated, as in this case, is a 
294 very powerful thing. Thus, I never made Eichmann out to be a 
295 "Zionist." If you missed the irony of the sentence- which was plainly in 
296 oratio obliqua, reporting Eichmann's own words- I really can't help it. 
297 I can assure you that none of dozens of readers who read the book 
298 before publication head ever any doubt about the matter. Further, I 
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299 never asked why the Jews "let themselves to be killed." On the contrary, 
300 I accused Hausner of having posed this question to witness after 
301 witness. There was no people and no group in Europe which reacted 
302 differently under the immediate pressure of terror. The question I raised 
303 was that of the cooperation of Jewish functionaries during the "Final 
304 Solution," and this question is so very uncomfortable because one 
305 cannot claim that they were traitors. (There were traitors too, but that is 
306 irrelevant.) In other words, until 1939 and even until 1941, whatever 
307 Jewish functionaries did or did not do is understandable and excusable. 
308 Only later does it become highly problematical. This issue came up 
309 during the trial and it was of course my duty to report it. This constitutes 
310 our part of the so-called "unmastered past," and although you may be 
311 right that it is too early for a "balanced judgment" (though I doubt this), 
312 I do believe that we shall only come to terms with this past if we begin 
313 to judge and to be frank about it. 
314 I have made my own position plain, and yet it is obvious that you did 
315 not understand it. I said that there was no possibility of resistance, but 
316 there existed the possibility of doing nothing. And in order to do 
317 nothing, one did not need to be a saint, one needed only to say: "I am 
318 just a simple Jew, and I have no desire to play any other role." Whether 
319 these people or some of them, as you indicate, deserved to be hanged is 
320 an altogether different question. What needs to be discussed are not the 
321 people so much as the arguments with which they justified themselves 
322 in their own eyes and in those of others. Concerning these arguments we 
323 are entitled to pass judgment. Moreover, we should not forget that we 
324 are dealing here with conditions which were terrible and desperate 
325 enough, but which were not the conditions of concentration camps. 
326 These decisions were made in an atmosphere of terror but not under the 
327 immediate pressure and impact of terror. These are important 
328 differences in degree, which every student oftotalitarianism must know 
329 and take into account. These people had still a certain, limited freedom 
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330 of decision and of action. Just as the SS murderers also possessed, as we 
331 now know, a limited choice of alternatives. They could say: "I wish to 
332 be relieved of my murderous duties," and nothing happened to them. 
333 Since we are dealing in politics with men, and not with heroes or saints, 
334 it is this possibility of "nonparticiation" (Kirchheimer) that is decisive if 
335 we begin to judge, not the system, but the individual, his choices and his 
336 arguments. 
337 
338 And the Eichmann trial was concerned with an individual. In my report 
339 I have only spoken of things which came up during the trial itself. It is 
340 for this reason that I could not mention the "saints" about whom you 
341 speak. Instead I had to limit myself to the resistance fighters whose 
342 behaviour, as I said, was the more admirable because it occurred under 
343 circumstances in which resistance had really ceased to be possible. 
344 There were no saints among the witnesses for the prosecution but there 
345 was one utterly pure human being, old Grynszpan, whose testimony I 
346 · therefore reported at some length. On the German side, after all, one 
347 could also have mentioned more than the single case of sergeant 
348 Schmidt. But since his was the also case mentioned in the trial, I had to 
349 restrict myself to it. 
350 That the distinction between victims and persecutors was blurred in the 
351 concentration camps, deliberately and with calculation, is well known, 
352 and I as well as others have insisted on this aspect of totalitarian 
353 methods. But to repeat: this is not what I mean by a Jewish share in the 
354 guilt, or by the totality of the collapse of all standards. This was part of 
355 the system and had indeed nothing to do with Jews. 
356 How you could believe that my book was "a mockery of Zionism" 
357 would be a complete mystery to me, if I did not know that many people 
358 in Zionist circles have become incapable of listening to opinions or 
359 arguments which are off the beaten track and not consonant with their 
360 ideology. There are exceptions, and a Zionist friend of mine remarked in 
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361 all innocence that the book, the last chapter in particular (recognition of 
362 the competence of the court, the justification of the kidnapping), was 
363 very pro-Israe1 - as indeed it is. What confuses you is that my 
364 arguments and my approach are different from what you are used to; in 
365 other words, the trouble is that I am independent. By this I mean, on the 
366 one hand, that I do not belong to any organization and always speak 
367 only for myself, and on the other hand, that I have great confidence in 
368 Lessing's se/bstdenken for which, I think, no ideology, no public opinion 
369 and no "convictions" can ever be a substitute. Whatever objections you 
3 70 may have to the results, you won't understand them unless you realize 
371 that they are really my own and nobody else's. 
372 
373 I regret that you did not argue your case against the carrying out of the 
374 death sentence. For I believe that in discussing this question we might 
375 have made some progress in finding out where our most fundamental 
376 differences are located. 
377 You say that it was "historically false," and I feel very uncomfortable 
378 seeing the spectre of History raised in this context. In my opinion, it was 
3 79 politically and juridically (and the last is actually all that mattered) not 
380 only correct - it would have been utterly impossible not to have carried 
381 out the sentence. The only way of avoiding it would have been to accept 
382 Karl Jaspers' suggestion and to hand Eichmann over to the United 
383 Nations. Nobody wanted that, and it was probably not feasible; hence 
384 there was no alternative left but to hang him. Mercy was out of question, 
385 not on juridical grounds - pardon is anyhow not a prerogative of the 
386 juridical system - but because mercy is applicable to the person rather 
387 than to the deed; the act of mercy does not forgive murder but pardons 
388 the murderer insofar as he, as a person, may be more than anything he 
389 ever did. This was not true of Eichmann. And to spare his life without 
390 pardoning him was impossible on juridical grounds. 
391 In conclusion, let me come to the only matter where you have not 
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392 misunderstood me, and where indeed I am glad that you have raised the 
393 point. You are quite right: I changed my mind and do no longer speak of 
394 "radical evil." It is a long time since we last met, or we would perhaps 
395 have spoken about the subject before. (Incidentally, I don't see why you 
396 call my term "banality of evil" a catchword or slogan. As far as I know 
397 no one has used the term before me; but it is unimportant.) It is indeed 
398 my opinion now that evil is never "radical," that it is only extreme, and 
399 that is possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension. It can 
400 overgrow and lay waste the whole world precisely because it spreads 
401 like a fungus on the surface. It is "thought-defying," as I said, because 
402 thought tries to reach some depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it 
403 concerns itself with evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is 
404 its ''banality." Only the good has depth and can be radical. But this is 
405 not the place to go into these matters seriously; I intend to elaborate 
406 them further in a different context. Eichmann may very well remain the 
407 concrete model of what I have to say. 
408 You propose to publish your letter and you ask if I have any objection. 
409 My advice would be not to recast the letter in the third person. The 
410 value of this controversy consists in its epistolary character, namely in 
411 the fact that it is informed by personal friendship. Hence, if you are 
412 prepared to publish my answer simultaneously with your letter, I have 
413 of course no objection. 
414 
415 HANNAH ARENDT 
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